Merton's shadow: Perspectives on science and democracy since 1940

Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences

Volumn 30, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 278-305

  Wang, Jessica ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347140713     PISSN: 08909997     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/27757827     Document Type: Review

References (96)

1. For published observations on this point, see David Holloway, Stalin and the bomb: The Soviet Union and atomic energy, 1939-1956 (New Haven, 1994), 363, 367; and H. Lyman Miller, Science and dissent in Post-Mao China: The politics of knowledge (Seattle, 1996), esp. chapt. 1.
2. For published observations on this point, see David Holloway, Stalin and the bomb: The Soviet Union and atomic energy, 1939-1956 (New Haven, 1994), 363, 367; and H. Lyman Miller, Science and dissent in Post-Mao China: The politics of knowledge (Seattle, 1996), esp. chapt. 1.
3. See, for example, John A. Jordan, Machine-age ideology: Social engineering and American liberalism, 1911-1939 (Chapel Hill, 1994), esp. chapts. 1-3. As Jordan argues, however, Progressive era thought was often elitist, despite progressive intellectuals' self-declared commitment to democratic political practices.
4. Edward A. Purcell, The crisis of democratic theory: Scientific naturalism and the problem of value (Lexington, KY, 1973), 108.
5. David A. Hollinger, "The defense of democracy and Robert K. Merton's formulation of the scientific ethos," Knowledge and society, 4 (1983), 1-15, reprinted in Hollinger, Science, Jews, and secular culture: Studies in mid-twentieth century American intellectual history (Princeton, 1996), chapt. 5. On American intellectuals' reappraisal of democracy in the 1930s and 1940s, see also Purcell, esp. chapts. 7, 8, 11.
6. David A. Hollinger, "The defense of democracy and Robert K. Merton's formulation of the scientific ethos," Knowledge and society, 4 (1983), 1-15, reprinted in Hollinger, Science, Jews, and secular culture: Studies in mid-twentieth century American intellectual history (Princeton, 1996), chapt. 5. On American intellectuals' reappraisal of democracy in the 1930s and 1940s, see also Purcell, esp. chapts. 7, 8, 11.
7. Robert K. Merton, "A note on science and democracy," Journal of legal and political sociology, 1 (Oct 1942), 115-126, on 120, 126.
8. See Hugh Richard Slotten, Patronage, practice, and the culture of American science: Alexander Dallas Bache and the U.S. Coast Survey (Cambridge and New York, 1994); Robert V. Bruce, The launching of modern American science, 1846-1876 (Ithaca, NY, 1987).
9. See Hugh Richard Slotten, Patronage, practice, and the culture of American science: Alexander Dallas Bache and the U.S. Coast Survey (Cambridge and New York, 1994); Robert V. Bruce, The launching of modern American science, 1846-1876 (Ithaca, NY, 1987).
10. Don K. Price, Government and science: Their dynamic relation in American democracy (New York, 1954). Robert Gilpin later characterized Government and science as the "first and foremost book on scientists and policy-making." C.P. Snow, in his Godkin Lecture in 1960, also offered it high praise: "Much the most interesting and experienced book on the subject that I have read." Gilpin, "Introduction: Natural scientists in policy-making," Robert Gilpin and Christopher Wright, eds., Scientists and national policy-making (New York, 1964), 2; C.P. Snow, Science and government (Cambridge, 1961), 84, n. 1.
11. Don K. Price, Government and science: Their dynamic relation in American democracy (New York, 1954). Robert Gilpin later characterized Government and science as the "first and foremost book on scientists and policy-making." C.P. Snow, in his Godkin Lecture in 1960, also offered it high praise: "Much the most interesting and experienced book on the subject that I have read." Gilpin, "Introduction: Natural scientists in policy-making," Robert Gilpin and Christopher Wright, eds., Scientists and national policy-making (New York, 1964), 2; C.P. Snow, Science and government (Cambridge, 1961), 84, n. 1.
12. Don K. Price, Government and science: Their dynamic relation in American democracy (New York, 1954). Robert Gilpin later characterized Government and science as the "first and foremost book on scientists and policy-making." C.P. Snow, in his Godkin Lecture in 1960, also offered it high praise: "Much the most interesting and experienced book on the subject that I have read." Gilpin, "Introduction: Natural scientists in policy-making," Robert Gilpin and Christopher Wright, eds., Scientists and national policy-making (New York, 1964), 2; C.P. Snow, Science and government (Cambridge, 1961), 84, n. 1.
13. Don K. Price, "References and reminiscences," in Price, America's unwritten constitu-tion: Science, religion, and political responsibility (Baton Rouge, 1983), 153-193; and Daniel J. Kevles, The physicists: The history of a scientific community in modern America (Cambridge, 1987; orig. publ. Alfred A. Knopf, 1977), 350, 356, 361.
14. Don K. Price, "References and reminiscences," in Price, America's unwritten constitu-tion: Science, religion, and political responsibility (Baton Rouge, 1983), 153-193; and Daniel J. Kevles, The physicists: The history of a scientific community in modern America (Cambridge, 1987; orig. publ. Alfred A. Knopf, 1977), 350, 356, 361.
15. Don K. Price (ref. 7), 9-11, 65-72.
16. As Price explained in his preface, over a pericd of several years he came to realize "that the development of public policy and of the methods of its administration owed less in the long run to the processes of conflict among political parties and social or economic pressure groups than to the more objective processes of research and discussion among professional groups." Ibid., v. The organizational historians rediscovered and elaborated upon Price's insight some two decades later. See Louis Galarnbos, "The emerging organizational synthesis in modern American history," Labor history, 11 (1970), 279-290; and "Technology, political economy, and professionalization: Central themes of the organizational synthesis," Business history review, 57 (1983), 471-493.
17. As Price explained in his preface, over a pericd of several years he came to realize "that the development of public policy and of the methods of its administration owed less in the long run to the processes of conflict among political parties and social or economic pressure groups than to the more objective processes of research and discussion among professional groups." Ibid., v. The organizational historians rediscovered and elaborated upon Price's insight some two decades later. See Louis Galarnbos, "The emerging organizational synthesis in modern American history," Labor history, 11 (1970), 279-290; and "Technology, political economy, and professionalization: Central themes of the organizational synthesis," Business history review, 57 (1983), 471-493.
18. Price (ref. 7), 28.
19. Ibid., 30.
20. Two classic historical studies of the politics of American science were published in the late 1950s, however: A. Hunter Dupree, Science in the federal government: A history of policies and activities to 1940 (Cambridge, 1957); and Samuel P. Hays, Conservation and the gospel of efficiency: The progressive conservation movement 1890-1920 (Cambridge, 1959).
21. Two classic historical studies of the politics of American science were published in the late 1950s, however: A. Hunter Dupree, Science in the federal government: A history of policies and activities to 1940 (Cambridge, 1957); and Samuel P. Hays, Conservation and the gospel of efficiency: The progressive conservation movement 1890-1920 (Cambridge, 1959).
22. Minerva's editorial board boasted a veritable who's who of nuclear physics, arms control, and the history, sociology, and philosophy of science. The board included J. Robert Oppenheimer, Eugene Rabinowitch, Cyril Stanley Smith, Gerald Holton, Thomas S. Kuhn, Michael Polanyi, and C.P. Snow. The American sociologist Edward A. Shils, who had a long-standing interest in scientists and politics, was Minerva's founding editor.
23. References to Snow and Eisenhower pervaded scientific discussions as well. As Price later observed, "During the early 1960's, it was a rare scientific meeting that failed to discuss two pronouncements on the relation of science to politics. The first was Sir Charles Snow's vivid story about the wartime rivalry of Tizard and Lindemann....That 'cautionary tale' warned us that democracy was in danger from the great gulf in understanding between the Two Cultures of science and the humanities, and from any possible monopoly on scientific advice to high political authority. The second was the farewell address of President Elsenhower." Price, The scientific estate (Cambridge, 1965), 11.
24. Tom Engelhardt, The end of victory culture: Cold War America and the disillusioning of a generation (New York, 1995); Richard H. Pells, The liberal mind in a conservative age: American intellectuals in the 1940s and 1950s (New York, 1985), chapt. 4, esp. 232-261; John Kenneth Galbraith, The affluent society (Boston, 1958), esp. chapts. 10 and 18.
25. Tom Engelhardt, The end of victory culture: Cold War America and the disillusioning of a generation (New York, 1995); Richard H. Pells, The liberal mind in a conservative age: American intellectuals in the 1940s and 1950s (New York, 1985), chapt. 4, esp. 232-261; John Kenneth Galbraith, The affluent society (Boston, 1958), esp. chapts. 10 and 18.
26. Tom Engelhardt, The end of victory culture: Cold War America and the disillusioning of a generation (New York, 1995); Richard H. Pells, The liberal mind in a conservative age: American intellectuals in the 1940s and 1950s (New York, 1985), chapt. 4, esp. 232-261; John Kenneth Galbraith, The affluent society (Boston, 1958), esp. chapts. 10 and 18.
27. C.P. Snow, The two cultures and the scientific revolution (Cambridge, 1959), 4 and 39. On the history of the two cultures concept, see Zuoyue Wang, "The First World War, academic science, and the 'Two cultures': Educational reforms at the University of Cambridge," Minerva, 33 (1995), 107-127; David A. Hollinger, "Science as a weapon in Kulturkämpfe in the United States during and after World War II," Isis, 86 (1995), 440-454, esp. 448-449.
28. C.P. Snow, The two cultures and the scientific revolution (Cambridge, 1959), 4 and 39. On the history of the two cultures concept, see Zuoyue Wang, "The First World War, academic science, and the 'Two cultures': Educational reforms at the University of Cambridge," Minerva, 33 (1995), 107-127; David A. Hollinger, "Science as a weapon in Kulturkämpfe in the United States during and after World War II," Isis, 86 (1995), 440-454, esp. 448-449.
29. C.P. Snow, The two cultures and the scientific revolution (Cambridge, 1959), 4 and 39. On the history of the two cultures concept, see Zuoyue Wang, "The First World War, academic science, and the 'Two cultures': Educational reforms at the University of Cambridge," Minerva, 33 (1995), 107-127; David A. Hollinger, "Science as a weapon in Kulturkämpfe in the United States during and after World War II," Isis, 86 (1995), 440-454, esp. 448-449.
30. Snow (ref. 17), 5-6, 11, 38-44.
31. Snow (ref. 7), 1-2.
32. On the shortcomings of Snow's account, see Albert Wohlstetter, "Strategy and the natural scientists," in Gilpin and Wright, eds. (ref. 17), 176, n. 5.
33. Snow (ref. 7), 23-36.
34. Ibid., 36-38. On 56, Snow defined "closed politics" as follows: "I mean any kind of politics in which there is no appeal to a larger assembly - larger assembly in the sense of a group of opinion, or an electorate, or on an even bigger scale what we call loosely 'social forces.'...[A]lmost all secret scientific choices are something like pure closed politics."
35. Ibid., 47-51.
36. . Ibid., 68-72. Cf. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Secrecy (New Haven, 1998).
37. Snow (ref. 7), 80-84.
38. Hannah Arendt's The origins of totalitarianism provided the classic cold war statement of the nature of totalitarian society. Pells (ref. 16), esp. 83-96; Abbott Gleason, Totalitarianism: The inner history of the Cold War (New York, 1995).
39. Hannah Arendt's The origins of totalitarianism provided the classic cold war statement of the nature of totalitarian society. Pells (ref. 16), esp. 83-96; Abbott Gleason, Totalitarianism: The inner history of the Cold War (New York, 1995).
40. Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Farewell address," Vital speeches of the day, 27 (1 Feb 1961), 228, 229.
41. Ibid., 229.
42. Robert Gilpin, American scientists and nuclear weapons policy (Princeton, 1962); Gilpin and Wright, eds. (ref. 17); Price (ref. 15); and Ralph E. Lapp, The new priesthood: The scientific elite and the uses of power (New York, 1965).
43. Robert Gilpin, American scientists and nuclear weapons policy (Princeton, 1962); Gilpin and Wright, eds. (ref. 17); Price (ref. 15); and Ralph E. Lapp, The new priesthood: The scientific elite and the uses of power (New York, 1965).
44. Don K. Price, "The scientific establishment," in Gilpin and Wright, eds. (ref. 17), 19, reprinted from American Philosophical Society, Proceedings, June 1962.
45. Price (ref. 15), 4, 6-8, on 8.
46. Ibid., 81, 129.
47. Ibid., 172, 270.
48. Ibid., 163.
49. Ibid., 15.
50. Ibid., 49.
51. Ibid., 45.
52. Ibid., 15-19, 45-48, 56, 97, 132-134.
53. Ibid., vii-viii. Cf. Price's insistence on the need for "a theory of the relation of science to political authority" rooted in an understanding of "the way scientists behave in relation to politicians, both individually and in the organizations to which they belong." Ibid., 59.
54. Ibid., 17.
55. Ibid., 58, 78: "[A parliamentary democracy] is not very much inclined to turn scientists loose to experiment with policy issues, or to license irresponsible private institutions to explore the inner workings of government."
56. Ibid., 58, 77-79.
57. Ibid., 79.
58. Ibid., 132. On the limitations of science, see also 103, 111, 117, 126-131.
59. Ibid., 202-204, giving the example of the AD-X2 battery additive. Cf. Tehodore M. Porter, Trust in numbers: The pursuit of objectivity in science and public life (Princeton, 1995), chapt. 7.
60. Price (ref. 15), 135.
61. Ibid., 125.
62. Ibid., 155.
63. Ibid., 137.
64. Ibid., 138 and 139.
65. Ibid., 171.
66. Ibid., 166-171, on 166.
67. Ibid., 189-190.
68. Ibid., 162.
69. Price (ref. 8), xiii.
70. On Ezrahi's intellectual debts to Merton and Price, see Yaron Ezrahi, The descent of Icarus: Science and the transformation of contemporary democracy (Cambridge, 1990), viii.
71. Ibid., 263.
72. Ibid., 10.
73. Ibid., 71-73, on 72, 73.
74. Ibid., 74-87, on 74.
75. Ibid., 87-90, 105-108, on 88.
76. Ibid., 75, 82-83. Although Ezrahi did not cite Habermas, he appeared to reach toward a notion that science played a central role in the creation of the public sphere itself, by creating a public that operated as an audience of engaged spectators. His notion that science helps to sustain a particular type of "public space" or "public realm" also seems to refer implicitly to Habermas. See Ezrahi (ref. 56), 127, 203, 231, 247, 278, 281. See also Thomas Broman, "The Habermasian public sphere and 'science in the Enlightenment,'" History of science, 36 (1998), 123-149, and Alex Soojung-Kim Pang, "Visual representation and post-constructivist history of science," HSPS, 28:1 (1997), 139-171.
77. Ibid., 75, 82-83. Although Ezrahi did not cite Habermas, he appeared to reach toward a notion that science played a central role in the creation of the public sphere itself, by creating a public that operated as an audience of engaged spectators. His notion that science helps to sustain a particular type of "public space" or "public realm" also seems to refer implicitly to Habermas. See Ezrahi (ref. 56), 127, 203, 231, 247, 278, 281. See also Thomas Broman, "The Habermasian public sphere and 'science in the Enlightenment,'" History of science, 36 (1998), 123-149, and Alex Soojung-Kim Pang, "Visual representation and post-constructivist history of science," HSPS, 28:1 (1997), 139-171.
78. Ezrahi (ref. 56), 13, 33.
79. Ibid., 34-35.
80. Yaron Ezrahi, "Technology and the illusion of the escape from politics," Yaron Ezrahi, Everett Mendelsohn, and Howard P. Segal, eds., Technology, pessimism, and postmodernism (Amherst, 1995; orig. pub. in Dordrecht, 1994), 30.
81. Ezrahi (ref. 56), chapt. 5. Ezrahi (ibid., 147-148) contrasted American and English political styles: "Unlike its American counterpart, the English system, in which the emphasis is on the will and autonomy of political actors, does not base the theatrics of public action on the trust given to transparent actors and visible actions. Even English business executives, whose successful performance is most perceptible in the material world of practical action, have characteristically tried to withdraw to an inaccessible space, to evolve an inner unobservable dimension which aristocratic culture postulates as a necessary condition of upper-class dignity and freedom. English styles of action in comparison with American ones, therefore, have been less hospitable to the machine metaphor and to instrumentalism as a means of externalizing action in a realm of observable causes and effects, of making action transparent in a visual public space, or of projecting it as a balance between voluntarism and determinism, engagement and detachment, freedom and accountability."
82. Ibid., chapt. 9. See also Jordan (ref. 2).
83. Cf. Paul Forman, "Recent science: Late-modern and post-modern," Thomas Söderqvist, ed., The historiography of contemporary science and technology (Amsterdam, 1997), 179-213.
84. Ezrahi (ref. 56), 236.
85. Ibid., 282.
86. Ibid., 253-262, on 261.
87. Ezrahi suggested, ironically, that science itself provided the foundation for the reflexive gaze when discoveries in quantum physics suggested that the observer of a phenomenon could affect the nature of what was being observed. Ezrahi cautioned against assuming that modern physics automatically implied the impossibility of objectivity. Quantum physics undermined modernist visual culture, but not necessarily objectivity itself: "When a Heisenberg or an Einstein discards the authority of the eye in judging scientific theories or in understanding the world, he does not deny that scientific theories are objective rather than arbitrary....What is denied is not the possibility of rigorous scientific knowledge but the established authority of visual witnessing." Ibid., 269-282, on 276.
88. See, for example, Russell Jacoby, The end of Utopia: Politics and culture in an age of apathy (New York, 1999).
89. Ezrahi (ref. 56), 289-290.
90. Ibid., 91-94, 125.
91. Ibid., viii. See also 194 and 222 for Ezrahi's interpretation of Merton's essay of 1942.
92. Ibid., 22-23. See also Alexei Kojevnikov's essay in this issue.
93. Ezrahi (ref. 56), 53, 140-141, 147, 156-166, 199-208. Mary Jo Nye's recent work on P.M.S. Blackett reinforces Ezrahi's point. Nye observes that despite the unpopularity of his political outlook, "Blackett's status as an officer, a gentleman, and a scientist in a small elite of Englishmen who were well-known to each other insured a hearing in the corridors of power, however controversial his views on war j.nd politics." Nye, "A physicist in the corridors of power: P.M.S. Blackett's opposition to atomic weapons following the war," Physics in perspective, 1 (1999), 136-156, on 153.
94. The growing visibility of conflicts among scientific experts has, of course, undermined the notion that scientific knowledge alone can settle political disputes. Brian Balogh, Chain reaction: Expert debate and public participation in American commercial nuclear power, 1945-1975 (Cambridge, 1991), esp. chapt. 8; and Sheila Jasanoff, The fifth branch: Science advisers as policymakers (Cambridge, 1990). The realization that facts do not by themselves define courses of political action is far from new, however; as discussed previously, Price recognized this reality in The scientific estate.
95. The growing visibility of conflicts among scientific experts has, of course, undermined the notion that scientific knowledge alone can settle political disputes. Brian Balogh, Chain reaction: Expert debate and public participation in American commercial nuclear power, 1945-1975 (Cambridge, 1991), esp. chapt. 8; and Sheila Jasanoff, The fifth branch: Science advisers as policymakers (Cambridge, 1990). The realization that facts do not by themselves define courses of political action is far from new, however; as discussed previously, Price recognized this reality in The scientific estate.
96. Hollinger (ref. 4), 81.