Examining the Relation between the Degree of Central Bank Independence and Its Policy Outcomes;Empirie vztahu mezi mírou nezávislosti centrální banky a výsledky její politiky

Finance a Uver - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance

Volumn 1999, Issue 10, 1999, Pages 565-585

  Kotlán, Viktor ^a,b   Frait, Jan ^b  

^a INSTITUTE FOR EPIDEMIOLOGY AND PATHOGEN DIAGNOSTICS   (Germany)

^b VSB TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY OF OSTRAVA   (Czech Republic)

Author keywords

(Dis)inflation; Central bank independence; Economic growth

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347628249     PISSN: 00151920     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (44)

1. AKERLOF, G. - DICKENS, W. - PERRY, G. (1996): The Macroeconomics of Low Inflation. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1996, no. 1, pp. 1-76.
2. AL-MAHRUBI, F. - WILLET, T.D. (1995): The Anti-Inflationary Influence of Corporatist Structures and Central Bank Independence: The Importance of Hump Shaped Hypothesis. Public Choice, 1995, no. 84, pp. 153-162.
3. ALESINA, A. - SUMMERS, L.H. (1993): Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, vol. 25, 1993, no. 2, pp. 151-162.
4. ALESINA, A. (1988): Macroeconomics and Politics. NBER Macroeconomics Annual, Cambridge University Press, 1988.
5. BADE, R. - PARKIN, M. (1982): Central Bank Laws and Inflation - A Comparative Analysis. (Mimeo.) University of Western Ontario, 1982.
6. BALL, L. - MANKIW, N. G. - ROMER, D. (1988): The New Keynesian Economics and the Output-Inflation Trade-Off. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1988, no. 1, pp. 1-65.
7. BLEANY, M. (1996): Central Bank Independence, Wage Bargaining Structure, and Macroeconomic Performance in OECD Countries. Oxford Economic Papers, no. 48, 1996, pp. 20-38.
8. CAMPILLO, M. - MIRON, J. A. (1996): Why Does Inflation Differ Across Countries? NBER Working Paper Series, no. 5540, 1996.
9. CHANG, R. (1998): Policy Credibility and the Design of Central Banks. Economic Review, FRB of Atlanta, First Quarter 1998, pp. 4-15.
10. COOREY, S. - MECAGNI, M. - OFFERDAL, E. (1997): Designing Desinflation Programs in Transition Economies: The Implications of Relative Price Adjustment. IMF Paper on Policy Analysis and Assessment, PPAA/97/1, February 1997.
11. CUKIERMAN, A. - KALAITZIDAKIS, P. - SUMMERS, L. H. - WEBB, S. B. (1993): Central Bank Independence, Growth, Investment, and Real Rates. Carnegie-Rochester Series on Public Policy, no. 39, 1993, pp. 95-140.
12. CUKIERMAN, A. - WEBB, S. B. (1995): Political Influence on the Central Bank: International Evidence. The World Bank Economic Review, vol. 9, no. 3, 1995, pp. 397-423.
13. CUKIERMAN, A. (1992): Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence. MIT Press, 1992.
14. DE LONG, J. B. - SUMMERS, L. H. (1992): Macroeconomic Policy and Long-Run Growth. In.: Policies for Long-Run Growth. Proceedings of a symposium sponsored by The Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, August 1992.
15. EIJFFINGER, S. C. W. - HAAN, J. D. (1996): The Political Economy of Central Bank Independence. Special Papers in International Economics, no. 19, Princeton University, 1996.
16. EIJFFINGER, S.C.W. - SCHALING, E. (1993): Central Bank Independence: Theory and Evidence. Center Discussion Paper Series, no. 9325, Tilburg University, 1993.
17. FISCHER, S. (1995): Modern Approaches to Central Banking. NBER Working Paper Series, no. 5064, 1995.
18. FRAIT, J. - ZEDNÍČEK, R. (1996): Časová nekonzistence a cíle měnové politiky. Bankovnictví, 1996, č. 16, ss. 11-13.
19. FRAIT, J. (1998): Makroekonomická politika a dlouhodobý růst v empirických pracich nové teorie růstu. Finance a úv̌r, 48, 1998, č. 7, ss. 431-44.
20. FUHRER, J. C. (1995): The Persistence of Inflation and the Cost of Disinflation. New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Jan./Feb. 1995, pp. 3-16.
21. FUHRER, J.C. (1997): Central Bank Independence and Inflation Targeting: Monetary Policy Paradigms for the Next Millenium? New England Economic Review, FRB of Boston, Jan./Feb. 1997, pp. 19-36.
22. GHOSH, A. - PHILLIPS, S. (1998): Warning: Inflation May Be Harmful to Your Growth. IMF Staff Papers, vol. 45, no. 4, December 1998, pp. 672-710.
23. GRILLI, V. - MASCIANDARO, D. - TABELLINI, G. (1991): Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries. Economic Policy, 13, 1991, pp. 342-376; 383-392.
24. HAAN, J. D. - VAN 'T HAG, G. J. (1995): Variation in Central Bank Independence Across Countries: Some Provisional Empirical Evidence. Public Choice, no. 85, 1995, pp. 335-351.
25. HAIMOWITZ, J. H. (1998): The Longevity of Expansions. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Economic Review, vol. 83, no. 4, 1998, pp. 13-34.
26. HAVRILESKY, T. - GRANATO, J. (1993): Determinants of Inflationary Performance: Corporatist Structures vs. Central Bank Autonomy. Public Choice, no. 76, 1993, pp. 249-261.
27. HOWITT, P. (1990): Zero Inflation as a Long-Term Target for Monetary Policy. In: Lipsey, R. (ed.): Zero Inflation: The Goal of Price Stability. C. D. Howe Institute, 1990.
28. HUH, CH. - LANSING, K. (1997): Expectations, Credibility, and Disinflation in a Small Macroeconomic Model. Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Working Paper, no. 9713, 1997.
29. KOTLÁN, V. (1998): Bank of England v novém hávu. Bankovnictví, 1998, č. 24, ss. 28-29.
30. KOTLÁN, V. a kol. (1999a): Monetární politika. (Skripta.) VŠB-TU Ostrava, 1999.
31. KOTLÁN, V. (1999b): Proč nemáme rádi inflaci? Bankovnictví, 1999, č. 5, ss. 22-23.
32. KRUGMAN, P. (1999): It's back. Japan's slump and the return of the liquidity trap. http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www/, 1999.
33. LOGUE, D. E. - SWEENEY, R. S. (1981): Inflation and Real Growth: Some Empirical Results. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, vol. 13, 1981, no. 4, pp. 497-501.
34. MALINVAUD, E. (1991): Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries - A Discussion. Economic Policy, 13, 1991, pp. 376-379.
35. NĚMCOVÁ, H. (1998): Princip nezávislosti Evropské centrální banky. Bankovnictví, 1998, č. 22, ss. 14-15.
36. PAKKO, M. R. (1998): Shoe-Leather Costs of Inflation and Policy Credibility. FRB of St. Louis, Review, vol. 80, 1998, no. 6, pp. 37-50.
37. POLLARD, P. S. (1993): Central Bank Independence and Economic Performance. Review, FRB of St. Louis, July/August 1993, pp. 21-36.
38. POSEN, A. (1995): Central Bank Independence and Disinflationary Credibility: A Missing Link? FRB of New York, Staff Reports, no. 1, March 1995.
39. RAGAN, Ch. (1998): On the Believable Benefits of Low Inflation. Bank of Canada, Working Paper, 98-15, September 1998.
40. SOUKUP, P. (1998): Měření nezávislosti centrální banky. Bankovnictví, 1998, č. 4, ss. 20-24.
41. SPIEGEL, M. M. (1998): Central Bank Independence and Inflation Expectations: Evidence from British Index-Linked Gilts. Economic Review. FRB of San Francisco, 1998, no. 1, pp. 3-14.
42. SUMMERS, L. (1981): How Should Long-Term Monetary Policy Be Determined? Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 23, 1981, no. 3, pp. 625-631.
43. TOBIN, J. (1972): Inflation and Unemployment. American Economic Review, March 1972, pp. 1-18.
44. WALSH, C. E. (1994): Central Bank Independence and the Costs of Desinflation in the EC. FRB of San Francisco Working Paper, no. 94-04, 1994.