Deconstructing the new efficiency rationale

Cornell Law Review

Volumn 86, Issue 5, 2001, Pages 1003-1005

  Sanchirico, Chris William ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0347079849     PISSN: 00108847     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (16)

1. For a review of the various efficiency concepts used by law-and-economics scholars, see Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509 (1980). Although pure efficiency analysis is the dominant mode of analysis in law and economics, not all scholarship in the field has ignored distributional considerations. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093 (1971); Jennifer H. Arlen, Should Defendants' Wealth Matter?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 413 (1992); Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211 (1991); Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472 (1980); Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Defining Efficient Care: The Role of Income Distribution, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 189 (1995); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075 (1980). A recent and prominent exchange in the law review literature has, on close inspection, only tangential bearing on the central issue of whether legal rules should be informed by distributional considerations. Howard F. Chang, A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and the Pareto Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 173 (2000) [hereinafter Chang, Liberal Theory]; Howard F. Chang, The Possibility of a Fair Paretian, 110 YALE L.J. 251 (2000) [hereinafter Chang, Fair Paretian]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961 (2001) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Notions of Fairness Versus the Pareto Principle: On the Role of Logical Consistency, 110 YALE L.J. 237 (2000) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Notions of Fairness]. Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell argue that policy choices should be made solely on the basis of how various alternatives affect individual well-being, and not on the basis of other criteria, which they group under the heading of "fairness." See Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare, supra. Kaplow and Shavell are careful to note that this position accommodates making policy choices on the basis of how policies affect the distribution of individual welfare. See Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare, supra. Yet, a close reading of their work indicates that - for the very reasons criticized in the present article - Kaplow and Shavell still envision no role for distributional considerations in evaluating legal rules. See Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare, supra. Howard F. Chang's critique of Kaplow and Shavell does not address their reasons for excluding legal rules from redistributional policy, but rather addresses the issues of whether all kinds of individual preferences should be respected in calculating social welfare and whether it really is technically impossible, as Kaplow and Shavell claim, to construct a social-welfare function that respects Pareto optimality and also values non-welfarist principles like "fairness." See Chang, Liberal Theory, supra; Chang, Fair Paretian, supra.
2. For a review of the various efficiency concepts used by law-and-economics scholars, see Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509 (1980). Although pure efficiency analysis is the dominant mode of analysis in law and economics, not all scholarship in the field has ignored distributional considerations. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093 (1971); Jennifer H. Arlen, Should Defendants' Wealth Matter?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 413 (1992); Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211 (1991); Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472 (1980); Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Defining Efficient Care: The Role of Income Distribution, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 189 (1995); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075 (1980). A recent and prominent exchange in the law review literature has, on close inspection, only tangential bearing on the central issue of whether legal rules should be informed by distributional considerations. Howard F. Chang, A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and the Pareto Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 173 (2000) [hereinafter Chang, Liberal Theory]; Howard F. Chang, The Possibility of a Fair Paretian, 110 YALE L.J. 251 (2000) [hereinafter Chang, Fair Paretian]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961 (2001) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Notions of Fairness Versus the Pareto Principle: On the Role of Logical Consistency, 110 YALE L.J. 237 (2000) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Notions of Fairness]. Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell argue that policy choices should be made solely on the basis of how various alternatives affect individual well-being, and not on the basis of other criteria, which they group under the heading of "fairness." See Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare, supra. Kaplow and Shavell are careful to note that this position accommodates making policy choices on the basis of how policies affect the distribution of individual welfare. See Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare, supra. Yet, a close reading of their work indicates that - for the very reasons criticized in the present article - Kaplow and Shavell still envision no role for distributional considerations in evaluating legal rules. See Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare, supra. Howard F. Chang's critique of Kaplow and Shavell does not address their reasons for excluding legal rules from redistributional policy, but rather addresses the issues of whether all kinds of individual preferences should be respected in calculating social welfare and whether it really is technically impossible, as Kaplow and Shavell claim, to construct a social-welfare function that respects Pareto optimality and also values non-welfarist principles like "fairness." See Chang, Liberal Theory, supra; Chang, Fair Paretian, supra.
3. For a review of the various efficiency concepts used by law-and-economics scholars, see Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509 (1980). Although pure efficiency analysis is the dominant mode of analysis in law and economics, not all scholarship in the field has ignored distributional considerations. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093 (1971); Jennifer H. Arlen, Should Defendants' Wealth Matter?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 413 (1992); Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211 (1991); Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472 (1980); Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Defining Efficient Care: The Role of Income Distribution, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 189 (1995); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075 (1980). A recent and prominent exchange in the law review literature has, on close inspection, only tangential bearing on the central issue of whether legal rules should be informed by distributional considerations. Howard F. Chang, A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and the Pareto Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 173 (2000) [hereinafter Chang, Liberal Theory]; Howard F. Chang, The Possibility of a Fair Paretian, 110 YALE L.J. 251 (2000) [hereinafter Chang, Fair Paretian]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961 (2001) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Notions of Fairness Versus the Pareto Principle: On the Role of Logical Consistency, 110 YALE L.J. 237 (2000) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Notions of Fairness]. Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell argue that policy choices should be made solely on the basis of how various alternatives affect individual well-being, and not on the basis of other criteria, which they group under the heading of "fairness." See Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare, supra. Kaplow and Shavell are careful to note that this position accommodates making policy choices on the basis of how policies affect the distribution of individual welfare. See Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare, supra. Yet, a close reading of their work indicates that - for the very reasons criticized in the present article - Kaplow and Shavell still envision no role for distributional considerations in evaluating legal rules. See Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare, supra. Howard F. Chang's critique of Kaplow and Shavell does not address their reasons for excluding legal rules from redistributional policy, but rather addresses the issues of whether all kinds of individual preferences should be respected in calculating social welfare and whether it really is technically impossible, as Kaplow and Shavell claim, to construct a social-welfare function that respects Pareto optimality and also values non-welfarist principles like "fairness." See Chang, Liberal Theory, supra; Chang, Fair Paretian, supra.
4. For a review of the various efficiency concepts used by law-and-economics scholars, see Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509 (1980). Although pure efficiency analysis is the dominant mode of analysis in law and economics, not all scholarship in the field has ignored distributional considerations. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093 (1971); Jennifer H. Arlen, Should Defendants' Wealth Matter?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 413 (1992); Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211 (1991); Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472 (1980); Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Defining Efficient Care: The Role of Income Distribution, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 189 (1995); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075 (1980). A recent and prominent exchange in the law review literature has, on close inspection, only tangential bearing on the central issue of whether legal rules should be informed by distributional considerations. Howard F. Chang, A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and the Pareto Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 173 (2000) [hereinafter Chang, Liberal Theory]; Howard F. Chang, The Possibility of a Fair Paretian, 110 YALE L.J. 251 (2000) [hereinafter Chang, Fair Paretian]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961 (2001) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Notions of Fairness Versus the Pareto Principle: On the Role of Logical Consistency, 110 YALE L.J. 237 (2000) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Notions of Fairness]. Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell argue that policy choices should be made solely on the basis of how various alternatives affect individual well-being, and not on the basis of other criteria, which they group under the heading of "fairness." See Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare, supra. Kaplow and Shavell are careful to note that this position accommodates making policy choices on the basis of how policies affect the distribution of individual welfare. See Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare, supra. Yet, a close reading of their work indicates that - for the very reasons criticized in the present article - Kaplow and Shavell still envision no role for distributional considerations in evaluating legal rules. See Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare, supra. Howard F. Chang's critique of Kaplow and Shavell does not address their reasons for excluding legal rules from redistributional policy, but rather addresses the issues of whether all kinds of individual preferences should be respected in calculating social welfare and whether it really is technically impossible, as Kaplow and Shavell claim, to construct a social-welfare function that respects Pareto optimality and also values non-welfarist principles like "fairness." See Chang, Liberal Theory, supra; Chang, Fair Paretian, supra.
5. For a review of the various efficiency concepts used by law-and-economics scholars, see Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509 (1980). Although pure efficiency analysis is the dominant mode of analysis in law and economics, not all scholarship in the field has ignored distributional considerations. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093 (1971); Jennifer H. Arlen, Should Defendants' Wealth Matter?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 413 (1992); Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211 (1991); Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472 (1980); Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Defining Efficient Care: The Role of Income Distribution, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 189 (1995); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075 (1980). A recent and prominent exchange in the law review literature has, on close inspection, only tangential bearing on the central issue of whether legal rules should be informed by distributional considerations. Howard F. Chang, A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and the Pareto Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 173 (2000) [hereinafter Chang, Liberal Theory]; Howard F. Chang, The Possibility of a Fair Paretian, 110 YALE L.J. 251 (2000) [hereinafter Chang, Fair Paretian]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961 (2001) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Notions of Fairness Versus the Pareto Principle: On the Role of Logical Consistency, 110 YALE L.J. 237 (2000) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Notions of Fairness]. Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell argue that policy choices should be made solely on the basis of how various alternatives affect individual well-being, and not on the basis of other criteria, which they group under the heading of "fairness." See Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare, supra. Kaplow and Shavell are careful to note that this position accommodates making policy choices on the basis of how policies affect the distribution of individual welfare. See Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare, supra. Yet, a close reading of their work indicates that - for the very reasons criticized in the present article - Kaplow and Shavell still envision no role for distributional considerations in evaluating legal rules. See Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare, supra. Howard F. Chang's critique of Kaplow and Shavell does not address their reasons for excluding legal rules from redistributional policy, but rather addresses the issues of whether all kinds of individual preferences should be respected in calculating social welfare and whether it really is technically impossible, as Kaplow and Shavell claim, to construct a social-welfare function that respects Pareto optimality and also values non-welfarist principles like "fairness." See Chang, Liberal Theory, supra; Chang, Fair Paretian, supra.
6. For a review of the various efficiency concepts used by law-and-economics scholars, see Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509 (1980). Although pure efficiency analysis is the dominant mode of analysis in law and economics, not all scholarship in the field has ignored distributional considerations. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093 (1971); Jennifer H. Arlen, Should Defendants' Wealth Matter?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 413 (1992); Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211 (1991); Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472 (1980); Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Defining Efficient Care: The Role of Income Distribution, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 189 (1995); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075 (1980). A recent and prominent exchange in the law review literature has, on close inspection, only tangential bearing on the central issue of whether legal rules should be informed by distributional considerations. Howard F. Chang, A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and the Pareto Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 173 (2000) [hereinafter Chang, Liberal Theory]; Howard F. Chang, The Possibility of a Fair Paretian, 110 YALE L.J. 251 (2000) [hereinafter Chang, Fair Paretian]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961 (2001) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Notions of Fairness Versus the Pareto Principle: On the Role of Logical Consistency, 110 YALE L.J. 237 (2000) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Notions of Fairness]. Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell argue that policy choices should be made solely on the basis of how various alternatives affect individual well-being, and not on the basis of other criteria, which they group under the heading of "fairness." See Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare, supra. Kaplow and Shavell are careful to note that this position accommodates making policy choices on the basis of how policies affect the distribution of individual welfare. See Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare, supra. Yet, a close reading of their work indicates that - for the very reasons criticized in the present article - Kaplow and Shavell still envision no role for distributional considerations in evaluating legal rules. See Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare, supra. Howard F. Chang's critique of Kaplow and Shavell does not address their reasons for excluding legal rules from redistributional policy, but rather addresses the issues of whether all kinds of individual preferences should be respected in calculating social welfare and whether it really is technically impossible, as Kaplow and Shavell claim, to construct a social-welfare function that respects Pareto optimality and also values non-welfarist principles like "fairness." See Chang, Liberal Theory, supra; Chang, Fair Paretian, supra.
7. For a review of the various efficiency concepts used by law-and-economics scholars, see Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509 (1980). Although pure efficiency analysis is the dominant mode of analysis in law and economics, not all scholarship in the field has ignored distributional considerations. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093 (1971); Jennifer H. Arlen, Should Defendants' Wealth Matter?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 413 (1992); Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211 (1991); Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472 (1980); Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Defining Efficient Care: The Role of Income Distribution, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 189 (1995); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075 (1980). A recent and prominent exchange in the law review literature has, on close inspection, only tangential bearing on the central issue of whether legal rules should be informed by distributional considerations. Howard F. Chang, A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and the Pareto Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 173 (2000) [hereinafter Chang, Liberal Theory]; Howard F. Chang, The Possibility of a Fair Paretian, 110 YALE L.J. 251 (2000) [hereinafter Chang, Fair Paretian]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961 (2001) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Notions of Fairness Versus the Pareto Principle: On the Role of Logical Consistency, 110 YALE L.J. 237 (2000) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Notions of Fairness]. Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell argue that policy choices should be made solely on the basis of how various alternatives affect individual well-being, and not on the basis of other criteria, which they group under the heading of "fairness." See Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare, supra. Kaplow and Shavell are careful to note that this position accommodates making policy choices on the basis of how policies affect the distribution of individual welfare. See Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare, supra. Yet, a close reading of their work indicates that - for the very reasons criticized in the present article - Kaplow and Shavell still envision no role for distributional considerations in evaluating legal rules. See Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare, supra. Howard F. Chang's critique of Kaplow and Shavell does not address their reasons for excluding legal rules from redistributional policy, but rather addresses the issues of whether all kinds of individual preferences should be respected in calculating social welfare and whether it really is technically impossible, as Kaplow and Shavell claim, to construct a social-welfare function that respects Pareto optimality and also values non-welfarist principles like "fairness." See Chang, Liberal Theory, supra; Chang, Fair Paretian, supra.
8. For a review of the various efficiency concepts used by law-and-economics scholars, see Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509 (1980). Although pure efficiency analysis is the dominant mode of analysis in law and economics, not all scholarship in the field has ignored distributional considerations. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093 (1971); Jennifer H. Arlen, Should Defendants' Wealth Matter?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 413 (1992); Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211 (1991); Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472 (1980); Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Defining Efficient Care: The Role of Income Distribution, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 189 (1995); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075 (1980). A recent and prominent exchange in the law review literature has, on close inspection, only tangential bearing on the central issue of whether legal rules should be informed by distributional considerations. Howard F. Chang, A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and the Pareto Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 173 (2000) [hereinafter Chang, Liberal Theory]; Howard F. Chang, The Possibility of a Fair Paretian, 110 YALE L.J. 251 (2000) [hereinafter Chang, Fair Paretian]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961 (2001) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Notions of Fairness Versus the Pareto Principle: On the Role of Logical Consistency, 110 YALE L.J. 237 (2000) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Notions of Fairness]. Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell argue that policy choices should be made solely on the basis of how various alternatives affect individual well-being, and not on the basis of other criteria, which they group under the heading of "fairness." See Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare, supra. Kaplow and Shavell are careful to note that this position accommodates making policy choices on the basis of how policies affect the distribution of individual welfare. See Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare, supra. Yet, a close reading of their work indicates that - for the very reasons criticized in the present article - Kaplow and Shavell still envision no role for distributional considerations in evaluating legal rules. See Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare, supra. Howard F. Chang's critique of Kaplow and Shavell does not address their reasons for excluding legal rules from redistributional policy, but rather addresses the issues of whether all kinds of individual preferences should be respected in calculating social welfare and whether it really is technically impossible, as Kaplow and Shavell claim, to construct a social-welfare function that respects Pareto optimality and also values non-welfarist principles like "fairness." See Chang, Liberal Theory, supra; Chang, Fair Paretian, supra.
9. For a review of the various efficiency concepts used by law-and-economics scholars, see Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509 (1980). Although pure efficiency analysis is the dominant mode of analysis in law and economics, not all scholarship in the field has ignored distributional considerations. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093 (1971); Jennifer H. Arlen, Should Defendants' Wealth Matter?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 413 (1992); Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211 (1991); Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472 (1980); Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Defining Efficient Care: The Role of Income Distribution, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 189 (1995); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075 (1980). A recent and prominent exchange in the law review literature has, on close inspection, only tangential bearing on the central issue of whether legal rules should be informed by distributional considerations. Howard F. Chang, A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and the Pareto Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 173 (2000) [hereinafter Chang, Liberal Theory]; Howard F. Chang, The Possibility of a Fair Paretian, 110 YALE L.J. 251 (2000) [hereinafter Chang, Fair Paretian]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961 (2001) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Notions of Fairness Versus the Pareto Principle: On the Role of Logical Consistency, 110 YALE L.J. 237 (2000) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Notions of Fairness]. Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell argue that policy choices should be made solely on the basis of how various alternatives affect individual well-being, and not on the basis of other criteria, which they group under the heading of "fairness." See Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare, supra. Kaplow and Shavell are careful to note that this position accommodates making policy choices on the basis of how policies affect the distribution of individual welfare. See Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare, supra. Yet, a close reading of their work indicates that - for the very reasons criticized in the present article - Kaplow and Shavell still envision no role for distributional considerations in evaluating legal rules. See Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare, supra. Howard F. Chang's critique of Kaplow and Shavell does not address their reasons for excluding legal rules from redistributional policy, but rather addresses the issues of whether all kinds of individual preferences should be respected in calculating social welfare and whether it really is technically impossible, as Kaplow and Shavell claim, to construct a social-welfare function that respects Pareto optimality and also values non-welfarist principles like "fairness." See Chang, Liberal Theory, supra; Chang, Fair Paretian, supra.
10. For a review of the various efficiency concepts used by law-and-economics scholars, see Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509 (1980). Although pure efficiency analysis is the dominant mode of analysis in law and economics, not all scholarship in the field has ignored distributional considerations. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093 (1971); Jennifer H. Arlen, Should Defendants' Wealth Matter?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 413 (1992); Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211 (1991); Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472 (1980); Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Defining Efficient Care: The Role of Income Distribution, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 189 (1995); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075 (1980). A recent and prominent exchange in the law review literature has, on close inspection, only tangential bearing on the central issue of whether legal rules should be informed by distributional considerations. Howard F. Chang, A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and the Pareto Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 173 (2000) [hereinafter Chang, Liberal Theory]; Howard F. Chang, The Possibility of a Fair Paretian, 110 YALE L.J. 251 (2000) [hereinafter Chang, Fair Paretian]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961 (2001) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Notions of Fairness Versus the Pareto Principle: On the Role of Logical Consistency, 110 YALE L.J. 237 (2000) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Notions of Fairness]. Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell argue that policy choices should be made solely on the basis of how various alternatives affect individual well-being, and not on the basis of other criteria, which they group under the heading of "fairness." See Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare, supra. Kaplow and Shavell are careful to note that this position accommodates making policy choices on the basis of how policies affect the distribution of individual welfare. See Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare, supra. Yet, a close reading of their work indicates that - for the very reasons criticized in the present article - Kaplow and Shavell still envision no role for distributional considerations in evaluating legal rules. See Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare, supra. Howard F. Chang's critique of Kaplow and Shavell does not address their reasons for excluding legal rules from redistributional policy, but rather addresses the issues of whether all kinds of individual preferences should be respected in calculating social welfare and whether it really is technically impossible, as Kaplow and Shavell claim, to construct a social-welfare function that respects Pareto optimality and also values non-welfarist principles like "fairness." See Chang, Liberal Theory, supra; Chang, Fair Paretian, supra.
11. For a review of the various efficiency concepts used by law-and-economics scholars, see Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509 (1980). Although pure efficiency analysis is the dominant mode of analysis in law and economics, not all scholarship in the field has ignored distributional considerations. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093 (1971); Jennifer H. Arlen, Should Defendants' Wealth Matter?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 413 (1992); Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211 (1991); Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472 (1980); Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Defining Efficient Care: The Role of Income Distribution, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 189 (1995); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075 (1980). A recent and prominent exchange in the law review literature has, on close inspection, only tangential bearing on the central issue of whether legal rules should be informed by distributional considerations. Howard F. Chang, A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and the Pareto Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 173 (2000) [hereinafter Chang, Liberal Theory]; Howard F. Chang, The Possibility of a Fair Paretian, 110 YALE L.J. 251 (2000) [hereinafter Chang, Fair Paretian]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961 (2001) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Notions of Fairness Versus the Pareto Principle: On the Role of Logical Consistency, 110 YALE L.J. 237 (2000) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Notions of Fairness]. Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell argue that policy choices should be made solely on the basis of how various alternatives affect individual well-being, and not on the basis of other criteria, which they group under the heading of "fairness." See Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare, supra. Kaplow and Shavell are careful to note that this position accommodates making policy choices on the basis of how policies affect the distribution of individual welfare. See Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare, supra. Yet, a close reading of their work indicates that - for the very reasons criticized in the present article - Kaplow and Shavell still envision no role for distributional considerations in evaluating legal rules. See Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare, supra. Howard F. Chang's critique of Kaplow and Shavell does not address their reasons for excluding legal rules from redistributional policy, but rather addresses the issues of whether all kinds of individual preferences should be respected in calculating social welfare and whether it really is technically impossible, as Kaplow and Shavell claim, to construct a social-welfare function that respects Pareto optimality and also values non-welfarist principles like "fairness." See Chang, Liberal Theory, supra; Chang, Fair Paretian, supra.
12. For a review of the various efficiency concepts used by law-and-economics scholars, see Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509 (1980). Although pure efficiency analysis is the dominant mode of analysis in law and economics, not all scholarship in the field has ignored distributional considerations. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093 (1971); Jennifer H. Arlen, Should Defendants' Wealth Matter?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 413 (1992); Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211 (1991); Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472 (1980); Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Defining Efficient Care: The Role of Income Distribution, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 189 (1995); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075 (1980). A recent and prominent exchange in the law review literature has, on close inspection, only tangential bearing on the central issue of whether legal rules should be informed by distributional considerations. Howard F. Chang, A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and the Pareto Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 173 (2000) [hereinafter Chang, Liberal Theory]; Howard F. Chang, The Possibility of a Fair Paretian, 110 YALE L.J. 251 (2000) [hereinafter Chang, Fair Paretian]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961 (2001) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Notions of Fairness Versus the Pareto Principle: On the Role of Logical Consistency, 110 YALE L.J. 237 (2000) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Notions of Fairness]. Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell argue that policy choices should be made solely on the basis of how various alternatives affect individual well-being, and not on the basis of other criteria, which they group under the heading of "fairness." See Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare, supra. Kaplow and Shavell are careful to note that this position accommodates making policy choices on the basis of how policies affect the distribution of individual welfare. See Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare, supra. Yet, a close reading of their work indicates that - for the very reasons criticized in the present article - Kaplow and Shavell still envision no role for distributional considerations in evaluating legal rules. See Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare, supra. Howard F. Chang's critique of Kaplow and Shavell does not address their reasons for excluding legal rules from redistributional policy, but rather addresses the issues of whether all kinds of individual preferences should be respected in calculating social welfare and whether it really is technically impossible, as Kaplow and Shavell claim, to construct a social-welfare function that respects Pareto optimality and also values non-welfarist principles like "fairness." See Chang, Liberal Theory, supra; Chang, Fair Paretian, supra.
13. For a review of the various efficiency concepts used by law-and-economics scholars, see Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509 (1980). Although pure efficiency analysis is the dominant mode of analysis in law and economics, not all scholarship in the field has ignored distributional considerations. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093 (1971); Jennifer H. Arlen, Should Defendants' Wealth Matter?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 413 (1992); Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211 (1991); Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472 (1980); Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Defining Efficient Care: The Role of Income Distribution, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 189 (1995); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075 (1980). A recent and prominent exchange in the law review literature has, on close inspection, only tangential bearing on the central issue of whether legal rules should be informed by distributional considerations. Howard F. Chang, A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and the Pareto Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 173 (2000) [hereinafter Chang, Liberal Theory]; Howard F. Chang, The Possibility of a Fair Paretian, 110 YALE L.J. 251 (2000) [hereinafter Chang, Fair Paretian]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961 (2001) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Notions of Fairness Versus the Pareto Principle: On the Role of Logical Consistency, 110 YALE L.J. 237 (2000) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Notions of Fairness]. Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell argue that policy choices should be made solely on the basis of how various alternatives affect individual well-being, and not on the basis of other criteria, which they group under the heading of "fairness." See Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare, supra. Kaplow and Shavell are careful to note that this position accommodates making policy choices on the basis of how policies affect the distribution of individual welfare. See Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare, supra. Yet, a close reading of their work indicates that - for the very reasons criticized in the present article - Kaplow and Shavell still envision no role for distributional considerations in evaluating legal rules. See Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare, supra. Howard F. Chang's critique of Kaplow and Shavell does not address their reasons for excluding legal rules from redistributional policy, but rather addresses the issues of whether all kinds of individual preferences should be respected in calculating social welfare and whether it really is technically impossible, as Kaplow and Shavell claim, to construct a social-welfare function that respects Pareto optimality and also values non-welfarist principles like "fairness." See Chang, Liberal Theory, supra; Chang, Fair Paretian, supra.
14. For a review of the various efficiency concepts used by law-and-economics scholars, see Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509 (1980). Although pure efficiency analysis is the dominant mode of analysis in law and economics, not all scholarship in the field has ignored distributional considerations. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093 (1971); Jennifer H. Arlen, Should Defendants' Wealth Matter?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 413 (1992); Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211 (1991); Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472 (1980); Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Defining Efficient Care: The Role of Income Distribution, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 189 (1995); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075 (1980). A recent and prominent exchange in the law review literature has, on close inspection, only tangential bearing on the central issue of whether legal rules should be informed by distributional considerations. Howard F. Chang, A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and the Pareto Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 173 (2000) [hereinafter Chang, Liberal Theory]; Howard F. Chang, The Possibility of a Fair Paretian, 110 YALE L.J. 251 (2000) [hereinafter Chang, Fair Paretian]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961 (2001) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Notions of Fairness Versus the Pareto Principle: On the Role of Logical Consistency, 110 YALE L.J. 237 (2000) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Notions of Fairness]. Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell argue that policy choices should be made solely on the basis of how various alternatives affect individual well-being, and not on the basis of other criteria, which they group under the heading of "fairness." See Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare, supra. Kaplow and Shavell are careful to note that this position accommodates making policy choices on the basis of how policies affect the distribution of individual welfare. See Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare, supra. Yet, a close reading of their work indicates that - for the very reasons criticized in the present article - Kaplow and Shavell still envision no role for distributional considerations in evaluating legal rules. See Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare, supra. Howard F. Chang's critique of Kaplow and Shavell does not address their reasons for excluding legal rules from redistributional policy, but rather addresses the issues of whether all kinds of individual preferences should be respected in calculating social welfare and whether it really is technically impossible, as Kaplow and Shavell claim, to construct a social-welfare function that respects Pareto optimality and also values non-welfarist principles like "fairness." See Chang, Liberal Theory, supra; Chang, Fair Paretian, supra.
15. For a review of the various efficiency concepts used by law-and-economics scholars, see Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509 (1980). Although pure efficiency analysis is the dominant mode of analysis in law and economics, not all scholarship in the field has ignored distributional considerations. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093 (1971); Jennifer H. Arlen, Should Defendants' Wealth Matter?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 413 (1992); Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211 (1991); Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472 (1980); Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Defining Efficient Care: The Role of Income Distribution, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 189 (1995); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075 (1980). A recent and prominent exchange in the law review literature has, on close inspection, only tangential bearing on the central issue of whether legal rules should be informed by distributional considerations. Howard F. Chang, A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and the Pareto Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 173 (2000) [hereinafter Chang, Liberal Theory]; Howard F. Chang, The Possibility of a Fair Paretian, 110 YALE L.J. 251 (2000) [hereinafter Chang, Fair Paretian]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961 (2001) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Notions of Fairness Versus the Pareto Principle: On the Role of Logical Consistency, 110 YALE L.J. 237 (2000) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Notions of Fairness]. Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell argue that policy choices should be made solely on the basis of how various alternatives affect individual well-being, and not on the basis of other criteria, which they group under the heading of "fairness." See Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare, supra. Kaplow and Shavell are careful to note that this position accommodates making policy choices on the basis of how policies affect the distribution of individual welfare. See Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare, supra. Yet, a close reading of their work indicates that - for the very reasons criticized in the present article - Kaplow and Shavell still envision no role for distributional considerations in evaluating legal rules. See Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare, supra. Howard F. Chang's critique of Kaplow and Shavell does not address their reasons for excluding legal rules from redistributional policy, but rather addresses the issues of whether all kinds of individual preferences should be respected in calculating social welfare and whether it really is technically impossible, as Kaplow and Shavell claim, to construct a social-welfare function that respects Pareto optimality and also values non-welfarist principles like "fairness." See Chang, Liberal Theory, supra; Chang, Fair Paretian, supra.
16. For a review of the various efficiency concepts used by law-and-economics scholars, see Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509 (1980). Although pure efficiency analysis is the dominant mode of analysis in law and economics, not all scholarship in the field has ignored distributional considerations. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093 (1971); Jennifer H. Arlen, Should Defendants' Wealth Matter?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 413 (1992); Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211 (1991); Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472 (1980); Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Defining Efficient Care: The Role of Income Distribution, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 189 (1995); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075 (1980). A recent and prominent exchange in the law review literature has, on close inspection, only tangential bearing on the central issue of whether legal rules should be informed by distributional considerations. Howard F. Chang, A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and the Pareto Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 173 (2000) [hereinafter Chang, Liberal Theory]; Howard F. Chang, The Possibility of a Fair Paretian, 110 YALE L.J. 251 (2000) [hereinafter Chang, Fair Paretian]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961 (2001) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Notions of Fairness Versus the Pareto Principle: On the Role of Logical Consistency, 110 YALE L.J. 237 (2000) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Notions of Fairness]. Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell argue that policy choices should be made solely on the basis of how various alternatives affect individual well-being, and not on the basis of other criteria, which they group under the heading of "fairness." See Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare, supra. Kaplow and Shavell are careful to note that this position accommodates making policy choices on the basis of how policies affect the distribution of individual welfare. See Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare, supra. Yet, a close reading of their work indicates that - for the very reasons criticized in the present article - Kaplow and Shavell still envision no role for distributional considerations in evaluating legal rules. See Kaplow & Shavell, Welfare, supra. Howard F. Chang's critique of Kaplow and Shavell does not address their reasons for excluding legal rules from redistributional policy, but rather addresses the issues of whether all kinds of individual preferences should be respected in calculating social welfare and whether it really is technically impossible, as Kaplow and Shavell claim, to construct a social-welfare function that respects Pareto optimality and also values non-welfarist principles like "fairness." See Chang, Liberal Theory, supra; Chang, Fair Paretian, supra.