At the crossroads of diplomatic and social history: The nuclear revolution, dissent and détente

Cold War History

Volumn 1, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 1-42

  Wenger, Andreas ^a   Suri, Jeremi ^b  

^a ETH ZURICH   (Switzerland)

^b STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0346009467     PISSN: 14682745     EISSN: 17437962     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/713999931     Document Type: Article

References (169)

1. For examples of how the acknowledged 'nuclear revolution' explicitly challenged standing policy concepts, like 'national security' and 'national interest', see C. Yost, 'The Idea of National Security', 26 June 1958
2. L.W Fuller to George McGhee 27 Nov. 1961, Folder: M.I.T., Box 122, RG 59, Lot 67D548 - Records of the Policy Planning Staff, 1957-61, National Archives, College Park, Maryland [hereafter NA]. On the meaning of the nuclear revolution, see Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989);
3. Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics before and after Hiroshima (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981);
4. McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York: Vintage Books, 1988);
5. Richard Ned Lebow, Nuclear Crisis Management: A Dangerous Illusion (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987);
6. Andreas Wenger, Living with Peril: Eisenhower, Kennedy and Nuclear Weapons (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997).
7. See, for example, John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp.215-45;
8. Anders Stephanson, 'The Big Two', in David Reynolds (ed.), The Origins of the Cold War in Europe: International Perspectives (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), pp.23-52;
9. Christoph Hoppe, Zwischen Teilhabe und Mitsprache: Die Nuklearfrage in der Allianzpolitik Deutschlands 1959-1966 (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1993).
10. Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), pp.147-304.
11. Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp.163-234;
12. Andreas Wenger, 'Der lange Weg zur Stabilität: Kennedy, Chruschtschow und das gemeinsame Interesse der Supermächte am Status quo in Europa', Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 46 (Jan. 1998), pp.69-99.
13. For a few instances, from an almost endless array of possible examples, where policymakers emphasized 'order', 'stability', and 'détente' in the face of possible international crisis during the 1960s, see Memorandum of Conversation between Soviet Ambassador Anatoli Dobrynin and American Ambassador Averell Harriman, 22 June 1962, President's Office Files, Box 113a, Folder: China, Security, 1962-63, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, Massachusetts [hereafter JFKL]
14. Entretien entre le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères Maurice Couve de Murville et le Premier Ministre d'URSS Aleksei Kossyguine, Pitzunda, le 31 octobre 1965
15. Fonds Couve de Murville, Carton CM2, Dossier: Entretiens Couve de Murville et responsables URSS 29-31 octobre 1965, Archives d'histoire contemporaine, Foundation nationale des sciences politiques, Paris, France [hereafter Couve Papers]; Aktenvermerk über den Abschiedsbesuch beim Vorsitzenden der VR China, Genosse Liu Schau-tji, am 8. Februar 1961 in Peking, Walter Ulbrichts Nachlass, NY 4182, Microfilm FBS 363/15322, Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv, Berlin-Lichterfelde, Deutschland [hereafter SAPMO-BArch].
16. The literature on the Kennedy years is marred by contradictory historical evaluations of foreign policy largely because Kennedy apologists and revisionists alike have frequently proven insensitive to the flux and uncertainty that characterized the international system during the early 1960s. On this point see Burton I. Kaufmann, 'John F. Kennedy as World Leader: A Perspective on the Literature', in Michael J. Hogan (ed.), America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations since 1941 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp.326-57.
17. Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, pp.180-91;
18. John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), pp.265-6.
19. See, for example, McGeorge Bundy to President Kennedy, 29 May 1961, Foreign Relations of the United States [hereafter FRUS], 1961-63, XIII: 659-62;
20. See Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, pp.1-45, 226-57.
21. For a summary of the discussion between Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and Henry Kissinger on 18 May 1961, see Aufzeichnung 23 May 1961, Konrad Adenauers Nachlass, Ordnung 111/59, Stiftung Bundeskanzler-Adenauer-Haus, Rhöndorf, Germany [hereafter Adenauer papers].
22. For an American perspective on these talks, see Telegram from Dowling, American Embassy in Germany to the Department of State, 17 Feb. 1962, FRUS, 1961-63, XIV: 824-7. One should note that, as the German text of these meetings between Adenauer and Kissinger reveals, the part-time NSC consultant did a very poor job of allaying Adenauer's concerns. During their 1962 meeting Kissinger explicitly confirmed Adenauer's expressed fears that America suffered from too much of an 'isolationist' tradition. This phrase and other negative Kissinger comments about American foreign policy are absent from the American text of the 1962 meeting.
23. Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1971);
24. Desmond Ball, Politics and Force Levels: the Strategic Missile Program of the Kennedy Administration (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980);
25. Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1974);
26. John D. Steinbrunner, The Cybernetic Theoriy of Decision: New Dimensions of Political Analysis (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).
27. Robert Jervis, Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976);
28. idem, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984);
29. Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985);
30. Alexander George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974).
31. For new perspectives of the Cold War, see Odd Arne Westad, 'The New International History of the Cold War: Three (Possible) Paradigms', Diplomatic History 24 (Fall 2000), pp.551-65;
32. Geir Lundestad, 'Empire' by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945-97 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998);
33. Gaddis, We Now Know; Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).
34. For an example of critical thought surrounding alliance management during the middle 1960s see Ronald Steel, The End of Alliance: America and the Future of Europe (New York: Viking Press, 1964).
35. Letter From President de Gaulle to President Eisenhower, 17 Sept.1958, FRUS, 1958-60, VII (part 2): pp.81-3.
36. For Chinese and Cuban criticisms of Soviet compromises with the United States, particularly after the Cuban Missile Crisis, see Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, 'One Hell of a Gamble': Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964 (New York: Norton, 1997), pp.290-315.
37. Roderick MacFarquhar describes how the Chinese leadership accepted Nikita Khrushchev's 1956 denunciation of Stalinist excess, but also grew increasingly uncomfortable with the apparent 'revisionist' line of the new Kremlin leadership. Roderick MacFarquhar, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution, Volume 1: Contradictions Among the People, 1956-1957 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), pp.46-56, 169-76.
38. See Entretien du General de Gaulle avec Monsieur Ben Gurion, 17 June 1960, l'Elysee, Carton CM9, Dossier 2, Couve Papers.
39. On America's anti-colonial tradition, see Tony Smith, America's Mission: The United States and the World Wide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).
40. The Suez crisis of 1956 is an obvious example: Scott W Lucas, Divided We Stand: Britain, the US, and the Suez Crisis (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1991);
41. Maurice Vaïsse, 'France and the Suez Crisis', in Willam Roger Louis and Roger Owen (eds.), Suez 1956: The Crisis and its Consequences (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp.131-43.
42. On the deepening ideological competition between China and the Soviet Union see Aktenvermerk über den Abschiedsbesuch beim Vorsitzenden der VR China, Genosse Liu Schau-tji, 8 Feb. 1961 in Peking, Walter Ulbrichts Nachlass, Microfilm FBS 363/15322, SAPMO-BArch. See also Gordon H. Chang, Friends and Enemies: United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990);
43. MacFarquhar, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution, Vol. 1, pp.169-249.
44. For evidence of growing French resentment toward American influence in Morocco and other parts of francophone North Africa see Michel Debre, Premier Ministre à Couve de Murville, 5 Jan. 1960, Carton CM7, Dossier: 1960, Couve Papers. Available documentation from communications between Chinese leaders and their counterparts in Southeast Asia reveals consistent Chinese criticism of Soviet 'revisionism' and 'anti-revolutionary' behaviour in the region. The Chinese leadership clearly used these condemnations of the Soviet regime to enhance Beijing's influence and prestige in the region.
45. See Odd Arne Westad et al. (eds.), '77 Conversations Between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964-1977', Cold War International History Project Working Paper number 22 (May 1998), documents 1, 4, 10, 18, 19, 24.
46. On the American side, this perception was closely linked to Nikita Khrushchev's 6 Jan. 1961 speech about wars of national liberation. With his promise to support national liberation struggles the Soviet leader seemed to expand the Soviet commitment in the Third World. Kennedy thought Khrushchev's speech was 'one of the most important speeches of the decade'. Summary of President Kennedy's Remarks to the 496th Meeting of the National Security Council, 18 Jan. 1962, FRUS, 1961-63, VIII: 238-12.
47. For Khrushchev's speech see Khrushchev Report on Moscow Conference of Representatives of Communist and Workers Parties, 6 Jan. 1961, President's Office Files, Box 126a, Folder USSR, Khrushchev Reports, 1961, JFKL.
48. See, for example, Walt Rostow's discussion of foreign aid programmes in: Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Kennedy, 28 Feb. 1961, FRUS, 1961-63, IX: 204-9.
49. See also Rostow's famous book: Walt W Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960).
50. On the emerging conflicts over burden sharing and developmental assistance in the Western alliance, see the following West German analysis of the new pressures - primarily from the US and Britain - for Bonn to expend more on NATO defence and foreign assistance. Aufzeichnung über den Verteidigungsbeitrag der Bundesrepublik und anderer NATO-Partner, 9 Nov. 1962, Ordnung Adenauer Papers. See also Francis J. Gavin, 'Gold, Dollars, and Power: The Politics of the U.S. Balance of Payments, 1958-1971' (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1997), especially chapters 2 and 3.
51. See 'Frankreichs Handel mit der SBZ', 11 Jan. 1965, IIIA6, Band 167, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Bonn, Germany [hereafter AA]
52. Considering the different economic strategies, Khrushchev wrote: 'It was patently clear to us that Mao Zedong had started down a wrong path that would lead to the collapse of his economy and, consequently, the failure of his politics. We did all we could to influence the Chinese and stop them before it was too late, but Mao thought he was God.' Cited in Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), p.219.
53. Paul H. Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989), p.205.
54. Second, the vital interests of both superpowers were at stake in Berlin but not in Cuba, which was clearly in the American sphere of influence and far away from the Soviet Union. On both crises see Michael Beschloss, The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960-1963 (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), pp.211-90, 354-575.
55. John C. Ausland, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Berlin-Cuba Crisis 1961-1964 (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1996);
56. Beschloss, The Crisis Years, pp.266-90.
57. See, for example, Willy Brandt, Brief an den Präsidenten der Vereinigten Staaten, Berlin, 15 Aug. 1961, President's Office Files, Box 117, Folder Germany, Security, 8/61-12/61, JFKL.
58. On popular demonstrations against the Wall in West Berlin see Alexandra Ritchie, Faust's Metropolis (New York: Carroll and Graf, 1998), pp.710-26.
59. For an example of East German dissent against the construction of the Wall, see Rainer Eppelmann, Fremd im eigenen Haus: Mein Leben im anderen Deutschland (Köln: Kiepenheuer and Witsch, 1993), pp.11-13.
60. See de Gaulle à Georges Pompidou et Maurice Couve de Murville, 27 Oct. 1963
61. reprinted in Charles de Gaulle, Lettres, Notes, et Carnets, 1961-1963 (Paris: Plon, 1986), pp.382-3.
62. see Matthew Evangelista, '"Why Keep Such an Army?": Khrushchev's Troop Reductions', Cold War International History Project Working Paper number 19 (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars, 1997), especially pp.1-13.
63. See, for example, Letter From President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev, 15 Feb. 1962, FRUS, 1961-63, XIV: 819-22;
64. Memorandum from Kohler to Rusk, 10 March 1962, FRUS, 1961-63, XV: 4-6;
65. Wenger, 'Der lange Weg zur Stabilität', pp.81-8.
66. See de Gaulle à Kennedy, 1 Dec. 1962, Lettres, Notes, et Carnets, 1961-1963, pp.278-9;
67. Remarks by McNamara, NATO Ministerial Meeting, 5 May 1962, Restricted Session, 'May 1962 Folder', Nuclear History Box 14, NSA;
68. Wenger, Living with Peril, pp.241-71.
69. Fursenko and Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble, pp.132-48.
70. 0n Khrushchev's general sense of desperation in the spring of 1962, see Gaddis, We now Know, pp.260-66;
71. Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War, pp.261-6.
72. See the famous passage in Khrushchev's letter to Kennedy, 26 Oct. 1962: 'If, however, you have not lost your self-control and sensibly conceive what this might lead to, then, Mr. President, we and you ought not now to pull on the ends of the rope in which you have tied the knot of war, because the more the two of us pull, the tighter that knot will be tied. And a moment may come when that knot will be tied so tight that even he who tied it will not have the strength to untie it, and then it will be necessary to cut that knot.' Telegram from the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State, 26 Oct. 1962, 7 p.m., FRUS, 1961-63, VI: 172-7. Addressing the National Security Council in January 1963, Kennedy noted that if the Soviets 'had only to act in an hour or two, their actions would have been spasmodic and might have resulted in nuclear war.' Notes on Remarks by President Kennedy before the NSC, 22 Jan.1963, Cuban Missile Crisis microfiche collection 1962, No. 02869, NSA.
73. Memorandum from Kaysen to Kennedy, 24 Dec. 1963, FRUS, 1961-63, VII: 599-601.
74. The Limited Test Ban Treaty intended to serve the common goal of prohibiting both a nuclear Germany and a nuclear China. This becomes evident in a conversation between Secretary of State Dean Rusk and French Ambassador Hervé Alphand in February 1963. Rusk pointed out that 'the Soviets might be prepared to withhold nuclear cooperation from the Chinese if the West withheld nuclear cooperation from the Germans'. Memorandum of Conversation between Rusk and Alphand, 28 Feb. 1962, FRUS, 1961-63, VII: 650-52;
75. see also Memorandum of Conversation between Rusk and Dobrynin, 10 Dec. 1962, FRUS, 1961-63, VII: 620-21.
76. See, for example, Kennedy letter to Khrushchev, 15 Feb. 1962, FRUS, 1961-63, XIV: 819-22.
77. Khrushchev's political vulnerability in the face of domestic and Chinese criticism became evident in the Soviet Premier's rude letter of 3 April 1963, where he accused the American government of treating the Soviet Union as a second-class power. Memorandum from Robert Kennedy to the President, 3 April 1963, FRUS, 1961-63, VI: 262-5.
78. See Khrushchev's remark to Averell Harriman that 'Berlin [was] no longer a source of any trouble' and Kennedy's letter to Khrushchev of 11 April 1963. Memorandum of Conversation between Khrushchev and Harriman, 26 April 1963, FRUS, 1961-63, XV: 510-11;
79. Message from Kennedy to Khrushchev, 11 April 1963, FRUS, 1961-63, VII: 672-3;
80. Memorandum of Conversation between Rusk and Khrushchev, 9 Aug. 1963, FRUS, 1961-63, XV: 563-70.
81. Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, chapter 9.
82. Dwight D.Eisenhower, 'Farewell Radio and Television Address to the American People', 17 Jan. 1961, Public Papers of the Presidents, 1960-61: 1035-40.
83. See Lawrence S. Wittner, Resisting the Bomb: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1954-70 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), pp.41-159;
84. Robert A. Divine, Blowing on the Wind (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978).
85. See also Nelson D. Lankford, The Last American Aristocrat: The Biography of Ambassador David K.E. Bruce (Boston: Little, Brown, 1996).
86. see Richard H. Immerman, John Foster Dulles: Piety, Pragmatism, and Power in U.S. Foreign Policy (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1999), especially pp.147-98.
87. See Andrei Sakharov, Memoirs, trans. Richard Lourie (London: Hutchinson, 1990), especially 215-94; Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, The Oak and the Calf: Sketches of a Literary Life in the Soviet Union, trans. Harry Willetts (New York: Harper and Row, 1980);
88. Michael Scammell, Solzhenitsyn: A Biography (New York: Norton, 1984).
89. See also Ludmilla Alexeyeva and Paul Goldberg, The Thaw Generation: Coming of Age in the Post-Stalin Era (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1990), especially pp.79-276.
90. 'The Danger of Atomic War and Soviet Youth', 21 Dec. 1961, Box 80/1/497, Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Open Society Institute, Budapest, Hungary [hereafter RFE/RL].
91. 'A Representative of the Soviet "Lost Generation"', 1 Aug. 1962, RFE/RL.
92. See Viktor Stepanov, Iurii Gagarin (Moskva: Molodaya Gvardia, 1987), 275-84;
93. Irving Bernstein, Promises Kept: John F. Kennedy's New Frontier (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp.259-79.
94. See Izvestia, 'What to do with "Disturbing" Students?' 11 Sept. 1962;
95. 'What is the Outlook of Soviet Youth', 27 April 1962, Box 80/1/497, RFE/RL; 'K Probleme molodezhi v SSSR', study produced by the Institute for the USSR in Munich, 6 Feb. 1962, Box 80/1/497, RFE/RL.
96. See KGB Report to the Central Committee, 2 June 1962
97. reprinted in Istoricheskii Arkhiv 1 (1993), pp.114-16.
98. For a detailed contemporary description of the 1962 Novocherkassk riots, see M. Modich, 'Yoonskii sobitia 1962 goda', 11 Dec. 1962, Box 85/12/196, RFE/RL.
99. On Khrushchev's programme for reallocating military resources to civilian production, see Evangelista, '"Why Keep Such an Army?"', pp.17-26.
100. Wittner, Resisting the Bomb, pp.415-62;
101. Paul Boyer, 'From Activism to Apathy: The American People and Nuclear Weapons, 1963-1980', Journal of American History 70 (March 1984), pp.821-44.
102. See Fredrik Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and Escalation of War in Vietnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), especially pp.43-107, 375-83.
103. Maurice Vaïsse, La grandeur: Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle (Paris: Fayard, 1997), pp.111-61.
104. On this general point see William Hitchcock, France Restored (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998).
105. See de Gaulle a Pompidou, Messmer, Couve de Murville, et le général de division aérienne Gauthier, 25 Oct. 1963, de Gaulle, Lettres, Notes, et Carnets, 1961-63: 381.
106. On the effects of the Berlin Wall see Ritchie, Faust's Metropolis, pp.770-91.
107. On the Hallstein Doctrine, see William Glenn Gray, 'The Hallstein Doctrine: West Germany's Global Campaign to Isolate East Germany, 1949-1969' (Ph.D.dissertation, Yale University, 1999).
108. For a general statement of Strauss' views see Franz-Josef Strauss, The Grand Design: A European Solution to German Reunification, trans. Brian Connell (London: Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, 1965).
109. On early thoughts of independent West German overtures to the East, within a strengthened NATO security umbrella, see Willy Brandt's 1962 speeches at Harvard University. Willy Brandt, The Ordeal of Coexistence (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963).
110. 'Üpberlegungen zu den wichtigsten aussenpolitischen Fragen', 14 Nov. 1966, Karl Carstens Nachlass, N 1337, Mappe 641, BA;
111. Karl Carstens an Bundeskanzler Kurt Georg Kiesinger, 25 Sept. 1967, Karl Carstens Nachlass, N 1337, Mappe 663, BA
112. Hope M. Harrison, 'Ulbricht and the Concrete "Rose": New Archival Evidence on the Dynamics of Soviet-East German Relations and the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1961', Cold War International History Project Working Paper number 5 (May 1993);
113. idem, 'Driving the Soviets up the Wall: A Super-Ally, a Superpower and the Building of the Berlin Wall, 1958-61', Cold War History 1 (2000), pp.53-74.
114. Roderick MacFarquhaur, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution, Vol. 3: The Coming of the Cataclysm, 1961-1966 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), pp.261-465;
115. Jasper Becker, Hungry Ghosts: Mao's Secret Famine (New York: The Free Press, 1996), pp.58-82;
116. John Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988).
117. H. Gordon Skilling, Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976);
118. Kieran Williams, The Prague Spring and its Aftermath (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp.3-28.
119. Hans J. Morgenthau, The Purpose of American Politics (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1960), pp.3-4.
120. See also Gordon Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), pp.228-52;
121. William Burr and Jeffrey T. Richelson, 'Whether to "Strangle the Baby in the Cradle": The United States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960-1964', International Security (Winter 2000), pp.54-99.
122. Memorandum, Harlan Cleveland to Secretary Rusk, 'East-West Relations in NATO', 17 Nov. 1966, Records of the Ambassador at Large, Llewellyn E. Thompson, 1961-70, Entry 5008, Lot 67D2, Box 7, Folder NATO-No. 2, NA
123. See also Memorandum for the Council, L.W. Fuller S/P, 'The President's Meeting with Erhard', 1 Nov. 1963, Folder: Germany 1963, Box 252, RG 59, Lot 70D199 -Records of the Policy Planning Staff Council, 1963-64, NA.
124. For a series of reflections on these developments see Memorandum, Llewellyn E. Thompson to the President, 'Talks with Gromyko on October 10', 8 Oct. 1963, Folder: POL US-USSR 10/1/63, Box 4121, RG 59, 1963 Alpha-Numeric Political and Defense POL, NA.
125. Memorandum, W.W.Rostow to Secretary Rusk, 'State of the World', 17 Sept.1963, RG 59: Records of the Policy Planning Staff Council (S/PC), 1963-64, Entry 5041, Lot 70D199, Box 256, Folder USSR July-Dec. 1963, NA.
126. On the American perception of Eastern alliance centralization as a strategic asset in the early 1950s, see Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. Immerman, Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp.149-57.
127. On de Gaulle's attitude towards the Atlantic Alliance after 1963, and the US in particular, see Vaïsse, La grandeur, 363-412;
128. Frank Costigliola, France and the United States: The Cold Alliance since World War II (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1992), pp.136-59
129. See also Lyndon B. Johnson, Annual Message to the Congress on the State of Union, 12 January 1966.
130. Johnson, Public Papers of the Presidents, 1966, I: 3-12.
131. Henry A. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership: A Re-appraisal of the Atlantic Alliance (New York: McGraw Hill, 1965), p.248.
132. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, p.23.
133. Ministerial Communiqué, North Atlantic Council, 'Harmel Report: The Future Tasks of the Alliance', Brussels, 13-14 Dec. 1967, http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/c671213b.htm.
134. The strategy of flexible response represented a compromise between a full-scale conventional defence, advocated by the United States - in particular Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara - and a trip-wire strategy, advocated by major European allies. Jane E. Stromseth, The Origins of Flexible Response: NATO's Debate over Strategy in the 1960s (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), pp.175-94. 102.
135. See Paul Buteux, The Politics of Nuclear Consultation in NATO, 1965-1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp.39-68;
136. J. Michael Legge, 'Theater Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response', RAND Report R-2964-FF (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 1983), pp.17-34.
137. On the strategic discussions within NATO see Helga Haftendorn, Kernwaffen und die Glaubwuerdigkeit der Allianz: die NATO-Krise von 1966/67 (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1994).
138. On West Germany's Ostpolitik, see A. James McAdams, Germany Divided: From the Wall to Reunification (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp.79-95;
139. William E. Griffith, The Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic of Germany (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1978);
140. Arnd Bauerkamper, Martin Sabrow and Bernd Stover (eds.), Doppelte Zeitgeschichte: deutsch-deutsche Beziehungen 1945-1990 (Bonn: J.H.W Dietz, 1998).
141. On the process of European détente, see Raymond L.Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, rev. edn, 1994), pp.123-45;
142. Wilfried von Bredow, Der KSZE-Prozess: Von der Zähmung zur Auflösung des Ost-West-Konflikts (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1992).
143. During the late 1960s, before the initiation of Kissinger's 'triangular diplomacy', both Moscow and Beijing made a series of overtures to France, then seen as the most independent member of the Western alliance. On the establishment of closer Franco-Soviet relations see '"Declaration" Franco-Sovietique', 3 Dec. 1966, Carton CM8, Dossier 1966, Couve Papers. On deepening Franco-Chinese relations see Compte Rendu de l'entretien du 8 octobre 1970 entre Zhou Enlai et Maurice Couve de Murville, Carton CM10, Dossier 2, Couve Papers.
144. See the Report by Four Chinese Marshals - Chen Yi, Ye Jianying, Nie Rongzhen, and Xu Xiangqian - to the CCP Central Committee, 'Our Views about the Current Situation' (excerpt), 17 Sept. 1969
145. reprinted in the Cold War International History Project Bulletin, 11 (Winter 1998), p.170.
146. See Ulbricht comments in Jaromir Navratil et al. (eds.), The Prague Spring, 1968: A National Security Archive Documents Reader (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1998), documents 52, 68, 79.
147. On this point see Jürgen Habermas, Toward a Rational Society: Student Protest, Science, and Politics, trans. Jeremy Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970), pp.13-61.
148. On Keynesian fiscal spending and its institutional connections to military policy see Michael Sherry, In the Shadow of War: The United States since the 1930s (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), pp.237-79;
149. Lloyd Gardner, Pay any Price: Lyndon Johnson and the Wars for Vietnam (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1995), pp.24-39.
150. See also Bator's influential book, The Question of Government Spending (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960).
151. Walter Lippmann, in consultation with Francis M. Bator, 'America Must Grow', The Saturday Evening Post, 5 Nov. 1960.
152. Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989).
153. See also Habermas, Toward a Rational Society, pp.1-12.
154. On this point see the SDS Port Huron Statement of 15 June 1962, reprinted in James Miller, Democracy Is in the Streets: From Port Huron to the Siege of Chicago (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), pp.329-74.
155. On the common perception of social and political blockage voiced by various protest movements in the 1960s see Robert Daniels, The Year of the Heroic Guerilla (New York: Basic Books 1989), pp.235-47.
156. Boyer, 'From Activism to Apathy'.
157. On this general point, see Maurice Isserman, If I Had a Hammer: The Death of the Old Left and the Birth of the New Left (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987), pp.77-219.
158. For the rhetoric of progressivism in American and Europe during the early twentieth century, see Daniel T. Rodgers, Crossing the Atlantic: Social Politics in a Progressive Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), especially pp.52-75.
159. See Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991 (New York: Random House, 1994), pp.257-86.
160. The growth of protest movements in this context of relative material comfort reflects the central insight of Alexis de Tocqueville. Protests are difficult to organize when many potential revolutionaries face starvation. Social movements, however, coalesce more easily with improved material conditions and rising expectations. Alexis de Tocqueville, L'Ancien Régime et la Révolution (Paris: Gallimard, 1952), especially pp.218-25.
161. See François Furet, Penser la Revolution française (Paris: Gallimard, 1978), especially pp.13-130.
162. See also Robert McNamara's description of creeping war escalation during the Johnson years. McNamara, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New York: Random House, 1995), pp.169-206.
163. For Brezhnev's deepened worries about stability in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union see the transcripts of the Soviet leader's August telephone conversations with Czechoslovak Communist Party Secretary Alexander Dubcek in Navratil et al. (eds.), The Prague Spring, 1968, documents 77, 81.
164. See Ilya Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996), especially 133-93.
165. See Memo of Conversation between Rusk, Bohlen and Dobrynin, 22 July 1968, FRUS, 1964-68, XVII: 212-14;
166. See Raymond Aron, Dix-huit leçons sur la société industrielle (Paris: Gallimard, 1962), especially pp.97-117.
167. See Aron's articles in the French newspaper, Le Figaro, May-June 1968.
168. See also Raymond Aron, Mémoires: 50 ans de réflexion politique (Paris: Julliard, 1983), pp.471-97.
169. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987), p.515.