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Volumn 93, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 1215-1238

The censorship of television

(1)  Fiss, Owen M a  

a NONE

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EID: 0347507731     PISSN: 00293571     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (6)

References (81)
  • 1
    • 0347990014 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See NATIONAL TELECOMM. AND INFO. ADMIN., FALLING THROUGH THE NET II: NEW DATA ON THE DIGITAL DIVIDE (1998). Only 18.6% of American households had online access at the time of the study. The "least connected" groups in the United States were the rural poor, rural and central city minorities, young households, and female-headed households. Id. The study also found that the gap in computer ownership levels between higher-income households and lower-income households had expanded significantly in the past three years.
  • 2
  • 3
    • 0347359753 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • id.; CFRA NEWS/TALK RADIO, visited May 19
    • See id.; CFRA NEWS/TALK RADIO, Seinfeld Goes Out on Top, (visited May 19, 1998) 〈http://interactive.cfra.com/1996/05/19/35308.html〉
    • (1998) Seinfeld Goes out on Top
  • 4
    • 0346729367 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • visited June 23, citing NIELSEN MEDIA RESEARCH, supra note 2, putting the number today at 67.5%
    • See Television Bureau of Advertising Online (visited June 23, 1999) 〈http://www.tvb.org/tvfacts/ tvbasics/tv_basics6.html〉 (citing NIELSEN MEDIA RESEARCH, supra note 2), putting the number today at 67.5%.
    • (1999) Television Bureau of Advertising Online
  • 5
    • 0347990015 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • note
    • See RESEARCH & POLICY ANALYSIS DEP'T, NAT'L CABLE TELEVISION ASS'N, CABLE TELEVISION DEVELOPMENTS: INDUSTRY OVERVIEW §§ 1-A, 2-A (Fall 1994) (finding that the percentage of television households with cable television has grown every year in the past two decades).
  • 7
    • 33645110017 scopus 로고
    • New York Times Co. v. United States, the Pentagon Papers case. 8 Cable Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460
    • See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (the Pentagon Papers case). 8 Cable Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460.
    • (1971) U.S. , vol.403 , pp. 713
  • 8
    • 77955348919 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Denver Area Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC
    • Denver Area Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
    • (1996) U.S. , vol.518 , pp. 727
  • 9
    • 0346729369 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id. at 754
    • See id. at 754.
  • 10
    • 0346098775 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id. at 755-60
    • See id. at 755-60.
  • 11
    • 0346098774 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See, e.g., id. at 760
    • See, e.g., id. at 760.
  • 12
    • 0039097850 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The First Amendment is an Absolute
    • See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 263.
    • SUP. CT. REV. , vol.1961 , pp. 245
    • Meiklejohn, A.1
  • 13
    • 33847392784 scopus 로고
    • See Miller v. California
    • See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
    • (1973) U.S. , vol.413 , pp. 15
  • 14
    • 0346729362 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 1
    • See National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168 (1998). Compare OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 27 (1996) [hereinafter IRONY] with Robert Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151 (1996).
    • (1998) S. Ct. , vol.18 , pp. 2168
  • 15
    • 0004188294 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • hereinafter IRONY
    • See National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168 (1998). Compare OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 27 (1996) [hereinafter IRONY] with Robert Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151 (1996).
    • (1996) The Irony of Free Speech , pp. 27
    • Fiss, O.M.1
  • 16
    • 0041157819 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Subsidized Speech
    • See National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168 (1998). Compare OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 27 (1996) [hereinafter IRONY] with Robert Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151 (1996).
    • (1996) Yale L.J. , vol.106 , pp. 151
    • Post, R.1
  • 17
    • 84865192562 scopus 로고
    • See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York
    • See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
    • (1968) U.S. , vol.390 , pp. 629
  • 18
    • 84866305307 scopus 로고
    • See FCC v. Pacifica Found.
    • See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
    • (1978) U.S. , vol.438 , pp. 726
  • 19
    • 84863572580 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
    • (1997) U.S. , vol.521 , pp. 844
  • 20
    • 0346098741 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Denver Area Telecomm. Consortium
    • See Denver Area Telecomm. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 755-59
    • U.S. , vol.518 , pp. 755-759
  • 21
    • 84894999165 scopus 로고
    • 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
    • (1957) U.S. , vol.352 , pp. 380
  • 22
    • 84863886741 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Pacifica
    • See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 726.
    • U.S. , vol.438 , pp. 726
  • 23
    • 0347359745 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id. at 748-49
    • See id. at 748-49.
  • 24
    • 0346098741 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Denver Area Telecomm. Consortium
    • See Denver Area Telecomm. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 744-47, 755-59.
    • U.S. , vol.518 , pp. 744-747
  • 25
    • 0347359748 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id. at 744
    • See id. at 744.
  • 26
    • 79851471418 scopus 로고
    • 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
    • (1984) U.S. , vol.468 , pp. 364
  • 27
    • 0346098741 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Denver Area Telecomm. Consortium
    • See Denver Area Telecomm. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 734-36.
    • U.S. , vol.518 , pp. 734-736
  • 28
    • 0346729366 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 763
    • Id. at 763.
  • 29
    • 0347359749 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id. at 737
    • See id. at 737.
  • 30
    • 0346729358 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id. at 63
    • See id. at 63.
  • 31
    • 0346729363 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id
    • Id.
  • 32
    • 0346727434 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC
    • Whose free speech rights was Breyer protecting? The rights at issue either belong to the programmers who might use public access channels, or to the public in general, which under standard analysis has a First Amendment right to receive information. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). See generally Dana R. Wagner, The First Amendment and the Right To Hear, 108 YALE L.J. 669 (1998). In his dissent in Denver Area, Justice Thomas denied that the public has any independent First Amendment interest in receiving information. Whatever reception right the public might have, according to him, is derived from the rights of those who produce the pertinent information - that is, "speakers" in the more classical sense. See Denver Area Telecomm. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 812-24. Justice Thomas also tried to foreclose the attempt to derive the public's interest from the First Amendment interest of programmers who use the public access channels. In his view, cable operators manage a purely private communication system, and as a result, public access programmers have no First Amendment right to have their shows transmitted by these operators. As he put it, "a programmer is protected in searching for an outlet for cable programming, but has no free-standing First Amendment right to have that programming transmitted." For support he drew an analogy to the physical world: "The author of a book . . . has no right to have the book sold in a particular bookstore without the store owner's consent." Id. Breyer not only disputed Thomas's major premise-that the public has no independent First Amendment interest - but also rejected Thomas's analysis of the property law regime; programmers were not intruding into private property, as Thomas would have us believe, but rather might be seen as using a public easement that government created on or over private property. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 225 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring)(discussed infra note 45). Speaking more generally, I would add that whatever value property rights may have in general in demarcating the proper bounds of First Amendment rights, see OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED 7, 24, 47 (1996), they are of little use here, when we deal with the so-called emerging technologies and there is no settled understanding of who possesses what property rights.
    • (1969) U.S. , vol.395 , pp. 367
  • 33
    • 0346727434 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The First Amendment and the Right to Hear
    • Whose free speech rights was Breyer protecting? The rights at issue either belong to the programmers who might use public access channels, or to the public in general, which under standard analysis has a First Amendment right to receive information. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). See generally Dana R. Wagner, The First Amendment and the Right To Hear, 108 YALE L.J. 669 (1998). In his dissent in Denver Area, Justice Thomas denied that the public has any independent First Amendment interest in receiving information. Whatever reception right the public might have, according to him, is derived from the rights of those who produce the pertinent information - that is, "speakers" in the more classical sense. See Denver Area Telecomm. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 812-24. Justice Thomas also tried to foreclose the attempt to derive the public's interest from the First Amendment interest of programmers who use the public access channels. In his view, cable operators manage a purely private communication system, and as a result, public access programmers have no First Amendment right to have their shows transmitted by these operators. As he put it, "a programmer is protected in searching for an outlet for cable programming, but has no free-standing First Amendment right to have that programming transmitted." For support he drew an analogy to the physical world: "The author of a book . . . has no right to have the book sold in a particular bookstore without the store owner's consent." Id. Breyer not only disputed Thomas's major premise-that the public has no independent First Amendment interest - but also rejected Thomas's analysis of the property law regime; programmers were not intruding into private property, as Thomas would have us believe, but rather might be seen as using a public easement that government created on or over private property. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 225 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring)(discussed infra note 45). Speaking more generally, I would add that whatever value property rights may have in general in demarcating the proper bounds of First Amendment rights, see OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED 7, 24, 47 (1996), they are of little use here, when we deal with the so-called emerging technologies and there is no settled understanding of who possesses what property rights.
    • (1998) Yale L.J. , vol.108 , pp. 669
    • Wagner, D.R.1
  • 34
    • 0346727434 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Denver Area Telecomm. Consortium
    • Whose free speech rights was Breyer protecting? The rights at issue either belong to the programmers who might use public access channels, or to the public in general, which under standard analysis has a First Amendment right to receive information. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). See generally Dana R. Wagner, The First Amendment and the Right To Hear, 108 YALE L.J. 669 (1998). In his dissent in Denver Area, Justice Thomas denied that the public has any independent First Amendment interest in receiving information. Whatever reception right the public might have, according to him, is derived from the rights of those who produce the pertinent information - that is, "speakers" in the more classical sense. See Denver Area Telecomm. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 812-24. Justice Thomas also tried to foreclose the attempt to derive the public's interest from the First Amendment interest of programmers who use the public access channels. In his view, cable operators manage a purely private communication system, and as a result, public access programmers have no First Amendment right to have their shows transmitted by these operators. As he put it, "a programmer is protected in searching for an outlet for cable programming, but has no free-standing First Amendment right to have that programming transmitted." For support he drew an analogy to the physical world: "The author of a book . . . has no right to have the book sold in a particular bookstore without the store owner's consent." Id. Breyer not only disputed Thomas's major premise-that the public has no independent First Amendment interest - but also rejected Thomas's analysis of the property law regime; programmers were not intruding into private property, as Thomas would have us believe, but rather might be seen as using a public easement that government created on or over private property. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 225 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring)(discussed infra note 45). Speaking more generally, I would add that whatever value property rights may have in general in demarcating the proper bounds of First Amendment rights, see OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED 7, 24, 47 (1996), they are of little use here, when we deal with the so-called emerging technologies and there is no settled understanding of who possesses what property rights.
    • U.S. , vol.518 , pp. 812-824
  • 35
    • 0346727434 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, Breyer, J., concurring(discussed infra note 45)
    • Whose free speech rights was Breyer protecting? The rights at issue either belong to the programmers who might use public access channels, or to the public in general, which under standard analysis has a First Amendment right to receive information. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). See generally Dana R. Wagner, The First Amendment and the Right To Hear, 108 YALE L.J. 669 (1998). In his dissent in Denver Area, Justice Thomas denied that the public has any independent First Amendment interest in receiving information. Whatever reception right the public might have, according to him, is derived from the rights of those who produce the pertinent information - that is, "speakers" in the more classical sense. See Denver Area Telecomm. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 812-24. Justice Thomas also tried to foreclose the attempt to derive the public's interest from the First Amendment interest of programmers who use the public access channels. In his view, cable operators manage a purely private communication system, and as a result, public access programmers have no First Amendment right to have their shows transmitted by these operators. As he put it, "a programmer is protected in searching for an outlet for cable programming, but has no free-standing First Amendment right to have that programming transmitted." For support he drew an analogy to the physical world: "The author of a book . . . has no right to have the book sold in a particular bookstore without the store owner's consent." Id. Breyer not only disputed Thomas's major premise-that the public has no independent First Amendment interest - but also rejected Thomas's analysis of the property law regime; programmers were not intruding into private property, as Thomas would have us believe, but rather might be seen as using a public easement that government created on or over private property. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 225 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring)(discussed infra note 45). Speaking more generally, I would add that whatever value property rights may have in general in demarcating the proper bounds of First Amendment rights, see OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED 7, 24, 47 (1996), they are of little use here, when we deal with the so-called emerging technologies and there is no settled understanding of who possesses what property rights.
    • (1997) U.S. , vol.520 , pp. 180
  • 36
    • 0346727434 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Whose free speech rights was Breyer protecting? The rights at issue either belong to the programmers who might use public access channels, or to the public in general, which under standard analysis has a First Amendment right to receive information. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). See generally Dana R. Wagner, The First Amendment and the Right To Hear, 108 YALE L.J. 669 (1998). In his dissent in Denver Area, Justice Thomas denied that the public has any independent First Amendment interest in receiving information. Whatever reception right the public might have, according to him, is derived from the rights of those who produce the pertinent information - that is, "speakers" in the more classical sense. See Denver Area Telecomm. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 812-24. Justice Thomas also tried to foreclose the attempt to derive the public's interest from the First Amendment interest of programmers who use the public access channels. In his view, cable operators manage a purely private communication system, and as a result, public access programmers have no First Amendment right to have their shows transmitted by these operators. As he put it, "a programmer is protected in searching for an outlet for cable programming, but has no free-standing First Amendment right to have that programming transmitted." For support he drew an analogy to the physical world: "The author of a book . . . has no right to have the book sold in a particular bookstore without the store owner's consent." Id. Breyer not only disputed Thomas's major premise-that the public has no independent First Amendment interest - but also rejected Thomas's analysis of the property law regime; programmers were not intruding into private property, as Thomas would have us believe, but rather might be seen as using a public easement that government created on or over private property. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 225 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring)(discussed infra note 45). Speaking more generally, I would add that whatever value property rights may have in general in demarcating the proper bounds of First Amendment rights, see OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED 7, 24, 47 (1996), they are of little use here, when we deal with the so-called emerging technologies and there is no settled understanding of who possesses what property rights.
    • (1996) Liberalism Divided , pp. 7
    • Fiss, O.M.1
  • 37
    • 0347990005 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Denver Area Telecomm. Consortium
    • See Denver Area Telecomm. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 763.
    • U.S. , vol.518 , pp. 763
  • 38
    • 0346680845 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, hereinafter Turner I
    • See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) [hereinafter Turner I].
    • (1994) U.S. , vol.512 , pp. 622
  • 39
    • 80052897999 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, hereinafter Turner II
    • See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) [hereinafter Turner II].
    • (1997) U.S. , vol.520 , pp. 180
  • 40
    • 0347989991 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Denver Area Telecomm. Consortium
    • Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
    • See Denver Area Telecomm. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 780 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
    • U.S. , vol.518 , pp. 780
  • 41
    • 0346098770 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Turner I
    • See Turner I, 512 U.S. at 623; Turner II, 520 U.S. at 189.
    • U.S. , vol.512 , pp. 623
  • 42
    • 80052897999 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Turner II
    • See Turner I, 512 U.S. at 623; Turner II, 520 U.S. at 189.
    • U.S. , vol.520 , pp. 189
  • 43
    • 0347359744 scopus 로고
    • See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, D.D.C. Williams, J., dissenting
    • See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 910 F. Supp. 734, 754 (D.D.C. 1995) (Williams, J., dissenting).
    • (1995) F. Supp. , vol.910 , pp. 734
  • 44
    • 80052897999 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Turner II
    • See Turner II, 520 U.S. at 189.
    • U.S. , vol.520 , pp. 189
  • 45
    • 32144448339 scopus 로고
    • Brandeis, J., concurring
    • 274 U.S. 357, 375-376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
    • (1927) U.S. , vol.274 , pp. 357
  • 46
    • 85024099030 scopus 로고
    • 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
    • (1945) U.S. , vol.326 , pp. 1
  • 47
    • 77954518807 scopus 로고
    • 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
    • (1964) U.S. , vol.376 , pp. 254
  • 48
    • 0346098760 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Turner II, Breyer, J., concurring
    • Turner II, 520 U.S. at 226-27 (Breyer, J., concurring).
    • U.S. , vol.520 , pp. 226-227
  • 49
    • 0347989999 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 227
    • Id. at 227.
  • 50
    • 0347359741 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id.; see supra note 31
    • Id.; see supra note 31.
  • 51
    • 0347989993 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id
    • Id.
  • 52
    • 0347989992 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id.; see also IRONY, supra note 17, at 19
    • Id.; see also IRONY, supra note 17, at 19.
  • 53
    • 0346098749 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Turner II, Breyer, J., concurring
    • See Turner II, 520 U.S. at 227 (Breyer, J., concurring).
    • U.S. , vol.520 , pp. 227
  • 54
    • 0346098753 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id
    • Id.
  • 55
    • 84863968687 scopus 로고
    • Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC
    • Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
    • (1969) U.S. , vol.395 , pp. 367
  • 56
    • 0346680845 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Turner I
    • See Turner I, 512 U.S. at 622.
    • U.S. , vol.512 , pp. 622
  • 57
    • 0346729354 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Turner II, Breyer, J., concurring
    • See Turner II, 520 U.S. at 226-28 (Breyer, J., concurring).
    • U.S. , vol.520 , pp. 226-228
  • 58
    • 0347359685 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 227-28
    • Id. at 227-28.
  • 59
    • 0347989930 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 228
    • Id. at 228.
  • 60
    • 0346098742 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 227-28
    • Id. at 227-28.
  • 61
    • 0345910873 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • 118 S. Ct. 1633 (1998).
    • (1998) S. Ct. , vol.118 , pp. 1633
  • 62
    • 0347989986 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id
    • See id.
  • 63
    • 0347989991 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Denver Area Telecomm. Consortium
    • Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
    • See Denver Area Telecomm. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 780 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
    • U.S. , vol.518 , pp. 780
  • 64
    • 0346098741 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Denver Area Telecomm. Consortium
    • Souter, J., concurring
    • See Denver Area Telecomm. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 774 (Souter, J., concurring).
    • U.S. , vol.518 , pp. 774
  • 65
    • 0346098744 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Turner II, Breyer, J., concurring
    • See Turner II, 520 U.S. at 227-29 (Breyer, J., concurring).
    • U.S. , vol.520 , pp. 227-229
  • 66
    • 0346098741 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Denver Area Telecomm. Consortium
    • See Denver Area Telecomm. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 738-39.
    • U.S. , vol.518 , pp. 738-739
  • 67
    • 0346729346 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Arkansas Educ. Television Comm 'n
    • See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm 'n, 118 S. Ct. at 1637-38.
    • S. Ct. , vol.118 , pp. 1637-1638
  • 68
    • 0347359730 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 1640
    • Id. at 1640.
  • 69
    • 0346729347 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id
    • Id.
  • 70
    • 0346729353 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Silence on the Street Corner
    • supra note 31
    • In other contexts, the Court disaggregated the state among its many functions, and applied a lesser standard, close to the one applied to private entities. For example, the Court curbed political activity on post office sidewalks and in airport terminals, where the state might be thought to be acting as property owner as opposed to sovereign. See OWEN M. FISS, Silence on the Street Corner, in LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 31, at 55-66. In those earlier cases, Justice Kennedy complained about the disaggregation, but in Forbes he reached the same result by rather unconvincingly characterizing the candidate debate on public television as a "non-public forum." See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
    • Liberalism Divided , pp. 55-66
    • Fiss, O.M.1
  • 71
    • 0346098743 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n
    • Stevens, J., dissenting
    • Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, 118 S. Ct. at 1649 n.18 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
    • S. Ct. at , vol.118 , Issue.18 , pp. 1649
  • 72
    • 0346729352 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 1644
    • Id. at 1644.
  • 73
    • 0347359736 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See id at 1647-48
    • See id at 1647-48.
  • 74
    • 0346729351 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Id. at 1649
    • Id. at 1649.
  • 75
    • 84893264817 scopus 로고
    • Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham
    • Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147(1969).
    • (1969) U.S. , vol.394 , pp. 147
  • 76
    • 84905045959 scopus 로고
    • 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
    • (1938) U.S. , vol.303 , pp. 444
  • 77
    • 0346729346 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n
    • Stevens, J., dissenting
    • See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, 118 S. Ct. at 1645 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
    • S. Ct. , vol.118 , pp. 1645
  • 78
    • 33847232410 scopus 로고
    • 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
    • (1961) U.S. , vol.365 , pp. 715
  • 79
    • 84871804167 scopus 로고
    • Shelley v. Kraemer
    • No nexun was present, for instance, in the classic state action case of Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), although Justice Rehnquist insisted upon the existence of such a nexus in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
    • (1948) U.S. , vol.334 , pp. 1
  • 80
    • 84887334884 scopus 로고
    • Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis
    • No nexun was present, for instance, in the classic state action case of Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), although Justice Rehnquist insisted upon the existence of such a nexus in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
    • (1972) U.S. , vol.407 , pp. 163
  • 81
    • 0347989987 scopus 로고
    • Brandeis, J., concurring
    • See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375-376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
    • (1927) U.S. , vol.274 , pp. 375-376
    • Whitney1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.