Cabinet Instability and the Accumulation of Experience: The French Fourth and Fifth Republics in Comparative Perspective

British Journal of Political Science

Volumn 34, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 27-48

  Huber, John D ^b   Martinez Gallardo, Cecilia ^a  

^a Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0346040476     PISSN: 00071234     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0007123403000334     Document Type: Article

References (63)

1. There are different ways of measuring cabinet duration (see below), and this number is based on data published in the European Journal of Political Research (Jaap Woldendorp, Hans Keman and Ian Budge, 'Party Government in 20 Democracies', European Journal of Political Research, 33 (1998), 125-64).
2. Many factors have been uncovered that systematically influence levels of cabinet instability. See, for example, Paul V. Warwick, Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) and citations therein.
3. E.g. Michel Debré, Ces Princes qui nous gouvernent; lettre aux dirigeants de la Nation (Paris: Plon, Collection Tribune Libre, 1957); Lawrence Scheinman, Atomic Energy Policy in France under the Fourth Republic (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965); Duncan MacRae Jr, Parliament, Parties and Society in France 1940-1958 (New York: St Martin's Press, 1967); Ezra Suleiman, Politics. Power, and Bureaucracy in France: The Administrative Elite (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974); Dominique Chagnollaud, 'La Haute Administration au pouvoir? Les "grands commis" de la IVe République', Pouvoirs, 76 (1996), 107-15. In contrast, LaPalombara suggests that if the French look to the 'administrative arena as the place where the aggregation of group interests occurs ... [then] French society may, in fact, derive important benefits from the very patterns [of cabinet instability] that are frequently cited as injurious' (Joseph Lapalombara, 'Political Party Systems and Crisis Government: French and Italian Comparisons', Midwest Journal of Political Science, 2 (1958), 117-42, p. 138).
4. E.g. Michel Debré, Ces Princes qui nous gouvernent; lettre aux dirigeants de la Nation (Paris: Plon, Collection Tribune Libre, 1957); Lawrence Scheinman, Atomic Energy Policy in France under the Fourth Republic (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965); Duncan MacRae Jr, Parliament, Parties and Society in France 1940-1958 (New York: St Martin's Press, 1967); Ezra Suleiman, Politics. Power, and Bureaucracy in France: The Administrative Elite (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974); Dominique Chagnollaud, 'La Haute Administration au pouvoir? Les "grands commis" de la IVe République', Pouvoirs, 76 (1996), 107-15. In contrast, LaPalombara suggests that if the French look to the 'administrative arena as the place where the aggregation of group interests occurs ... [then] French society may, in fact, derive important benefits from the very patterns [of cabinet instability] that are frequently cited as injurious' (Joseph Lapalombara, 'Political Party Systems and Crisis Government: French and Italian Comparisons', Midwest Journal of Political Science, 2 (1958), 117-42, p. 138).
5. E.g. Michel Debré, Ces Princes qui nous gouvernent; lettre aux dirigeants de la Nation (Paris: Plon, Collection Tribune Libre, 1957); Lawrence Scheinman, Atomic Energy Policy in France under the Fourth Republic (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965); Duncan MacRae Jr, Parliament, Parties and Society in France 1940-1958 (New York: St Martin's Press, 1967); Ezra Suleiman, Politics. Power, and Bureaucracy in France: The Administrative Elite (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974); Dominique Chagnollaud, 'La Haute Administration au pouvoir? Les "grands commis" de la IVe République', Pouvoirs, 76 (1996), 107-15. In contrast, LaPalombara suggests that if the French look to the 'administrative arena as the place where the aggregation of group interests occurs ... [then] French society may, in fact, derive important benefits from the very patterns [of cabinet instability] that are frequently cited as injurious' (Joseph Lapalombara, 'Political Party Systems and Crisis Government: French and Italian Comparisons', Midwest Journal of Political Science, 2 (1958), 117-42, p. 138).
6. E.g. Michel Debré, Ces Princes qui nous gouvernent; lettre aux dirigeants de la Nation (Paris: Plon, Collection Tribune Libre, 1957); Lawrence Scheinman, Atomic Energy Policy in France under the Fourth Republic (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965); Duncan MacRae Jr, Parliament, Parties and Society in France 1940-1958 (New York: St Martin's Press, 1967); Ezra Suleiman, Politics. Power, and Bureaucracy in France: The Administrative Elite (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974); Dominique Chagnollaud, 'La Haute Administration au pouvoir? Les "grands commis" de la IVe République', Pouvoirs, 76 (1996), 107-15. In contrast, LaPalombara suggests that if the French look to the 'administrative arena as the place where the aggregation of group interests occurs ... [then] French society may, in fact, derive important benefits from the very patterns [of cabinet instability] that are frequently cited as injurious' (Joseph Lapalombara, 'Political Party Systems and Crisis Government: French and Italian Comparisons', Midwest Journal of Political Science, 2 (1958), 117-42, p. 138).
7. E.g. Michel Debré, Ces Princes qui nous gouvernent; lettre aux dirigeants de la Nation (Paris: Plon, Collection Tribune Libre, 1957); Lawrence Scheinman, Atomic Energy Policy in France under the Fourth Republic (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965); Duncan MacRae Jr, Parliament, Parties and Society in France 1940-1958 (New York: St Martin's Press, 1967); Ezra Suleiman, Politics. Power, and Bureaucracy in France: The Administrative Elite (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974); Dominique Chagnollaud, 'La Haute Administration au pouvoir? Les "grands commis" de la IVe République', Pouvoirs, 76 (1996), 107-15. In contrast, LaPalombara suggests that if the French look to the 'administrative arena as the place where the aggregation of group interests occurs ... [then] French society may, in fact, derive important benefits from the very patterns [of cabinet instability] that are frequently cited as injurious' (Joseph Lapalombara, 'Political Party Systems and Crisis Government: French and Italian Comparisons', Midwest Journal of Political Science, 2 (1958), 117-42, p. 138).
8. E.g. Michel Debré, Ces Princes qui nous gouvernent; lettre aux dirigeants de la Nation (Paris: Plon, Collection Tribune Libre, 1957); Lawrence Scheinman, Atomic Energy Policy in France under the Fourth Republic (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965); Duncan MacRae Jr, Parliament, Parties and Society in France 1940-1958 (New York: St Martin's Press, 1967); Ezra Suleiman, Politics. Power, and Bureaucracy in France: The Administrative Elite (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974); Dominique Chagnollaud, 'La Haute Administration au pouvoir? Les "grands commis" de la IVe République', Pouvoirs, 76 (1996), 107-15. In contrast, LaPalombara suggests that if the French look to the 'administrative arena as the place where the aggregation of group interests occurs ... [then] French society may, in fact, derive important benefits from the very patterns [of cabinet instability] that are frequently cited as injurious' (Joseph Lapalombara, 'Political Party Systems and Crisis Government: French and Italian Comparisons', Midwest Journal of Political Science, 2 (1958), 117-42, p. 138).
9. Jean-Luc Parodi, 'Eléments constitutifs et combinatoires institutionnels', in Jean-Luc Parodi and Olivier Duhamel, eds, La Constitution de la Cinquième République (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1988), pp. 24-45.
10. Didier Maus, 'La Constitution jugée par sa pratique. Réflexions pour un bilan,' in Parodi and Duhamel, eds, La Constitution de la Cinquième République, pp. 295-329, at p. 317.
11. Michel Debré, 'The Constitution of 1958, Its Raison D'Être and How it Evolved', in William G. Andrews and Stanley Hoffman, eds, The Fifth Republic at Twenty (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1981), pp. 11-24, at p. 22.
12. Mattei Dogan and Peter Campbell, 'Le personnel ministériel en France et en Grande-Bretagne', Revue française de science politique, (1957), 313-45, p. 334.
13. Philip Maynard Williams, Crisis and Compromise: Politics in the Fourth Republic (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1964), p. 206.
14. François Petry, 'The Role of Cabinet Ministers in the French Fourth Republic', in Michael Laver and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds, Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 125-38, at p. 132; see also Vincent Wright, The Government and Politics of France (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1989), p. 91.
15. François Petry, 'The Role of Cabinet Ministers in the French Fourth Republic', in Michael Laver and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds, Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 125-38, at p. 132; see also Vincent Wright, The Government and Politics of France (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1989), p. 91.
16. Chagnollaud, 'La Haute Administration au pouvoir?'
17. Mattei Dogan, ed., Pathways to Power: Selecting Rulers in Pluralist Democracies (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989), p. 250.
18. Dogan, ed., Pathways to Power, p. 239.
19. Klaus von Beyme, 'Party Systems and Cabinet Stability in European Parliamentary Systems', in Henry Steele Commager, ed., Festschrift fur Karl Loewenstein: aus Anlass seines achtzigsten Geburtstages (Tubingen: Mohr, 1971), pp. 51-70.
20. John D. Huber and Arthur Lupia, 'Cabinet Instability and Delegation in Parliamentary Democracies', American Journal of Political Science, 45 (1999), 18-33. For the impact of cabinet turnover on policy making, see John D. Huber, 'How Does Cabinet Instability Affect Political Performance? Portfolio Volatility and Health Care Cost Containment in Parliamentary Democracies', American Political Science Review, 92 (1998), 577-92; John D. Huber, 'Delegation to Civil Servants in Parliamentary Democracies', European Journal of Political Research, 37 (2000), 397-413; John D. Huber and Charles R. Shipan, Deliberate Discretion? Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Cecilia Martinez-Gallardo, 'Measuring Cabinet Turnover The Case of Inflation Control in Mexico' (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 2001) ; and Beth Simmons, Who Adjusts? Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policy During the Interwar Years (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994).
21. John D. Huber and Arthur Lupia, 'Cabinet Instability and Delegation in Parliamentary Democracies', American Journal of Political Science, 45 (1999), 18-33. For the impact of cabinet turnover on policy making, see John D. Huber, 'How Does Cabinet Instability Affect Political Performance? Portfolio Volatility and Health Care Cost Containment in Parliamentary Democracies', American Political Science Review, 92 (1998), 577-92; John D. Huber, 'Delegation to Civil Servants in Parliamentary Democracies', European Journal of Political Research, 37 (2000), 397-413; John D. Huber and Charles R. Shipan, Deliberate Discretion? Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Cecilia Martinez-Gallardo, 'Measuring Cabinet Turnover The Case of Inflation Control in Mexico' (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 2001) ; and Beth Simmons, Who Adjusts? Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policy During the Interwar Years (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994).
22. John D. Huber and Arthur Lupia, 'Cabinet Instability and Delegation in Parliamentary Democracies', American Journal of Political Science, 45 (1999), 18-33. For the impact of cabinet turnover on policy making, see John D. Huber, 'How Does Cabinet Instability Affect Political Performance? Portfolio Volatility and Health Care Cost Containment in Parliamentary Democracies', American Political Science Review, 92 (1998), 577-92; John D. Huber, 'Delegation to Civil Servants in Parliamentary Democracies', European Journal of Political Research, 37 (2000), 397-413; John D. Huber and Charles R. Shipan, Deliberate Discretion? Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Cecilia Martinez-Gallardo, 'Measuring Cabinet Turnover The Case of Inflation Control in Mexico' (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 2001) ; and Beth Simmons, Who Adjusts? Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policy During the Interwar Years (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994).
23. John D. Huber and Arthur Lupia, 'Cabinet Instability and Delegation in Parliamentary Democracies', American Journal of Political Science, 45 (1999), 18-33. For the impact of cabinet turnover on policy making, see John D. Huber, 'How Does Cabinet Instability Affect Political Performance? Portfolio Volatility and Health Care Cost Containment in Parliamentary Democracies', American Political Science Review, 92 (1998), 577-92; John D. Huber, 'Delegation to Civil Servants in Parliamentary Democracies', European Journal of Political Research, 37 (2000), 397-413; John D. Huber and Charles R. Shipan, Deliberate Discretion? Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Cecilia Martinez-Gallardo, 'Measuring Cabinet Turnover The Case of Inflation Control in Mexico' (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 2001) ; and Beth Simmons, Who Adjusts? Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policy During the Interwar Years (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994).
24. John D. Huber and Arthur Lupia, 'Cabinet Instability and Delegation in Parliamentary Democracies', American Journal of Political Science, 45 (1999), 18-33. For the impact of cabinet turnover on policy making, see John D. Huber, 'How Does Cabinet Instability Affect Political Performance? Portfolio Volatility and Health Care Cost Containment in Parliamentary Democracies', American Political Science Review, 92 (1998), 577-92; John D. Huber, 'Delegation to Civil Servants in Parliamentary Democracies', European Journal of Political Research, 37 (2000), 397-413; John D. Huber and Charles R. Shipan, Deliberate Discretion? Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Cecilia Martinez-Gallardo, 'Measuring Cabinet Turnover The Case of Inflation Control in Mexico' (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 2001) ; and Beth Simmons, Who Adjusts? Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policy During the Interwar Years (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994).
25. John D. Huber and Arthur Lupia, 'Cabinet Instability and Delegation in Parliamentary Democracies', American Journal of Political Science, 45 (1999), 18-33. For the impact of cabinet turnover on policy making, see John D. Huber, 'How Does Cabinet Instability Affect Political Performance? Portfolio Volatility and Health Care Cost Containment in Parliamentary Democracies', American Political Science Review, 92 (1998), 577-92; John D. Huber, 'Delegation to Civil Servants in Parliamentary Democracies', European Journal of Political Research, 37 (2000), 397-413; John D. Huber and Charles R. Shipan, Deliberate Discretion? Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Cecilia Martinez-Gallardo, 'Measuring Cabinet Turnover The Case of Inflation Control in Mexico' (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 2001) ; and Beth Simmons, Who Adjusts? Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policy During the Interwar Years (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994).
26. Dogan, ed., Pathways to Power.
27. Woldendorp, Keman and Budge, 'Party Government in 20 Democracies', and annual updates of European Journal of Political Research.
28. See Woldendorp, Keman and Budge, 'Party Government in 20 Democracies', for a full description of each type of event.
29. See Warwick, Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies, for a careful discussion of the measurement of government duration. See Huber, 'How Does Cabinet Instability Affect Political Performance?' for a critique of the drawbacks of focusing on government duration.
30. See Warwick, Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies, for a careful discussion of the measurement of government duration. See Huber, 'How Does Cabinet Instability Affect Political Performance?' for a critique of the drawbacks of focusing on government duration.
31. Summaries of our measures of political and portfolio experience, as well as the measures of cabinet duration for all countries are found in the Appendix.
32. Keesing's Record of World Events (London: Longman, various volumes), and European Journal of Political Research (various volumes).
33. Summaries of our measures of political and portfolio experience, as well as the measures of cabinet duration for all countries are found in the Appendix.
34. Michael Laver and W. Ben Hunt, Policy and Party Competition (New York: Routledge, 1992).
35. Huber, 'How Does Cabinet Instability Affect Political Performance?'; Simmons, Who Adjusts? and Martinez-Gallardo, 'Measuring Cabinet Turnover'.
36. Huber, 'How Does Cabinet Instability Affect Political Performance?'; Simmons, Who Adjusts? and Martinez-Gallardo, 'Measuring Cabinet Turnover'.
37. Huber, 'How Does Cabinet Instability Affect Political Performance?'; Simmons, Who Adjusts? and Martinez-Gallardo, 'Measuring Cabinet Turnover'.
38. For both portfolio and political experience, we count any prior experience by a minister in a top ten portfolio. It does not have to be uninterrupted experience. If one of the top ten portfolios was not occupied during the year it is not taken into account when calculating the average measures of political and portfolio experience.
39. We also calculated the measures using a third dataset based on roughly the same period of the Fourth Republic, which begins with the first year for which we have data and ends in December 1957. The measures of experience for the most unstable countries (the Fourth Republic, Finland and Italy) and the most stable ones (Luxembourg, Austria and Sweden) are the same but the level of experience for other countries changes considerably. We include the measures of experience based on these data in the Appendix but do not discuss them at length since these data underline the fact that idiosyncratic factors can affect measures of experience in any given ten-year period.
40. Dogan, ed., Pathways to Power.
41. As before, the measure of duration used here is based on the European Journal of Political Research. See Woldendorp, Keman and Budge, 'Party Government in 20 Democracies'.
42. As before, the measure of duration used here is based on the European Journal of Political Research. See Woldendorp, Keman and Budge, 'Party Government in 20 Democracies'.
43. See G. Bingham Powell, Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability and Violence (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), p. 63.
44. Some scholars argue that party systems that allow for the representation of more, and more diverse, groups contribute to regime stability. This need not be the case when studying cabinet turnover. See Powell, Contemporary Democracies, for a discussion.
45. E.g., Powell, Contemporary Democracies, and Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1999).
46. MacRae, Parliament, Parties and Society in France.
47. Daniel Diermeier and Antonio Merlo, 'Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies', Journal of Economic Theory, 94 (2000), 46-79.
48. Dogan, ed., Pathways to Power, p. 239.
49. In fact, most arguments about portfolio allocation and number of parties refer to the percentage of cabinet positions awarded to each party in a government but have little to say about changes in this distribution within a single government. See, for example, Carol Mershon, 'Party Factions and Coalition Government: Portfolio Allocation in Italian Christian Democracy', Electoral Studies, 20 (2001), 555-80; and Paul V. Warwick and James N. Druckman, 'Portfolio Salience and the Proportionality of Payoffs in Coalition Governments', British Journal of Political Science, 31 (2001), 627-49.
50. In fact, most arguments about portfolio allocation and number of parties refer to the percentage of cabinet positions awarded to each party in a government but have little to say about changes in this distribution within a single government. See, for example, Carol Mershon, 'Party Factions and Coalition Government: Portfolio Allocation in Italian Christian Democracy', Electoral Studies, 20 (2001), 555-80; and Paul V. Warwick and James N. Druckman, 'Portfolio Salience and the Proportionality of Payoffs in Coalition Governments', British Journal of Political Science, 31 (2001), 627-49.
51. Kaare Strom, 'A Behavioral Theory of Competitive Political Parties', American Journal of Political Science, 34 (1990), 565-98.
52. See Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy, Appendix A.
53. New Zealand was a classic Westminster system for all but four years in our dataset.
54. Laver and Hunt's scale actually goes from 1 (policy payoffs) to 9 (office payoffs). We reverse coding of this variable to facilitate interpretation.
55. The results are very similar when these countries are included along with a control for population.
56. See Philip Maynard Williams, Politics in Past-War France: Parties and the Constitution in the Fourth Republic (London: Longmans, 1958).
57. Keith Dowding and Won-Taek Kang, 'Factors Affecting Ministerial Resignation in the UK' (unpublished paper, London School of Economics, 1998); Keith Dowding and Won-Taek Kang, 'Ministerial Resignations 1945-97', Public Administration, 76 (1998), 411-29; and Torun Dewan and Keith Dowding, 'He Has to Go! Analysing the Effects of Ministerial Resignations on Government Popularity' (unpublished paper, London School of Economics, 2002).
58. Keith Dowding and Won-Taek Kang, 'Factors Affecting Ministerial Resignation in the UK' (unpublished paper, London School of Economics, 1998); Keith Dowding and Won-Taek Kang, 'Ministerial Resignations 1945-97', Public Administration, 76 (1998), 411-29; and Torun Dewan and Keith Dowding, 'He Has to Go! Analysing the Effects of Ministerial Resignations on Government Popularity' (unpublished paper, London School of Economics, 2002).
59. Keith Dowding and Won-Taek Kang, 'Factors Affecting Ministerial Resignation in the UK' (unpublished paper, London School of Economics, 1998); Keith Dowding and Won-Taek Kang, 'Ministerial Resignations 1945-97', Public Administration, 76 (1998), 411-29; and Torun Dewan and Keith Dowding, 'He Has to Go! Analysing the Effects of Ministerial Resignations on Government Popularity' (unpublished paper, London School of Economics, 2002).
60. Ian Budge and Hans Keman, Parties and Democracy: Coalition Formation and Government Functioning in Twenty States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), chap. 4; Michael Laver and Kenneth Shepsle, Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies (New York: Cambridge University Press. 1996); and Warwick, Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies.
61. Ian Budge and Hans Keman, Parties and Democracy: Coalition Formation and Government Functioning in Twenty States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), chap. 4; Michael Laver and Kenneth Shepsle, Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies (New York: Cambridge University Press. 1996); and Warwick, Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies.
62. Ian Budge and Hans Keman, Parties and Democracy: Coalition Formation and Government Functioning in Twenty States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), chap. 4; Michael Laver and Kenneth Shepsle, Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies (New York: Cambridge University Press. 1996); and Warwick, Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies.
63. Dewan and Dowding, 'He Has to Go!'.