Sowing doubt optimally in two-person repeated games

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 28, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 203-216

  Israeli, Eitan ^a  

^a NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347146010     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1998.0695     Document Type: Article

References (13)

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10. Koren, G. 1989, Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information and Observable Payoffs, M.Sc. Thesis, School of Mathematics, Tel-Aviv University.
11. Kuhn H. W. Extensive Games and the Problem of Information. Kuhn H. W., Tucker W. Contributions to the Theory of Games. Annals of Mathematics. II:1953;193-216 Princeton Univ. Press. Princeton.
12. Shalev J. Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information and Known-Own Payoffs. Games Econ. Behav. 7:1994;246-259.
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