-
1
-
-
0347990014
-
-
note
-
See NATIONAL TELECOMM. AND INFO. ADMIN., FALLING THROUGH THE NET II: NEW DATA ON THE DIGITAL DIVIDE (1998). Only 18.6% of American households had online access at the time of the study. The "least connected" groups in the United States were the rural poor, rural and central city minorities, young households, and female-headed households. Id. The study also found that the gap in computer ownership levels between higher-income households and lower-income households had expanded significantly in the past three years.
-
-
-
-
2
-
-
0347990016
-
-
See NIELSEN MEDIA RESEARCH, 1998 REPORT ON TELEVISION (1999).
-
(1999)
Report on Television
-
-
-
3
-
-
0347359753
-
-
id.; CFRA NEWS/TALK RADIO, visited May 19
-
See id.; CFRA NEWS/TALK RADIO, Seinfeld Goes Out on Top, (visited May 19, 1998) 〈http://interactive.cfra.com/1996/05/19/35308.html〉
-
(1998)
Seinfeld Goes out on Top
-
-
-
4
-
-
0346729367
-
-
visited June 23, citing NIELSEN MEDIA RESEARCH, supra note 2, putting the number today at 67.5%
-
See Television Bureau of Advertising Online (visited June 23, 1999) 〈http://www.tvb.org/tvfacts/ tvbasics/tv_basics6.html〉 (citing NIELSEN MEDIA RESEARCH, supra note 2), putting the number today at 67.5%.
-
(1999)
Television Bureau of Advertising Online
-
-
-
5
-
-
0347990015
-
-
note
-
See RESEARCH & POLICY ANALYSIS DEP'T, NAT'L CABLE TELEVISION ASS'N, CABLE TELEVISION DEVELOPMENTS: INDUSTRY OVERVIEW §§ 1-A, 2-A (Fall 1994) (finding that the percentage of television households with cable television has grown every year in the past two decades).
-
-
-
-
7
-
-
33645110017
-
-
New York Times Co. v. United States, the Pentagon Papers case. 8 Cable Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460
-
See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (the Pentagon Papers case). 8 Cable Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460.
-
(1971)
U.S.
, vol.403
, pp. 713
-
-
-
8
-
-
77955348919
-
-
Denver Area Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC
-
Denver Area Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
-
(1996)
U.S.
, vol.518
, pp. 727
-
-
-
9
-
-
0346729369
-
-
See id. at 754
-
See id. at 754.
-
-
-
-
10
-
-
0346098775
-
-
See id. at 755-60
-
See id. at 755-60.
-
-
-
-
11
-
-
0346098774
-
-
See, e.g., id. at 760
-
See, e.g., id. at 760.
-
-
-
-
12
-
-
0039097850
-
The First Amendment is an Absolute
-
See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 263.
-
SUP. CT. REV.
, vol.1961
, pp. 245
-
-
Meiklejohn, A.1
-
13
-
-
33847392784
-
-
See Miller v. California
-
See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
-
(1973)
U.S.
, vol.413
, pp. 15
-
-
-
14
-
-
0346729362
-
-
See National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 1
-
See National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168 (1998). Compare OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 27 (1996) [hereinafter IRONY] with Robert Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151 (1996).
-
(1998)
S. Ct.
, vol.18
, pp. 2168
-
-
-
15
-
-
0004188294
-
-
hereinafter IRONY
-
See National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168 (1998). Compare OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 27 (1996) [hereinafter IRONY] with Robert Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151 (1996).
-
(1996)
The Irony of Free Speech
, pp. 27
-
-
Fiss, O.M.1
-
16
-
-
0041157819
-
Subsidized Speech
-
See National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168 (1998). Compare OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 27 (1996) [hereinafter IRONY] with Robert Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151 (1996).
-
(1996)
Yale L.J.
, vol.106
, pp. 151
-
-
Post, R.1
-
17
-
-
84865192562
-
-
See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York
-
See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
-
(1968)
U.S.
, vol.390
, pp. 629
-
-
-
18
-
-
84866305307
-
-
See FCC v. Pacifica Found.
-
See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
-
(1978)
U.S.
, vol.438
, pp. 726
-
-
-
19
-
-
84863572580
-
-
521 U.S. 844 (1997).
-
(1997)
U.S.
, vol.521
, pp. 844
-
-
-
20
-
-
0346098741
-
Denver Area Telecomm. Consortium
-
See Denver Area Telecomm. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 755-59
-
U.S.
, vol.518
, pp. 755-759
-
-
-
21
-
-
84894999165
-
-
352 U.S. 380 (1957).
-
(1957)
U.S.
, vol.352
, pp. 380
-
-
-
22
-
-
84863886741
-
Pacifica
-
See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 726.
-
U.S.
, vol.438
, pp. 726
-
-
-
23
-
-
0347359745
-
-
See id. at 748-49
-
See id. at 748-49.
-
-
-
-
24
-
-
0346098741
-
Denver Area Telecomm. Consortium
-
See Denver Area Telecomm. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 744-47, 755-59.
-
U.S.
, vol.518
, pp. 744-747
-
-
-
25
-
-
0347359748
-
-
See id. at 744
-
See id. at 744.
-
-
-
-
26
-
-
79851471418
-
-
468 U.S. 364 (1984).
-
(1984)
U.S.
, vol.468
, pp. 364
-
-
-
27
-
-
0346098741
-
Denver Area Telecomm. Consortium
-
See Denver Area Telecomm. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 734-36.
-
U.S.
, vol.518
, pp. 734-736
-
-
-
28
-
-
0346729366
-
-
Id. at 763
-
Id. at 763.
-
-
-
-
29
-
-
0347359749
-
-
See id. at 737
-
See id. at 737.
-
-
-
-
30
-
-
0346729358
-
-
See id. at 63
-
See id. at 63.
-
-
-
-
31
-
-
0346729363
-
-
Id
-
Id.
-
-
-
-
32
-
-
0346727434
-
-
Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC
-
Whose free speech rights was Breyer protecting? The rights at issue either belong to the programmers who might use public access channels, or to the public in general, which under standard analysis has a First Amendment right to receive information. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). See generally Dana R. Wagner, The First Amendment and the Right To Hear, 108 YALE L.J. 669 (1998). In his dissent in Denver Area, Justice Thomas denied that the public has any independent First Amendment interest in receiving information. Whatever reception right the public might have, according to him, is derived from the rights of those who produce the pertinent information - that is, "speakers" in the more classical sense. See Denver Area Telecomm. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 812-24. Justice Thomas also tried to foreclose the attempt to derive the public's interest from the First Amendment interest of programmers who use the public access channels. In his view, cable operators manage a purely private communication system, and as a result, public access programmers have no First Amendment right to have their shows transmitted by these operators. As he put it, "a programmer is protected in searching for an outlet for cable programming, but has no free-standing First Amendment right to have that programming transmitted." For support he drew an analogy to the physical world: "The author of a book . . . has no right to have the book sold in a particular bookstore without the store owner's consent." Id. Breyer not only disputed Thomas's major premise-that the public has no independent First Amendment interest - but also rejected Thomas's analysis of the property law regime; programmers were not intruding into private property, as Thomas would have us believe, but rather might be seen as using a public easement that government created on or over private property. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 225 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring)(discussed infra note 45). Speaking more generally, I would add that whatever value property rights may have in general in demarcating the proper bounds of First Amendment rights, see OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED 7, 24, 47 (1996), they are of little use here, when we deal with the so-called emerging technologies and there is no settled understanding of who possesses what property rights.
-
(1969)
U.S.
, vol.395
, pp. 367
-
-
-
33
-
-
0346727434
-
The First Amendment and the Right to Hear
-
Whose free speech rights was Breyer protecting? The rights at issue either belong to the programmers who might use public access channels, or to the public in general, which under standard analysis has a First Amendment right to receive information. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). See generally Dana R. Wagner, The First Amendment and the Right To Hear, 108 YALE L.J. 669 (1998). In his dissent in Denver Area, Justice Thomas denied that the public has any independent First Amendment interest in receiving information. Whatever reception right the public might have, according to him, is derived from the rights of those who produce the pertinent information - that is, "speakers" in the more classical sense. See Denver Area Telecomm. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 812-24. Justice Thomas also tried to foreclose the attempt to derive the public's interest from the First Amendment interest of programmers who use the public access channels. In his view, cable operators manage a purely private communication system, and as a result, public access programmers have no First Amendment right to have their shows transmitted by these operators. As he put it, "a programmer is protected in searching for an outlet for cable programming, but has no free-standing First Amendment right to have that programming transmitted." For support he drew an analogy to the physical world: "The author of a book . . . has no right to have the book sold in a particular bookstore without the store owner's consent." Id. Breyer not only disputed Thomas's major premise-that the public has no independent First Amendment interest - but also rejected Thomas's analysis of the property law regime; programmers were not intruding into private property, as Thomas would have us believe, but rather might be seen as using a public easement that government created on or over private property. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 225 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring)(discussed infra note 45). Speaking more generally, I would add that whatever value property rights may have in general in demarcating the proper bounds of First Amendment rights, see OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED 7, 24, 47 (1996), they are of little use here, when we deal with the so-called emerging technologies and there is no settled understanding of who possesses what property rights.
-
(1998)
Yale L.J.
, vol.108
, pp. 669
-
-
Wagner, D.R.1
-
34
-
-
0346727434
-
Denver Area Telecomm. Consortium
-
Whose free speech rights was Breyer protecting? The rights at issue either belong to the programmers who might use public access channels, or to the public in general, which under standard analysis has a First Amendment right to receive information. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). See generally Dana R. Wagner, The First Amendment and the Right To Hear, 108 YALE L.J. 669 (1998). In his dissent in Denver Area, Justice Thomas denied that the public has any independent First Amendment interest in receiving information. Whatever reception right the public might have, according to him, is derived from the rights of those who produce the pertinent information - that is, "speakers" in the more classical sense. See Denver Area Telecomm. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 812-24. Justice Thomas also tried to foreclose the attempt to derive the public's interest from the First Amendment interest of programmers who use the public access channels. In his view, cable operators manage a purely private communication system, and as a result, public access programmers have no First Amendment right to have their shows transmitted by these operators. As he put it, "a programmer is protected in searching for an outlet for cable programming, but has no free-standing First Amendment right to have that programming transmitted." For support he drew an analogy to the physical world: "The author of a book . . . has no right to have the book sold in a particular bookstore without the store owner's consent." Id. Breyer not only disputed Thomas's major premise-that the public has no independent First Amendment interest - but also rejected Thomas's analysis of the property law regime; programmers were not intruding into private property, as Thomas would have us believe, but rather might be seen as using a public easement that government created on or over private property. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 225 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring)(discussed infra note 45). Speaking more generally, I would add that whatever value property rights may have in general in demarcating the proper bounds of First Amendment rights, see OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED 7, 24, 47 (1996), they are of little use here, when we deal with the so-called emerging technologies and there is no settled understanding of who possesses what property rights.
-
U.S.
, vol.518
, pp. 812-824
-
-
-
35
-
-
0346727434
-
-
Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, Breyer, J., concurring(discussed infra note 45)
-
Whose free speech rights was Breyer protecting? The rights at issue either belong to the programmers who might use public access channels, or to the public in general, which under standard analysis has a First Amendment right to receive information. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). See generally Dana R. Wagner, The First Amendment and the Right To Hear, 108 YALE L.J. 669 (1998). In his dissent in Denver Area, Justice Thomas denied that the public has any independent First Amendment interest in receiving information. Whatever reception right the public might have, according to him, is derived from the rights of those who produce the pertinent information - that is, "speakers" in the more classical sense. See Denver Area Telecomm. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 812-24. Justice Thomas also tried to foreclose the attempt to derive the public's interest from the First Amendment interest of programmers who use the public access channels. In his view, cable operators manage a purely private communication system, and as a result, public access programmers have no First Amendment right to have their shows transmitted by these operators. As he put it, "a programmer is protected in searching for an outlet for cable programming, but has no free-standing First Amendment right to have that programming transmitted." For support he drew an analogy to the physical world: "The author of a book . . . has no right to have the book sold in a particular bookstore without the store owner's consent." Id. Breyer not only disputed Thomas's major premise-that the public has no independent First Amendment interest - but also rejected Thomas's analysis of the property law regime; programmers were not intruding into private property, as Thomas would have us believe, but rather might be seen as using a public easement that government created on or over private property. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 225 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring)(discussed infra note 45). Speaking more generally, I would add that whatever value property rights may have in general in demarcating the proper bounds of First Amendment rights, see OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED 7, 24, 47 (1996), they are of little use here, when we deal with the so-called emerging technologies and there is no settled understanding of who possesses what property rights.
-
(1997)
U.S.
, vol.520
, pp. 180
-
-
-
36
-
-
0346727434
-
-
Whose free speech rights was Breyer protecting? The rights at issue either belong to the programmers who might use public access channels, or to the public in general, which under standard analysis has a First Amendment right to receive information. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). See generally Dana R. Wagner, The First Amendment and the Right To Hear, 108 YALE L.J. 669 (1998). In his dissent in Denver Area, Justice Thomas denied that the public has any independent First Amendment interest in receiving information. Whatever reception right the public might have, according to him, is derived from the rights of those who produce the pertinent information - that is, "speakers" in the more classical sense. See Denver Area Telecomm. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 812-24. Justice Thomas also tried to foreclose the attempt to derive the public's interest from the First Amendment interest of programmers who use the public access channels. In his view, cable operators manage a purely private communication system, and as a result, public access programmers have no First Amendment right to have their shows transmitted by these operators. As he put it, "a programmer is protected in searching for an outlet for cable programming, but has no free-standing First Amendment right to have that programming transmitted." For support he drew an analogy to the physical world: "The author of a book . . . has no right to have the book sold in a particular bookstore without the store owner's consent." Id. Breyer not only disputed Thomas's major premise-that the public has no independent First Amendment interest - but also rejected Thomas's analysis of the property law regime; programmers were not intruding into private property, as Thomas would have us believe, but rather might be seen as using a public easement that government created on or over private property. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 225 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring)(discussed infra note 45). Speaking more generally, I would add that whatever value property rights may have in general in demarcating the proper bounds of First Amendment rights, see OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED 7, 24, 47 (1996), they are of little use here, when we deal with the so-called emerging technologies and there is no settled understanding of who possesses what property rights.
-
(1996)
Liberalism Divided
, pp. 7
-
-
Fiss, O.M.1
-
37
-
-
0347990005
-
Denver Area Telecomm. Consortium
-
See Denver Area Telecomm. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 763.
-
U.S.
, vol.518
, pp. 763
-
-
-
38
-
-
0346680845
-
-
See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, hereinafter Turner I
-
See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) [hereinafter Turner I].
-
(1994)
U.S.
, vol.512
, pp. 622
-
-
-
39
-
-
80052897999
-
-
See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, hereinafter Turner II
-
See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) [hereinafter Turner II].
-
(1997)
U.S.
, vol.520
, pp. 180
-
-
-
40
-
-
0347989991
-
Denver Area Telecomm. Consortium
-
Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
-
See Denver Area Telecomm. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 780 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
-
U.S.
, vol.518
, pp. 780
-
-
-
41
-
-
0346098770
-
-
Turner I
-
See Turner I, 512 U.S. at 623; Turner II, 520 U.S. at 189.
-
U.S.
, vol.512
, pp. 623
-
-
-
42
-
-
80052897999
-
-
Turner II
-
See Turner I, 512 U.S. at 623; Turner II, 520 U.S. at 189.
-
U.S.
, vol.520
, pp. 189
-
-
-
43
-
-
0347359744
-
-
See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, D.D.C. Williams, J., dissenting
-
See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 910 F. Supp. 734, 754 (D.D.C. 1995) (Williams, J., dissenting).
-
(1995)
F. Supp.
, vol.910
, pp. 734
-
-
-
44
-
-
80052897999
-
-
Turner II
-
See Turner II, 520 U.S. at 189.
-
U.S.
, vol.520
, pp. 189
-
-
-
45
-
-
32144448339
-
-
Brandeis, J., concurring
-
274 U.S. 357, 375-376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
-
(1927)
U.S.
, vol.274
, pp. 357
-
-
-
46
-
-
85024099030
-
-
326 U.S. 1 (1945).
-
(1945)
U.S.
, vol.326
, pp. 1
-
-
-
47
-
-
77954518807
-
-
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
-
(1964)
U.S.
, vol.376
, pp. 254
-
-
-
48
-
-
0346098760
-
-
Turner II, Breyer, J., concurring
-
Turner II, 520 U.S. at 226-27 (Breyer, J., concurring).
-
U.S.
, vol.520
, pp. 226-227
-
-
-
49
-
-
0347989999
-
-
Id. at 227
-
Id. at 227.
-
-
-
-
50
-
-
0347359741
-
-
Id.; see supra note 31
-
Id.; see supra note 31.
-
-
-
-
51
-
-
0347989993
-
-
Id
-
Id.
-
-
-
-
52
-
-
0347989992
-
-
Id.; see also IRONY, supra note 17, at 19
-
Id.; see also IRONY, supra note 17, at 19.
-
-
-
-
53
-
-
0346098749
-
-
Turner II, Breyer, J., concurring
-
See Turner II, 520 U.S. at 227 (Breyer, J., concurring).
-
U.S.
, vol.520
, pp. 227
-
-
-
54
-
-
0346098753
-
-
Id
-
Id.
-
-
-
-
55
-
-
84863968687
-
-
Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC
-
Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
-
(1969)
U.S.
, vol.395
, pp. 367
-
-
-
56
-
-
0346680845
-
-
Turner I
-
See Turner I, 512 U.S. at 622.
-
U.S.
, vol.512
, pp. 622
-
-
-
57
-
-
0346729354
-
-
Turner II, Breyer, J., concurring
-
See Turner II, 520 U.S. at 226-28 (Breyer, J., concurring).
-
U.S.
, vol.520
, pp. 226-228
-
-
-
58
-
-
0347359685
-
-
Id. at 227-28
-
Id. at 227-28.
-
-
-
-
59
-
-
0347989930
-
-
Id. at 228
-
Id. at 228.
-
-
-
-
60
-
-
0346098742
-
-
Id. at 227-28
-
Id. at 227-28.
-
-
-
-
61
-
-
0345910873
-
-
118 S. Ct. 1633 (1998).
-
(1998)
S. Ct.
, vol.118
, pp. 1633
-
-
-
62
-
-
0347989986
-
-
See id
-
See id.
-
-
-
-
63
-
-
0347989991
-
Denver Area Telecomm. Consortium
-
Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
-
See Denver Area Telecomm. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 780 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
-
U.S.
, vol.518
, pp. 780
-
-
-
64
-
-
0346098741
-
Denver Area Telecomm. Consortium
-
Souter, J., concurring
-
See Denver Area Telecomm. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 774 (Souter, J., concurring).
-
U.S.
, vol.518
, pp. 774
-
-
-
65
-
-
0346098744
-
-
Turner II, Breyer, J., concurring
-
See Turner II, 520 U.S. at 227-29 (Breyer, J., concurring).
-
U.S.
, vol.520
, pp. 227-229
-
-
-
66
-
-
0346098741
-
Denver Area Telecomm. Consortium
-
See Denver Area Telecomm. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 738-39.
-
U.S.
, vol.518
, pp. 738-739
-
-
-
67
-
-
0346729346
-
Arkansas Educ. Television Comm 'n
-
See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm 'n, 118 S. Ct. at 1637-38.
-
S. Ct.
, vol.118
, pp. 1637-1638
-
-
-
68
-
-
0347359730
-
-
Id. at 1640
-
Id. at 1640.
-
-
-
-
69
-
-
0346729347
-
-
Id
-
Id.
-
-
-
-
70
-
-
0346729353
-
Silence on the Street Corner
-
supra note 31
-
In other contexts, the Court disaggregated the state among its many functions, and applied a lesser standard, close to the one applied to private entities. For example, the Court curbed political activity on post office sidewalks and in airport terminals, where the state might be thought to be acting as property owner as opposed to sovereign. See OWEN M. FISS, Silence on the Street Corner, in LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 31, at 55-66. In those earlier cases, Justice Kennedy complained about the disaggregation, but in Forbes he reached the same result by rather unconvincingly characterizing the candidate debate on public television as a "non-public forum." See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
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Liberalism Divided
, pp. 55-66
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Fiss, O.M.1
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71
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0346098743
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Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n
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Stevens, J., dissenting
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Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, 118 S. Ct. at 1649 n.18 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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S. Ct. at
, vol.118
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72
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0346729352
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Id. at 1644
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Id. at 1644.
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73
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0347359736
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See id at 1647-48
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See id at 1647-48.
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74
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0346729351
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Id. at 1649
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Id. at 1649.
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75
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84893264817
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Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham
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Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147(1969).
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(1969)
U.S.
, vol.394
, pp. 147
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76
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84905045959
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303 U.S. 444 (1938).
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(1938)
U.S.
, vol.303
, pp. 444
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77
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0346729346
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Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n
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Stevens, J., dissenting
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See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, 118 S. Ct. at 1645 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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S. Ct.
, vol.118
, pp. 1645
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78
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33847232410
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365 U.S. 715 (1961).
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(1961)
U.S.
, vol.365
, pp. 715
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79
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84871804167
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Shelley v. Kraemer
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No nexun was present, for instance, in the classic state action case of Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), although Justice Rehnquist insisted upon the existence of such a nexus in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
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(1948)
U.S.
, vol.334
, pp. 1
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80
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84887334884
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Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis
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No nexun was present, for instance, in the classic state action case of Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), although Justice Rehnquist insisted upon the existence of such a nexus in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
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(1972)
U.S.
, vol.407
, pp. 163
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81
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0347989987
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Brandeis, J., concurring
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See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375-376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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(1927)
U.S.
, vol.274
, pp. 375-376
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Whitney1
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