Toyota v. Williams: The Disability Analysis Continues

Employee Relations Law Journal

Volumn 28, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 25-46

  Mook, Jonathan R ^a  

^a DiMuro   (United States)

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EID: 0346996133     PISSN: 00988898     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (46)

1. Since its inception, the employment provisions of the ADA have spurred several Supreme Court cases that have tested its depth and breadth, the first group of which were decided almost three years ago. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (correctable conditions, such as poor eyesight, do not constitute disabilities); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516 (1999) (employee whose high blood pressure was controlled by medication was not disabled); Albertson's Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999) (monocular vision, in and of itself, does not constitute disability).
2. Edward Walsh, "High Court Narrows Disabilities Act Scope," The Washington Post, Jan. 9, 2002, A-1.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Ms. Williams' complaint asserted that Toyota had violated the ADA and the Kentucky Civil Rights Act by failing to reasonably accommodate her disability and by terminating her employment. Ms. Williams later amended her complaint to additionally claim a violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act.
6. The district court also rejected Williams' claim that her termination violated the ADA because at the time she was terminated, her physicians had restricted her from performing work of any kind.
7. Williams v. Toyota, 224 F.3d 840 (6th Cir. 2000). The court of appeals, however, affirmed the district court's determination that Williams' termination did not violate the ADA because at the time of Ms. Williams' termination, her physicians had prohibited her totally from working. 224 F.3d at 844.
8. Id. Because the court found that Williams was substantially limited in performing manual tasks, the Sixth Circuit did not reach the issue of whether she had been substantially limited in other major life activities, such as lifting or working.
9. 224 F.3d at 846-48.
10. Id. at 847. Judge Boggs also pointed out that even if Ms. Williams were deemed to be disabled and covered by the ADA, Toyota had accommodated her by assigning her to lighter work in the paint inspection unit.
11. Cf. Thornton v. McClatchy Newspaper, Inc., 261 F.3d 789, 797 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2001) (expressing "doubt" as to whether court of appeals decision in Toyota represented the "correct approach.").
12. See Helfter v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 115 F.3d 613 (8th Cir. 1997); Gutridge v. Klure, 153 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 1998); Crompton v. St. Vincent's Hospital, 963 F. Supp. 1104 (N.D. Ala. 1997); Adair v. W.H. Braum's, Inc., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5789 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 1999); Watson v. Cencom Cable, 993 F. Supp. 1149 (M.D. Tex. 1997); Wilmarth v. Ciiy of Santa Rosa, 945 F. Supp. 1271 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Price v. Marathan Cheese Corp., 119 F.3d 330 (5th Cir. 1997); Jenkins-Alan v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 18F. Supp.2d 885 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Ouzts v. USAir, Inc., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11610 (W.D. Pa. July 26, 1996), aff'd, 118 F.3d 1577 (3d Cir. 1997); Chanda v. Engelhard/ICC, 234 F.3d 1219 (11th Cir. 2000).
13. See, e.g., Tice v. Centre Area Transportation Authority, 247 F.3d 506, 512 (3d Cir. 2001); Broosaro v. University of California at Berkeley, 192 F.3d 1252, 1257 (9th Cir. 1999).
14. In order for a physical or mental impairment to rise to the level of an actual "disability," the impairment must "substantially limitII one or more. . . major life activities." 42 U.S.C. §12102(2)(A). The ADA also covers individuals who have a record of a disability and those regarded as having a disability. 42 U.S.C. §12102(2)(B), (C). The only issue before the Supreme Court was whether Ms. Williams had an actual disability. Hence, the Court's decision did not discuss the "record of" or "regarded as" prongs of the ADA definition.
15. 122 S.Ct. at 691, citing Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 2280 (1976) and 17 Oxford English Dictionary at 66-67 (2d ed. 1989).
16. 122 S.Ct. at 691, citing Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 2280 (1976) and 17 Oxford English Dictionary at 66-67 (2d ed. 1989).
17. 122 S.Ct. at 691. The Court recognized that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission had issued regulations interpreting the term "disability," but left open the issue as to "what level of deference they are due" in light of the fact that both parties accepted the regulations as "reasonable." Id.
18. Id. at 691.
19. 122 S.Ct. at 691, citing 42 U.S.C. §12101(a)(1).
20. 122 S.Ct. at 691.
21. Id. at 692. Justice O'Connor's opinion cites to articles in a number of medical journals dealing with the variations in duration and degree of symptoms experienced by those suffering from carpal tunnel syndrome. Id.
22. Id. at 693.
23. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491. Significantly, Justice O'Connor's opinion in Toyota sidesteps the question, first raised in Sutton, as to whether working should be considered a "major life activity" under the ADA. The opinion simply mentions that the Court had "been hesitant to hold as much, and we need not decide this difficult question today." 2002 U.S. LEXIS 400 at *29.
24. Id. at 694.
25. Toyota, in its brief on the merits, had sought reinstatement of the district court's grant of summary judgment in its favor. Because Toyota had not sought this relief in its petition for certiorari, however, the Court found that the question of whether the company was entitled to summary judgment was not properly before the Court. 2002 U.S. LEXIS 400 at *34.
26. Transcript of Oral Argument, Toyota Motor Mfg. Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, No. 00-1089, at 27 (Nov. 8, 2001).
27. The fact that the United States filed a brief in support of the employer's position caused some consternation among disability rights advocates, who feared that the Justice Department's action might be a signal of the Administration's lack of willingness to support disability rights. As stated by Chai Feldblum, a professor of law at Georgetown University Law Center, "they [the Justice Department] could have done it because they were being hyper-technical, and they could have done it because they were trying to pander in some way to the business community." See Sarah Schafer, "Case Leaves Disabilities Activists Wary of Bush Policy," The Washington Post, Aug. 8, 2001, at E-1.
28. Transcript of Oral Argument, note 25 at 18.
29. Id. at 18-19.
30. Id. at 25-26.
31. See, e.g., Chanda v. Engelhard/ICC, 234 F.3d 1219 (11th Cir. 2000) (employee with tendinitis who was prevented from cutting foam board with utility knife as part of his job as a quality control technician was not disabled); Hilburn v. Murata Elecs. N. Am., Inc., 181 F.3d 1220, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999) (plaintiff's inability to perform certain job functions did not substantially limit her in the major life activity of performing manual tasks); Snow v. Ridgeview Med. Ctr., 128 F.3d 1201, 1207 (8th Cir. 1997) (inability to perform manual tasks associated with a full-time laboratory technician not disabling); Skorup v. Modem Door Corp., 153 F.3d 512, 515 (7th Cir. 1998) (plaintiff's tendinitis preventing jobs requiring a "repetitive pulling motion of the shoulder" not a disability); Dutcher v. Ingals Shipbuilding, 53 F.3d 723 (5th Cir. 1995) ("inability to perform one task of job" due to physical impairment did not render employee disabled); Hutchinson v. United Parcel Serv., 883 F.Supp. 379 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (employee who could not lift over 40 pounds and, as a result, could not perform various aspects of job was not disabled); Dotson v. Electro-Wire Prod., Inc., 890 F.Supp. 982 (D. Kan. 1995) (where plaintiff unable to perform only one aspect of former job due to physical impairment, plaintiff was not disabled); Bedwell v. Jefferson Smurfit Corp., 947 F.Supp. 1322 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (where plaintiff's bursitis prevented her from doing any one job at employer's facility, plaintiff was not disabled); Huffman v. Ace Elec. Co., 833 F.Supp. 1469 (D. Kan. 1994) (impairment that limits individual's ability to perform only one particular job is not an ADA covered disability).
32. Brief of Amicus Curiae, National Association of Manufacturers at 15, Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams (No. 00-1089), citing "Facts About Carpal Tunnel Syndrome," American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons.
33. Eric Herman, "Ruling Roils the Disabled," Daily News, Jan. 9, 2002, p. 27.
34. Transcript of Oral Argument, note 25 at 37.
35. 42 U.S.C. §12101(a)(7).
36. "Insurers Expect Toyota v. Williams to Affect Rulemaking." CTD NEWS Work-place Solutions for Repetitive Stress Injuries, Feb. 19, 2002. Efforts to put in place ergonomics regulations on the federal level were put on hold last year when Congress rescinded the Clinton Administration's ergonomics standard. The revoked standard would have required virtually all employers to implement an ergonomics program to adopt engineering and administrative controls to eliminate ergonomic hazards, and to inform and train employees about ergonomic hazards and symptoms. In addition, the standard would have required employers to fully compensate employees who might be required to take a lower-paying light duty position while recuperating from an ergonomics injury and to supplement temporary total disability benefits paid to injured employees of up to 90 percent of the employee's regular salary. See Spognardi, Mark A. and Staci L. Ketay, "Perspective - Bad Law and Bad Politics: OSHA's Ill-Fated Ergonomics Standard," 27 Empl. Rel. L.J. 85 (2001).
37. "Defining Disability," The Buffalo News, Jan. 21, 2002, p. B-4.
38. Toyota, 122 S.Ct. at 691.
39. A harbinger of what might be attempted in Congress may be found in the recent amendments to the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, which took effect on Jan. 1, 2001. Those amendments revised the California state law, which previously had followed the ADA definitions, to make clear that mitigating measures should not be a factor in determining whether an impairment rises to the level of a disabling condition and, in addition, remove the requirement that the impairment substantially limit a major life activity. See 2000 Cal. ALS 1049, 2000 Cal. AB 2222, Stats. 2000 Ch. 1049, Sections 5, 6.
40. Vivecca Novak, "Is the Disabilities Act Disabled?," Time, Jan. 21, 2002, p. 23.
41. Steney H. Hoyer, "Not Exactly What We Intended, Justice O'Connor," The Washington Post, Jan. 20, 2002 at B-1.
42. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Compliance Manual "Threshold Issues," http//www.eeoc.gov/docs/threshold.html, p. 12 ("[u]nlike Title VII and the ADEA, under which the charging party's status as a member of a protected group is seldom in doubt, coverage is frequently a significant issue in ADA cases."); Adam C. Wit, "Should 'Mitigating Measures' Be Considered in the 'Disability' Analysis Under the ADA?", 24 Empl. Rel. L.J. 74 (1998) ("contrary to the general certainty associated with one's race, sex, or age . . . what constitutes a 'disability' under the ADA is an issue which is far from certain").
43. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Compliance Manual "Threshold Issues," http//www.eeoc.gov/docs/threshold.html, p. 12 ("[u]nlike Title VII and the ADEA, under which the charging party's status as a member of a protected group is seldom in doubt, coverage is frequently a significant issue in ADA cases."); Adam C. Wit, "Should 'Mitigating Measures' Be Considered in the 'Disability' Analysis Under the ADA?", 24 Empl. Rel. L.J. 74 (1998) ("contrary to the general certainty associated with one's race, sex, or age . . . what constitutes a 'disability' under the ADA is an issue which is far from certain").
44. See Christian v. St. Anthony Medical Center Inc., 117F.3d 1051, 1053 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1022 (1998).
45. See, e.g., Jonathan C. Drimmer, "Cripples, Overcomers, and Civil Rights: Tracing the Evolution of Federal Legislation and Social Policy for People with Disabilities," 40 UCLA Law Review 1341, 1343 (1993) (describing how persons with disabilities have been viewed as deficient and inferior and that "[t]he history of society's formal methods of dealing with handicapped people can be summed up in two words: segregation and inequality.").
46. The focus of the ADA upon persons with physical or mental impairments who historically have been isolated from the rest of society was emphasized by Justin Dart, the Chairperson of the Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities, who in testimony before Congress in favor of the legislation that later became the ADA, stated as follows: [o]ur society is still infected by the ancient, now almost subconscious assumption that people with disabilities are less than fully human and, therefore, are not fully eligible for opportunities, services and support systems which are available to other people as a matter of right. The result is massive, society-wide discrimination. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Joint Hearings in H.R. 2273 Before The Subcomms. on Select Education and Employment Opportunities of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. at 62 (1989). This sentiment was echoed by President George Bush when, at the signing ceremony for the ADA, he declared that the "legislation . . . takes the sledge hammer to [a] wall . . . which has for too many generations separated Americans with disabilities from the freedom they could glimpse, but not grasp. Let the shameful wall of exclusion finally come rumbling down." 26 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1165(July 26, 1990), reprinted in 1990 US Code Cong. & Admin. News 601.