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1
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2542617175
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42 USC §12102(2)(A), (B), (C)
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42 USC §12102(2)(A), (B), (C).
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2
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2542575910
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See, e.g., Gilday (cited on p. 78) at 760, 766-67; Harris (cited on p. 84) at 516, 520; Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 872, 977 (D. Kan. 1996)
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See, e.g., Gilday (cited on p. 78) at 760, 766-67; Harris (cited on p. 84) at 516, 520; Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 872, 977 (D. Kan. 1996).
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3
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2542534936
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29 CFR §1630.2(h)
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29 CFR §1630.2(h).
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4
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2542636801
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note
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29 CFR §1630(j)(1). Factors involved in determining whether or not the impairment is "significantly restricting" include the nature and severity of the impairment, its duration or expected duration, and any permanent or long-term impact that the impairment may have on the individual. 29 CFR §1630.2(j). The regulations also contemplate what might be considered a "major life activity" for the purposes of the Act. Such activities include "caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 29 CFR §1630.2(j).
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5
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2542603449
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29 CFR §1630, App. 1630.2(j)
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29 CFR §1630, App. 1630.2(j).
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6
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2542607960
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Id.
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Id.
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7
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2542601888
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H.R. Rep. No. 101-485(II) at 53, USCCAN 1990, p. 334. See also H.R. Rep. No. 101-485(III) at 28, USCCAN 1990, p. 451; S. Rep. No. 101-116 at 23
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H.R. Rep. No. 101-485(II) at 53, USCCAN 1990, p. 334. See also H.R. Rep. No. 101-485(III) at 28, USCCAN 1990, p. 451; S. Rep. No. 101-116 at 23.
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8
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2542545408
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note
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Despite the court's ruling in that regard, the case was still remanded to the district court, because the court found that the plaintiffs diabetes, even fully treated, could very well still substantially limit his ability to perform the major life activity of working. It is also worth noting that the Sixth Circuit's opinion with regard to the "mitigating measures" issue, as expressed in Gilday, was laid out in the concurring opinion of Chief Judge Kennedy. Judge Moore, who authored the court's opinion for the remainder of the case, advocated adopting the EEOC's interpretive guidelines on the issue.
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9
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2542546961
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Citing 29 CFR §1630, App. §1630.2(j)
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Citing 29 CFR §1630, App. §1630.2(j).
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10
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2542524210
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note
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Sutton (cited on p. 79); Gilday (cited on p. 78) at 766-67; accord Ellison (cited on p. 87); Testerman v. ChryskrCorp., - F. Supp. - , 1997 WL320934 at *9-10 (D. Del. Dec. 30, 1997); Wilking v. County of Ramsey, 983 F. Supp. 848, 853-54 (D. Minn. 1997); Cline v. Fort Howard Corp., 963 F. Supp. 1075, 1081 (E.D. Okl. 1997); Gaddy by and through Gaddy v. Four B. Corp., 953 F. Supp. 331, 337 (D. Kan. 1997); Murphy (cited in note 2) at 872, 880-81; Schluter v. Indus. Coils, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 1437, 1444-45 (W.D. Wis. 1996); Coghlan v. H.J. Heinz Co., 851 F. Supp. 808, 813-14 (N.D. Tex. 1994).
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11
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2542522676
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See also Shiflett v. GE Fanuc Automation Corp., 960 F. Supp. 1022, 1029 (W.D. Va. 1997); Wilson (cited on p. 84)
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See also Shiflett v. GE Fanuc Automation Corp., 960 F. Supp. 1022, 1029 (W.D. Va. 1997); Wilson (cited on p. 84).
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12
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2542515023
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note
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In any case, the court noted that it was not consulting the legislative history to interpret the statute, but was doing so "because that is the basis for the agency's [EEOC's] interpretation, and the court is to evaluate the reasoning behind the agency's interpretation to determine how much deference to give that agency interpretation."
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13
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2542562403
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note
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See also Matczak v. Frankford Candy and Chocolate Co., No. 97-1057 (3d Cir. Nov. 18, 1997) (unpublished); Doane v. City of Omaha, 115 F.3d 624 (8th Cir. 1997), cert, denied, 118 S. Ct. 693 (1997); Holihan v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 87 F.3d 362 (9th Cir. 1997), cert, denied, 117 S. Ct. 1349 (1997); Roth v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 57 F.3d 1446 (7th Cir. 1995).
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14
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2542623253
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Id.
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Id.
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15
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2542635336
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In that sense, the EEOC's interpretive guidelines are indeed in conflict with its own stated policy, as the court in Sutton stated. See Sutton (cited on p. 79), 1997 WL 732520 at *8
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In that sense, the EEOC's interpretive guidelines are indeed in conflict with its own stated policy, as the court in Sutton stated. See Sutton (cited on p. 79), 1997 WL 732520 at *8.
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16
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2542557800
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See e.g., Williams v. Channel Master Satellite Sys., Inc., 101 F.3d 346, 349-50 (4th Cir. 1996) (25-pound lifting restriction did not constitute a disability under the ADA)
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See e.g., Williams v. Channel Master Satellite Sys., Inc., 101 F.3d 346, 349-50 (4th Cir. 1996) (25-pound lifting restriction did not constitute a disability under the ADA).
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17
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2542528870
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note
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29 CFR §1630.2(r). See, e.g., Brennan v. New York City Policy Dep't et al., 1997 WL 811543 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 1997), aff'd, 1998 WL 51284 (2d Cir. Feb. 10,1998) (police officer's alcoholism presented direct threat to safety of himself and fellow officers); Johnson v. State of Maryland, 940 F. Supp. 873 (D. Md. 1996), affd, 113 F.3d 1232 (4th Cir. 1997) (state correctional officer dismissed because neuromuscular disorder prevented him from obtaining firearm certification).
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18
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2542620227
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See also Hendler v. Intertelecom USA, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 200 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)
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See also Hendler v. Intertelecom USA, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 200 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
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