Determinants of Legislative Turnover: A Cross-National Analysis

British Journal of Political Science

Volumn 34, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 87-108

  Matland, Richard E ^a   Studlar, Donley T ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON   (United States)

^b WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347301867     PISSN: 00071234     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S000712340300036X     Document Type: Article

References (115)

1. Roben D. Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1976), p. 65.
2. Pippa Norris, 'Conclusion: Comparative Legislative Recruitment in Western Democracies', in Joni Lovenduski and Pippa Norris, eds, Gender and Party Politics (London: Sage, 1993), pp. 309-30, at p. 316.
3. Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class, ed. and rev. by Arthur Livingston, trans. Hannah D. Kahn (New York: McGraw Hill, 1939); Vilfredo Pareto, Vilfredo Pareto: Sociological Writings, selected and introduced by S. E. Finer, trans. Derick Mirfin (New York: Praeger, 1966); Putnam, The Comparative Studies of Political Elites.
4. Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class, ed. and rev. by Arthur Livingston, trans. Hannah D. Kahn (New York: McGraw Hill, 1939); Vilfredo Pareto, Vilfredo Pareto: Sociological Writings, selected and introduced by S. E. Finer, trans. Derick Mirfin (New York: Praeger, 1966); Putnam, The Comparative Studies of Political Elites.
5. Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class, ed. and rev. by Arthur Livingston, trans. Hannah D. Kahn (New York: McGraw Hill, 1939); Vilfredo Pareto, Vilfredo Pareto: Sociological Writings, selected and introduced by S. E. Finer, trans. Derick Mirfin (New York: Praeger, 1966); Putnam, The Comparative Studies of Political Elites.
6. Joseph Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966); Pippa Norris and Joni Lovenduski, Political Recruitment: Gender, Race and Class in the British Parliament (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
7. Joseph Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966); Pippa Norris and Joni Lovenduski, Political Recruitment: Gender, Race and Class in the British Parliament (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
8. Valerie Bunce, Do Leaders Make a Difference? Executive Succession and Public Policy under Capitalism and Socialism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981); David W. Brady, Critical Elections and Congressional Policymaking (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 1988).
9. Valerie Bunce, Do Leaders Make a Difference? Executive Succession and Public Policy under Capitalism and Socialism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981); David W. Brady, Critical Elections and Congressional Policymaking (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1988).
10. Keith Jackson, 'Stability and Renewal: Incumbency and Parliamentary Composition', in Albert Somit, Rudolf Wildenmann, Bernhard Bell and Andrea Rommel, eds, The Victorious Incumbent: A Threat to Democracy ? (Aldershot, Hants.: Dartmouth, 1994), pp. 251-77, at pp. 270.
11. Putnam, The Comparative Studies of Political Elites, p. 65-8.
12. Richard S. Katz, Democracy and Elections (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).
13. Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967); Anne Phillips, The Politics of Presence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
14. Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967); Anne Phillips, The Politics of Presence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
15. R. Darcy and James R. Choike, 'A Formal Analysis of Legislative Turnover: Women Candidates and Legislative Representation', American Journal of Political Science, 30 (1986), 237-55; Kristi Anderson and Stuart Thorson, 'Congressional Turnover and the Election of Women', Western Political Quarterly, 37 (1984), 143-56.
16. R. Darcy and James R. Choike, 'A Formal Analysis of Legislative Turnover: Women Candidates and Legislative Representation', American Journal of Political Science, 30 (1986), 237-55; Kristi Anderson and Stuart Thorson, 'Congressional Turnover and the Election of Women', Western Political Quarterly, 37 (1984), 143-56.
17. Kathleen Bratton and Leonard Ray, 'Descriptive Representation, Policy Outcomes, and Municipal Day-Care Coverage in Norway', American Journal of Political Science, 46 (2002), 428-37; Cindy Simon Rosenthal, When Women Lead: Integrative Leadership in State Legislatures (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Sue Thomas, How Women Legislate (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
18. Kathleen Bratton and Leonard Ray, 'Descriptive Representation, Policy Outcomes, and Municipal Day-Care Coverage in Norway', American Journal of Political Science, 46 (2002), 428-37; Cindy Simon Rosenthal, When Women Lead: Integrative Leadership in State Legislatures (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Sue Thomas, How Women Legislate (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
19. Kathleen Bratton and Leonard Ray, 'Descriptive Representation, Policy Outcomes, and Municipal Day-Care Coverage in Norway', American Journal of Political Science, 46 (2002), 428-37; Cindy Simon Rosenthal, When Women Lead: Integrative Leadership in State Legislatures (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Sue Thomas, How Women Legislate (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
20. Christine Wolbrecht, The Politics of Women's Rights: Parties, Positions, and Change (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000).
21. John M. Carey, Term Limits and Legislative Representation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
22. John R. Hibbing, 'Legislative Careers: Why and How We Should Study Them', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 24 (1999), 149-71.
23. Brady, Critical Elections and Congressional Policymaking; Wolbrecht, The Politics of Women's Rights.
24. Brady, Critical Elections and Congressional Policymaking; Wolbrecht, The Politics of Women's Rights.
25. Thomas W. Casstevens and William A. Denham III, 'Turnover and Tenure in the Canadian House of Commons: 1867-1968', Canadian Journal of Political Science, 3 (1970), 655-61 ; Basil Chubb, The Government and Politics of Ireland (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1982); John R. Hibbing, 'Legislative Institutionalization with Illustrations from the British House of Commons', American Journal of Political Science, 32 (1988), 681-712; Akira Hayama, 'Incumbency Advantage in Japanese Elections', Electoral Studies, 11 (1992), 46-57.
26. Thomas W. Casstevens and William A. Denham III, 'Turnover and Tenure in the Canadian House of Commons: 1867-1968', Canadian Journal of Political Science, 3 (1970), 655-61 ; Basil Chubb, The Government and Politics of Ireland (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1982); John R. Hibbing, 'Legislative Institutionalization with Illustrations from the British House of Commons', American Journal of Political Science, 32 (1988), 681-712; Akira Hayama, 'Incumbency Advantage in Japanese Elections', Electoral Studies, 11 (1992), 46-57.
27. Thomas W. Casstevens and William A. Denham III, 'Turnover and Tenure in the Canadian House of Commons: 1867-1968', Canadian Journal of Political Science, 3 (1970), 655-61 ; Basil Chubb, The Government and Politics of Ireland (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1982); John R. Hibbing, 'Legislative Institutionalization with Illustrations from the British House of Commons', American Journal of Political Science, 32 (1988), 681-712; Akira Hayama, 'Incumbency Advantage in Japanese Elections', Electoral Studies, 11 (1992), 46-57.
28. Thomas W. Casstevens and William A. Denham III, 'Turnover and Tenure in the Canadian House of Commons: 1867-1968', Canadian Journal of Political Science, 3 (1970), 655-61 ; Basil Chubb, The Government and Politics of Ireland (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1982); John R. Hibbing, 'Legislative Institutionalization with Illustrations from the British House of Commons', American Journal of Political Science, 32 (1988), 681-712; Akira Hayama, 'Incumbency Advantage in Japanese Elections', Electoral Studies, 11 (1992), 46-57.
29. Kjell A. Eliassen and Mogens N. Pedersen, 'Professionalization of Legislatures: Long-Term Changes in Political Recruitment in Denmark and Norway', Comparative Studies in Society and History, 20 (1978), 123-32; James Q. Graham Jr, 'Legislative Careers in the French Chamber and U.S. House 1871-1940", Legislative Studies Quarterly, 1 (1982), 37-56.
30. Kjell A. Eliassen and Mogens N. Pedersen, 'Professionalization of Legislatures: Long-Term Changes in Political Recruitment in Denmark and Norway', Comparative Studies in Society and History, 20 (1978), 123-32; James Q. Graham Jr, 'Legislative Careers in the French Chamber and U.S. House 1871-1940", Legislative Studies Quarterly, 1 (1982), 37-56.
31. Jean Blondel, Comparative Legislatures (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1973); Putnam, The Comparative Studies of Political Elites; Donald R. Matthews, 'Legislative Recruitment and Legislative Careers', in Gerhard Loewenberg, Patterson and Jewell, eds, Handbook of Legislative Research (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 17-56; Lyn Ragsdale, 'Legislative Elections and Electoral Responsiveness', in Loewenberg, Patterson and Jewell, eds, Handbook of Legislative Research, pp. 57-96; Werner J. Patzelt, 'Recruitment and Retention in Western European Parliaments', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 24 (1999), 239-79.
32. Jean Blondel, Comparative Legislatures (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1973); Putnam, The Comparative Studies of Political Elites; Donald R. Matthews, 'Legislative Recruitment and Legislative Careers', in Gerhard Loewenberg, Patterson and Jewell, eds, Handbook of Legislative Research (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 17-56; Lyn Ragsdale, 'Legislative Elections and Electoral Responsiveness', in Loewenberg, Patterson and Jewell, eds, Handbook of Legislative Research, pp. 57-96; Werner J. Patzelt, 'Recruitment and Retention in Western European Parliaments', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 24 (1999), 239-79.
33. Jean Blondel, Comparative Legislatures (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1973); Putnam, The Comparative Studies of Political Elites; Donald R. Matthews, 'Legislative Recruitment and Legislative Careers', in Gerhard Loewenberg, Patterson and Jewell, eds, Handbook of Legislative Research (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 17-56; Lyn Ragsdale, 'Legislative Elections and Electoral Responsiveness', in Loewenberg, Patterson and Jewell, eds, Handbook of Legislative Research, pp. 57-96; Werner J. Patzelt, 'Recruitment and Retention in Western European Parliaments', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 24 (1999), 239-79.
34. Jean Blondel, Comparative Legislatures (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1973); Putnam, The Comparative Studies of Political Elites; Donald R. Matthews, 'Legislative Recruitment and Legislative Careers', in Gerhard Loewenberg, Patterson and Jewell, eds, Handbook of Legislative Research (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 17-56; Lyn Ragsdale, 'Legislative Elections and Electoral Responsiveness', in Loewenberg, Patterson and Jewell, eds, Handbook of Legislative Research, pp. 57-96; Werner J. Patzelt, 'Recruitment and Retention in Western European Parliaments', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 24 (1999), 239-79.
35. Jean Blondel, Comparative Legislatures (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1973); Putnam, The Comparative Studies of Political Elites; Donald R. Matthews, 'Legislative Recruitment and Legislative Careers', in Gerhard Loewenberg, Patterson and Jewell, eds, Handbook of Legislative Research (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 17-56; Lyn Ragsdale, 'Legislative Elections and Electoral Responsiveness', in Loewenberg, Patterson and Jewell, eds, Handbook of Legislative Research, pp. 57-96; Werner J. Patzelt, 'Recruitment and Retention in Western European Parliaments', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 24 (1999), 239-79.
36. Somit et al., eds, The Victorious Incumbent.
37. Bruce Cain, John Ferejohn and Moms Fiorina. The Personal Vote (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987); Thomas D. Lancaster and David W. Patterson, 'Comparative Pork Barrel Politics: Perceptions from the West German Bundestag', Comparative Political Studies, 22 (1990), 458-77; Philip Norton and David Wood, Back from Westminister (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1993); Donley T. Studlar and lan McAllister, 'Political Representation and Constituency Activity Among Australian Federal MPs', Journal of Politics, 58 (1996), 69-90.
38. Bruce Cain, John Ferejohn and Moms Fiorina. The Personal Vote (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987); Thomas D. Lancaster and David W. Patterson, 'Comparative Pork Barrel Politics: Perceptions from the West German Bundestag', Comparative Political Studies, 22 (1990), 458-77; Philip Norton and David Wood, Back from Westminister (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1993); Donley T. Studlar and lan McAllister, 'Political Representation and Constituency Activity Among Australian Federal MPs', Journal of Politics, 58 (1996), 69-90.
39. Bruce Cain, John Ferejohn and Moms Fiorina. The Personal Vote (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987); Thomas D. Lancaster and David W. Patterson, 'Comparative Pork Barrel Politics: Perceptions from the West German Bundestag', Comparative Political Studies, 22 (1990), 458-77; Philip Norton and David Wood, Back from Westminister (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1993); Donley T. Studlar and lan McAllister, 'Political Representation and Constituency Activity Among Australian Federal MPs', Journal of Politics, 58 (1996), 69-90.
40. Bruce Cain, John Ferejohn and Moms Fiorina. The Personal Vote (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987); Thomas D. Lancaster and David W. Patterson, 'Comparative Pork Barrel Politics: Perceptions from the West German Bundestag', Comparative Political Studies, 22 (1990), 458-77; Philip Norton and David Wood, Back from Westminister (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1993); Donley T. Studlar and lan McAllister, 'Political Representation and Constituency Activity Among Australian Federal MPs', Journal of Politics, 58 (1996), 69-90.
41. Nelson Polsby, 'The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives', American Political Science Review, 62 (1968), 144-68; Morris P. Fiorina, David W. Rohde and Peter Wessel, 'Historical Change in House Turnover', in Norman Ornstein, ed., Congress in Change (New York: Praeger, 1975), pp. 24-57; John W. Swain, Stephen A. Borrelli, Brian C. Reed and Sean F. Evans, 'A New Look at Turnover in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1789-1998', American Politics Quarterly, 28 (2000), 435-57.
42. Nelson Polsby, 'The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives', American Political Science Review, 62 (1968), 144-68; Morris P. Fiorina, David W. Rohde and Peter Wessel, 'Historical Change in House Turnover', in Norman Ornstein, ed., Congress in Change (New York: Praeger, 1975), pp. 24-57; John W. Swain, Stephen A. Borrelli, Brian C. Reed and Sean F. Evans, 'A New Look at Turnover in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1789-1998', American Politics Quarterly, 28 (2000), 435-57.
43. Nelson Polsby, 'The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives', American Political Science Review, 62 (1968), 144-68; Morris P. Fiorina, David W. Rohde and Peter Wessel, 'Historical Change in House Turnover', in Norman Ornstein, ed., Congress in Change (New York: Praeger, 1975), pp. 24-57; John W. Swain, Stephen A. Borrelli, Brian C. Reed and Sean F. Evans, 'A New Look at Turnover in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1789-1998', American Politics Quarterly, 28 (2000), 435-57.
44. Fiorina, Rohde and Wessel, 'Historical Change in House Turnover' ; Matthews, 'Legislative Recruitment and Legislative Careers' ; Peverill Squire, 'Career Opportunities and Membership Stability in Legislatures ', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 13 (1988), 65-82.
45. Fiorina, Rohde and Wessel, 'Historical Change in House Turnover' ; Matthews, 'Legislative Recruitment and Legislative Careers' ; Peverill Squire, 'Career Opportunities and Membership Stability in Legislatures ', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 13 (1988), 65-82.
46. Fiorina, Rohde and Wessel, 'Historical Change in House Turnover' ; Matthews, 'Legislative Recruitment and Legislative Careers' ; Peverill Squire, 'Career Opportunities and Membership Stability in Legislatures ', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 13 (1988), 65-82.
47. Polsby, 'The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives'; Richard Hall and Robert P. Van Houweling, 'Avarice and Ambition in Congress: Representatives' Decisions to Run or Retire from the U.S. House', American Political Science Review, 89 (1995),121-36.
48. Polsby, 'The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives'; Richard Hall and Robert P. Van Houweling, 'Avarice and Ambition in Congress: Representatives' Decisions to Run or Retire from the U.S. House', American Political Science Review, 89 (1995),121-36.
49. Jean A. Laponce, 'Democracy and Incumbency: The Canadian Case', in Somit et al., eds, The Victorious Incumbent, pp. 122-49.
50. Gary F. Moncrief, 'Terminating the Provincial Career: Retirement and Electoral Defeat in Canadian Provincial Legislatures, 1950-1997', Canadian Journal of Political Science, 31 (1998), 359-72.
51. C. E. S. Franks, The Parliament of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987); Michael Atkinson and David Docherty, 'Moving Right Along: The Roots of Amateurism in the Canadian House of Commons', Canadian Journal of Political Science, 25 (1992), 295-318; Laponce, 'Democracy and Incumbency'.
52. C. E. S. Franks, The Parliament of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987); Michael Atkinson and David Docherty, 'Moving Right Along: The Roots of Amateurism in the Canadian House of Commons', Canadian Journal of Political Science, 25 (1992), 295-318; Laponce, 'Democracy and Incumbency'.
53. C. E. S. Franks, The Parliament of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987); Michael Atkinson and David Docherty, 'Moving Right Along: The Roots of Amateurism in the Canadian House of Commons', Canadian Journal of Political Science, 25 (1992), 295-318; Laponce, 'Democracy and Incumbency'.
54. Atkinson and Docherty, 'Moving Right Along'; Sharon Sutherland, 'The Consequences of Electoral Volatility: Inexperienced Ministers: 1949-90', in Herman Bakvis, ed., Representation, Integration, and Political Parties in Canada (Ottawa: Dundurn Press, 1991); Lisa Young, 'Legislative Turnover and the Election of Women to the Canadian House of Commons', in Kathy Megyery, ed., Women in Canadian Politics: Toward Equity in Representation (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1991).
55. Atkinson and Docherty, 'Moving Right Along'; Sharon Sutherland, 'The Consequences of Electoral Volatility: Inexperienced Ministers: 1949-90', in Herman Bakvis, ed., Representation, Integration, and Political Parties in Canada (Ottawa: Dundurn Press, 1991); Lisa Young, 'Legislative Turnover and the Election of Women to the Canadian House of Commons', in Kathy Megyery, ed., Women in Canadian Politics: Toward Equity in Representation (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1991).
56. Atkinson and Docherty, 'Moving Right Along'; Sharon Sutherland, 'The Consequences of Electoral Volatility: Inexperienced Ministers: 1949-90', in Herman Bakvis, ed., Representation, Integration, and Political Parties in Canada (Ottawa: Dundurn Press, 1991); Lisa Young, 'Legislative Turnover and the Election of Women to the Canadian House of Commons', in Kathy Megyery, ed., Women in Canadian Politics: Toward Equity in Representation (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1991).
57. Polsby, 'The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives'.
58. Blondel, Comparative Legislatures.
59. See, however, Franks, The Parliament of Canada.
60. Somit et al., The Victorious Incumbent.
61. Somit et al., The Victorious Incumbent, p. 14.
62. Arend Lijphart, in Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1999), identifies a group of thirty-six countries as having been continuously democratic from 1977 onward. We have collected data on twenty-five of these. The remaining eleven are all democracies in developing countries where we were unable to collect complete information.
63. While this pattern was generally followed there were a few exceptions. The 1994 Italian election was not included so as to avoid the inclusion of the electoral system change. Data for Germany covers a slightly earlier period to avoid having to deal with reunification. Finally, the French case is an unusual one in that the French switched election systems for one election (proportional representation was used in the 1986 election). Turnover for the French case includes only those elections where the majority vote, double ballot system was used for both the preceding and the present election (that is 1978, 1981, 1993). Appendix Table A lists which elections were used in each country to determine turnover rates.
64. Hibbing, 'Legislative Institutionalization with Illustrations from the British House of Commons'; see also Norris and Lovenduski, Political Recruitment.
65. Hibbing, 'Legislative Institutionalization with Illustrations from the British House of Commons'; see also Norris and Lovenduski, Political Recruitment.
66. We tested for possible effects of scandal at the level of individual countries by using Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, see www.gwdg.de/̃uwvw. We established a level of perceived corruption for each of the countries in our study by taking the TI Corruption Perception Index scores for 1980-85 and 1988-92 and averaging them. This index takes several existing indices and develops from them an overall index of corruption, with a heavy emphasis on public corruption. When we added this variable to the model, variations in perceived corruption across countries failed to have anything approaching a statistically significant effect on turnover rates.
67. Swain et al., 'A New Look at Turnover in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1789-1998'.
68. Jackson, 'Stability and Renewal', p. 257.
69. Mogens N. Pedersen, 'The Dynamics of European Party Systems: Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility', European Journal of Political Research, 7 (1979), 1-26; Ivor Crewe and David Denver, eds, Electoral Change in Western Democracies: Patterns and Sources of Electoral Volatility (London: Croom Helm, 1985); Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair, Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability: The Stabilization of European Electorates, 1885-1985 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
70. Mogens N. Pedersen, 'The Dynamics of European Party Systems: Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility', European Journal of Political Research, 7 (1979), 1-26; Ivor Crewe and David Denver, eds, Electoral Change in Western Democracies: Patterns and Sources of Electoral Volatility (London: Croom Helm, 1985); Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair, Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability: The Stabilization of European Electorates, 1885-1985 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
71. Mogens N. Pedersen, 'The Dynamics of European Party Systems: Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility', European Journal of Political Research, 7 (1979), 1-26; Ivor Crewe and David Denver, eds, Electoral Change in Western Democracies: Patterns and Sources of Electoral Volatility (London: Croom Helm, 1985); Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair, Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability: The Stabilization of European Electorates, 1885-1985 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
72. M. G. Kendall and A. Stuart, 'The Law of Cubic Proportion in Election Results', British Journal of Sociology, 1 (1950), 183-97; Edward R. Tufte, 'The Relationship Between Seats and Votes in Two-Party Systems', American Political Science Review, 67 (1973), 540-7.
73. M. G. Kendall and A. Stuart, 'The Law of Cubic Proportion in Election Results', British Journal of Sociology, 1 (1950), 183-97; Edward R. Tufte, 'The Relationship Between Seats and Votes in Two-Party Systems', American Political Science Review, 67 (1973), 540-7.
74. Rein Taagepera, 'Reformulating the Cube Law for Proportional Representation Elections', American Political Science Review, 80 (1986), 489-504.
75. n (seats for party K divided by seats for parties L equals votes for party K divided by votes for parties L raised to the nth power). The magnitude of the effect of a change in votes on change in seats depends upon n, the power to which the vote formula is raised. The cube rule asserts that for single-member district systems this is 3.0, so that a 1 per cent shift in the national vote will lead to a 3 per cent shift in seats. For perfectly proportional systems the power function should be 1.0 denoting a 1 per cent shift in seats for that party.
76. Swain et al., 'A New Look at Turnover in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1789-1998'.
77. Thomas E. Mann, Unsafe at Any Margin: Interpreting Congressional Elections (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1978).
78. Michael Gallagher, 'The (Relatively) Victorious Incumbent under PR-STV: Legislative Turnover in Ireland and Malta', in Shaun Bowler and Bernard Grofman, eds, Elections in Australia, Ireland and Malta under the Single Transferable Vote (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), pp. 81-113.
79. Richard S. Katz, 'Intraparty Preference Voting', in Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart, eds, Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences (New York: Agathon Press, 1986), pp. 85-103 ; Katz, Democracy and Elections.
80. Richard S. Katz, 'Intraparty Preference Voting', in Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart, eds, Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences (New York: Agathon Press, 1986), pp. 85-103 ; Katz, Democracy and Elections.
81. Joanne Brzinski, 'Women's Representation in Germany: A Comparison of East and West', in Richard E. Mailand and Kathleen A. Montgomery, eds, Women's Access to Political Power in Post-Communist Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
82. Bruce Cain, John Ferejohn and Morris Fiorina, The Personal Vote (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987).
83. John Curtice and Michael Steed, 'Appendix 2' in David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh, eds, The British General Election of 1992 (London: Macmillan, 1992); Norris and Lovenduski, Political Recruitment; Philip Norton and David Wood, 'Constituency Service by Members of Parliament', Parliamentary Affairs, 43 (1990), 196-208.
84. John Curtice and Michael Steed, 'Appendix 2' in David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh, eds, The British General Election of 1992 (London: Macmillan, 1992); Norris and Lovenduski, Political Recruitment; Philip Norton and David Wood, 'Constituency Service by Members of Parliament', Parliamentary Affairs, 43 (1990), 196-208.
85. John Curtice and Michael Steed, 'Appendix 2' in David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh, eds, The British General Election of 1992 (London: Macmillan, 1992); Norris and Lovenduski, Political Recruitment; Philip Norton and David Wood, 'Constituency Service by Members of Parliament', Parliamentary Affairs, 43 (1990), 196-208.
86. John Ferejohn and Brian Gaines, 'The Personal Vote in Canada", in Herman Bakvis, ed., Representation, Integration and Political Parties in Canada (Toronto: Dundurn, 1991).
87. Clive Bean, 'The Personal Vote in Australian Federal Elections', Political Studies, 38 (1990), 253-68.
88. John M. Carey and Matthew Soberg Shugart, in 'Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas', Electoral Studies, 14 (1995), 417-39, emphasize a different set of characteristics when they develop a ranking of incentives for individual politicians to cultivate a personal vote. We would largely agree with their rankings, with one important exception. They place single-member simple plurality (SMSP) systems where the party controls access to the ballot, i.e. the ability to run under the party's name (Canada and Britain for example), near the bottom of the list of systems where a candidate has an incentive to develop a personal vote, well below PR systems that allow for preferential voting. These differences we believe stem from a difference in emphasis. Carey and Shugart suggest when the party has control over ballot access, as they do in the British and Canadian cases, there is little incentive for the candidate to try and establish an independent personal vote. 'When leaders have maximum control over ballots, voters choose among parties rather than individual candidates, and so the value of personal reputations is minimized' (p. 421). We disagree; we believe personal reputations can affect the choices of individual voters under SMSP and therefore we expect a greater effect. These are cases where a personal vote would help both the individual candidate and his party, while Carey and Shugart emphasize cases where the individual candidate and party may have diverging incentives. It is worth noting the extensive literature cited above finds a personal voting effect precisely where Carey and Shugart say it is unlikely to exist.
89. Note also that the type of personal vote that Carey and Shugart suggest will be important in PR systems with preferential voting are likely to be used by MPs to try and distinguish themselves from other members of the same party. From a party perspective this type of personal vote is of little value. It may help the individual MP, but it is unlikely to help the party. Therefore, the party should feel less concern about rotating out sitting MPs in PR systems.
90. Michael Gallagher and Michael Marsh, Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective: The Secret Garden of Politics (London: Sage, 1988).
91. Richard E. Mailand and Donley T. Studlar, The Contagion of Women Candidates in Single-Member District and Proportional Representation Electoral Systems: Canada and Norway', Journal of Politics, 58 (1996), 707-33; Miki Caul, 'Political Parties and the Adoption of Candidate Gender Quotas: A Cross-National Analysis', Journal of Politics, 63 (2001), 1214-29.
92. Richard E. Mailand and Donley T. Studlar, The Contagion of Women Candidates in Single-Member District and Proportional Representation Electoral Systems: Canada and Norway', Journal of Politics, 58 (1996), 707-33; Miki Caul, 'Political Parties and the Adoption of Candidate Gender Quotas: A Cross-National Analysis', Journal of Politics, 63 (2001), 1214-29.
93. Hall and Van Houweling, 'Avarice and Ambition in Congress: Representatives Decisions to Run or Retire from the U.S. House'.
94. We want to thank Michael Rush for pointing out the effects of pensions on retirements in the British House of Commons. While we tried to get retirement rule information for all twenty-five national legislatures we were ultimately unsuccessful and therefore are unable to include variables that might measure the effect of pension rules on voluntary retirements. It seems probable, however, these advanced industrialized democracies are all likely to provide pensions that are generous within the context of the society in which they operate. Even if we had the data, we do not believe differences in pension plans would explain very much of the difference in turnover rates.
95. Jackson, 'Stability and Renewal'.
96. Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics.
97. Calculations are based on data from ICPSR file, 'Roster of United States Congressional Officeholders and Biographical Characteristics of Members of Congress, 1789-1996', available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
98. The one obvious place where there is greater political power is as a minister in the Cabinet. In most cases, however, ministers continue to retain their seats in parliament or, at a minimum, their place on the party lists for elections if they do not retain their seats in the parliament. Virtually all ministers know they can go back to their old district and run again. In the United States, however, it is exceedingly rare for a minister to go back and run for his old congressional seat. While large numbers of ministers may be replaced by alternates in the parliament when the government is formed, we have counted ministers who are re-elected on their party ' s ballot as returning incumbents, even if they end up serving in the cabinet rather than the parliament.
99. Polsby, 'The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives'.
100. Blondel, Comparative Legislatures.
101. Since half of the German MPs are elected via SMD systems, while half are closed party list system, West Germany has a value of 0.5. SNTV (Japan) and STV (Ireland and Malta) are defined as PR systems in accordance with Lijphart's divisions in Patterns of Democracy.
102. There is some question as to which countries should be identified as having PR-preferential voting systems. We have chosen to identify the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden as PR-list systems, rather than preferential vote systems, because even though voters formally have the opportunity to influence the order in which candidates are elected, the barriers are so high that in practice voters are never able to change the order decided by the party. On the other side, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg and Switzerland are all cases where the voters clearly do influence outcomes through their voting. That leaves Austria and Belgium as cases where barriers for voter influence are quite high, but not insurmountable. We ran the regressions three ways. We report in the article the case where Austria and Belgium are both defined as preferential voting systems. Receding this, first so that only Austria is a preferential voting system and then as neither of them are preferential voting systems, and then re-running the regressions, we found these possible changes did not affect the regressions in a noticeable way. Regardless of how Austria and Belgium are defined, the results are the same. Finally, note that starting in 1998 Sweden has changed the manner in which its preferential voting system functions, so that Sweden probably should be grouped with Austria and Belgium in future studies of preferential voting.
103. Mogens N. Pedersen, 'The Dynamics of European Party Systems: Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility', European Journal of Political Research, 7 (1979), 1-26.
104. I/M. Taagepera found for a very wide range of countries (log Wlog DM) clustered around 3, setting log V/1og DM equal to 3 is therefore a reasonable simplification.
105. John Huber and Ronald Inglehart, 'Expert Interpretations of Party Space and Party Locations in 42 Societies', Party Politics, 1 (1995), 73-111 ; Michael J. Laver and W. Bent Hunt, Policy and Party Competition (New York: Routledge, 1992).
106. John Huber and Ronald Inglehart, 'Expert Interpretations of Party Space and Party Locations in 42 Societies', Party Politics, 1 (1995), 73-111 ; Michael J. Laver and W. Bent Hunt, Policy and Party Competition (New York: Routledge, 1992).
107. Uwe Wagschal, 'Parties, Party Systems and Tax Smoothing' (paper presented at European Consortium of Political Research Workshops, Oslo, 1996).
108. While we did not suspect serial auto-correlation would be a serious problem in the dataset, just to be secure we tested for it in a couple of different manners. First, we included a lagged dependent variable in the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The lagged term did not begin to approach significance (t = 0.31, sig. = 0.76). Secondly, we ran a random effects generalized least squares (GLS) regression using Stata (xtreg). All of the coefficients in the GLS regression showed up with the same effects and with the same levels of significance as in the OLS regression, only minor changes in the coefficient values occurred. As such, we merely report the OLS coefficients of our initial analysis.
109. Since there is only one SNTV system, the coefficient imputed to SNTV is the equivalent of adding a Japan dummy to the equation. Since all the idiosyncrasies of Japanese turnover become defined as an SNTV effect, caution needs to be applied when interpreting the SNTV coefficient. Furthermore, since electoral reform in 1993, SNTV is no longer used in Japan.
110. The United States falls into this category. There is a need, however, for some caution in considering the average yearly turnover figures we have calculated. This average probably slightly overestimates overall turnover. This is true because it may be the same seats switching over several elections while a large number may stay relatively stable. For example, assume that all incumbents run for re-election in the United States. If the election results in a forty-three seat swing to the Republicans in one election, followed by a twenty-two seat swing back to the Democrats in the next election, our manner of calculating turnover would estimate this as 15 per cent over four years or about 3.75 per cent per year. If, however, all of the seats that swung back to the Democrats in the second election were in districts they had lost in the first election, the number of seats where the occupant had changed over four years would only be 10 per cent or 2.5 per cent per year.
111. In further analysis we added a US country dummy to the regression reported in Table 3. This term did not begin to approach statistical significance (b = + 0.44, s.e. = 3.01). Thus we can quite safely assert the United States fits the general model rather than being a unique case in need of special explanation.
112. Walter C. Opello Jr, 'Portugal's Parliament: An Organizational Analysis of Legislative Performance', Legislative Studies Quarterly, 11 (1986), 291-319.
113. Albert Somit, '... And Where We Came Out', in Somit et al., eds, The Victorious Incumbent, pp. 11-18.
114. Stefane Bartolini and Peter Mair, Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability: The Stabilization of European Electorates, 1885-1985 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 157.
115. This difference diminishes to only 0.1 per cent when the new democracies are removed from the sample (10.2 vs. 10.3).