The impact of board composition and ownership on the nature and outcome of UK takeovers

Corporate Governance: An International Review

Volumn 6, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 92-100

  O'Sullivan, Noel ^a   Wong, Pauline ^b  

^a LOUGHBOROUGH UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Board composition; Managerial ownership; Takeovers

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347573288     PISSN: 09648410     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-8683.00088     Document Type: Article

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