The Role of Randomized Field Trials in Social Science Research: A Perspective from Evaluations of Reforms of Social Welfare Programs

American Behavioral Scientist

Volumn 47, Issue 5, 2004, Pages 506-540

  Moffitt, Robert A ^a  

^a JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Poverty; Program evaluation; Social experimentation; Welfare programs

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347603930     PISSN: 00027642     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0002764203259292     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (44)

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