Sequential communication in agencies

Review of Accounting Studies

Volumn 2, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 123-155

  Christensen, Peter Ove ^a   Feltham, Gerald A ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN DENMARK   (Denmark)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0008547477     PISSN: 13806653     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1023684603889     Document Type: Article

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