Cultural relativism

Human Rights Quarterly

Volumn 22, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 501-547

  Tilley, John J ^a  

^a INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0345936799     PISSN: 02750392     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1353/hrq.2000.0027     Document Type: Article

References (168)

1. I am grateful to Rhoda Howard, Louis Pojman, Paul Warren and, especially, Michael Burke for helpful comments. I am also grateful to my students in P326, Ethical Theory, for useful questions and discussions.
2. The terminology in this essay is not out of the ordinary, but nor is it universal. For instance, some authors use "ethical relativism" for what this article calls "cultural relativism," reserving the latter term for the view that different cultures accept different moral principles. Also, the terms "agent relativism," "transcendentalism," "moral liberalism," and "Victorian morality," all of which appear in this article, have more than one use in moral philosophy.
3. Especially those disciplines concerned with international human rights. See, e.g., Alison Dundes Renteln, The Unanswered Challenge of Relativism and the Consequences for Human Rights, 7 HUM. RTS. Q. 514 (1985); Alison Dundes Renteln, Relativism and the Search for Human Rights, 90 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 56 (1988); ALISON DUNDES RENTELN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: UNIVERSALISM VERSUS RELATIVISM (1990); Terry Nardin, The Problem of Relativism in International Ethics, 18 MILLENNIUM 149 (1989); Martha C. Nussbaum, Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism, 20 POL. THEORY 203, 203-04 (1992) (recounting conversations that reveal the prevalence of cultural relativism among academics); Sam Garkawe, The Impact of the Doctrine of Cultural Relativism on the Australian Legal System, 2 E LAW-MURDOCH UNIV. ELEC. J.L., Apr. 1995, available in 〈http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v2n1/ garkawe.txt〉 (visited 9 Feb. 2000); Donald J. Puchala, The Ethics of Globalism, 5 REP. & PAPERS 2 (1995), available in 〈http://www.yale.edu/acuns/NEW_publications/ 95_Holmes_Lecture.html〉 (visited 9 Feb. 2000) (recounting conference events that reveal the prevalence and influence of cultural relativism); Elvin Hatch, The Good Side of Relativism, 53 J. ANTHROPOLOGICAL RES. 371 (1997). Some valuable correctives to this trend are Nussbaum, supra, at 205-46; Puchala, supra, at 3-17; Rhoda E. Howard, Cultural Absolutism and the Nostalgia for Community, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 315 (1993); Ray Kiely, Third Worldist Relativism: A New Form of Imperialism, 25 J. CONTEMP. ASIA 159 (1995); Anne F. Bayefsky, Cultural Sovereignty, Relativism, and International Human Rights: New Excuses for Old Strategies, 9 RATIO JURIS 42 (1996).
4. Especially those disciplines concerned with international human rights. See, e.g., Alison Dundes Renteln, The Unanswered Challenge of Relativism and the Consequences for Human Rights, 7 HUM. RTS. Q. 514 (1985); Alison Dundes Renteln, Relativism and the Search for Human Rights, 90 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 56 (1988); ALISON DUNDES RENTELN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: UNIVERSALISM VERSUS RELATIVISM (1990); Terry Nardin, The Problem of Relativism in International Ethics, 18 MILLENNIUM 149 (1989); Martha C. Nussbaum, Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism, 20 POL. THEORY 203, 203-04 (1992) (recounting conversations that reveal the prevalence of cultural relativism among academics); Sam Garkawe, The Impact of the Doctrine of Cultural Relativism on the Australian Legal System, 2 E LAW-MURDOCH UNIV. ELEC. J.L., Apr. 1995, available in 〈http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v2n1/ garkawe.txt〉 (visited 9 Feb. 2000); Donald J. Puchala, The Ethics of Globalism, 5 REP. & PAPERS 2 (1995), available in 〈http://www.yale.edu/acuns/NEW_publications/ 95_Holmes_Lecture.html〉 (visited 9 Feb. 2000) (recounting conference events that reveal the prevalence and influence of cultural relativism); Elvin Hatch, The Good Side of Relativism, 53 J. ANTHROPOLOGICAL RES. 371 (1997). Some valuable correctives to this trend are Nussbaum, supra, at 205-46; Puchala, supra, at 3-17; Rhoda E. Howard, Cultural Absolutism and the Nostalgia for Community, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 315 (1993); Ray Kiely, Third Worldist Relativism: A New Form of Imperialism, 25 J. CONTEMP. ASIA 159 (1995); Anne F. Bayefsky, Cultural Sovereignty, Relativism, and International Human Rights: New Excuses for Old Strategies, 9 RATIO JURIS 42 (1996).
5. Especially those disciplines concerned with international human rights. See, e.g., Alison Dundes Renteln, The Unanswered Challenge of Relativism and the Consequences for Human Rights, 7 HUM. RTS. Q. 514 (1985); Alison Dundes Renteln, Relativism and the Search for Human Rights, 90 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 56 (1988); ALISON DUNDES RENTELN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: UNIVERSALISM VERSUS RELATIVISM (1990); Terry Nardin, The Problem of Relativism in International Ethics, 18 MILLENNIUM 149 (1989); Martha C. Nussbaum, Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism, 20 POL. THEORY 203, 203-04 (1992) (recounting conversations that reveal the prevalence of cultural relativism among academics); Sam Garkawe, The Impact of the Doctrine of Cultural Relativism on the Australian Legal System, 2 E LAW-MURDOCH UNIV. ELEC. J.L., Apr. 1995, available in 〈http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v2n1/ garkawe.txt〉 (visited 9 Feb. 2000); Donald J. Puchala, The Ethics of Globalism, 5 REP. & PAPERS 2 (1995), available in 〈http://www.yale.edu/acuns/NEW_publications/ 95_Holmes_Lecture.html〉 (visited 9 Feb. 2000) (recounting conference events that reveal the prevalence and influence of cultural relativism); Elvin Hatch, The Good Side of Relativism, 53 J. ANTHROPOLOGICAL RES. 371 (1997). Some valuable correctives to this trend are Nussbaum, supra, at 205-46; Puchala, supra, at 3-17; Rhoda E. Howard, Cultural Absolutism and the Nostalgia for Community, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 315 (1993); Ray Kiely, Third Worldist Relativism: A New Form of Imperialism, 25 J. CONTEMP. ASIA 159 (1995); Anne F. Bayefsky, Cultural Sovereignty, Relativism, and International Human Rights: New Excuses for Old Strategies, 9 RATIO JURIS 42 (1996).
6. Especially those disciplines concerned with international human rights. See, e.g., Alison Dundes Renteln, The Unanswered Challenge of Relativism and the Consequences for Human Rights, 7 HUM. RTS. Q. 514 (1985); Alison Dundes Renteln, Relativism and the Search for Human Rights, 90 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 56 (1988); ALISON DUNDES RENTELN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: UNIVERSALISM VERSUS RELATIVISM (1990); Terry Nardin, The Problem of Relativism in International Ethics, 18 MILLENNIUM 149 (1989); Martha C. Nussbaum, Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism, 20 POL. THEORY 203, 203-04 (1992) (recounting conversations that reveal the prevalence of cultural relativism among academics); Sam Garkawe, The Impact of the Doctrine of Cultural Relativism on the Australian Legal System, 2 E LAW-MURDOCH UNIV. ELEC. J.L., Apr. 1995, available in 〈http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v2n1/ garkawe.txt〉 (visited 9 Feb. 2000); Donald J. Puchala, The Ethics of Globalism, 5 REP. & PAPERS 2 (1995), available in 〈http://www.yale.edu/acuns/NEW_publications/ 95_Holmes_Lecture.html〉 (visited 9 Feb. 2000) (recounting conference events that reveal the prevalence and influence of cultural relativism); Elvin Hatch, The Good Side of Relativism, 53 J. ANTHROPOLOGICAL RES. 371 (1997). Some valuable correctives to this trend are Nussbaum, supra, at 205-46; Puchala, supra, at 3-17; Rhoda E. Howard, Cultural Absolutism and the Nostalgia for Community, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 315 (1993); Ray Kiely, Third Worldist Relativism: A New Form of Imperialism, 25 J. CONTEMP. ASIA 159 (1995); Anne F. Bayefsky, Cultural Sovereignty, Relativism, and International Human Rights: New Excuses for Old Strategies, 9 RATIO JURIS 42 (1996).
7. Especially those disciplines concerned with international human rights. See, e.g., Alison Dundes Renteln, The Unanswered Challenge of Relativism and the Consequences for Human Rights, 7 HUM. RTS. Q. 514 (1985); Alison Dundes Renteln, Relativism and the Search for Human Rights, 90 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 56 (1988); ALISON DUNDES RENTELN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: UNIVERSALISM VERSUS RELATIVISM (1990); Terry Nardin, The Problem of Relativism in International Ethics, 18 MILLENNIUM 149 (1989); Martha C. Nussbaum, Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism, 20 POL. THEORY 203, 203-04 (1992) (recounting conversations that reveal the prevalence of cultural relativism among academics); Sam Garkawe, The Impact of the Doctrine of Cultural Relativism on the Australian Legal System, 2 E LAW-MURDOCH UNIV. ELEC. J.L., Apr. 1995, available in 〈http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v2n1/ garkawe.txt〉 (visited 9 Feb. 2000); Donald J. Puchala, The Ethics of Globalism, 5 REP. & PAPERS 2 (1995), available in 〈http://www.yale.edu/acuns/NEW_publications/ 95_Holmes_Lecture.html〉 (visited 9 Feb. 2000) (recounting conference events that reveal the prevalence and influence of cultural relativism); Elvin Hatch, The Good Side of Relativism, 53 J. ANTHROPOLOGICAL RES. 371 (1997). Some valuable correctives to this trend are Nussbaum, supra, at 205-46; Puchala, supra, at 3-17; Rhoda E. Howard, Cultural Absolutism and the Nostalgia for Community, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 315 (1993); Ray Kiely, Third Worldist Relativism: A New Form of Imperialism, 25 J. CONTEMP. ASIA 159 (1995); Anne F. Bayefsky, Cultural Sovereignty, Relativism, and International Human Rights: New Excuses for Old Strategies, 9 RATIO JURIS 42 (1996).
8. Especially those disciplines concerned with international human rights. See, e.g., Alison Dundes Renteln, The Unanswered Challenge of Relativism and the Consequences for Human Rights, 7 HUM. RTS. Q. 514 (1985); Alison Dundes Renteln, Relativism and the Search for Human Rights, 90 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 56 (1988); ALISON DUNDES RENTELN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: UNIVERSALISM VERSUS RELATIVISM (1990); Terry Nardin, The Problem of Relativism in International Ethics, 18 MILLENNIUM 149 (1989); Martha C. Nussbaum, Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism, 20 POL. THEORY 203, 203-04 (1992) (recounting conversations that reveal the prevalence of cultural relativism among academics); Sam Garkawe, The Impact of the Doctrine of Cultural Relativism on the Australian Legal System, 2 E LAW-MURDOCH UNIV. ELEC. J.L., Apr. 1995, available in 〈http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v2n1/ garkawe.txt〉 (visited 9 Feb. 2000); Donald J. Puchala, The Ethics of Globalism, 5 REP. & PAPERS 2 (1995), available in 〈http://www.yale.edu/acuns/NEW_publications/ 95_Holmes_Lecture.html〉 (visited 9 Feb. 2000) (recounting conference events that reveal the prevalence and influence of cultural relativism); Elvin Hatch, The Good Side of Relativism, 53 J. ANTHROPOLOGICAL RES. 371 (1997). Some valuable correctives to this trend are Nussbaum, supra, at 205-46; Puchala, supra, at 3-17; Rhoda E. Howard, Cultural Absolutism and the Nostalgia for Community, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 315 (1993); Ray Kiely, Third Worldist Relativism: A New Form of Imperialism, 25 J. CONTEMP. ASIA 159 (1995); Anne F. Bayefsky, Cultural Sovereignty, Relativism, and International Human Rights: New Excuses for Old Strategies, 9 RATIO JURIS 42 (1996).
9. Especially those disciplines concerned with international human rights. See, e.g., Alison Dundes Renteln, The Unanswered Challenge of Relativism and the Consequences for Human Rights, 7 HUM. RTS. Q. 514 (1985); Alison Dundes Renteln, Relativism and the Search for Human Rights, 90 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 56 (1988); ALISON DUNDES RENTELN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: UNIVERSALISM VERSUS RELATIVISM (1990); Terry Nardin, The Problem of Relativism in International Ethics, 18 MILLENNIUM 149 (1989); Martha C. Nussbaum, Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism, 20 POL. THEORY 203, 203-04 (1992) (recounting conversations that reveal the prevalence of cultural relativism among academics); Sam Garkawe, The Impact of the Doctrine of Cultural Relativism on the Australian Legal System, 2 E LAW-MURDOCH UNIV. ELEC. J.L., Apr. 1995, available in 〈http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v2n1/ garkawe.txt〉 (visited 9 Feb. 2000); Donald J. Puchala, The Ethics of Globalism, 5 REP. & PAPERS 2 (1995), available in 〈http://www.yale.edu/acuns/NEW_publications/ 95_Holmes_Lecture.html〉 (visited 9 Feb. 2000) (recounting conference events that reveal the prevalence and influence of cultural relativism); Elvin Hatch, The Good Side of Relativism, 53 J. ANTHROPOLOGICAL RES. 371 (1997). Some valuable correctives to this trend are Nussbaum, supra, at 205-46; Puchala, supra, at 3-17; Rhoda E. Howard, Cultural Absolutism and the Nostalgia for Community, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 315 (1993); Ray Kiely, Third Worldist Relativism: A New Form of Imperialism, 25 J. CONTEMP. ASIA 159 (1995); Anne F. Bayefsky, Cultural Sovereignty, Relativism, and International Human Rights: New Excuses for Old Strategies, 9 RATIO JURIS 42 (1996).
10. Especially those disciplines concerned with international human rights. See, e.g., Alison Dundes Renteln, The Unanswered Challenge of Relativism and the Consequences for Human Rights, 7 HUM. RTS. Q. 514 (1985); Alison Dundes Renteln, Relativism and the Search for Human Rights, 90 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 56 (1988); ALISON DUNDES RENTELN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: UNIVERSALISM VERSUS RELATIVISM (1990); Terry Nardin, The Problem of Relativism in International Ethics, 18 MILLENNIUM 149 (1989); Martha C. Nussbaum, Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism, 20 POL. THEORY 203, 203-04 (1992) (recounting conversations that reveal the prevalence of cultural relativism among academics); Sam Garkawe, The Impact of the Doctrine of Cultural Relativism on the Australian Legal System, 2 E LAW-MURDOCH UNIV. ELEC. J.L., Apr. 1995, available in 〈http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v2n1/ garkawe.txt〉 (visited 9 Feb. 2000); Donald J. Puchala, The Ethics of Globalism, 5 REP. & PAPERS 2 (1995), available in 〈http://www.yale.edu/acuns/NEW_publications/ 95_Holmes_Lecture.html〉 (visited 9 Feb. 2000) (recounting conference events that reveal the prevalence and influence of cultural relativism); Elvin Hatch, The Good Side of Relativism, 53 J. ANTHROPOLOGICAL RES. 371 (1997). Some valuable correctives to this trend are Nussbaum, supra, at 205-46; Puchala, supra, at 3-17; Rhoda E. Howard, Cultural Absolutism and the Nostalgia for Community, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 315 (1993); Ray Kiely, Third Worldist Relativism: A New Form of Imperialism, 25 J. CONTEMP. ASIA 159 (1995); Anne F. Bayefsky, Cultural Sovereignty, Relativism, and International Human Rights: New Excuses for Old Strategies, 9 RATIO JURIS 42 (1996).
11. Especially those disciplines concerned with international human rights. See, e.g., Alison Dundes Renteln, The Unanswered Challenge of Relativism and the Consequences for Human Rights, 7 HUM. RTS. Q. 514 (1985); Alison Dundes Renteln, Relativism and the Search for Human Rights, 90 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 56 (1988); ALISON DUNDES RENTELN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: UNIVERSALISM VERSUS RELATIVISM (1990); Terry Nardin, The Problem of Relativism in International Ethics, 18 MILLENNIUM 149 (1989); Martha C. Nussbaum, Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism, 20 POL. THEORY 203, 203-04 (1992) (recounting conversations that reveal the prevalence of cultural relativism among academics); Sam Garkawe, The Impact of the Doctrine of Cultural Relativism on the Australian Legal System, 2 E LAW-MURDOCH UNIV. ELEC. J.L., Apr. 1995, available in 〈http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v2n1/ garkawe.txt〉 (visited 9 Feb. 2000); Donald J. Puchala, The Ethics of Globalism, 5 REP. & PAPERS 2 (1995), available in 〈http://www.yale.edu/acuns/NEW_publications/ 95_Holmes_Lecture.html〉 (visited 9 Feb. 2000) (recounting conference events that reveal the prevalence and influence of cultural relativism); Elvin Hatch, The Good Side of Relativism, 53 J. ANTHROPOLOGICAL RES. 371 (1997). Some valuable correctives to this trend are Nussbaum, supra, at 205-46; Puchala, supra, at 3-17; Rhoda E. Howard, Cultural Absolutism and the Nostalgia for Community, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 315 (1993); Ray Kiely, Third Worldist Relativism: A New Form of Imperialism, 25 J. CONTEMP. ASIA 159 (1995); Anne F. Bayefsky, Cultural Sovereignty, Relativism, and International Human Rights: New Excuses for Old Strategies, 9 RATIO JURIS 42 (1996).
12. Especially those disciplines concerned with international human rights. See, e.g., Alison Dundes Renteln, The Unanswered Challenge of Relativism and the Consequences for Human Rights, 7 HUM. RTS. Q. 514 (1985); Alison Dundes Renteln, Relativism and the Search for Human Rights, 90 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 56 (1988); ALISON DUNDES RENTELN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: UNIVERSALISM VERSUS RELATIVISM (1990); Terry Nardin, The Problem of Relativism in International Ethics, 18 MILLENNIUM 149 (1989); Martha C. Nussbaum, Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism, 20 POL. THEORY 203, 203-04 (1992) (recounting conversations that reveal the prevalence of cultural relativism among academics); Sam Garkawe, The Impact of the Doctrine of Cultural Relativism on the Australian Legal System, 2 E LAW-MURDOCH UNIV. ELEC. J.L., Apr. 1995, available in 〈http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v2n1/ garkawe.txt〉 (visited 9 Feb. 2000); Donald J. Puchala, The Ethics of Globalism, 5 REP. & PAPERS 2 (1995), available in 〈http://www.yale.edu/acuns/NEW_publications/ 95_Holmes_Lecture.html〉 (visited 9 Feb. 2000) (recounting conference events that reveal the prevalence and influence of cultural relativism); Elvin Hatch, The Good Side of Relativism, 53 J. ANTHROPOLOGICAL RES. 371 (1997). Some valuable correctives to this trend are Nussbaum, supra, at 205-46; Puchala, supra, at 3-17; Rhoda E. Howard, Cultural Absolutism and the Nostalgia for Community, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 315 (1993); Ray Kiely, Third Worldist Relativism: A New Form of Imperialism, 25 J. CONTEMP. ASIA 159 (1995); Anne F. Bayefsky, Cultural Sovereignty, Relativism, and International Human Rights: New Excuses for Old Strategies, 9 RATIO JURIS 42 (1996).
13. Especially those disciplines concerned with international human rights. See, e.g., Alison Dundes Renteln, The Unanswered Challenge of Relativism and the Consequences for Human Rights, 7 HUM. RTS. Q. 514 (1985); Alison Dundes Renteln, Relativism and the Search for Human Rights, 90 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 56 (1988); ALISON DUNDES RENTELN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: UNIVERSALISM VERSUS RELATIVISM (1990); Terry Nardin, The Problem of Relativism in International Ethics, 18 MILLENNIUM 149 (1989); Martha C. Nussbaum, Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism, 20 POL. THEORY 203, 203-04 (1992) (recounting conversations that reveal the prevalence of cultural relativism among academics); Sam Garkawe, The Impact of the Doctrine of Cultural Relativism on the Australian Legal System, 2 E LAW-MURDOCH UNIV. ELEC. J.L., Apr. 1995, available in 〈http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v2n1/ garkawe.txt〉 (visited 9 Feb. 2000); Donald J. Puchala, The Ethics of Globalism, 5 REP. & PAPERS 2 (1995), available in 〈http://www.yale.edu/acuns/NEW_publications/ 95_Holmes_Lecture.html〉 (visited 9 Feb. 2000) (recounting conference events that reveal the prevalence and influence of cultural relativism); Elvin Hatch, The Good Side of Relativism, 53 J. ANTHROPOLOGICAL RES. 371 (1997). Some valuable correctives to this trend are Nussbaum, supra, at 205-46; Puchala, supra, at 3-17; Rhoda E. Howard, Cultural Absolutism and the Nostalgia for Community, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 315 (1993); Ray Kiely, Third Worldist Relativism: A New Form of Imperialism, 25 J. CONTEMP. ASIA 159 (1995); Anne F. Bayefsky, Cultural Sovereignty, Relativism, and International Human Rights: New Excuses for Old Strategies, 9 RATIO JURIS 42 (1996).
14. Critical studies of cultural relativism are numerous. Useful ones include the "correctives" in note 3. See also W.T. STACE, THE CONCEPT OF MORALS chs. 1-2, 10 (1937); Elgin Williams, Anthropology for the Common Man, 49 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 84 (1947); Frank E. Hartung, Cultural Relativity and Moral Judgments, 21 PHIL. SCI. 118 (1954); Paul F. Schmidt, Some Criticisms of Cultural Relativism, 52 J. PHIL. 780 (1955); David Bidney, The Philosophical Presuppositions of Cultural Relativism and Cultural Absolutism, in ETHICS AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 51 (Leo Ward ed., 1959); RICHARD B. BRANDT, ETHICAL THEORY ch. 11 (1959); T. L. McClintock, The Argument for Ethical Relativism from the Diversity of Morals, 47 MONIST 528 (1963); PAUL W. TAYLOR, PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS ch. 2 (1975); William H. Shaw, Relativism and Objectivity in Ethics, in MORALITY AND MORAL CONTROVERSIES 31 (John Arthur ed., 1981); F. C. WHITE, KNOWLEDGE AND RELATIVISM chs. 4-5 (1983); JEFFREY STOUT, ETHICS AFTER BABEL pt. 1 (1988); LOUIS P. POJMAN, ETHICS: DISCOVERING RIGHT AND WRONG chs. 2-3 (2d ed. 1995). My discussion has benefitted from these authors at many points. A related note: this article was finished in all essentials in mid-1997; hence, it makes little use of items that have appeared since then. Among those items are the following, which I recommend highly: Elizabeth M. Zechenter, In the Name of Culture: Cultural Relativism and the Abuse of the Individual, 53 J. ANTHROPOLOGICAL RES. 319 (1997); Michael J. Perry, Are Human Rights Universal?: The Relativist Challenge and Related Matters, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 461 (1997); MICHELE M. MOODY-ADAMS, FIELDVVORK IN FAMILIAR PLACES: MORALITY, CULTURE, AND PHILOSOPHY (1997); William Max Knorpp Jr., What Relativism Isn't, 73 PHILOSOPHY 277 (1998); JOHN W. COOK, MORALITY AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES (1999).
15. Critical studies of cultural relativism are numerous. Useful ones include the "correctives" in note 3. See also W.T. STACE, THE CONCEPT OF MORALS chs. 1-2, 10 (1937); Elgin Williams, Anthropology for the Common Man, 49 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 84 (1947); Frank E. Hartung, Cultural Relativity and Moral Judgments, 21 PHIL. SCI. 118 (1954); Paul F. Schmidt, Some Criticisms of Cultural Relativism, 52 J. PHIL. 780 (1955); David Bidney, The Philosophical Presuppositions of Cultural Relativism and Cultural Absolutism, in ETHICS AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 51 (Leo Ward ed., 1959); RICHARD B. BRANDT, ETHICAL THEORY ch. 11 (1959); T. L. McClintock, The Argument for Ethical Relativism from the Diversity of Morals, 47 MONIST 528 (1963); PAUL W. TAYLOR, PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS ch. 2 (1975); William H. Shaw, Relativism and Objectivity in Ethics, in MORALITY AND MORAL CONTROVERSIES 31 (John Arthur ed., 1981); F. C. WHITE, KNOWLEDGE AND RELATIVISM chs. 4-5 (1983); JEFFREY STOUT, ETHICS AFTER BABEL pt. 1 (1988); LOUIS P. POJMAN, ETHICS: DISCOVERING RIGHT AND WRONG chs. 2-3 (2d ed. 1995). My discussion has benefitted from these authors at many points. A related note: this article was finished in all essentials in mid-1997; hence, it makes little use of items that have appeared since then. Among those items are the following, which I recommend highly: Elizabeth M. Zechenter, In the Name of Culture: Cultural Relativism and the Abuse of the Individual, 53 J. ANTHROPOLOGICAL RES. 319 (1997); Michael J. Perry, Are Human Rights Universal?: The Relativist Challenge and Related Matters, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 461 (1997); MICHELE M. MOODY-ADAMS, FIELDVVORK IN FAMILIAR PLACES: MORALITY, CULTURE, AND PHILOSOPHY (1997); William Max Knorpp Jr., What Relativism Isn't, 73 PHILOSOPHY 277 (1998); JOHN W. COOK, MORALITY AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES (1999).
16. Critical studies of cultural relativism are numerous. Useful ones include the "correctives" in note 3. See also W.T. STACE, THE CONCEPT OF MORALS chs. 1-2, 10 (1937); Elgin Williams, Anthropology for the Common Man, 49 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 84 (1947); Frank E. Hartung, Cultural Relativity and Moral Judgments, 21 PHIL. SCI. 118 (1954); Paul F. Schmidt, Some Criticisms of Cultural Relativism, 52 J. PHIL. 780 (1955); David Bidney, The Philosophical Presuppositions of Cultural Relativism and Cultural Absolutism, in ETHICS AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 51 (Leo Ward ed., 1959); RICHARD B. BRANDT, ETHICAL THEORY ch. 11 (1959); T. L. McClintock, The Argument for Ethical Relativism from the Diversity of Morals, 47 MONIST 528 (1963); PAUL W. TAYLOR, PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS ch. 2 (1975); William H. Shaw, Relativism and Objectivity in Ethics, in MORALITY AND MORAL CONTROVERSIES 31 (John Arthur ed., 1981); F. C. WHITE, KNOWLEDGE AND RELATIVISM chs. 4-5 (1983); JEFFREY STOUT, ETHICS AFTER BABEL pt. 1 (1988); LOUIS P. POJMAN, ETHICS: DISCOVERING RIGHT AND WRONG chs. 2-3 (2d ed. 1995). My discussion has benefitted from these authors at many points. A related note: this article was finished in all essentials in mid-1997; hence, it makes little use of items that have appeared since then. Among those items are the following, which I recommend highly: Elizabeth M. Zechenter, In the Name of Culture: Cultural Relativism and the Abuse of the Individual, 53 J. ANTHROPOLOGICAL RES. 319 (1997); Michael J. Perry, Are Human Rights Universal?: The Relativist Challenge and Related Matters, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 461 (1997); MICHELE M. MOODY-ADAMS, FIELDVVORK IN FAMILIAR PLACES: MORALITY, CULTURE, AND PHILOSOPHY (1997); William Max Knorpp Jr., What Relativism Isn't, 73 PHILOSOPHY 277 (1998); JOHN W. COOK, MORALITY AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES (1999).
17. Critical studies of cultural relativism are numerous. Useful ones include the "correctives" in note 3. See also W.T. STACE, THE CONCEPT OF MORALS chs. 1-2, 10 (1937); Elgin Williams, Anthropology for the Common Man, 49 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 84 (1947); Frank E. Hartung, Cultural Relativity and Moral Judgments, 21 PHIL. SCI. 118 (1954); Paul F. Schmidt, Some Criticisms of Cultural Relativism, 52 J. PHIL. 780 (1955); David Bidney, The Philosophical Presuppositions of Cultural Relativism and Cultural Absolutism, in ETHICS AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 51 (Leo Ward ed., 1959); RICHARD B. BRANDT, ETHICAL THEORY ch. 11 (1959); T. L. McClintock, The Argument for Ethical Relativism from the Diversity of Morals, 47 MONIST 528 (1963); PAUL W. TAYLOR, PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS ch. 2 (1975); William H. Shaw, Relativism and Objectivity in Ethics, in MORALITY AND MORAL CONTROVERSIES 31 (John Arthur ed., 1981); F. C. WHITE, KNOWLEDGE AND RELATIVISM chs. 4-5 (1983); JEFFREY STOUT, ETHICS AFTER BABEL pt. 1 (1988); LOUIS P. POJMAN, ETHICS: DISCOVERING RIGHT AND WRONG chs. 2-3 (2d ed. 1995). My discussion has benefitted from these authors at many points. A related note: this article was finished in all essentials in mid-1997; hence, it makes little use of items that have appeared since then. Among those items are the following, which I recommend highly: Elizabeth M. Zechenter, In the Name of Culture: Cultural Relativism and the Abuse of the Individual, 53 J. ANTHROPOLOGICAL RES. 319 (1997); Michael J. Perry, Are Human Rights Universal?: The Relativist Challenge and Related Matters, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 461 (1997); MICHELE M. MOODY-ADAMS, FIELDVVORK IN FAMILIAR PLACES: MORALITY, CULTURE, AND PHILOSOPHY (1997); William Max Knorpp Jr., What Relativism Isn't, 73 PHILOSOPHY 277 (1998); JOHN W. COOK, MORALITY AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES (1999).
18. Critical studies of cultural relativism are numerous. Useful ones include the "correctives" in note 3. See also W.T. STACE, THE CONCEPT OF MORALS chs. 1-2, 10 (1937); Elgin Williams, Anthropology for the Common Man, 49 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 84 (1947); Frank E. Hartung, Cultural Relativity and Moral Judgments, 21 PHIL. SCI. 118 (1954); Paul F. Schmidt, Some Criticisms of Cultural Relativism, 52 J. PHIL. 780 (1955); David Bidney, The Philosophical Presuppositions of Cultural Relativism and Cultural Absolutism, in ETHICS AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 51 (Leo Ward ed., 1959); RICHARD B. BRANDT, ETHICAL THEORY ch. 11 (1959); T. L. McClintock, The Argument for Ethical Relativism from the Diversity of Morals, 47 MONIST 528 (1963); PAUL W. TAYLOR, PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS ch. 2 (1975); William H. Shaw, Relativism and Objectivity in Ethics, in MORALITY AND MORAL CONTROVERSIES 31 (John Arthur ed., 1981); F. C. WHITE, KNOWLEDGE AND RELATIVISM chs. 4-5 (1983); JEFFREY STOUT, ETHICS AFTER BABEL pt. 1 (1988); LOUIS P. POJMAN, ETHICS: DISCOVERING RIGHT AND WRONG chs. 2-3 (2d ed. 1995). My discussion has benefitted from these authors at many points. A related note: this article was finished in all essentials in mid-1997; hence, it makes little use of items that have appeared since then. Among those items are the following, which I recommend highly: Elizabeth M. Zechenter, In the Name of Culture: Cultural Relativism and the Abuse of the Individual, 53 J. ANTHROPOLOGICAL RES. 319 (1997); Michael J. Perry, Are Human Rights Universal?: The Relativist Challenge and Related Matters, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 461 (1997); MICHELE M. MOODY-ADAMS, FIELDVVORK IN FAMILIAR PLACES: MORALITY, CULTURE, AND PHILOSOPHY (1997); William Max Knorpp Jr., What Relativism Isn't, 73 PHILOSOPHY 277 (1998); JOHN W. COOK, MORALITY AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES (1999).
19. Critical studies of cultural relativism are numerous. Useful ones include the "correctives" in note 3. See also W.T. STACE, THE CONCEPT OF MORALS chs. 1-2, 10 (1937); Elgin Williams, Anthropology for the Common Man, 49 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 84 (1947); Frank E. Hartung, Cultural Relativity and Moral Judgments, 21 PHIL. SCI. 118 (1954); Paul F. Schmidt, Some Criticisms of Cultural Relativism, 52 J. PHIL. 780 (1955); David Bidney, The Philosophical Presuppositions of Cultural Relativism and Cultural Absolutism, in ETHICS AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 51 (Leo Ward ed., 1959); RICHARD B. BRANDT, ETHICAL THEORY ch. 11 (1959); T. L. McClintock, The Argument for Ethical Relativism from the Diversity of Morals, 47 MONIST 528 (1963); PAUL W. TAYLOR, PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS ch. 2 (1975); William H. Shaw, Relativism and Objectivity in Ethics, in MORALITY AND MORAL CONTROVERSIES 31 (John Arthur ed., 1981); F. C. WHITE, KNOWLEDGE AND RELATIVISM chs. 4-5 (1983); JEFFREY STOUT, ETHICS AFTER BABEL pt. 1 (1988); LOUIS P. POJMAN, ETHICS: DISCOVERING RIGHT AND WRONG chs. 2-3 (2d ed. 1995). My discussion has benefitted from these authors at many points. A related note: this article was finished in all essentials in mid-1997; hence, it makes little use of items that have appeared since then. Among those items are the following, which I recommend highly: Elizabeth M. Zechenter, In the Name of Culture: Cultural Relativism and the Abuse of the Individual, 53 J. ANTHROPOLOGICAL RES. 319 (1997); Michael J. Perry, Are Human Rights Universal?: The Relativist Challenge and Related Matters, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 461 (1997); MICHELE M. MOODY-ADAMS, FIELDVVORK IN FAMILIAR PLACES: MORALITY, CULTURE, AND PHILOSOPHY (1997); William Max Knorpp Jr., What Relativism Isn't, 73 PHILOSOPHY 277 (1998); JOHN W. COOK, MORALITY AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES (1999).
20. Critical studies of cultural relativism are numerous. Useful ones include the "correctives" in note 3. See also W.T. STACE, THE CONCEPT OF MORALS chs. 1-2, 10 (1937); Elgin Williams, Anthropology for the Common Man, 49 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 84 (1947); Frank E. Hartung, Cultural Relativity and Moral Judgments, 21 PHIL. SCI. 118 (1954); Paul F. Schmidt, Some Criticisms of Cultural Relativism, 52 J. PHIL. 780 (1955); David Bidney, The Philosophical Presuppositions of Cultural Relativism and Cultural Absolutism, in ETHICS AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 51 (Leo Ward ed., 1959); RICHARD B. BRANDT, ETHICAL THEORY ch. 11 (1959); T. L. McClintock, The Argument for Ethical Relativism from the Diversity of Morals, 47 MONIST 528 (1963); PAUL W. TAYLOR, PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS ch. 2 (1975); William H. Shaw, Relativism and Objectivity in Ethics, in MORALITY AND MORAL CONTROVERSIES 31 (John Arthur ed., 1981); F. C. WHITE, KNOWLEDGE AND RELATIVISM chs. 4-5 (1983); JEFFREY STOUT, ETHICS AFTER BABEL pt. 1 (1988); LOUIS P. POJMAN, ETHICS: DISCOVERING RIGHT AND WRONG chs. 2-3 (2d ed. 1995). My discussion has benefitted from these authors at many points. A related note: this article was finished in all essentials in mid-1997; hence, it makes little use of items that have appeared since then. Among those items are the following, which I recommend highly: Elizabeth M. Zechenter, In the Name of Culture: Cultural Relativism and the Abuse of the Individual, 53 J. ANTHROPOLOGICAL RES. 319 (1997); Michael J. Perry, Are Human Rights Universal?: The Relativist Challenge and Related Matters, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 461 (1997); MICHELE M. MOODY-ADAMS, FIELDVVORK IN FAMILIAR PLACES: MORALITY, CULTURE, AND PHILOSOPHY (1997); William Max Knorpp Jr., What Relativism Isn't, 73 PHILOSOPHY 277 (1998); JOHN W. COOK, MORALITY AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES (1999).
21. Critical studies of cultural relativism are numerous. Useful ones include the "correctives" in note 3. See also W.T. STACE, THE CONCEPT OF MORALS chs. 1-2, 10 (1937); Elgin Williams, Anthropology for the Common Man, 49 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 84 (1947); Frank E. Hartung, Cultural Relativity and Moral Judgments, 21 PHIL. SCI. 118 (1954); Paul F. Schmidt, Some Criticisms of Cultural Relativism, 52 J. PHIL. 780 (1955); David Bidney, The Philosophical Presuppositions of Cultural Relativism and Cultural Absolutism, in ETHICS AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 51 (Leo Ward ed., 1959); RICHARD B. BRANDT, ETHICAL THEORY ch. 11 (1959); T. L. McClintock, The Argument for Ethical Relativism from the Diversity of Morals, 47 MONIST 528 (1963); PAUL W. TAYLOR, PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS ch. 2 (1975); William H. Shaw, Relativism and Objectivity in Ethics, in MORALITY AND MORAL CONTROVERSIES 31 (John Arthur ed., 1981); F. C. WHITE, KNOWLEDGE AND RELATIVISM chs. 4-5 (1983); JEFFREY STOUT, ETHICS AFTER BABEL pt. 1 (1988); LOUIS P. POJMAN, ETHICS: DISCOVERING RIGHT AND WRONG chs. 2-3 (2d ed. 1995). My discussion has benefitted from these authors at many points. A related note: this article was finished in all essentials in mid-1997; hence, it makes little use of items that have appeared since then. Among those items are the following, which I recommend highly: Elizabeth M. Zechenter, In the Name of Culture: Cultural Relativism and the Abuse of the Individual, 53 J. ANTHROPOLOGICAL RES. 319 (1997); Michael J. Perry, Are Human Rights Universal?: The Relativist Challenge and Related Matters, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 461 (1997); MICHELE M. MOODY-ADAMS, FIELDVVORK IN FAMILIAR PLACES: MORALITY, CULTURE, AND PHILOSOPHY (1997); William Max Knorpp Jr., What Relativism Isn't, 73 PHILOSOPHY 277 (1998); JOHN W. COOK, MORALITY AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES (1999).
22. Critical studies of cultural relativism are numerous. Useful ones include the "correctives" in note 3. See also W.T. STACE, THE CONCEPT OF MORALS chs. 1-2, 10 (1937); Elgin Williams, Anthropology for the Common Man, 49 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 84 (1947); Frank E. Hartung, Cultural Relativity and Moral Judgments, 21 PHIL. SCI. 118 (1954); Paul F. Schmidt, Some Criticisms of Cultural Relativism, 52 J. PHIL. 780 (1955); David Bidney, The Philosophical Presuppositions of Cultural Relativism and Cultural Absolutism, in ETHICS AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 51 (Leo Ward ed., 1959); RICHARD B. BRANDT, ETHICAL THEORY ch. 11 (1959); T. L. McClintock, The Argument for Ethical Relativism from the Diversity of Morals, 47 MONIST 528 (1963); PAUL W. TAYLOR, PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS ch. 2 (1975); William H. Shaw, Relativism and Objectivity in Ethics, in MORALITY AND MORAL CONTROVERSIES 31 (John Arthur ed., 1981); F. C. WHITE, KNOWLEDGE AND RELATIVISM chs. 4-5 (1983); JEFFREY STOUT, ETHICS AFTER BABEL pt. 1 (1988); LOUIS P. POJMAN, ETHICS: DISCOVERING RIGHT AND WRONG chs. 2-3 (2d ed. 1995). My discussion has benefitted from these authors at many points. A related note: this article was finished in all essentials in mid-1997; hence, it makes little use of items that have appeared since then. Among those items are the following, which I recommend highly: Elizabeth M. Zechenter, In the Name of Culture: Cultural Relativism and the Abuse of the Individual, 53 J. ANTHROPOLOGICAL RES. 319 (1997); Michael J. Perry, Are Human Rights Universal?: The Relativist Challenge and Related Matters, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 461 (1997); MICHELE M. MOODY-ADAMS, FIELDVVORK IN FAMILIAR PLACES: MORALITY, CULTURE, AND PHILOSOPHY (1997); William Max Knorpp Jr., What Relativism Isn't, 73 PHILOSOPHY 277 (1998); JOHN W. COOK, MORALITY AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES (1999).
23. Critical studies of cultural relativism are numerous. Useful ones include the "correctives" in note 3. See also W.T. STACE, THE CONCEPT OF MORALS chs. 1-2, 10 (1937); Elgin Williams, Anthropology for the Common Man, 49 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 84 (1947); Frank E. Hartung, Cultural Relativity and Moral Judgments, 21 PHIL. SCI. 118 (1954); Paul F. Schmidt, Some Criticisms of Cultural Relativism, 52 J. PHIL. 780 (1955); David Bidney, The Philosophical Presuppositions of Cultural Relativism and Cultural Absolutism, in ETHICS AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 51 (Leo Ward ed., 1959); RICHARD B. BRANDT, ETHICAL THEORY ch. 11 (1959); T. L. McClintock, The Argument for Ethical Relativism from the Diversity of Morals, 47 MONIST 528 (1963); PAUL W. TAYLOR, PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS ch. 2 (1975); William H. Shaw, Relativism and Objectivity in Ethics, in MORALITY AND MORAL CONTROVERSIES 31 (John Arthur ed., 1981); F. C. WHITE, KNOWLEDGE AND RELATIVISM chs. 4-5 (1983); JEFFREY STOUT, ETHICS AFTER BABEL pt. 1 (1988); LOUIS P. POJMAN, ETHICS: DISCOVERING RIGHT AND WRONG chs. 2-3 (2d ed. 1995). My discussion has benefitted from these authors at many points. A related note: this article was finished in all essentials in mid-1997; hence, it makes little use of items that have appeared since then. Among those items are the following, which I recommend highly: Elizabeth M. Zechenter, In the Name of Culture: Cultural Relativism and the Abuse of the Individual, 53 J. ANTHROPOLOGICAL RES. 319 (1997); Michael J. Perry, Are Human Rights Universal?: The Relativist Challenge and Related Matters, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 461 (1997); MICHELE M. MOODY-ADAMS, FIELDVVORK IN FAMILIAR PLACES: MORALITY, CULTURE, AND PHILOSOPHY (1997); William Max Knorpp Jr., What Relativism Isn't, 73 PHILOSOPHY 277 (1998); JOHN W. COOK, MORALITY AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES (1999).
24. Critical studies of cultural relativism are numerous. Useful ones include the "correctives" in note 3. See also W.T. STACE, THE CONCEPT OF MORALS chs. 1-2, 10 (1937); Elgin Williams, Anthropology for the Common Man, 49 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 84 (1947); Frank E. Hartung, Cultural Relativity and Moral Judgments, 21 PHIL. SCI. 118 (1954); Paul F. Schmidt, Some Criticisms of Cultural Relativism, 52 J. PHIL. 780 (1955); David Bidney, The Philosophical Presuppositions of Cultural Relativism and Cultural Absolutism, in ETHICS AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 51 (Leo Ward ed., 1959); RICHARD B. BRANDT, ETHICAL THEORY ch. 11 (1959); T. L. McClintock, The Argument for Ethical Relativism from the Diversity of Morals, 47 MONIST 528 (1963); PAUL W. TAYLOR, PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS ch. 2 (1975); William H. Shaw, Relativism and Objectivity in Ethics, in MORALITY AND MORAL CONTROVERSIES 31 (John Arthur ed., 1981); F. C. WHITE, KNOWLEDGE AND RELATIVISM chs. 4-5 (1983); JEFFREY STOUT, ETHICS AFTER BABEL pt. 1 (1988); LOUIS P. POJMAN, ETHICS: DISCOVERING RIGHT AND WRONG chs. 2-3 (2d ed. 1995). My discussion has benefitted from these authors at many points. A related note: this article was finished in all essentials in mid-1997; hence, it makes little use of items that have appeared since then. Among those items are the following, which I recommend highly: Elizabeth M. Zechenter, In the Name of Culture: Cultural Relativism and the Abuse of the Individual, 53 J. ANTHROPOLOGICAL RES. 319 (1997); Michael J. Perry, Are Human Rights Universal?: The Relativist Challenge and Related Matters, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 461 (1997); MICHELE M. MOODY-ADAMS, FIELDVVORK IN FAMILIAR PLACES: MORALITY, CULTURE, AND PHILOSOPHY (1997); William Max Knorpp Jr., What Relativism Isn't, 73 PHILOSOPHY 277 (1998); JOHN W. COOK, MORALITY AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES (1999).
25. Critical studies of cultural relativism are numerous. Useful ones include the "correctives" in note 3. See also W.T. STACE, THE CONCEPT OF MORALS chs. 1-2, 10 (1937); Elgin Williams, Anthropology for the Common Man, 49 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 84 (1947); Frank E. Hartung, Cultural Relativity and Moral Judgments, 21 PHIL. SCI. 118 (1954); Paul F. Schmidt, Some Criticisms of Cultural Relativism, 52 J. PHIL. 780 (1955); David Bidney, The Philosophical Presuppositions of Cultural Relativism and Cultural Absolutism, in ETHICS AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 51 (Leo Ward ed., 1959); RICHARD B. BRANDT, ETHICAL THEORY ch. 11 (1959); T. L. McClintock, The Argument for Ethical Relativism from the Diversity of Morals, 47 MONIST 528 (1963); PAUL W. TAYLOR, PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS ch. 2 (1975); William H. Shaw, Relativism and Objectivity in Ethics, in MORALITY AND MORAL CONTROVERSIES 31 (John Arthur ed., 1981); F. C. WHITE, KNOWLEDGE AND RELATIVISM chs. 4-5 (1983); JEFFREY STOUT, ETHICS AFTER BABEL pt. 1 (1988); LOUIS P. POJMAN, ETHICS: DISCOVERING RIGHT AND WRONG chs. 2-3 (2d ed. 1995). My discussion has benefitted from these authors at many points. A related note: this article was finished in all essentials in mid-1997; hence, it makes little use of items that have appeared since then. Among those items are the following, which I recommend highly: Elizabeth M. Zechenter, In the Name of Culture: Cultural Relativism and the Abuse of the Individual, 53 J. ANTHROPOLOGICAL RES. 319 (1997); Michael J. Perry, Are Human Rights Universal?: The Relativist Challenge and Related Matters, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 461 (1997); MICHELE M. MOODY-ADAMS, FIELDVVORK IN FAMILIAR PLACES: MORALITY, CULTURE, AND PHILOSOPHY (1997); William Max Knorpp Jr., What Relativism Isn't, 73 PHILOSOPHY 277 (1998); JOHN W. COOK, MORALITY AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES (1999).
26. Critical studies of cultural relativism are numerous. Useful ones include the "correctives" in note 3. See also W.T. STACE, THE CONCEPT OF MORALS chs. 1-2, 10 (1937); Elgin Williams, Anthropology for the Common Man, 49 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 84 (1947); Frank E. Hartung, Cultural Relativity and Moral Judgments, 21 PHIL. SCI. 118 (1954); Paul F. Schmidt, Some Criticisms of Cultural Relativism, 52 J. PHIL. 780 (1955); David Bidney, The Philosophical Presuppositions of Cultural Relativism and Cultural Absolutism, in ETHICS AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 51 (Leo Ward ed., 1959); RICHARD B. BRANDT, ETHICAL THEORY ch. 11 (1959); T. L. McClintock, The Argument for Ethical Relativism from the Diversity of Morals, 47 MONIST 528 (1963); PAUL W. TAYLOR, PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS ch. 2 (1975); William H. Shaw, Relativism and Objectivity in Ethics, in MORALITY AND MORAL CONTROVERSIES 31 (John Arthur ed., 1981); F. C. WHITE, KNOWLEDGE AND RELATIVISM chs. 4-5 (1983); JEFFREY STOUT, ETHICS AFTER BABEL pt. 1 (1988); LOUIS P. POJMAN, ETHICS: DISCOVERING RIGHT AND WRONG chs. 2-3 (2d ed. 1995). My discussion has benefitted from these authors at many points. A related note: this article was finished in all essentials in mid-1997; hence, it makes little use of items that have appeared since then. Among those items are the following, which I recommend highly: Elizabeth M. Zechenter, In the Name of Culture: Cultural Relativism and the Abuse of the Individual, 53 J. ANTHROPOLOGICAL RES. 319 (1997); Michael J. Perry, Are Human Rights Universal?: The Relativist Challenge and Related Matters, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 461 (1997); MICHELE M. MOODY-ADAMS, FIELDVVORK IN FAMILIAR PLACES: MORALITY, CULTURE, AND PHILOSOPHY (1997); William Max Knorpp Jr., What Relativism Isn't, 73 PHILOSOPHY 277 (1998); JOHN W. COOK, MORALITY AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES (1999).
27. Critical studies of cultural relativism are numerous. Useful ones include the "correctives" in note 3. See also W.T. STACE, THE CONCEPT OF MORALS chs. 1-2, 10 (1937); Elgin Williams, Anthropology for the Common Man, 49 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 84 (1947); Frank E. Hartung, Cultural Relativity and Moral Judgments, 21 PHIL. SCI. 118 (1954); Paul F. Schmidt, Some Criticisms of Cultural Relativism, 52 J. PHIL. 780 (1955); David Bidney, The Philosophical Presuppositions of Cultural Relativism and Cultural Absolutism, in ETHICS AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 51 (Leo Ward ed., 1959); RICHARD B. BRANDT, ETHICAL THEORY ch. 11 (1959); T. L. McClintock, The Argument for Ethical Relativism from the Diversity of Morals, 47 MONIST 528 (1963); PAUL W. TAYLOR, PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS ch. 2 (1975); William H. Shaw, Relativism and Objectivity in Ethics, in MORALITY AND MORAL CONTROVERSIES 31 (John Arthur ed., 1981); F. C. WHITE, KNOWLEDGE AND RELATIVISM chs. 4-5 (1983); JEFFREY STOUT, ETHICS AFTER BABEL pt. 1 (1988); LOUIS P. POJMAN, ETHICS: DISCOVERING RIGHT AND WRONG chs. 2-3 (2d ed. 1995). My discussion has benefitted from these authors at many points. A related note: this article was finished in all essentials in mid-1997; hence, it makes little use of items that have appeared since then. Among those items are the following, which I recommend highly: Elizabeth M. Zechenter, In the Name of Culture: Cultural Relativism and the Abuse of the Individual, 53 J. ANTHROPOLOGICAL RES. 319 (1997); Michael J. Perry, Are Human Rights Universal?: The Relativist Challenge and Related Matters, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 461 (1997); MICHELE M. MOODY-ADAMS, FIELDVVORK IN FAMILIAR PLACES: MORALITY, CULTURE, AND PHILOSOPHY (1997); William Max Knorpp Jr., What Relativism Isn't, 73 PHILOSOPHY 277 (1998); JOHN W. COOK, MORALITY AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES (1999).
28. Critical studies of cultural relativism are numerous. Useful ones include the "correctives" in note 3. See also W.T. STACE, THE CONCEPT OF MORALS chs. 1-2, 10 (1937); Elgin Williams, Anthropology for the Common Man, 49 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 84 (1947); Frank E. Hartung, Cultural Relativity and Moral Judgments, 21 PHIL. SCI. 118 (1954); Paul F. Schmidt, Some Criticisms of Cultural Relativism, 52 J. PHIL. 780 (1955); David Bidney, The Philosophical Presuppositions of Cultural Relativism and Cultural Absolutism, in ETHICS AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 51 (Leo Ward ed., 1959); RICHARD B. BRANDT, ETHICAL THEORY ch. 11 (1959); T. L. McClintock, The Argument for Ethical Relativism from the Diversity of Morals, 47 MONIST 528 (1963); PAUL W. TAYLOR, PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS ch. 2 (1975); William H. Shaw, Relativism and Objectivity in Ethics, in MORALITY AND MORAL CONTROVERSIES 31 (John Arthur ed., 1981); F. C. WHITE, KNOWLEDGE AND RELATIVISM chs. 4-5 (1983); JEFFREY STOUT, ETHICS AFTER BABEL pt. 1 (1988); LOUIS P. POJMAN, ETHICS: DISCOVERING RIGHT AND WRONG chs. 2-3 (2d ed. 1995). My discussion has benefitted from these authors at many points. A related note: this article was finished in all essentials in mid-1997; hence, it makes little use of items that have appeared since then. Among those items are the following, which I recommend highly: Elizabeth M. Zechenter, In the Name of Culture: Cultural Relativism and the Abuse of the Individual, 53 J. ANTHROPOLOGICAL RES. 319 (1997); Michael J. Perry, Are Human Rights Universal?: The Relativist Challenge and Related Matters, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 461 (1997); MICHELE M. MOODY-ADAMS, FIELDWORK IN FAMILIAR PLACES: MORALITY, CULTURE, AND PHILOSOPHY (1997); William Max Knorpp Jr., What Relativism Isn't, 73 PHILOSOPHY 277 (1998); JOHN W. COOK, MORALITY AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES (1999).
29. Critical studies of cultural relativism are numerous. Useful ones include the "correctives" in note 3. See also W.T. STACE, THE CONCEPT OF MORALS chs. 1-2, 10 (1937); Elgin Williams, Anthropology for the Common Man, 49 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 84 (1947); Frank E. Hartung, Cultural Relativity and Moral Judgments, 21 PHIL. SCI. 118 (1954); Paul F. Schmidt, Some Criticisms of Cultural Relativism, 52 J. PHIL. 780 (1955); David Bidney, The Philosophical Presuppositions of Cultural Relativism and Cultural Absolutism, in ETHICS AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 51 (Leo Ward ed., 1959); RICHARD B. BRANDT, ETHICAL THEORY ch. 11 (1959); T. L. McClintock, The Argument for Ethical Relativism from the Diversity of Morals, 47 MONIST 528 (1963); PAUL W. TAYLOR, PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS ch. 2 (1975); William H. Shaw, Relativism and Objectivity in Ethics, in MORALITY AND MORAL CONTROVERSIES 31 (John Arthur ed., 1981); F. C. WHITE, KNOWLEDGE AND RELATIVISM chs. 4-5 (1983); JEFFREY STOUT, ETHICS AFTER BABEL pt. 1 (1988); LOUIS P. POJMAN, ETHICS: DISCOVERING RIGHT AND WRONG chs. 2-3 (2d ed. 1995). My discussion has benefitted from these authors at many points. A related note: this article was finished in all essentials in mid-1997; hence, it makes little use of items that have appeared since then. Among those items are the following, which I recommend highly: Elizabeth M. Zechenter, In the Name of Culture: Cultural Relativism and the Abuse of the Individual, 53 J. ANTHROPOLOGICAL RES. 319 (1997); Michael J. Perry, Are Human Rights Universal?: The Relativist Challenge and Related Matters, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 461 (1997); MICHELE M. MOODY-ADAMS, FIELDVVORK IN FAMILIAR PLACES: MORALITY, CULTURE, AND PHILOSOPHY (1997); William Max Knorpp Jr., What Relativism Isn't, 73 PHILOSOPHY 277 (1998); JOHN W. COOK, MORALITY AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES (1999).
30. Critical studies of cultural relativism are numerous. Useful ones include the "correctives" in note 3. See also W.T. STACE, THE CONCEPT OF MORALS chs. 1-2, 10 (1937); Elgin Williams, Anthropology for the Common Man, 49 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 84 (1947); Frank E. Hartung, Cultural Relativity and Moral Judgments, 21 PHIL. SCI. 118 (1954); Paul F. Schmidt, Some Criticisms of Cultural Relativism, 52 J. PHIL. 780 (1955); David Bidney, The Philosophical Presuppositions of Cultural Relativism and Cultural Absolutism, in ETHICS AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 51 (Leo Ward ed., 1959); RICHARD B. BRANDT, ETHICAL THEORY ch. 11 (1959); T. L. McClintock, The Argument for Ethical Relativism from the Diversity of Morals, 47 MONIST 528 (1963); PAUL W. TAYLOR, PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS ch. 2 (1975); William H. Shaw, Relativism and Objectivity in Ethics, in MORALITY AND MORAL CONTROVERSIES 31 (John Arthur ed., 1981); F. C. WHITE, KNOWLEDGE AND RELATIVISM chs. 4-5 (1983); JEFFREY STOUT, ETHICS AFTER BABEL pt. 1 (1988); LOUIS P. POJMAN, ETHICS: DISCOVERING RIGHT AND WRONG chs. 2-3 (2d ed. 1995). My discussion has benefitted from these authors at many points. A related note: this article was finished in all essentials in mid-1997; hence, it makes little use of items that have appeared since then. Among those items are the following, which I recommend highly: Elizabeth M. Zechenter, In the Name of Culture: Cultural Relativism and the Abuse of the Individual, 53 J. ANTHROPOLOGICAL RES. 319 (1997); Michael J. Perry, Are Human Rights Universal?: The Relativist Challenge and Related Matters, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 461 (1997); MICHELE M. MOODY-ADAMS, FIELDVVORK IN FAMILIAR PLACES: MORALITY, CULTURE, AND PHILOSOPHY (1997); William Max Knorpp Jr., What Relativism Isn't, 73 PHILOSOPHY 277 (1998); JOHN W. COOK, MORALITY AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES (1999).
31. One of my aims is to avoid the errors listed in the Appendix.
32. For a prime example, see JAMES F. DOWNS, CULTURES IN CRISIS ch. 2 (2d ed. 1975). Downs not only fails to pin down the moral theory he intends, but allows it to change from page to page and to remain entangled with nonmoral ones. For other examples, see RUTH BENEDICT, PATTERNS OF CULTURE 278 (1934); Ruth Benedict, Ideologies in the Light of Comparative Data, in AN ANTHROPOLOGIST AT WORK 383-84 (Margaret Mead ed., 1959); MELVILLE J. HERSKOVITS, CULTURAL RELATIVISM: PERSPECTIVES IN CULTURAL PLURALISM 14, 15, 32-33, 93, 101 (Frances Herskovits ed., 1973).
33. For a prime example, see JAMES F. DOWNS, CULTURES IN CRISIS ch. 2 (2d ed. 1975). Downs not only fails to pin down the moral theory he intends, but allows it to change from page to page and to remain entangled with nonmoral ones. For other examples, see RUTH BENEDICT, PATTERNS OF CULTURE 278 (1934); Ruth Benedict, Ideologies in the Light of Comparative Data, in AN ANTHROPOLOGIST AT WORK 383-84 (Margaret Mead ed., 1959); MELVILLE J. HERSKOVITS, CULTURAL RELATIVISM: PERSPECTIVES IN CULTURAL PLURALISM 14, 15, 32-33, 93, 101 (Frances Herskovits ed., 1973).
34. For a prime example, see JAMES F. DOWNS, CULTURES IN CRISIS ch. 2 (2d ed. 1975). Downs not only fails to pin down the moral theory he intends, but allows it to change from page to page and to remain entangled with nonmoral ones. For other examples, see RUTH BENEDICT, PATTERNS OF CULTURE 278 (1934); Ruth Benedict, Ideologies in the Light of Comparative Data, in AN ANTHROPOLOGIST AT WORK 383-84 (Margaret Mead ed., 1959); MELVILLE J. HERSKOVITS, CULTURAL RELATIVISM: PERSPECTIVES IN CULTURAL PLURALISM 14, 15, 32-33, 93, 101 (Frances Herskovits ed., 1973).
35. For a prime example, see JAMES F. DOWNS, CULTURES IN CRISIS ch. 2 (2d ed. 1975). Downs not only fails to pin down the moral theory he intends, but allows it to change from page to page and to remain entangled with nonmoral ones. For other examples, see RUTH BENEDICT, PATTERNS OF CULTURE 278 (1934); Ruth Benedict, Ideologies in the Light of Comparative Data, in AN ANTHROPOLOGIST AT WORK 383-84 (Margaret Mead ed., 1959); MELVILLE J. HERSKOVITS, CULTURAL RELATIVISM: PERSPECTIVES IN CULTURAL PLURALISM 14, 15, 32-33, 93, 101 (Frances Herskovits ed., 1973).
36. I have in mind BENEDICT, supra note 6; Ruth Benedict, Anthropology and the Abnormal, 10 J. GEN. PSYCHOL. 59 (1934); HERSKOVITS, supra note 6; MELVILLE J. HERSKOVITS, MAN AND HIS WORKS (1948); and WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, FOLKWAYS (1906). (Some would add Edward Westermarck to this list, but he is properly classified as a moral subjectivist, not as a cultural relativist.) Benedict's work reflects the influence of Oswald Spengler, who defends cultural relativism in 1 OSWALD SPENGLER, THE DECLINE OF THE WEST 345-46 (Charles F. Atkinson trans., 1932) (rev. ed. 1922). A lesser known relativist, well worth consulting, is CLARENCE E. AYRES, HOLIER THAN THOU: THE WAY OF THE RIGHTEOUS (1929). Additional endorsements of cultural relativism are easy to find. See, e.g., ALLEN WHEELIS, THE QUEST FOR IDENTITY 94-96 (1958); EDMUND R. LEACH, A RUNAWAY WORLD? 48 (1968); Paul Piccone, Introduction, 106 TELOS 8 (1996). For recent defenses (as opposed to mere endorsements) of relativism, see RENTELN, supra note 3, ch. 3; Clifford Geertz, Anti Anti-Relativism, 86 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 263 (1984). Actually, "defenses" is not quite accurate. Geertz's aim is not to support relativism, but to point out faults and excesses of anti-relativists. Renteln's chief aim is to "correct the caricatured picture of relativism" and to uncover the implications of relativism for human rights issues. RENTELN, supra note 3, ch. 3. So it is not surprising that neither author adds to the stock of arguments used by Sumner, Benedict, and Herskovits. A valuable history of cultural relativism is ELVIN HATCH, CULTURE AND MORALITY: THE RELATIVITY OF VALUES IN ANTHROPOLOGY (1983).
37. I have in mind BENEDICT, supra note 6; Ruth Benedict, Anthropology and the Abnormal, 10 J. GEN. PSYCHOL. 59 (1934); HERSKOVITS, supra note 6; MELVILLE J. HERSKOVITS, MAN AND HIS WORKS (1948); and WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, FOLKWAYS (1906). (Some would add Edward Westermarck to this list, but he is properly classified as a moral subjectivist, not as a cultural relativist.) Benedict's work reflects the influence of Oswald Spengler, who defends cultural relativism in 1 OSWALD SPENGLER, THE DECLINE OF THE WEST 345-46 (Charles F. Atkinson trans., 1932) (rev. ed. 1922). A lesser known relativist, well worth consulting, is CLARENCE E. AYRES, HOLIER THAN THOU: THE WAY OF THE RIGHTEOUS (1929). Additional endorsements of cultural relativism are easy to find. See, e.g., ALLEN WHEELIS, THE QUEST FOR IDENTITY 94-96 (1958); EDMUND R. LEACH, A RUNAWAY WORLD? 48 (1968); Paul Piccone, Introduction, 106 TELOS 8 (1996). For recent defenses (as opposed to mere endorsements) of relativism, see RENTELN, supra note 3, ch. 3; Clifford Geertz, Anti Anti-Relativism, 86 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 263 (1984). Actually, "defenses" is not quite accurate. Geertz's aim is not to support relativism, but to point out faults and excesses of anti-relativists. Renteln's chief aim is to "correct the caricatured picture of relativism" and to uncover the implications of relativism for human rights issues. RENTELN, supra note 3, ch. 3. So it is not surprising that neither author adds to the stock of arguments used by Sumner, Benedict, and Herskovits. A valuable history of cultural relativism is ELVIN HATCH, CULTURE AND MORALITY: THE RELATIVITY OF VALUES IN ANTHROPOLOGY (1983).
38. I have in mind BENEDICT, supra note 6; Ruth Benedict, Anthropology and the Abnormal, 10 J. GEN. PSYCHOL. 59 (1934); HERSKOVITS, supra note 6; MELVILLE J. HERSKOVITS, MAN AND HIS WORKS (1948); and WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, FOLKWAYS (1906). (Some would add Edward Westermarck to this list, but he is properly classified as a moral subjectivist, not as a cultural relativist.) Benedict's work reflects the influence of Oswald Spengler, who defends cultural relativism in 1 OSWALD SPENGLER, THE DECLINE OF THE WEST 345-46 (Charles F. Atkinson trans., 1932) (rev. ed. 1922). A lesser known relativist, well worth consulting, is CLARENCE E. AYRES, HOLIER THAN THOU: THE WAY OF THE RIGHTEOUS (1929). Additional endorsements of cultural relativism are easy to find. See, e.g., ALLEN WHEELIS, THE QUEST FOR IDENTITY 94-96 (1958); EDMUND R. LEACH, A RUNAWAY WORLD? 48 (1968); Paul Piccone, Introduction, 106 TELOS 8 (1996). For recent defenses (as opposed to mere endorsements) of relativism, see RENTELN, supra note 3, ch. 3; Clifford Geertz, Anti Anti-Relativism, 86 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 263 (1984). Actually, "defenses" is not quite accurate. Geertz's aim is not to support relativism, but to point out faults and excesses of anti-relativists. Renteln's chief aim is to "correct the caricatured picture of relativism" and to uncover the implications of relativism for human rights issues. RENTELN, supra note 3, ch. 3. So it is not surprising that neither author adds to the stock of arguments used by Sumner, Benedict, and Herskovits. A valuable history of cultural relativism is ELVIN HATCH, CULTURE AND MORALITY: THE RELATIVITY OF VALUES IN ANTHROPOLOGY (1983).
39. I have in mind BENEDICT, supra note 6; Ruth Benedict, Anthropology and the Abnormal, 10 J. GEN. PSYCHOL. 59 (1934); HERSKOVITS, supra note 6; MELVILLE J. HERSKOVITS, MAN AND HIS WORKS (1948); and WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, FOLKWAYS (1906). (Some would add Edward Westermarck to this list, but he is properly classified as a moral subjectivist, not as a cultural relativist.) Benedict's work reflects the influence of Oswald Spengler, who defends cultural relativism in 1 OSWALD SPENGLER, THE DECLINE OF THE WEST 345-46 (Charles F. Atkinson trans., 1932) (rev. ed. 1922). A lesser known relativist, well worth consulting, is CLARENCE E. AYRES, HOLIER THAN THOU: THE WAY OF THE RIGHTEOUS (1929). Additional endorsements of cultural relativism are easy to find. See, e.g., ALLEN WHEELIS, THE QUEST FOR IDENTITY 94-96 (1958); EDMUND R. LEACH, A RUNAWAY WORLD? 48 (1968); Paul Piccone, Introduction, 106 TELOS 8 (1996). For recent defenses (as opposed to mere endorsements) of relativism, see RENTELN, supra note 3, ch. 3; Clifford Geertz, Anti Anti-Relativism, 86 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 263 (1984). Actually, "defenses" is not quite accurate. Geertz's aim is not to support relativism, but to point out faults and excesses of anti-relativists. Renteln's chief aim is to "correct the caricatured picture of relativism" and to uncover the implications of relativism for human rights issues. RENTELN, supra note 3, ch. 3. So it is not surprising that neither author adds to the stock of arguments used by Sumner, Benedict, and Herskovits. A valuable history of cultural relativism is ELVIN HATCH, CULTURE AND MORALITY: THE RELATIVITY OF VALUES IN ANTHROPOLOGY (1983).
40. I have in mind BENEDICT, supra note 6; Ruth Benedict, Anthropology and the Abnormal, 10 J. GEN. PSYCHOL. 59 (1934); HERSKOVITS, supra note 6; MELVILLE J. HERSKOVITS, MAN AND HIS WORKS (1948); and WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, FOLKWAYS (1906). (Some would add Edward Westermarck to this list, but he is properly classified as a moral subjectivist, not as a cultural relativist.) Benedict's work reflects the influence of Oswald Spengler, who defends cultural relativism in 1 OSWALD SPENGLER, THE DECLINE OF THE WEST 345-46 (Charles F. Atkinson trans., 1932) (rev. ed. 1922). A lesser known relativist, well worth consulting, is CLARENCE E. AYRES, HOLIER THAN THOU: THE WAY OF THE RIGHTEOUS (1929). Additional endorsements of cultural relativism are easy to find. See, e.g., ALLEN WHEELIS, THE QUEST FOR IDENTITY 94-96 (1958); EDMUND R. LEACH, A RUNAWAY WORLD? 48 (1968); Paul Piccone, Introduction, 106 TELOS 8 (1996). For recent defenses (as opposed to mere endorsements) of relativism, see RENTELN, supra note 3, ch. 3; Clifford Geertz, Anti Anti-Relativism, 86 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 263 (1984). Actually, "defenses" is not quite accurate. Geertz's aim is not to support relativism, but to point out faults and excesses of anti-relativists. Renteln's chief aim is to "correct the caricatured picture of relativism" and to uncover the implications of relativism for human rights issues. RENTELN, supra note 3, ch. 3. So it is not surprising that neither author adds to the stock of arguments used by Sumner, Benedict, and Herskovits. A valuable history of cultural relativism is ELVIN HATCH, CULTURE AND MORALITY: THE RELATIVITY OF VALUES IN ANTHROPOLOGY (1983).
41. I have in mind BENEDICT, supra note 6; Ruth Benedict, Anthropology and the Abnormal, 10 J. GEN. PSYCHOL. 59 (1934); HERSKOVITS, supra note 6; MELVILLE J. HERSKOVITS, MAN AND HIS WORKS (1948); and WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, FOLKWAYS (1906). (Some would add Edward Westermarck to this list, but he is properly classified as a moral subjectivist, not as a cultural relativist.) Benedict's work reflects the influence of Oswald Spengler, who defends cultural relativism in 1 OSWALD SPENGLER, THE DECLINE OF THE WEST 345-46 (Charles F. Atkinson trans., 1932) (rev. ed. 1922). A lesser known relativist, well worth consulting, is CLARENCE E. AYRES, HOLIER THAN THOU: THE WAY OF THE RIGHTEOUS (1929). Additional endorsements of cultural relativism are easy to find. See, e.g., ALLEN WHEELIS, THE QUEST FOR IDENTITY 94-96 (1958); EDMUND R. LEACH, A RUNAWAY WORLD? 48 (1968); Paul Piccone, Introduction, 106 TELOS 8 (1996). For recent defenses (as opposed to mere endorsements) of relativism, see RENTELN, supra note 3, ch. 3; Clifford Geertz, Anti Anti-Relativism, 86 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 263 (1984). Actually, "defenses" is not quite accurate. Geertz's aim is not to support relativism, but to point out faults and excesses of anti-relativists. Renteln's chief aim is to "correct the caricatured picture of relativism" and to uncover the implications of relativism for human rights issues. RENTELN, supra note 3, ch. 3. So it is not surprising that neither author adds to the stock of arguments used by Sumner, Benedict, and Herskovits. A valuable history of cultural relativism is ELVIN HATCH, CULTURE AND MORALITY: THE RELATIVITY OF VALUES IN ANTHROPOLOGY (1983).
42. I have in mind BENEDICT, supra note 6; Ruth Benedict, Anthropology and the Abnormal, 10 J. GEN. PSYCHOL. 59 (1934); HERSKOVITS, supra note 6; MELVILLE J. HERSKOVITS, MAN AND HIS WORKS (1948); and WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, FOLKWAYS (1906). (Some would add Edward Westermarck to this list, but he is properly classified as a moral subjectivist, not as a cultural relativist.) Benedict's work reflects the influence of Oswald Spengler, who defends cultural relativism in 1 OSWALD SPENGLER, THE DECLINE OF THE WEST 345-46 (Charles F. Atkinson trans., 1932) (rev. ed. 1922). A lesser known relativist, well worth consulting, is CLARENCE E. AYRES, HOLIER THAN THOU: THE WAY OF THE RIGHTEOUS (1929). Additional endorsements of cultural relativism are easy to find. See, e.g., ALLEN WHEELIS, THE QUEST FOR IDENTITY 94-96 (1958); EDMUND R. LEACH, A RUNAWAY WORLD? 48 (1968); Paul Piccone, Introduction, 106 TELOS 8 (1996). For recent defenses (as opposed to mere endorsements) of relativism, see RENTELN, supra note 3, ch. 3; Clifford Geertz, Anti Anti-Relativism, 86 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 263 (1984). Actually, "defenses" is not quite accurate. Geertz's aim is not to support relativism, but to point out faults and excesses of anti-relativists. Renteln's chief aim is to "correct the caricatured picture of relativism" and to uncover the implications of relativism for human rights issues. RENTELN, supra note 3, ch. 3. So it is not surprising that neither author adds to the stock of arguments used by Sumner, Benedict, and Herskovits. A valuable history of cultural relativism is ELVIN HATCH, CULTURE AND MORALITY: THE RELATIVITY OF VALUES IN ANTHROPOLOGY (1983).
43. I have in mind BENEDICT, supra note 6; Ruth Benedict, Anthropology and the Abnormal, 10 J. GEN. PSYCHOL. 59 (1934); HERSKOVITS, supra note 6; MELVILLE J. HERSKOVITS, MAN AND HIS WORKS (1948); and WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, FOLKWAYS (1906). (Some would add Edward Westermarck to this list, but he is properly classified as a moral subjectivist, not as a cultural relativist.) Benedict's work reflects the influence of Oswald Spengler, who defends cultural relativism in 1 OSWALD SPENGLER, THE DECLINE OF THE WEST 345-46 (Charles F. Atkinson trans., 1932) (rev. ed. 1922). A lesser known relativist, well worth consulting, is CLARENCE E. AYRES, HOLIER THAN THOU: THE WAY OF THE RIGHTEOUS (1929). Additional endorsements of cultural relativism are easy to find. See, e.g., ALLEN WHEELIS, THE QUEST FOR IDENTITY 94-96 (1958); EDMUND R. LEACH, A RUNAWAY WORLD? 48 (1968); Paul Piccone, Introduction, 106 TELOS 8 (1996). For recent defenses (as opposed to mere endorsements) of relativism, see RENTELN, supra note 3, ch. 3; Clifford Geertz, Anti Anti-Relativism, 86 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 263 (1984). Actually, "defenses" is not quite accurate. Geertz's aim is not to support relativism, but to point out faults and excesses of anti-relativists. Renteln's chief aim is to "correct the caricatured picture of relativism" and to uncover the implications of relativism for human rights issues. RENTELN, supra note 3, ch. 3. So it is not surprising that neither author adds to the stock of arguments used by Sumner, Benedict, and Herskovits. A valuable history of cultural relativism is ELVIN HATCH, CULTURE AND MORALITY: THE RELATIVITY OF VALUES IN ANTHROPOLOGY (1983).
44. I have in mind BENEDICT, supra note 6; Ruth Benedict, Anthropology and the Abnormal, 10 J. GEN. PSYCHOL. 59 (1934); HERSKOVITS, supra note 6; MELVILLE J. HERSKOVITS, MAN AND HIS WORKS (1948); and WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, FOLKWAYS (1906). (Some would add Edward Westermarck to this list, but he is properly classified as a moral subjectivist, not as a cultural relativist.) Benedict's work reflects the influence of Oswald Spengler, who defends cultural relativism in 1 OSWALD SPENGLER, THE DECLINE OF THE WEST 345-46 (Charles F. Atkinson trans., 1932) (rev. ed. 1922). A lesser known relativist, well worth consulting, is CLARENCE E. AYRES, HOLIER THAN THOU: THE WAY OF THE RIGHTEOUS (1929). Additional endorsements of cultural relativism are easy to find. See, e.g., ALLEN WHEELIS, THE QUEST FOR IDENTITY 94-96 (1958); EDMUND R. LEACH, A RUNAWAY WORLD? 48 (1968); Paul Piccone, Introduction, 106 TELOS 8 (1996). For recent defenses (as opposed to mere endorsements) of relativism, see RENTELN, supra note 3, ch. 3; Clifford Geertz, Anti Anti-Relativism, 86 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 263 (1984). Actually, "defenses" is not quite accurate. Geertz's aim is not to support relativism, but to point out faults and excesses of anti-relativists. Renteln's chief aim is to "correct the caricatured picture of relativism" and to uncover the implications of relativism for human rights issues. RENTELN, supra note 3, ch. 3. So it is not surprising that neither author adds to the stock of arguments used by Sumner, Benedict, and Herskovits. A valuable history of cultural relativism is ELVIN HATCH, CULTURE AND MORALITY: THE RELATIVITY OF VALUES IN ANTHROPOLOGY (1983).
45. I have in mind BENEDICT, supra note 6; Ruth Benedict, Anthropology and the Abnormal, 10 J. GEN. PSYCHOL. 59 (1934); HERSKOVITS, supra note 6; MELVILLE J. HERSKOVITS, MAN AND HIS WORKS (1948); and WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, FOLKWAYS (1906). (Some would add Edward Westermarck to this list, but he is properly classified as a moral subjectivist, not as a cultural relativist.) Benedict's work reflects the influence of Oswald Spengler, who defends cultural relativism in 1 OSWALD SPENGLER, THE DECLINE OF THE WEST 345-46 (Charles F. Atkinson trans., 1932) (rev. ed. 1922). A lesser known relativist, well worth consulting, is CLARENCE E. AYRES, HOLIER THAN THOU: THE WAY OF THE RIGHTEOUS (1929). Additional endorsements of cultural relativism are easy to find. See, e.g., ALLEN WHEELIS, THE QUEST FOR IDENTITY 94-96 (1958); EDMUND R. LEACH, A RUNAWAY WORLD? 48 (1968); Paul Piccone, Introduction, 106 TELOS 8 (1996). For recent defenses (as opposed to mere endorsements) of relativism, see RENTELN, supra note 3, ch. 3; Clifford Geertz, Anti Anti-Relativism, 86 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 263 (1984). Actually, "defenses" is not quite accurate. Geertz's aim is not to support relativism, but to point out faults and excesses of anti-relativists. Renteln's chief aim is to "correct the caricatured picture of relativism" and to uncover the implications of relativism for human rights issues. RENTELN, supra note 3, ch. 3. So it is not surprising that neither author adds to the stock of arguments used by Sumner, Benedict, and Herskovits. A valuable history of cultural relativism is ELVIN HATCH, CULTURE AND MORALITY: THE RELATIVITY OF VALUES IN ANTHROPOLOGY (1983).
46. The point that they are human beings is not superfluous. Some philosophers use "people" interchangeably with "rational agents," implying that nonhuman rational agents would count as people. This article does not use "people" this broadly.
47. The concept of a nonexistent yet realistically imaginable culture (or person), although fuzzy, is not too fuzzy to be useful. History provides many (though not the only) examples of such cultures, just as science fiction provides many examples of "cultures" that fail to qualify. One reason for extending "cultures" to realistically imaginable cultures, not just to actual ones, is that it enables us to avoid Error 6 in the Appendix. Anyone out to detail some of the central features of realistically imaginable cultures or persons would profit from Nussbaum, supra note 3, at 214-23.
48. Three comments: First, in this article "right," "wrong," etc., mean "morally right," "morally wrong," etc. Second, some remarks pertinent to statements i and j are in the Appendix, and much is said about k in Section IV. Third, "X is prima facie wrong" means the same as "other things being equal, X is wrong."
49. This is not the only way for "stealing is wrong" to make a covert reference (as I use that term) to C. It would do so if "wrong" were a relational term (like "tall") and C were the relevant reference class.
50. Two remarks: first, I am assuming that a moral judgment is valid for group X only if it is valid for each member of X. Second, as my wording indicates, I am deliberately ignoring the possibility that some moral judgments are relative to group X, but not to group Y, in their truth, and to Y, but not to X, in their content. This view lacks proponents, not to mention plausibility.
51. Given the meaning of "culturally relative," some brands of relativism face a curious problem. They assert that some moral judgments are valid for no one. But if "X is wrong" is valid for no one, it seems to follow that "X is not wrong" is valid for everyone, in which case cultural relativism is false. Having mentioned this problem, I will put it aside, except to say that the relativists who face it are not alone. A variation of it plagues error theories of moral judgment. (For such a theory, see J.L. MACKIE, ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG (1977).) If we agree with error theorists that all moral judgments, including "stealing is wrong," are false, we seem to imply that "stealing is not wrong" is true, in which case not all moral judgments are false. For more on this problem and the prospects for overcoming it, see Jonathan Harrison, Mackie's Moral Scepticism, 57 PHIL. 173 (1982).
52. Given the meaning of "culturally relative," some brands of relativism face a curious problem. They assert that some moral judgments are valid for no one. But if "X is wrong" is valid for no one, it seems to follow that "X is not wrong" is valid for everyone, in which case cultural relativism is false. Having mentioned this problem, I will put it aside, except to say that the relativists who face it are not alone. A variation of it plagues error theories of moral judgment. (For such a theory, see J.L. MACKIE, ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG (1977).) If we agree with error theorists that all moral judgments, including "stealing is wrong," are false, we seem to imply that "stealing is not wrong" is true, in which case not all moral judgments are false. For more on this problem and the prospects for overcoming it, see Jonathan Harrison, Mackie's Moral Scepticism, 57 PHIL. 173 (1982).
53. SUMNER, supra note 7, §§ 31, 65, 439; HERSKOVITS, supra note 6, at 101; Benedict, supra note 7, at 73. The terms "agent relativism" and "appraiser relativism," by the way, are borrowed from David Lyons, Ethical Relativism and the Problem of Incoherence, 86 ETHICS 107 (1976). (Lyons uses the terms "agent's-group relativism" and "appraiser's-group relativism.")
54. A pristine example of moral nihilism is the emotive theory defended by A.J. AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC ch. 6 (2d ed. 1946).
55. This is not only the standard way of interpreting cultural relativism, but the only charitable way. It also is borne out by the unqualified way in which cultural relativists state their thesis. See, e.g., SUMNER, supra note 7, §§ 31, 42, 65, 439, 572; HERSKOVITS, supra note 6, at 101; Benedict, supra note 7, at 73. Also relevant are RENTEIN, supra note 3, at 68-69; Schmidt, supra note 4, at 781-82.
56. For example, Sumner, Benedict, and Herskovits seem to do this at times. (I say "seem" because they are not entirely clear about the thesis they intend.) See SUMNER, supra note 7, § 232; BENEDICT, supra note 6, at 2; HERSKOVITS, supra note 6, at 15.
57. And when they do have such a view in mind, we usually find them rejecting it. See, e.g., HATCH, supra note 7, chs. 5, 7; H. RUSSELL BERNARD, RESEARCH METHODS IN CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 117 (1988); Henry H. Bagish, Confessions of a Former Cultural Relativist, in ANTHROPOLOGY 90/91, at 30 (Elvio Angeloni ed., 1990); STANLEY JEYARAJA TAMBIAH, MAGIC, SCIENCE, RELIGION, AND THE SCOPE OF RATIONALITY 128-29 (1990); Janine Hitchens, Critical Implications of Franz Boas' Theory and Methodology, 19 DIALECTICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 237, 248-49 (1994); CONRAD PHILLIP KOTTAK, ANTHROPOLOGY: THE EXPLORATION OF HUMAN DIVERSITY 45-46 (6th ed. 1994); James P. Spradley & David W. McCurdy, Culture and the Contemporary World, in CONFORMITY AND CONFLICT 8 (James P. Spradley & David W. McCurdy eds., 9th ed. 1997). A second point: when contemporary anthropologists write about "cultural relativism," they sometimes choose words that suggest one of the theories in Section II. But when their words are read in context, the view in question almost always turns out to be one of those below. This point may pertain to a few of the authors in note 19.
58. And when they do have such a view in mind, we usually find them rejecting it. See, e.g., HATCH, supra note 7, chs. 5, 7; H. RUSSELL BERNARD, RESEARCH METHODS IN CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 117 (1988); Henry H. Bagish, Confessions of a Former Cultural Relativist, in ANTHROPOLOGY 90/91, at 30 (Elvio Angeloni ed., 1990); STANLEY JEYARAJA TAMBIAH, MAGIC, SCIENCE, RELIGION, AND THE SCOPE OF RATIONALITY 128-29 (1990); Janine Hitchens, Critical Implications of Franz Boas' Theory and Methodology, 19 DIALECTICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 237, 248-49 (1994); CONRAD PHILLIP KOTTAK, ANTHROPOLOGY: THE EXPLORATION OF HUMAN DIVERSITY 45-46 (6th ed. 1994); James P. Spradley & David W. McCurdy, Culture and the Contemporary World, in CONFORMITY AND CONFLICT 8 (James P. Spradley & David W. McCurdy eds., 9th ed. 1997). A second point: when contemporary anthropologists write about "cultural relativism," they sometimes choose words that suggest one of the theories in Section II. But when their words are read in context, the view in question almost always turns out to be one of those below. This point may pertain to a few of the authors in note 19.
59. And when they do have such a view in mind, we usually find them rejecting it. See, e.g., HATCH, supra note 7, chs. 5, 7; H. RUSSELL BERNARD, RESEARCH METHODS IN CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 117 (1988); Henry H. Bagish, Confessions of a Former Cultural Relativist, in ANTHROPOLOGY 90/91, at 30 (Elvio Angeloni ed., 1990); STANLEY JEYARAJA TAMBIAH, MAGIC, SCIENCE, RELIGION, AND THE SCOPE OF RATIONALITY 128-29 (1990); Janine Hitchens, Critical Implications of Franz Boas' Theory and Methodology, 19 DIALECTICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 237, 248-49 (1994); CONRAD PHILLIP KOTTAK, ANTHROPOLOGY: THE EXPLORATION OF HUMAN DIVERSITY 45-46 (6th ed. 1994); James P. Spradley & David W. McCurdy, Culture and the Contemporary World, in CONFORMITY AND CONFLICT 8 (James P. Spradley & David W. McCurdy eds., 9th ed. 1997). A second point: when contemporary anthropologists write about "cultural relativism," they sometimes choose words that suggest one of the theories in Section II. But when their words are read in context, the view in question almost always turns out to be one of those below. This point may pertain to a few of the authors in note 19.
60. And when they do have such a view in mind, we usually find them rejecting it. See, e.g., HATCH, supra note 7, chs. 5, 7; H. RUSSELL BERNARD, RESEARCH METHODS IN CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 117 (1988); Henry H. Bagish, Confessions of a Former Cultural Relativist, in ANTHROPOLOGY 90/91, at 30 (Elvio Angeloni ed., 1990); STANLEY JEYARAJA TAMBIAH, MAGIC, SCIENCE, RELIGION, AND THE SCOPE OF RATIONALITY 128-29 (1990); Janine Hitchens, Critical Implications of Franz Boas' Theory and Methodology, 19 DIALECTICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 237, 248-49 (1994); CONRAD PHILLIP KOTTAK, ANTHROPOLOGY: THE EXPLORATION OF HUMAN DIVERSITY 45-46 (6th ed. 1994); James P. Spradley & David W. McCurdy, Culture and the Contemporary World, in CONFORMITY AND CONFLICT 8 (James P. Spradley & David W. McCurdy eds., 9th ed. 1997). A second point: when contemporary anthropologists write about "cultural relativism," they sometimes choose words that suggest one of the theories in Section II. But when their words are read in context, the view in question almost always turns out to be one of those below. This point may pertain to a few of the authors in note 19.
61. And when they do have such a view in mind, we usually find them rejecting it. See, e.g., HATCH, supra note 7, chs. 5, 7; H. RUSSELL BERNARD, RESEARCH METHODS IN CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 117 (1988); Henry H. Bagish, Confessions of a Former Cultural Relativist, in ANTHROPOLOGY 90/91, at 30 (Elvio Angeloni ed., 1990); STANLEY JEYARAJA TAMBIAH, MAGIC, SCIENCE, RELIGION, AND THE SCOPE OF RATIONALITY 128-29 (1990); Janine Hitchens, Critical Implications of Franz Boas' Theory and Methodology, 19 DIALECTICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 237, 248-49 (1994); CONRAD PHILLIP KOTTAK, ANTHROPOLOGY: THE EXPLORATION OF HUMAN DIVERSITY 45-46 (6th ed. 1994); James P. Spradley & David W. McCurdy, Culture and the Contemporary World, in CONFORMITY AND CONFLICT 8 (James P. Spradley & David W. McCurdy eds., 9th ed. 1997). A second point: when contemporary anthropologists write about "cultural relativism," they sometimes choose words that suggest one of the theories in Section II. But when their words are read in context, the view in question almost always turns out to be one of those below. This point may pertain to a few of the authors in note 19.
62. And when they do have such a view in mind, we usually find them rejecting it. See, e.g., HATCH, supra note 7, chs. 5, 7; H. RUSSELL BERNARD, RESEARCH METHODS IN CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 117 (1988); Henry H. Bagish, Confessions of a Former Cultural Relativist, in ANTHROPOLOGY 90/91, at 30 (Elvio Angeloni ed., 1990); STANLEY JEYARAJA TAMBIAH, MAGIC, SCIENCE, RELIGION, AND THE SCOPE OF RATIONALITY 128-29 (1990); Janine Hitchens, Critical Implications of Franz Boas' Theory and Methodology, 19 DIALECTICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 237, 248-49 (1994); CONRAD PHILLIP KOTTAK, ANTHROPOLOGY: THE EXPLORATION OF HUMAN DIVERSITY 45-46 (6th ed. 1994); James P. Spradley & David W. McCurdy, Culture and the Contemporary World, in CONFORMITY AND CONFLICT 8 (James P. Spradley & David W. McCurdy eds., 9th ed. 1997). A second point: when contemporary anthropologists write about "cultural relativism," they sometimes choose words that suggest one of the theories in Section II. But when their words are read in context, the view in question almost always turns out to be one of those below. This point may pertain to a few of the authors in note 19.
63. These posilions are not new in anthropology (Benedict and Herskovits held both), nor is the habit of calling them "cultural relativism." What is new - i.e., different from the first half of the century - is the habit of restricting that term to these positions, thereby excluding the moral theories in Section II. For the first of the two positions, see RICHLEY H. CRAPO, CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 17, 38-39 (3d ed. 1993); MICHAEL C. HOWARD, CONTEMPORARY CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 5-6, 14 (4th ed. 1993); SERENA NANDA, CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 17, 19 (5th ed. 1994); F. Allan Hanson, Racism and Relativism, 10 TIKKUN 63, 66 (1995). For the second position, see HATCH, supra note 7, at 11; Bagish, supra note 18, at 33-34; MARVIN HARRIS, CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 10-11 (3d ed. 1991); David H.P. Maybury-Lewis, A Special Sort of Pleading: Anthropology at the Service of Ethnic Groups, in TALKING ABOUT PEOPLE: READINGS IN CONTEMPORARY CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 16, 17 (William A. Haviland & Robert J. Gordon eds., 2d ed. 1996).
64. These posilions are not new in anthropology (Benedict and Herskovits held both), nor is the habit of calling them "cultural relativism." What is new - i.e., different from the first half of the century - is the habit of restricting that term to these positions, thereby excluding the moral theories in Section II. For the first of the two positions, see RICHLEY H. CRAPO, CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 17, 38-39 (3d ed. 1993); MICHAEL C. HOWARD, CONTEMPORARY CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 5-6, 14 (4th ed. 1993); SERENA NANDA, CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 17, 19 (5th ed. 1994); F. Allan Hanson, Racism and Relativism, 10 TIKKUN 63, 66 (1995). For the second position, see HATCH, supra note 7, at 11; Bagish, supra note 18, at 33-34; MARVIN HARRIS, CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 10-11 (3d ed. 1991); David H.P. Maybury-Lewis, A Special Sort of Pleading: Anthropology at the Service of Ethnic Groups, in TALKING ABOUT PEOPLE: READINGS IN CONTEMPORARY CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 16, 17 (William A. Haviland & Robert J. Gordon eds., 2d ed. 1996).
65. These posilions are not new in anthropology (Benedict and Herskovits held both), nor is the habit of calling them "cultural relativism." What is new - i.e., different from the first half of the century - is the habit of restricting that term to these positions, thereby excluding the moral theories in Section II. For the first of the two positions, see RICHLEY H. CRAPO, CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 17, 38-39 (3d ed. 1993); MICHAEL C. HOWARD, CONTEMPORARY CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 5-6, 14 (4th ed. 1993); SERENA NANDA, CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 17, 19 (5th ed. 1994); F. Allan Hanson, Racism and Relativism, 10 TIKKUN 63, 66 (1995). For the second position, see HATCH, supra note 7, at 11; Bagish, supra note 18, at 33-34; MARVIN HARRIS, CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 10-11 (3d ed. 1991); David H.P. Maybury-Lewis, A Special Sort of Pleading: Anthropology at the Service of Ethnic Groups, in TALKING ABOUT PEOPLE: READINGS IN CONTEMPORARY CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 16, 17 (William A. Haviland & Robert J. Gordon eds., 2d ed. 1996).
66. These posilions are not new in anthropology (Benedict and Herskovits held both), nor is the habit of calling them "cultural relativism." What is new - i.e., different from the first half of the century - is the habit of restricting that term to these positions, thereby excluding the moral theories in Section II. For the first of the two positions, see RICHLEY H. CRAPO, CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 17, 38-39 (3d ed. 1993); MICHAEL C. HOWARD, CONTEMPORARY CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 5-6, 14 (4th ed. 1993); SERENA NANDA, CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 17, 19 (5th ed. 1994); F. Allan Hanson, Racism and Relativism, 10 TIKKUN 63, 66 (1995). For the second position, see HATCH, supra note 7, at 11; Bagish, supra note 18, at 33-34; MARVIN HARRIS, CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 10-11 (3d ed. 1991); David H.P. Maybury-Lewis, A Special Sort of Pleading: Anthropology at the Service of Ethnic Groups, in TALKING ABOUT PEOPLE: READINGS IN CONTEMPORARY CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 16, 17 (William A. Haviland & Robert J. Gordon eds., 2d ed. 1996).
67. These posilions are not new in anthropology (Benedict and Herskovits held both), nor is the habit of calling them "cultural relativism." What is new - i.e., different from the first half of the century - is the habit of restricting that term to these positions, thereby excluding the moral theories in Section II. For the first of the two positions, see RICHLEY H. CRAPO, CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 17, 38-39 (3d ed. 1993); MICHAEL C. HOWARD, CONTEMPORARY CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 5-6, 14 (4th ed. 1993); SERENA NANDA, CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 17, 19 (5th ed. 1994); F. Allan Hanson, Racism and Relativism, 10 TIKKUN 63, 66 (1995). For the second position, see HATCH, supra note 7, at 11; Bagish, supra note 18, at 33-34; MARVIN HARRIS, CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 10-11 (3d ed. 1991); David H.P. Maybury-Lewis, A Special Sort of Pleading: Anthropology at the Service of Ethnic Groups, in TALKING ABOUT PEOPLE: READINGS IN CONTEMPORARY CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 16, 17 (William A. Haviland & Robert J. Gordon eds., 2d ed. 1996).
68. These posilions are not new in anthropology (Benedict and Herskovits held both), nor is the habit of calling them "cultural relativism." What is new - i.e., different from the first half of the century - is the habit of restricting that term to these positions, thereby excluding the moral theories in Section II. For the first of the two positions, see RICHLEY H. CRAPO, CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 17, 38-39 (3d ed. 1993); MICHAEL C. HOWARD, CONTEMPORARY CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 5-6, 14 (4th ed. 1993); SERENA NANDA, CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 17, 19 (5th ed. 1994); F. Allan Hanson, Racism and Relativism, 10 TIKKUN 63, 66 (1995). For the second position, see HATCH, supra note 7, at 11; Bagish, supra note 18, at 33-34; MARVIN HARRIS, CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 10-11 (3d ed. 1991); David H.P. Maybury-Lewis, A Special Sort of Pleading: Anthropology at the Service of Ethnic Groups, in TALKING ABOUT PEOPLE: READINGS IN CONTEMPORARY CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 16, 17 (William A. Haviland & Robert J. Gordon eds., 2d ed. 1996).
69. This is emphasized by some of the social scientists who accept these views. Examples are HATCH, supra note 7, at 11; Hanson, supra note 19; HOWARD, supra note 19; Maybury-Lewis, supra note 19.
70. This dated view is common among philosophers; unfortunately, it often blinds them to some worthwhile literature. I have in mind the many useful criticisms of cultural relativism that have been written by anthropologists. Three examples: HATCH, supra note 7, chs. 4-5; Bidney, supra note 4; David Bidney, The Concept of Value in Modern Anthropology, in ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY 682 (A. L. Kroeber ed., 1953).
71. See, e.g., Ayres, supra note 7; WHEELIS, supra note 7.
72. A metaethical theory aims to illuminate one or more features of moral language or thought, perhaps even to provide a comprehensive account of such language and thought. A normative ethical theory furnishes moral guidance by, say, providing a method for identifying valid moral judgments. In saying that cultural relativism is strictly metaethical, I am deviating from the views of Sumner, Benedict, and Herskovits, who intend their theory to be normative as well as metaethical. But I am doing so in a charitable way, a way that cuts down on the number of objections to which they are open. Insofar as Sumner, Benedict, and Herskovits defend a normative theory, that theory is a brand of agent relativism or appraiser relativism, and hence open to the objections in Section IV. See generally the passages cited in notes 14 and 27.
73. Not everything I call a "version of universalism" counts as a full-blown normative theory, though many such theories are indeed versions of universalism.
74. Much of the material in this section is taken, with slight modifications, from two of my previous papers: John J. Tilley, Cultural Relativism, Universalism, and the Burden of Proof, 27 MILLENNIUM 275 (1998); John J. Tilley, The Problem for Normative Cultural Relativism, 11 RATIO JURIS 272 (1998) [hereinafter Tilley, The Problem]. The same goes for some other portions of this essay. For instance, much of Section VII, part F, appears in Tilley, The Problem, supra, at 281-82.
75. Much of the material in this section is taken, with slight modifications, from two of my previous papers: John J. Tilley, Cultural Relativism, Universalism, and the Burden of Proof, 27 MILLENNIUM 275 (1998); John J. Tilley, The Problem for Normative Cultural Relativism, 11 RATIO JURIS 272 (1998) [hereinafter Tilley, The Problem]. The same goes for some other portions of this essay. For instance, much of Section VII, part F, appears in Tilley, The Problem, supra, at 281-82.
76. Much of the material in this section is taken, with slight modifications, from two of my previous papers: John J. Tilley, Cultural Relativism, Universalism, and the Burden of Proof, 27 MILLENNIUM 275 (1998); John J. Tilley, The Problem for Normative Cultural Relativism, 11 RATIO JURIS 272 (1998) [hereinafter Tilley, The Problem]. The same goes for some other portions of this essay. For instance, much of Section VII, part F, appears in Tilley, The Problem, supra, at 281-82.
77. See JONATHAN HARRISON, OUR KNOWLEDGE OF RIGHT AND WRONG 230 (1971). See also id. at 120-21.
78. For variants of this view, see SUMNER, supra note 7, § 439; Benedict, supra note 7, at 73.
79. For a hint as to how they might proceed, see the second sentence in note 11. Frankly, I believe that a close scrutiny of cultural relativism would uncover problems of the kind discussed in Section IV. I will not pursue this because I want to focus on the arguments for cultural relativism.
80. Most of these arguments fall into three categories. Those in the first category aim to show that relativism is confirmed by the study of diverse cultures. Those in the second aim to reveal desirable aspects of relativism or undesirable aspects of universalism. Those in the third aim to illustrate by example that what is wrong in one culture is not wrong in the next, or that widely different customs can be equally right. Presumably, we are to infer from the examples that relativism is true, no doubt because it so easily explains the illustrated point. Arguments of all three types appear in the classic texts of relativism, though often in only embryonic form. For example, what I later dub the "nomad argument" and the "ethnocentrism argument" are suggested, respectively, by SUMNER, supra note 7, § 333; and HERSKOVITS, supra note 6, at 50. The "tolerance argument" is suggested in BENEDICT, supra note 6, at 37, 278; and in HERSKOVITS, supra note 7, at 76, 78. For the "research argument," see HERSKOVITS, supra note 6, at 14-15, 39, 51, 101; HERSKOVITS, supra note 7, at 78.
81. F.H. BRADLEY, ETHICAL STUDIES 115 n.2 (2d ed. 1927).
82. Other customs could have been chosen here, for example, the Dinka's ritual burial of spear-masters or the Inuit's custom of female infanticide.
83. The term "our culture" (and any term akin to it), both here and elsewhere in this article, need not refer to the author's culture. It can be interpreted to refer to most any culture the reader chooses, though in a few cases this may require minor adjustments in the relevant passage or argument.
84. Stanley Fish, There's No Such Thing as Free Speech and It's a Good Thing, Too, in ARE YOU POLITICALLY CORRECT?: DEBATING AMERICA'S CULTURAL STANDARDS 43, 51 (Francis J. Beckwith & Michael E. Bauman eds., 1993).
85. Even when this requirement exists, it seldom creates great difficulties. But I will let this pass.
86. "But who's to say what 'morality' means! Maybe for me it means nothing more than Victorian morality!" Whatever the attractions of this response, relativists would be wise to avoid it. If relativism says nothing about the morality of rape, torture, and racism, if it implies nothing about whether "slavery is wrong" and "genocide is evil" are universally valid, it contributes nothing to moral theory.
87. Notes 2, 24, and 51 are relevant here. For examples of moral liberalism, see STACE, supra note 4, chs. 3, 7-8; HATCH, supra note 7, ch. 7. Neither author makes the mistake mentioned later in this paragraph.
88. See, e.g., BENEDICT, supra note 6, at 37, 278; HERSKOVITS, supra note 6, at 33, 93-94; HERSKOVITS, supra note 7, at 76. For a pertinent and helpful discussion of Benedict's work, see Williams, supra note 4.
89. STOUT, supra note 4, at 86-87.
90. Likewise, whether "genocide is not good" is universally valid is not settled by determining whether "you should not commit genocide" is true no matter who "you" designates. For this reason, Gilbert Harman's thesis in Gilbert Harman, Moral Relativism Defended, 84 PHIL. REV. 3 (1975), is irrelevant to the present topic (and not very contentious - see STOUT, supra note 4, at 90). Harman argues that "inner judgments," meaning judgments that evaluate an agent in relation to an action (e.g., "you should not do X"), are relative to reasons with two features: They are endorsed by the person making the judgment; and they are capable of motivating the evaluated agent. Harman's argument does not tie inner judgments specifically to culture, nor does it address moral judgments as they are defined in this paper. In short, it does not support cultural relativism. For criticism of Harman's thesis, see B.C. Postow, Moral Relativism Avoided, 60 PERSONALIST 95 (1979); David Copp, Harman on Internalism, Relativism, and Logical Form, 92 ETHICS 227 (1982); John Tilley, Inner Judgments and Moral Relativism, 18 PHILOSOPHIA 171 (1988); ROBERT L. ARRINGTON, RATIONALISM, REALISM, AND RELATIVISM 202 (1989).
91. Likewise, whether "genocide is not good" is universally valid is not settled by determining whether "you should not commit genocide" is true no matter who "you" designates. For this reason, Gilbert Harman's thesis in Gilbert Harman, Moral Relativism Defended, 84 PHIL. REV. 3 (1975), is irrelevant to the present topic (and not very contentious - see STOUT, supra note 4, at 90). Harman argues that "inner judgments," meaning judgments that evaluate an agent in relation to an action (e.g., "you should not do X"), are relative to reasons with two features: They are endorsed by the person making the judgment; and they are capable of motivating the evaluated agent. Harman's argument does not tie inner judgments specifically to culture, nor does it address moral judgments as they are defined in this paper. In short, it does not support cultural relativism. For criticism of Harman's thesis, see B.C. Postow, Moral Relativism Avoided, 60 PERSONALIST 95 (1979); David Copp, Harman on Internalism, Relativism, and Logical Form, 92 ETHICS 227 (1982); John Tilley, Inner Judgments and Moral Relativism, 18 PHILOSOPHIA 171 (1988); ROBERT L. ARRINGTON, RATIONALISM, REALISM, AND RELATIVISM 202 (1989).
92. Likewise, whether "genocide is not good" is universally valid is not settled by determining whether "you should not commit genocide" is true no matter who "you" designates. For this reason, Gilbert Harman's thesis in Gilbert Harman, Moral Relativism Defended, 84 PHIL. REV. 3 (1975), is irrelevant to the present topic (and not very contentious - see STOUT, supra note 4, at 90). Harman argues that "inner judgments," meaning judgments that evaluate an agent in relation to an action (e.g., "you should not do X"), are relative to reasons with two features: They are endorsed by the person making the judgment; and they are capable of motivating the evaluated agent. Harman's argument does not tie inner judgments specifically to culture, nor does it address moral judgments as they are defined in this paper. In short, it does not support cultural relativism. For criticism of Harman's thesis, see B.C. Postow, Moral Relativism Avoided, 60 PERSONALIST 95 (1979); David Copp, Harman on Internalism, Relativism, and Logical Form, 92 ETHICS 227 (1982); John Tilley, Inner Judgments and Moral Relativism, 18 PHILOSOPHIA 171 (1988); ROBERT L. ARRINGTON, RATIONALISM, REALISM, AND RELATIVISM 202 (1989).
93. Likewise, whether "genocide is not good" is universally valid is not settled by determining whether "you should not commit genocide" is true no matter who "you" designates. For this reason, Gilbert Harman's thesis in Gilbert Harman, Moral Relativism Defended, 84 PHIL. REV. 3 (1975), is irrelevant to the present topic (and not very contentious - see STOUT, supra note 4, at 90). Harman argues that "inner judgments," meaning judgments that evaluate an agent in relation to an action (e.g., "you should not do X"), are relative to reasons with two features: They are endorsed by the person making the judgment; and they are capable of motivating the evaluated agent. Harman's argument does not tie inner judgments specifically to culture, nor does it address moral judgments as they are defined in this paper. In short, it does not support cultural relativism. For criticism of Harman's thesis, see B.C. Postow, Moral Relativism Avoided, 60 PERSONALIST 95 (1979); David Copp, Harman on Internalism, Relativism, and Logical Form, 92 ETHICS 227 (1982); John Tilley, Inner Judgments and Moral Relativism, 18 PHILOSOPHIA 171 (1988); ROBERT L. ARRINGTON, RATIONALISM, REALISM, AND RELATIVISM 202 (1989).
94. Likewise, whether "genocide is not good" is universally valid is not settled by determining whether "you should not commit genocide" is true no matter who "you" designates. For this reason, Gilbert Harman's thesis in Gilbert Harman, Moral Relativism Defended, 84 PHIL. REV. 3 (1975), is irrelevant to the present topic (and not very contentious - see STOUT, supra note 4, at 90). Harman argues that "inner judgments," meaning judgments that evaluate an agent in relation to an action (e.g., "you should not do X"), are relative to reasons with two features: They are endorsed by the person making the judgment; and they are capable of motivating the evaluated agent. Harman's argument does not tie inner judgments specifically to culture, nor does it address moral judgments as they are defined in this paper. In short, it does not support cultural relativism. For criticism of Harman's thesis, see B.C. Postow, Moral Relativism Avoided, 60 PERSONALIST 95 (1979); David Copp, Harman on Internalism, Relativism, and Logical Form, 92 ETHICS 227 (1982); John Tilley, Inner Judgments and Moral Relativism, 18 PHILOSOPHIA 171 (1988); ROBERT L. ARRINGTON, RATIONALISM, REALISM, AND RELATIVISM 202 (1989).
95. It goes without saying that what we are dubbing "circumstances" are sometimes tied to culture. For instance, what counts as a joke in one society might count as an insult in another, owing to cultural differences between the societies. Clearly, this truism about circumstances lends no support to relativism. It is light-years apart from the view that no moral judgment is universally valid.
96. The usual term is "situational relativism." "Situationism" is useful because "relativism" does not appear in it; so we risk no confusion with cultural relativism.
97. Many people find this surprising. They have the vague idea that situationism is a discovery of the last hundred years or so. Some of them even believe that relativists deserve credit for the discovery. Lest these errors gain any more currency, the case against them will be documented with especial thoroughness. See PLATO, Republic, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO bk. 1, 331c, at 580 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 1963); ARISTOTLE, Ethica Nicomachea, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE bk. 2, 1104a1-9, 1109b14-27, at 953, 964 (Richard McKeon ed., 1941); CICERO, The Offices, in CICERO'S OFFICES 14-15 ,27, 120, 124-25 (Thomas Cockman trans., J.M. Dent & Sons 1949); 1 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I, q.19, a.6, ad.1 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros. 1947-48); id. at I-II, q.7, aa.2-3; id. at I-II, q.18, aa.3-4 & 10-11; id. at I-II, q.73, a.7; id. at I-II, q.94, a.4; JOHN LOCKE, Essays on the Law of Nature, in LOCKE: POLITICAL ESSAYS essay 7, at 120 (Mark Goldie ed., 1997); William Wollaston, The Religion of Nature Delineated, in 1 BRITISH MORALISTS §§ 287-88, at 248-49 (D. D. Raphael ed., 1969) (1724); EDWARD BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY 27-28 (Thoemmes Press 1994) (1745); DAVID FORDYCE, THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 47-48, 107 (Thoemmes Press 1990) (1754); ADAM FERGUSON, INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 163-64 (Garland 1978) (1773); RICHARD PRICE, A REVIEW OF THE PRINCIPAL QUESTIONS IN MORALS 164-65 175-76 (D. Daiches Raphael ed., 1948) (1787); ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 174, 331-32, 339-40 (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfie eds., 1976) (1759); JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION ch. 7, § 21, at 194-95 (Wilfrid Harrison ed., 1948) (1823); 2 DUGALD STEWART, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ACTIVE AND MORAL POWERS OF MAN 326 (1828); GEORGE ELIOT, THE MILL ON THE FLOSS bk. 7, ch. 2, at 628 (A.S. Byatt ed., 1979) (1860); 2 ADOLF WUTTKE, CHRISTIAN ETHICS 133-39 (John P. Lacroix trans., 1873); PAUL JANET, THE THEORY OF MORALS 163-64 (Mary Chapman trans., 1883); WALTER H. HILL, ETHICS 62-64 (2d ed. 1878); J.H. MUIRHEAD, THE ELEMENTS OF ETHICS 197, 213 (1892).
98. Many people find this surprising. They have the vague idea that situationism is a discovery of the last hundred years or so. Some of them even believe that relativists deserve credit for the discovery. Lest these errors gain any more currency, the case against them will be documented with especial thoroughness. See PLATO, Republic, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO bk. 1, 331c, at 580 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 1963); ARISTOTLE, Ethica Nicomachea, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE bk. 2, 1104a1-9, 1109b14-27, at 953, 964 (Richard McKeon ed., 1941); CICERO, The Offices, in CICERO'S OFFICES 14-15 ,27, 120, 124-25 (Thomas Cockman trans., J.M. Dent & Sons 1949); 1 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I, q.19, a.6, ad.1 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros. 1947-48); id. at I-II, q.7, aa.2-3; id. at I-II, q.18, aa.3-4 & 10-11; id. at I-II, q.73, a.7; id. at I-II, q.94, a.4; JOHN LOCKE, Essays on the Law of Nature, in LOCKE: POLITICAL ESSAYS essay 7, at 120 (Mark Goldie ed., 1997); William Wollaston, The Religion of Nature Delineated, in 1 BRITISH MORALISTS §§ 287-88, at 248-49 (D. D. Raphael ed., 1969) (1724); EDWARD BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY 27-28 (Thoemmes Press 1994) (1745); DAVID FORDYCE, THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 47-48, 107 (Thoemmes Press 1990) (1754); ADAM FERGUSON, INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 163-64 (Garland 1978) (1773); RICHARD PRICE, A REVIEW OF THE PRINCIPAL QUESTIONS IN MORALS 164-65 175-76 (D. Daiches Raphael ed., 1948) (1787); ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 174, 331-32, 339-40 (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfie eds., 1976) (1759); JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION ch. 7, § 21, at 194-95 (Wilfrid Harrison ed., 1948) (1823); 2 DUGALD STEWART, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ACTIVE AND MORAL POWERS OF MAN 326 (1828); GEORGE ELIOT, THE MILL ON THE FLOSS bk. 7, ch. 2, at 628 (A.S. Byatt ed., 1979) (1860); 2 ADOLF WUTTKE, CHRISTIAN ETHICS 133-39 (John P. Lacroix trans., 1873); PAUL JANET, THE THEORY OF MORALS 163-64 (Mary Chapman trans., 1883); WALTER H. HILL, ETHICS 62-64 (2d ed. 1878); J.H. MUIRHEAD, THE ELEMENTS OF ETHICS 197, 213 (1892).
99. Many people find this surprising. They have the vague idea that situationism is a discovery of the last hundred years or so. Some of them even believe that relativists deserve credit for the discovery. Lest these errors gain any more currency, the case against them will be documented with especial thoroughness. See PLATO, Republic, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO bk. 1, 331c, at 580 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 1963); ARISTOTLE, Ethica Nicomachea, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE bk. 2, 1104a1-9, 1109b14-27, at 953, 964 (Richard McKeon ed., 1941); CICERO, The Offices, in CICERO'S OFFICES 14-15 ,27, 120, 124-25 (Thomas Cockman trans., J.M. Dent & Sons 1949); 1 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I, q.19, a.6, ad.1 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros. 1947-48); id. at I-II, q.7, aa.2-3; id. at I-II, q.18, aa.3-4 & 10-11; id. at I-II, q.73, a.7; id. at I-II, q.94, a.4; JOHN LOCKE, Essays on the Law of Nature, in LOCKE: POLITICAL ESSAYS essay 7, at 120 (Mark Goldie ed., 1997); William Wollaston, The Religion of Nature Delineated, in 1 BRITISH MORALISTS §§ 287-88, at 248-49 (D. D. Raphael ed., 1969) (1724); EDWARD BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY 27-28 (Thoemmes Press 1994) (1745); DAVID FORDYCE, THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 47-48, 107 (Thoemmes Press 1990) (1754); ADAM FERGUSON, INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 163-64 (Garland 1978) (1773); RICHARD PRICE, A REVIEW OF THE PRINCIPAL QUESTIONS IN MORALS 164-65 175-76 (D. Daiches Raphael ed., 1948) (1787); ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 174, 331-32, 339-40 (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfie eds., 1976) (1759); JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION ch. 7, § 21, at 194-95 (Wilfrid Harrison ed., 1948) (1823); 2 DUGALD STEWART, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ACTIVE AND MORAL POWERS OF MAN 326 (1828); GEORGE ELIOT, THE MILL ON THE FLOSS bk. 7, ch. 2, at 628 (A.S. Byatt ed., 1979) (1860); 2 ADOLF WUTTKE, CHRISTIAN ETHICS 133-39 (John P. Lacroix trans., 1873); PAUL JANET, THE THEORY OF MORALS 163-64 (Mary Chapman trans., 1883); WALTER H. HILL, ETHICS 62-64 (2d ed. 1878); J.H. MUIRHEAD, THE ELEMENTS OF ETHICS 197, 213 (1892).
100. Many people find this surprising. They have the vague idea that situationism is a discovery of the last hundred years or so. Some of them even believe that relativists deserve credit for the discovery. Lest these errors gain any more currency, the case against them will be documented with especial thoroughness. See PLATO, Republic, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO bk. 1, 331c, at 580 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 1963); ARISTOTLE, Ethica Nicomachea, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE bk. 2, 1104a1-9, 1109b14-27, at 953, 964 (Richard McKeon ed., 1941); CICERO, The Offices, in CICERO'S OFFICES 14-15 ,27, 120, 124-25 (Thomas Cockman trans., J.M. Dent & Sons 1949); 1 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I, q.19, a.6, ad.1 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros. 1947-48); id. at I-II, q.7, aa.2-3; id. at I-II, q.18, aa.3-4 & 10-11; id. at I-II, q.73, a.7; id. at I-II, q.94, a.4; JOHN LOCKE, Essays on the Law of Nature, in LOCKE: POLITICAL ESSAYS essay 7, at 120 (Mark Goldie ed., 1997); William Wollaston, The Religion of Nature Delineated, in 1 BRITISH MORALISTS §§ 287-88, at 248-49 (D. D. Raphael ed., 1969) (1724); EDWARD BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY 27-28 (Thoemmes Press 1994) (1745); DAVID FORDYCE, THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 47-48, 107 (Thoemmes Press 1990) (1754); ADAM FERGUSON, INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 163-64 (Garland 1978) (1773); RICHARD PRICE, A REVIEW OF THE PRINCIPAL QUESTIONS IN MORALS 164-65 175-76 (D. Daiches Raphael ed., 1948) (1787); ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 174, 331-32, 339-40 (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfie eds., 1976) (1759); JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION ch. 7, § 21, at 194-95 (Wilfrid Harrison ed., 1948) (1823); 2 DUGALD STEWART, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ACTIVE AND MORAL POWERS OF MAN 326 (1828); GEORGE ELIOT, THE MILL ON THE FLOSS bk. 7, ch. 2, at 628 (A.S. Byatt ed., 1979) (1860); 2 ADOLF WUTTKE, CHRISTIAN ETHICS 133-39 (John P. Lacroix trans., 1873); PAUL JANET, THE THEORY OF MORALS 163-64 (Mary Chapman trans., 1883); WALTER H. HILL, ETHICS 62-64 (2d ed. 1878); J.H. MUIRHEAD, THE ELEMENTS OF ETHICS 197, 213 (1892).
101. Many people find this surprising. They have the vague idea that situationism is a discovery of the last hundred years or so. Some of them even believe that relativists deserve credit for the discovery. Lest these errors gain any more currency, the case against them will be documented with especial thoroughness. See PLATO, Republic, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO bk. 1, 331c, at 580 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 1963); ARISTOTLE, Ethica Nicomachea, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE bk. 2, 1104a1-9, 1109b14-27, at 953, 964 (Richard McKeon ed., 1941); CICERO, The Offices, in CICERO'S OFFICES 14-15 ,27, 120, 124-25 (Thomas Cockman trans., J.M. Dent & Sons 1949); 1 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I, q.19, a.6, ad.1 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros. 1947-48); id. at I-II, q.7, aa.2-3; id. at I-II, q.18, aa.3-4 & 10-11; id. at I-II, q.73, a.7; id. at I-II, q.94, a.4; JOHN LOCKE, Essays on the Law of Nature, in LOCKE: POLITICAL ESSAYS essay 7, at 120 (Mark Goldie ed., 1997); William Wollaston, The Religion of Nature Delineated, in 1 BRITISH MORALISTS §§ 287-88, at 248-49 (D. D. Raphael ed., 1969) (1724); EDWARD BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY 27-28 (Thoemmes Press 1994) (1745); DAVID FORDYCE, THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 47-48, 107 (Thoemmes Press 1990) (1754); ADAM FERGUSON, INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 163-64 (Garland 1978) (1773); RICHARD PRICE, A REVIEW OF THE PRINCIPAL QUESTIONS IN MORALS 164-65 175-76 (D. Daiches Raphael ed., 1948) (1787); ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 174, 331-32, 339-40 (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfie eds., 1976) (1759); JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION ch. 7, § 21, at 194-95 (Wilfrid Harrison ed., 1948) (1823); 2 DUGALD STEWART, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ACTIVE AND MORAL POWERS OF MAN 326 (1828); GEORGE ELIOT, THE MILL ON THE FLOSS bk. 7, ch. 2, at 628 (A.S. Byatt ed., 1979) (1860); 2 ADOLF WUTTKE, CHRISTIAN ETHICS 133-39 (John P. Lacroix trans., 1873); PAUL JANET, THE THEORY OF MORALS 163-64 (Mary Chapman trans., 1883); WALTER H. HILL, ETHICS 62-64 (2d ed. 1878); J.H. MUIRHEAD, THE ELEMENTS OF ETHICS 197, 213 (1892).
102. Many people find this surprising. They have the vague idea that situationism is a discovery of the last hundred years or so. Some of them even believe that relativists deserve credit for the discovery. Lest these errors gain any more currency, the case against them will be documented with especial thoroughness. See PLATO, Republic, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO bk. 1, 331c, at 580 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 1963); ARISTOTLE, Ethica Nicomachea, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE bk. 2, 1104a1-9, 1109b14-27, at 953, 964 (Richard McKeon ed., 1941); CICERO, The Offices, in CICERO'S OFFICES 14-15 ,27, 120, 124-25 (Thomas Cockman trans., J.M. Dent & Sons 1949); 1 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I, q.19, a.6, ad.1 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros. 1947-48); id. at I-II, q.7, aa.2-3; id. at I-II, q.18, aa.3-4 & 10-11; id. at I-II, q.73, a.7; id. at I-II, q.94, a.4; JOHN LOCKE, Essays on the Law of Nature, in LOCKE: POLITICAL ESSAYS essay 7, at 120 (Mark Goldie ed., 1997); William Wollaston, The Religion of Nature Delineated, in 1 BRITISH MORALISTS §§ 287-88, at 248-49 (D. D. Raphael ed., 1969) (1724); EDWARD BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY 27-28 (Thoemmes Press 1994) (1745); DAVID FORDYCE, THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 47-48, 107 (Thoemmes Press 1990) (1754); ADAM FERGUSON, INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 163-64 (Garland 1978) (1773); RICHARD PRICE, A REVIEW OF THE PRINCIPAL QUESTIONS IN MORALS 164-65 175-76 (D. Daiches Raphael ed., 1948) (1787); ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 174, 331-32, 339-40 (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfie eds., 1976) (1759); JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION ch. 7, § 21, at 194-95 (Wilfrid Harrison ed., 1948) (1823); 2 DUGALD STEWART, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ACTIVE AND MORAL POWERS OF MAN 326 (1828); GEORGE ELIOT, THE MILL ON THE FLOSS bk. 7, ch. 2, at 628 (A.S. Byatt ed., 1979) (1860); 2 ADOLF WUTTKE, CHRISTIAN ETHICS 133-39 (John P. Lacroix trans., 1873); PAUL JANET, THE THEORY OF MORALS 163-64 (Mary Chapman trans., 1883); WALTER H. HILL, ETHICS 62-64 (2d ed. 1878); J.H. MUIRHEAD, THE ELEMENTS OF ETHICS 197, 213 (1892).
103. Many people find this surprising. They have the vague idea that situationism is a discovery of the last hundred years or so. Some of them even believe that relativists deserve credit for the discovery. Lest these errors gain any more currency, the case against them will be documented with especial thoroughness. See PLATO, Republic, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO bk. 1, 331c, at 580 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 1963); ARISTOTLE, Ethica Nicomachea, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE bk. 2, 1104a1-9, 1109b14-27, at 953, 964 (Richard McKeon ed., 1941); CICERO, The Offices, in CICERO'S OFFICES 14-15 ,27, 120, 124-25 (Thomas Cockman trans., J.M. Dent & Sons 1949); 1 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I, q.19, a.6, ad.1 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros. 1947-48); id. at I-II, q.7, aa.2-3; id. at I-II, q.18, aa.3-4 & 10-11; id. at I-II, q.73, a.7; id. at I-II, q.94, a.4; JOHN LOCKE, Essays on the Law of Nature, in LOCKE: POLITICAL ESSAYS essay 7, at 120 (Mark Goldie ed., 1997); William Wollaston, The Religion of Nature Delineated, in 1 BRITISH MORALISTS §§ 287-88, at 248-49 (D. D. Raphael ed., 1969) (1724); EDWARD BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY 27-28 (Thoemmes Press 1994) (1745); DAVID FORDYCE, THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 47-48, 107 (Thoemmes Press 1990) (1754); ADAM FERGUSON, INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 163-64 (Garland 1978) (1773); RICHARD PRICE, A REVIEW OF THE PRINCIPAL QUESTIONS IN MORALS 164-65 175-76 (D. Daiches Raphael ed., 1948) (1787); ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 174, 331-32, 339-40 (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfie eds., 1976) (1759); JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION ch. 7, § 21, at 194-95 (Wilfrid Harrison ed., 1948) (1823); 2 DUGALD STEWART, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ACTIVE AND MORAL POWERS OF MAN 326 (1828); GEORGE ELIOT, THE MILL ON THE FLOSS bk. 7, ch. 2, at 628 (A.S. Byatt ed., 1979) (1860); 2 ADOLF WUTTKE, CHRISTIAN ETHICS 133-39 (John P. Lacroix trans., 1873); PAUL JANET, THE THEORY OF MORALS 163-64 (Mary Chapman trans., 1883); WALTER H. HILL, ETHICS 62-64 (2d ed. 1878); J.H. MUIRHEAD, THE ELEMENTS OF ETHICS 197, 213 (1892).
104. Many people find this surprising. They have the vague idea that situationism is a discovery of the last hundred years or so. Some of them even believe that relativists deserve credit for the discovery. Lest these errors gain any more currency, the case against them will be documented with especial thoroughness. See PLATO, Republic, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO bk. 1, 331c, at 580 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 1963); ARISTOTLE, Ethica Nicomachea, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE bk. 2, 1104a1-9, 1109b14-27, at 953, 964 (Richard McKeon ed., 1941); CICERO, The Offices, in CICERO'S OFFICES 14-15 ,27, 120, 124-25 (Thomas Cockman trans., J.M. Dent & Sons 1949); 1 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I, q.19, a.6, ad.1 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros. 1947-48); id. at I-II, q.7, aa.2-3; id. at I-II, q.18, aa.3-4 & 10-11; id. at I-II, q.73, a.7; id. at I-II, q.94, a.4; JOHN LOCKE, Essays on the Law of Nature, in LOCKE: POLITICAL ESSAYS essay 7, at 120 (Mark Goldie ed., 1997); William Wollaston, The Religion of Nature Delineated, in 1 BRITISH MORALISTS §§ 287-88, at 248-49 (D. D. Raphael ed., 1969) (1724); EDWARD BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY 27-28 (Thoemmes Press 1994) (1745); DAVID FORDYCE, THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 47-48, 107 (Thoemmes Press 1990) (1754); ADAM FERGUSON, INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 163-64 (Garland 1978) (1773); RICHARD PRICE, A REVIEW OF THE PRINCIPAL QUESTIONS IN MORALS 164-65 175-76 (D. Daiches Raphael ed., 1948) (1787); ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 174, 331-32, 339-40 (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfie eds., 1976) (1759); JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION ch. 7, § 21, at 194-95 (Wilfrid Harrison ed., 1948) (1823); 2 DUGALD STEWART, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ACTIVE AND MORAL POWERS OF MAN 326 (1828); GEORGE ELIOT, THE MILL ON THE FLOSS bk. 7, ch. 2, at 628 (A.S. Byatt ed., 1979) (1860); 2 ADOLF WUTTKE, CHRISTIAN ETHICS 133-39 (John P. Lacroix trans., 1873); PAUL JANET, THE THEORY OF MORALS 163-64 (Mary Chapman trans., 1883); WALTER H. HILL, ETHICS 62-64 (2d ed. 1878); J.H. MUIRHEAD, THE ELEMENTS OF ETHICS 197, 213 (1892).
105. Many people find this surprising. They have the vague idea that situationism is a discovery of the last hundred years or so. Some of them even believe that relativists deserve credit for the discovery. Lest these errors gain any more currency, the case against them will be documented with especial thoroughness. See PLATO, Republic, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO bk. 1, 331c, at 580 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 1963); ARISTOTLE, Ethica Nicomachea, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE bk. 2, 1104a1-9, 1109b14-27, at 953, 964 (Richard McKeon ed., 1941); CICERO, The Offices, in CICERO'S OFFICES 14-15 ,27, 120, 124-25 (Thomas Cockman trans., J.M. Dent & Sons 1949); 1 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I, q.19, a.6, ad.1 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros. 1947-48); id. at I-II, q.7, aa.2-3; id. at I-II, q.18, aa.3-4 & 10-11; id. at I-II, q.73, a.7; id. at I-II, q.94, a.4; JOHN LOCKE, Essays on the Law of Nature, in LOCKE: POLITICAL ESSAYS essay 7, at 120 (Mark Goldie ed., 1997); William Wollaston, The Religion of Nature Delineated, in 1 BRITISH MORALISTS §§ 287-88, at 248-49 (D. D. Raphael ed., 1969) (1724); EDWARD BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY 27-28 (Thoemmes Press 1994) (1745); DAVID FORDYCE, THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 47-48, 107 (Thoemmes Press 1990) (1754); ADAM FERGUSON, INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 163-64 (Garland 1978) (1773); RICHARD PRICE, A REVIEW OF THE PRINCIPAL QUESTIONS IN MORALS 164-65 175-76 (D. Daiches Raphael ed., 1948) (1787); ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 174, 331-32, 339-40 (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfie eds., 1976) (1759); JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION ch. 7, § 21, at 194-95 (Wilfrid Harrison ed., 1948) (1823); 2 DUGALD STEWART, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ACTIVE AND MORAL POWERS OF MAN 326 (1828); GEORGE ELIOT, THE MILL ON THE FLOSS bk. 7, ch. 2, at 628 (A.S. Byatt ed., 1979) (1860); 2 ADOLF WUTTKE, CHRISTIAN ETHICS 133-39 (John P. Lacroix trans., 1873); PAUL JANET, THE THEORY OF MORALS 163-64 (Mary Chapman trans., 1883); WALTER H. HILL, ETHICS 62-64 (2d ed. 1878); J.H. MUIRHEAD, THE ELEMENTS OF ETHICS 197, 213 (1892).
106. Many people find this surprising. They have the vague idea that situationism is a discovery of the last hundred years or so. Some of them even believe that relativists deserve credit for the discovery. Lest these errors gain any more currency, the case against them will be documented with especial thoroughness. See PLATO, Republic, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO bk. 1, 331c, at 580 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 1963); ARISTOTLE, Ethica Nicomachea, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE bk. 2, 1104a1-9, 1109b14-27, at 953, 964 (Richard McKeon ed., 1941); CICERO, The Offices, in CICERO'S OFFICES 14-15 ,27, 120, 124-25 (Thomas Cockman trans., J.M. Dent & Sons 1949); 1 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I, q.19, a.6, ad.1 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros. 1947-48); id. at I-II, q.7, aa.2-3; id. at I-II, q.18, aa.3-4 & 10-11; id. at I-II, q.73, a.7; id. at I-II, q.94, a.4; JOHN LOCKE, Essays on the Law of Nature, in LOCKE: POLITICAL ESSAYS essay 7, at 120 (Mark Goldie ed., 1997); William Wollaston, The Religion of Nature Delineated, in 1 BRITISH MORALISTS §§ 287-88, at 248-49 (D. D. Raphael ed., 1969) (1724); EDWARD BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY 27-28 (Thoemmes Press 1994) (1745); DAVID FORDYCE, THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 47-48, 107 (Thoemmes Press 1990) (1754); ADAM FERGUSON, INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 163-64 (Garland 1978) (1773); RICHARD PRICE, A REVIEW OF THE PRINCIPAL QUESTIONS IN MORALS 164-65 175-76 (D. Daiches Raphael ed., 1948) (1787); ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 174, 331-32, 339-40 (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfie eds., 1976) (1759); JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION ch. 7, § 21, at 194-95 (Wilfrid Harrison ed., 1948) (1823); 2 DUGALD STEWART, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ACTIVE AND MORAL POWERS OF MAN 326 (1828); GEORGE ELIOT, THE MILL ON THE FLOSS bk. 7, ch. 2, at 628 (A.S. Byatt ed., 1979) (1860); 2 ADOLF WUTTKE, CHRISTIAN ETHICS 133-39
107. Many people find this surprising. They have the vague idea that situationism is a discovery of the last hundred years or so. Some of them even believe that relativists deserve credit for the discovery. Lest these errors gain any more currency, the case against them will be documented with especial thoroughness. See PLATO, Republic, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO bk. 1, 331c, at 580 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 1963); ARISTOTLE, Ethica Nicomachea, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE bk. 2, 1104a1-9, 1109b14-27, at 953, 964 (Richard McKeon ed., 1941); CICERO, The Offices, in CICERO'S OFFICES 14-15 ,27, 120, 124-25 (Thomas Cockman trans., J.M. Dent & Sons 1949); 1 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I, q.19, a.6, ad.1 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros. 1947-48); id. at I-II, q.7, aa.2-3; id. at I-II, q.18, aa.3-4 & 10-11; id. at I-II, q.73, a.7; id. at I-II, q.94, a.4; JOHN LOCKE, Essays on the Law of Nature, in LOCKE: POLITICAL ESSAYS essay 7, at 120 (Mark Goldie ed., 1997); William Wollaston, The Religion of Nature Delineated, in 1 BRITISH MORALISTS §§ 287-88, at 248-49 (D. D. Raphael ed., 1969) (1724); EDWARD BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY 27-28 (Thoemmes Press 1994) (1745); DAVID FORDYCE, THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 47-48, 107 (Thoemmes Press 1990) (1754); ADAM FERGUSON, INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 163-64 (Garland 1978) (1773); RICHARD PRICE, A REVIEW OF THE PRINCIPAL QUESTIONS IN MORALS 164-65 175-76 (D. Daiches Raphael ed., 1948) (1787); ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 174, 331-32, 339-40 (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfie eds., 1976) (1759); JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION ch. 7, § 21, at 194-95 (Wilfrid Harrison ed., 1948) (1823); 2 DUGALD STEWART, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ACTIVE AND MORAL POWERS OF MAN 326 (1828); GEORGE ELIOT, THE MILL ON THE FLOSS bk. 7, ch. 2, at 628 (A.S. Byatt ed., 1979) (1860); 2 ADOLF WUTTKE, CHRISTIAN ETHICS 133-39 (John P. Lacroix trans., 1873); PAUL JANET, THE THEORY OF MORALS 163-64 (Mary Chapman trans., 1883); WALTER H. HILL, ETHICS 62-64 (2d ed. 1878); J.H. MUIRHEAD, THE ELEMENTS OF ETHICS 197, 213 (1892).
108. Many people find this surprising. They have the vague idea that situationism is a discovery of the last hundred years or so. Some of them even believe that relativists deserve credit for the discovery. Lest these errors gain any more currency, the case against them will be documented with especial thoroughness. See PLATO, Republic, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO bk. 1, 331c, at 580 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 1963); ARISTOTLE, Ethica Nicomachea, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE bk. 2, 1104a1-9, 1109b14-27, at 953, 964 (Richard McKeon ed., 1941); CICERO, The Offices, in CICERO'S OFFICES 14-15 ,27, 120, 124-25 (Thomas Cockman trans., J.M. Dent & Sons 1949); 1 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I, q.19, a.6, ad.1 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros. 1947-48); id. at I-II, q.7, aa.2-3; id. at I-II, q.18, aa.3-4 & 10-11; id. at I-II, q.73, a.7; id. at I-II, q.94, a.4; JOHN LOCKE, Essays on the Law of Nature, in LOCKE: POLITICAL ESSAYS essay 7, at 120 (Mark Goldie ed., 1997); William Wollaston, The Religion of Nature Delineated, in 1 BRITISH MORALISTS §§ 287-88, at 248-49 (D. D. Raphael ed., 1969) (1724); EDWARD BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY 27-28 (Thoemmes Press 1994) (1745); DAVID FORDYCE, THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 47-48, 107 (Thoemmes Press 1990) (1754); ADAM FERGUSON, INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 163-64 (Garland 1978) (1773); RICHARD PRICE, A REVIEW OF THE PRINCIPAL QUESTIONS IN MORALS 164-65 175-76 (D. Daiches Raphael ed., 1948) (1787); ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 174, 331-32, 339-40 (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfie eds., 1976) (1759); JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION ch. 7, § 21, at 194-95 (Wilfrid Harrison ed., 1948) (1823); 2 DUGALD STEWART, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ACTIVE AND MORAL POWERS OF MAN 326 (1828); GEORGE ELIOT, THE MILL ON THE FLOSS bk. 7, ch. 2, at 628 (A.S. Byatt ed., 1979) (1860); 2 ADOLF WUTTKE, CHRISTIAN ETHICS 133-39 (John P. Lacroix trans., 1873); PAUL JANET, THE THEORY OF MORALS 163-64 (Mary Chapman trans., 1883); WALTER H. HILL, ETHICS 62-64 (2d ed. 1878); J.H. MUIRHEAD, THE ELEMENTS OF ETHICS 197, 213 (1892).
109. Many people find this surprising. They have the vague idea that situationism is a discovery of the last hundred years or so. Some of them even believe that relativists deserve credit for the discovery. Lest these errors gain any more currency, the case against them will be documented with especial thoroughness. See PLATO, Republic, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO bk. 1, 331c, at 580 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 1963); ARISTOTLE, Ethica Nicomachea, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE bk. 2, 1104a1-9, 1109b14-27, at 953, 964 (Richard McKeon ed., 1941); CICERO, The Offices, in CICERO'S OFFICES 14-15 ,27, 120, 124-25 (Thomas Cockman trans., J.M. Dent & Sons 1949); 1 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I, q.19, a.6, ad.1 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros. 1947-48); id. at I-II, q.7, aa.2-3; id. at I-II, q.18, aa.3-4 & 10-11; id. at I-II, q.73, a.7; id. at I-II, q.94, a.4; JOHN LOCKE, Essays on the Law of Nature, in LOCKE: POLITICAL ESSAYS essay 7, at 120 (Mark Goldie ed., 1997); William Wollaston, The Religion of Nature Delineated, in 1 BRITISH MORALISTS §§ 287-88, at 248-49 (D. D. Raphael ed., 1969) (1724); EDWARD BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY 27-28 (Thoemmes Press 1994) (1745); DAVID FORDYCE, THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 47-48, 107 (Thoemmes Press 1990) (1754); ADAM FERGUSON, INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 163-64 (Garland 1978) (1773); RICHARD PRICE, A REVIEW OF THE PRINCIPAL QUESTIONS IN MORALS 164-65 175-76 (D. Daiches Raphael ed., 1948) (1787); ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 174, 331-32, 339-40 (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfie eds., 1976) (1759); JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION ch. 7, § 21, at 194-95 (Wilfrid Harrison ed., 1948) (1823); 2 DUGALD STEWART, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ACTIVE AND MORAL POWERS OF MAN 326 (1828); GEORGE ELIOT, THE MILL ON THE FLOSS bk. 7, ch. 2, at 628 (A.S. Byatt ed., 1979) (1860); 2 ADOLF WUTTKE, CHRISTIAN ETHICS 133-39 (John P. Lacroix trans., 1873); PAUL JANET, THE THEORY OF MORALS 163-64 (Mary Chapman trans., 1883); WALTER H. HILL, ETHICS 62-64 (2d ed. 1878); J.H. MUIRHEAD, THE ELEMENTS OF ETHICS 197, 213 (1892).
110. Many people find this surprising. They have the vague idea that situationism is a discovery of the last hundred years or so. Some of them even believe that relativists deserve credit for the discovery. Lest these errors gain any more currency, the case against them will be documented with especial thoroughness. See PLATO, Republic, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO bk. 1, 331c, at 580 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 1963); ARISTOTLE, Ethica Nicomachea, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE bk. 2, 1104a1-9, 1109b14-27, at 953, 964 (Richard McKeon ed., 1941); CICERO, The Offices, in CICERO'S OFFICES 14-15 ,27, 120, 124-25 (Thomas Cockman trans., J.M. Dent & Sons 1949); 1 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I, q.19, a.6, ad.1 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros. 1947-48); id. at I-II, q.7, aa.2-3; id. at I-II, q.18, aa.3-4 & 10-11; id. at I-II, q.73, a.7; id. at I-II, q.94, a.4; JOHN LOCKE, Essays on the Law of Nature, in LOCKE: POLITICAL ESSAYS essay 7, at 120 (Mark Goldie ed., 1997); William Wollaston, The Religion of Nature Delineated, in 1 BRITISH MORALISTS §§ 287-88, at 248-49 (D. D. Raphael ed., 1969) (1724); EDWARD BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY 27-28 (Thoemmes Press 1994) (1745); DAVID FORDYCE, THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 47-48, 107 (Thoemmes Press 1990) (1754); ADAM FERGUSON, INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 163-64 (Garland 1978) (1773); RICHARD PRICE, A REVIEW OF THE PRINCIPAL QUESTIONS IN MORALS 164-65 175-76 (D. Daiches Raphael ed., 1948) (1787); ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 174, 331-32, 339-40 (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfie eds., 1976) (1759); JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION ch. 7, § 21, at 194-95 (Wilfrid Harrison ed., 1948) (1823); 2 DUGALD STEWART, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ACTIVE AND MORAL POWERS OF MAN 326 (1828); GEORGE ELIOT, THE MILL ON THE FLOSS bk. 7, ch. 2, at 628 (A.S. Byatt ed., 1979) (1860); 2 ADOLF WUTTKE, CHRISTIAN ETHICS 133-39 (John P. Lacroix trans., 1873); PAUL JANET, THE THEORY OF MORALS 163-64 (Mary Chapman trans., 1883); WALTER H. HILL, ETHICS 62-64 (2d ed. 1878); J.H. MUIRHEAD, THE ELEMENTS OF ETHICS 197, 213 (1892).
111. Many people find this surprising. They have the vague idea that situationism is a discovery of the last hundred years or so. Some of them even believe that relativists deserve credit for the discovery. Lest these errors gain any more currency, the case against them will be documented with especial thoroughness. See PLATO, Republic, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO bk. 1, 331c, at 580 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 1963); ARISTOTLE, Ethica Nicomachea, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE bk. 2, 1104a1-9, 1109b14-27, at 953, 964 (Richard McKeon ed., 1941); CICERO, The Offices, in CICERO'S OFFICES 14-15 ,27, 120, 124-25 (Thomas Cockman trans., J.M. Dent & Sons 1949); 1 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I, q.19, a.6, ad.1 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros. 1947-48); id. at I-II, q.7, aa.2-3; id. at I-II, q.18, aa.3-4 & 10-11; id. at I-II, q.73, a.7; id. at I-II, q.94, a.4; JOHN LOCKE, Essays on the Law of Nature, in LOCKE: POLITICAL ESSAYS essay 7, at 120 (Mark Goldie ed., 1997); William Wollaston, The Religion of Nature Delineated, in 1 BRITISH MORALISTS §§ 287-88, at 248-49 (D. D. Raphael ed., 1969) (1724); EDWARD BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY 27-28 (Thoemmes Press 1994) (1745); DAVID FORDYCE, THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 47-48, 107 (Thoemmes Press 1990) (1754); ADAM FERGUSON, INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 163-64 (Garland 1978) (1773); RICHARD PRICE, A REVIEW OF THE PRINCIPAL QUESTIONS IN MORALS 164-65 175-76 (D. Daiches Raphael ed., 1948) (1787); ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 174, 331-32, 339-40 (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfie eds., 1976) (1759); JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION ch. 7, § 21, at 194-95 (Wilfrid Harrison ed., 1948) (1823); 2 DUGALD STEWART, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ACTIVE AND MORAL POWERS OF MAN 326 (1828); GEORGE ELIOT, THE MILL ON THE FLOSS bk. 7, ch. 2, at 628 (A.S. Byatt ed., 1979) (1860); 2 ADOLF WUTTKE, CHRISTIAN ETHICS 133-39 (John P. Lacroix trans., 1873); PAUL JANET, THE THEORY OF MORALS 163-64 (Mary Chapman trans., 1883); WALTER H. HILL, ETHICS 62-64 (2d ed. 1878); J.H. MUIRHEAD, THE ELEMENTS OF ETHICS 197, 213 (1892).
112. Many people find this surprising. They have the vague idea that situationism is a discovery of the last hundred years or so. Some of them even believe that relativists deserve credit for the discovery. Lest these errors gain any more currency, the case against them will be documented with especial thoroughness. See PLATO, Republic, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO bk. 1, 331c, at 580 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 1963); ARISTOTLE, Ethica Nicomachea, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE bk. 2, 1104a1-9, 1109b14-27, at 953, 964 (Richard McKeon ed., 1941); CICERO, The Offices, in CICERO'S OFFICES 14-15 ,27, 120, 124-25 (Thomas Cockman trans., J.M. Dent & Sons 1949); 1 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I, q.19, a.6, ad.1 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros. 1947-48); id. at I-II, q.7, aa.2-3; id. at I-II, q.18, aa.3-4 & 10-11; id. at I-II, q.73, a.7; id. at I-II, q.94, a.4; JOHN LOCKE, Essays on the Law of Nature, in LOCKE: POLITICAL ESSAYS essay 7, at 120 (Mark Goldie ed., 1997); William Wollaston, The Religion of Nature Delineated, in 1 BRITISH MORALISTS §§ 287-88, at 248-49 (D. D. Raphael ed., 1969) (1724); EDWARD BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY 27-28 (Thoemmes Press 1994) (1745); DAVID FORDYCE, THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 47-48, 107 (Thoemmes Press 1990) (1754); ADAM FERGUSON, INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 163-64 (Garland 1978) (1773); RICHARD PRICE, A REVIEW OF THE PRINCIPAL QUESTIONS IN MORALS 164-65 175-76 (D. Daiches Raphael ed., 1948) (1787); ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 174, 331-32, 339-40 (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfie eds., 1976) (1759); JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION ch. 7, § 21, at 194-95 (Wilfrid Harrison ed., 1948) (1823); 2 DUGALD STEWART, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ACTIVE AND MORAL POWERS OF MAN 326 (1828); GEORGE ELIOT, THE MILL ON THE FLOSS bk. 7, ch. 2, at 628 (A.S. Byatt ed., 1979) (1860); 2 ADOLF WUTTKE, CHRISTIAN ETHICS 133-39 (John P. Lacroix trans., 1873); PAUL JANET, THE THEORY OF MORALS 163-64 (Mary Chapman trans., 1883); WALTER H. HILL, ETHICS 62-64 (2d ed. 1878); J.H. MUIRHEAD, THE ELEMENTS OF ETHICS 197, 213 (1892).
113. Many people find this surprising. They have the vague idea that situationism is a discovery of the last hundred years or so. Some of them even believe that relativists deserve credit for the discovery. Lest these errors gain any more currency, the case against them will be documented with especial thoroughness. See PLATO, Republic, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO bk. 1, 331c, at 580 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 1963); ARISTOTLE, Ethica Nicomachea, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE bk. 2, 1104a1-9, 1109b14-27, at 953, 964 (Richard McKeon ed., 1941); CICERO, The Offices, in CICERO'S OFFICES 14-15 ,27, 120, 124-25 (Thomas Cockman trans., J.M. Dent & Sons 1949); 1 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I, q.19, a.6, ad.1 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros. 1947-48); id. at I-II, q.7, aa.2-3; id. at I-II, q.18, aa.3-4 & 10-11; id. at I-II, q.73, a.7; id. at I-II, q.94, a.4; JOHN LOCKE, Essays on the Law of Nature, in LOCKE: POLITICAL ESSAYS essay 7, at 120 (Mark Goldie ed., 1997); William Wollaston, The Religion of Nature Delineated, in 1 BRITISH MORALISTS §§ 287-88, at 248-49 (D. D. Raphael ed., 1969) (1724); EDWARD BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY 27-28 (Thoemmes Press 1994) (1745); DAVID FORDYCE, THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 47-48, 107 (Thoemmes Press 1990) (1754); ADAM FERGUSON, INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 163-64 (Garland 1978) (1773); RICHARD PRICE, A REVIEW OF THE PRINCIPAL QUESTIONS IN MORALS 164-65 175-76 (D. Daiches Raphael ed., 1948) (1787); ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 174, 331-32, 339-40 (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfie eds., 1976) (1759); JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION ch. 7, § 21, at 194-95 (Wilfrid Harrison ed., 1948) (1823); 2 DUGALD STEWART, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ACTIVE AND MORAL POWERS OF MAN 326 (1828); GEORGE ELIOT, THE MILL ON THE FLOSS bk. 7, ch. 2, at 628 (A.S. Byatt ed., 1979) (1860); 2 ADOLF WUTTKE, CHRISTIAN ETHICS 133-39 (John P. Lacroix trans., 1873); PAUL JANET, THE THEORY OF MORALS 163-64 (Mary Chapman trans., 1883); WALTER H. HILL, ETHICS 62-64 (2d ed. 1878); J.H. MUIRHEAD, THE ELEMENTS OF ETHICS 197, 213 (1892).
114. Many people find this surprising. They have the vague idea that situationism is a discovery of the last hundred years or so. Some of them even believe that relativists deserve credit for the discovery. Lest these errors gain any more currency, the case against them will be documented with especial thoroughness. See PLATO, Republic, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO bk. 1, 331c, at 580 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 1963); ARISTOTLE, Ethica Nicomachea, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE bk. 2, 1104a1-9, 1109b14-27, at 953, 964 (Richard McKeon ed., 1941); CICERO, The Offices, in CICERO'S OFFICES 14-15 ,27, 120, 124-25 (Thomas Cockman trans., J.M. Dent & Sons 1949); 1 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I, q.19, a.6, ad.1 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros. 1947-48); id. at I-II, q.7, aa.2-3; id. at I-II, q.18, aa.3-4 & 10-11; id. at I-II, q.73, a.7; id. at I-II, q.94, a.4; JOHN LOCKE, Essays on the Law of Nature, in LOCKE: POLITICAL ESSAYS essay 7, at 120 (Mark Goldie ed., 1997); William Wollaston, The Religion of Nature Delineated, in 1 BRITISH MORALISTS §§ 287-88, at 248-49 (D. D. Raphael ed., 1969) (1724); EDWARD BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY 27-28 (Thoemmes Press 1994) (1745); DAVID FORDYCE, THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 47-48, 107 (Thoemmes Press 1990) (1754); ADAM FERGUSON, INSTITUTES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 163-64 (Garland 1978) (1773); RICHARD PRICE, A REVIEW OF THE PRINCIPAL QUESTIONS IN MORALS 164-65 175-76 (D. Daiches Raphael ed., 1948) (1787); ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 174, 331-32, 339-40 (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfie eds., 1976) (1759); JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION ch. 7, § 21, at 194-95 (Wilfrid Harrison ed., 1948) (1823); 2 DUGALD STEWART, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ACTIVE AND MORAL POWERS OF MAN 326 (1828); GEORGE ELIOT, THE MILL ON THE FLOSS bk. 7, ch. 2, at 628 (A.S. Byatt ed., 1979) (1860); 2 ADOLF WUTTKE, CHRISTIAN ETHICS 133-39 (John P. Lacroix trans., 1873); PAUL JANET, THE THEORY OF MORALS 163-64 (Mary Chapman trans., 1883); WALTER H. HILL, ETHICS 62-64 (2d ed. 1878); J.H. MUIRHEAD, THE ELEMENTS OF ETHICS 197, 213 (1892).
115. For useful discussions, see STOUT, supra note 4, pt. 1; Max Hocutt, Some Truths about Truth, 22 BEHAV. & PHIL. 1-5 (1994).
116. An accessible defense of the correspondence theory - or a correspondence theory-is in JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY ch. 9 (1995). Also helpful is Hocutt, supra note 43.
117. I might have overlooked the fourth one had I not heard Dennis Stampe mention it. The example - about the chili - is his.
118. Indeed, fallibilists who reject relativism are numerous. Two examples are STOUT, supra note 4, pt. 1; and DAVID O. BRINK, MORAL REALISM AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS (1989). A second point: The footnoted sentence suggests that just as fallibilists can be universalists, nonfallibilists can be cultural relativists. This is indeed the case. Nonfallibilism, in its classic form (known as foundationalism), asserts that some beliefs are incorrigible and that others are justified insofar as they are, or can be, reliably derived from the incorrigible ones. This thesis comports with the view that every moral truth tacitly refers to, and in that sense is "relative to," a specific culture. In short, a moral belief can be founded on incorrigible truths and at the same time be indexed to, or tacitly about, a particular culture. (Sumner and Herskovits can be interpreted along these lines, though it would take some work to show this.) Thus, the debate over fallibilism cannot settle the debate over relativism, and vice versa. We must keep these issues distinct.
119. Foundationalism is defined in note 46. Alternatives to it include coherentism and minimal (or fallibilist) foundationalism. Each of these views incorporates fallibilism; neither entails cultural relativism or anything close to it. Both views are discussed in ROBERT AUDI, THE STRUCTURE OF JUSTIFICATION (1993). Coherentism is also discussed in BRINK, supra note 46, ch. 5.
120. For a more detailed discussion, see MARCUS GEORGE SINGER, GENERALIZATION IN ETHICS ch. 5 (1971). Also relevant are STACE, supra note 4, ch. 4 ; NICHOLAS RESCHER, OBJECTIVITY: THE OBLIGATIONS OF IMPERSONAL REASON 136-44 (1997). My treatment of rules, principles, and particular moral judgments is fairly traditional and perhaps oversimplified. For a more complicated picture, see ARRINGTON, supra note 39, ch. 1. The complications undermine none of the main results of this section.
121. For a more detailed discussion, see MARCUS GEORGE SINGER, GENERALIZATION IN ETHICS ch. 5 (1971). Also relevant are STACE, supra note 4, ch. 4 ; NICHOLAS RESCHER, OBJECTIVITY: THE OBLIGATIONS OF IMPERSONAL REASON 136-44 (1997). My treatment of rules, principles, and particular moral judgments is fairly traditional and perhaps oversimplified. For a more complicated picture, see ARRINGTON, supra note 39, ch. 1. The complications undermine none of the main results of this section.
122. My definition of absolutism, specifically my insertion of "ordinary" in front of "moral rules," reflects the influence of Marcus George Singer, The Ideal of a Rational Morality, 60 PROC. & ADDRESSES AM. PHIL. ASSN. 15, 28 (1986).
123. Five examples: POJMAN, supra note 4, at 47; RESCHER, supra note 48, at 164; SINGER, supra note 48, at 123-33; FRIEDRICH PAULSEN, A SYSTEM OF ETHICS 233-35, 360-63 (Frank Thilly trans., 1899); KWASI WIREDU, CULTURAL UNIVERSALS AND PARTICULARS: AN AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE 65-66 (1996). See also STACE, supra note 4, at 193-94; TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 26-29; SMITH, supra note 42, at 174. An objection may come to mind here: namely, that when relativists identify universalism with absolutism, they are not using "absolutism" the way I do. This objection is addressed in Section VII, part H.
124. Five examples: POJMAN, supra note 4, at 47; RESCHER, supra note 48, at 164; SINGER, supra note 48, at 123-33; FRIEDRICH PAULSEN, A SYSTEM OF ETHICS 233-35, 360-63 (Frank Thilly trans., 1899); KWASI WIREDU, CULTURAL UNIVERSALS AND PARTICULARS: AN AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE 65-66 (1996). See also STACE, supra note 4, at 193-94; TAYLOR, supra note 4, at 26-29; SMITH, supra note 42, at 174. An objection may come to mind here: namely, that when relativists identify universalism with absolutism, they are not using "absolutism" the way I do. This objection is addressed in Section VII, part H.
125. This article uses utilitarianism (act utilitarianism) and liberalism, both of which are forms of universalism, to illustrate various points. This is because both views are plausible and familiar. Whether they are true is an independent issue, an issue on which the general points of this essay do not hinge. For an illustration of this claim, see infra note 66 and accompanying text.
126. See HERSKOVITS, supra note 6, at 14; BENEDICT, supra note 6, at 278.
127. Some will contend that (1) is not plausible, that mercy killing is always wrong. We need not dispute their point. If it is true, the nomad argument fails owing to a false premise. If it is not true, the nomad argument fails for reasons stated below.
128. For discussions, summaries, and pieces of this evidence, see the following authors and the many others they cite: BRANDT, supra note 4, at 285-88; W.H. Davis, Cultural Relativity in Ethics, 9 S. HUMAN. REV. 51 (1975); Frances V. Harbour, Basic Moral Values: A Shared Core, 9 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 155 (1995). Also relevant are WIREDU, supra note 50, ch. 6; and 1 WILLIAM EDWARD HARTPOLE LECKY, HISTORY OF EUROPEAN MORALS FROM AUGUSTUS TO CHARLEMAGNE 91-110 (George Braziller 1955) (1869).
129. For discussions, summaries, and pieces of this evidence, see the following authors and the many others they cite: BRANDT, supra note 4, at 285-88; W.H. Davis, Cultural Relativity in Ethics, 9 S. HUMAN. REV. 51 (1975); Frances V. Harbour, Basic Moral Values: A Shared Core, 9 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 155 (1995). Also relevant are WIREDU, supra note 50, ch. 6; and 1 WILLIAM EDWARD HARTPOLE LECKY, HISTORY OF EUROPEAN MORALS FROM AUGUSTUS TO CHARLEMAGNE 91-110 (George Braziller 1955) (1869).
130. For discussions, summaries, and pieces of this evidence, see the following authors and the many others they cite: BRANDT, supra note 4, at 285-88; W.H. Davis, Cultural Relativity in Ethics, 9 S. HUMAN. REV. 51 (1975); Frances V. Harbour, Basic Moral Values: A Shared Core, 9 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 155 (1995). Also relevant are WIREDU, supra note 50, ch. 6; and 1 WILLIAM EDWARD HARTPOLE LECKY, HISTORY OF EUROPEAN MORALS FROM AUGUSTUS TO CHARLEMAGNE 91-110 (George Braziller 1955) (1869).
131. Also, relativists have no business asking the first question, for their thesis asserts that some moral judgments are valid.
132. We should expect this for other reasons as well. For pertinent and useful remarks, see STACE, supra note 4, ch. 10; LECKY, supra note 54; MORRIS GINSBERG, ON THE DIVERSITY OF MORALS 101-10 (1956); Ronald D. Milo, Moral Deadlock, 61 PHIL. 453 (1986); Judith Jarvis Thomson, The No Reason Thesis, in FOUNDATIONS OF MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 1, 15-18 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1990).
133. We should expect this for other reasons as well. For pertinent and useful remarks, see STACE, supra note 4, ch. 10; LECKY, supra note 54; MORRIS GINSBERG, ON THE DIVERSITY OF MORALS 101-10 (1956); Ronald D. Milo, Moral Deadlock, 61 PHIL. 453 (1986); Judith Jarvis Thomson, The No Reason Thesis, in FOUNDATIONS OF MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 1, 15-18 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1990).
134. We should expect this for other reasons as well. For pertinent and useful remarks, see STACE, supra note 4, ch. 10; LECKY, supra note 54; MORRIS GINSBERG, ON THE DIVERSITY OF MORALS 101-10 (1956); Ronald D. Milo, Moral Deadlock, 61 PHIL. 453 (1986); Judith Jarvis Thomson, The No Reason Thesis, in FOUNDATIONS OF MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 1, 15-18 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1990).
135. Assuming, that is, that it is possible for different people to accept different ones. See the next paragraph in the text.
136. For more on this point, which to my knowledge no relativist has adequately addressed, see STOUT, supra note 4, at 19-21; RESCHER, supra note 48, ch. 9; Martin E. Lean, Aren't Moral Judgments "Factual"?, 51 PERSONALIST § 4 (1970); David Cooper, Moral Relativism, 3 MIDWEST STUD. IN PHIL. 97 (1978); J.L.A. Garcia, Relativism and Moral Divergence, 19 METAPHIL. 264, 275-80 (1988).
137. For more on this point, which to my knowledge no relativist has adequately addressed, see STOUT, supra note 4, at 19-21; RESCHER, supra note 48, ch. 9; Martin E. Lean, Aren't Moral Judgments "Factual"?, 51 PERSONALIST § 4 (1970); David Cooper, Moral Relativism, 3 MIDWEST STUD. IN PHIL. 97 (1978); J.L.A. Garcia, Relativism and Moral Divergence, 19 METAPHIL. 264, 275-80 (1988).
138. For more on this point, which to my knowledge no relativist has adequately addressed, see STOUT, supra note 4, at 19-21; RESCHER, supra note 48, ch. 9; Martin E. Lean, Aren't Moral Judgments "Factual"?, 51 PERSONALIST § 4 (1970); David Cooper, Moral Relativism, 3 MIDWEST STUD. IN PHIL. 97 (1978); J.L.A. Garcia, Relativism and Moral Divergence, 19 METAPHIL. 264, 275-80 (1988).
139. Some people assume that total relativism has been established by the individual or combined work of various "postmodern" thinkers - e.g., Stanley Fish, Jacques Derrida, and Richard Rorty. This assumption is made by JUNG MIN CHOI & JOHN W. MURPHY, THE POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY OF POLITICAL CORRECTNESS (1992). These authors accept total relativism but never state it clearly. For a brief but sound criticism of their endorsement and use of that thesis, a criticism that applies to many other postmodernists, see Francis J. Beckwith, A Critique of Political Correctness, in PHILOSOPHY: THE QUEST FOR TRUTH 582 (Louis P. Pojman ed., 3d ed. 1996). Three other brief but forceful works on this topic are: Richard D. Mohr, The Perils of Postmodernism, 2 HARV. GAY & LESBIAN REV. 9 (1995); Thomas Nagel, The Sleep of Reason, NEW REPUBLIC, 12 Oct. 1998, at 32; Margarita Rosa Levin, A Defense of Objectivity, in THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE: CLASSICAL & CONTEMPORARY READINGS 631 (Louis P. Pojman ed., 2d ed. 1999).
140. Some people assume that total relativism has been established by the individual or combined work of various "postmodern" thinkers - e.g., Stanley Fish, Jacques Derrida, and Richard Rorty. This assumption is made by JUNG MIN CHOI & JOHN W. MURPHY, THE POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY OF POLITICAL CORRECTNESS (1992). These authors accept total relativism but never state it clearly. For a brief but sound criticism of their endorsement and use of that thesis, a criticism that applies to many other postmodernists, see Francis J. Beckwith, A Critique of Political Correctness, in PHILOSOPHY: THE QUEST FOR TRUTH 582 (Louis P. Pojman ed., 3d ed. 1996). Three other brief but forceful works on this topic are: Richard D. Mohr, The Perils of Postmodernism, 2 HARV. GAY & LESBIAN REV. 9 (1995); Thomas Nagel, The Sleep of Reason, NEW REPUBLIC, 12 Oct. 1998, at 32; Margarita Rosa Levin, A Defense of Objectivity, in THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE: CLASSICAL & CONTEMPORARY READINGS 631 (Louis P. Pojman ed., 2d ed. 1999).
141. Some people assume that total relativism has been established by the individual or combined work of various "postmodern" thinkers - e.g., Stanley Fish, Jacques Derrida, and Richard Rorty. This assumption is made by JUNG MIN CHOI & JOHN W. MURPHY, THE POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY OF POLITICAL CORRECTNESS (1992). These authors accept total relativism but never state it clearly. For a brief but sound criticism of their endorsement and use of that thesis, a criticism that applies to many other postmodernists, see Francis J. Beckwith, A Critique of Political Correctness, in PHILOSOPHY: THE QUEST FOR TRUTH 582 (Louis P. Pojman ed., 3d ed. 1996). Three other brief but forceful works on this topic are: Richard D. Mohr, The Perils of Postmodernism, 2 HARV. GAY & LESBIAN REV. 9 (1995); Thomas Nagel, The Sleep of Reason, NEW REPUBLIC, 12 Oct. 1998, at 32; Margarita Rosa Levin, A Defense of Objectivity, in THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE: CLASSICAL & CONTEMPORARY READINGS 631 (Louis P. Pojman ed., 2d ed. 1999).
142. Some people assume that total relativism has been established by the individual or combined work of various "postmodern" thinkers - e.g., Stanley Fish, Jacques Derrida, and Richard Rorty. This assumption is made by JUNG MIN CHOI & JOHN W. MURPHY, THE POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY OF POLITICAL CORRECTNESS (1992). These authors accept total relativism but never state it clearly. For a brief but sound criticism of their endorsement and use of that thesis, a criticism that applies to many other postmodernists, see Francis J. Beckwith, A Critique of Political Correctness, in PHILOSOPHY: THE QUEST FOR TRUTH 582 (Louis P. Pojman ed., 3d ed. 1996). Three other brief but forceful works on this topic are: Richard D. Mohr, The Perils of Postmodernism, 2 HARV. GAY & LESBIAN REV. 9 (1995); Thomas Nagel, The Sleep of Reason, NEW REPUBLIC, 12 Oct. 1998, at 32; Margarita Rosa Levin, A Defense of Objectivity, in THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE: CLASSICAL & CONTEMPORARY READINGS 631 (Louis P. Pojman ed., 2d ed. 1999).
143. Some people assume that total relativism has been established by the individual or combined work of various "postmodern" thinkers - e.g., Stanley Fish, Jacques Derrida, and Richard Rorty. This assumption is made by JUNG MIN CHOI & JOHN W. MURPHY, THE POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY OF POLITICAL CORRECTNESS (1992). These authors accept total relativism but never state it clearly. For a brief but sound criticism of their endorsement and use of that thesis, a criticism that applies to many other postmodernists, see Francis J. Beckwith, A Critique of Political Correctness, in PHILOSOPHY: THE QUEST FOR TRUTH 582 (Louis P. Pojman ed., 3d ed. 1996). Three other brief but forceful works on this topic are: Richard D. Mohr, The Perils of Postmodernism, 2 HARV. GAY & LESBIAN REV. 9 (1995); Thomas Nagel, The Sleep of Reason, NEW REPUBLIC, 12 Oct. 1998, at 32; Margarita Rosa Levin, A Defense of Objectivity, in THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE: CLASSICAL & CONTEMPORARY READINGS 631 (Louis P. Pojman ed., 2d ed. 1999).
144. See PLATO, Theaetetus, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO, supra note 42, 170a-171c, at 875-77. For recent discussions, see HARVEY SIEGEL, RELATIVISM REFUTED (1987); JAMES F. HARRIS, AGAINST RELATIVISM (1992); John Preston, On Some Objections to Relativism, 5 RATIO JURIS 57 (1992); Harold Zellner, Is Relativism Self-Defeating?, 20 J. PHIL. RES. 287 (1995).
145. See PLATO, Theaetetus, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO, supra note 42, 170a-171c, at 875-77. For recent discussions, see HARVEY SIEGEL, RELATIVISM REFUTED (1987); JAMES F. HARRIS, AGAINST RELATIVISM (1992); John Preston, On Some Objections to Relativism, 5 RATIO JURIS 57 (1992); Harold Zellner, Is Relativism Self-Defeating?, 20 J. PHIL. RES. 287 (1995).
146. See PLATO, Theaetetus, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO, supra note 42, 170a-171c, at 875-77. For recent discussions, see HARVEY SIEGEL, RELATIVISM REFUTED (1987); JAMES F. HARRIS, AGAINST RELATIVISM (1992); John Preston, On Some Objections to Relativism, 5 RATIO JURIS 57 (1992); Harold Zellner, Is Relativism Self-Defeating?, 20 J. PHIL. RES. 287 (1995).
147. See PLATO, Theaetetus, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO, supra note 42, 170a-171c, at 875-77. For recent discussions, see HARVEY SIEGEL, RELATIVISM REFUTED (1987); JAMES F. HARRIS, AGAINST RELATIVISM (1992); John Preston, On Some Objections to Relativism, 5 RATIO JURIS 57 (1992); Harold Zellner, Is Relativism Self-Defeating?, 20 J. PHIL. RES. 287 (1995).
148. See PLATO, Theaetetus, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO, supra note 42, 170a-171c, at 875-77. For recent discussions, see HARVEY SIEGEL, RELATIVISM REFUTED (1987); JAMES F. HARRIS, AGAINST RELATIVISM (1992); John Preston, On Some Objections to Relativism, 5 RATIO JURIS 57 (1992); Harold Zellner, Is Relativism Self-Defeating?, 20 J. PHIL. RES. 287 (1995).
149. Nor will it do to exempt total relativism from what it says about other judgments. If one judgment is exempt from it, perhaps many are, including many moral ones.
150. BENEDICT, supra note 6, at 126. I am not saying (nor denying) that Benedict thinks certainty is attainable. Confidence and certainty are two different things. See infra note 64.
151. Benedict does some confident moralizing in BENEDICT, supra note 6, at 32, 37, 247-50.
152. Two such accounts are mentioned in note 46. The claim that confidence is at home with nonfoundationalism will seem paradoxical if we conflate confidence with philosophical certainly. The greatest confidence we can have in a belief is the confidence produced, or rather constituted by, the absence of sincere doubt. The absence of such doubt requires no certainty of the kind foundationalism deems possible. An excellent source on this subject is 1 CHARLES S. PEIRCE, THE ESSENTIAL PEIRCE: SELECTED PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS (Nathan Houser & Christian Kloesel eds., 1992) (see especially essay 7: The Fixation of Belief). Included in this volume is Peirce's 1868 article, Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man. This is a classic critique of foundationalism.
153. Two such accounts are mentioned in note 46. The claim that confidence is at home with nonfoundationalism will seem paradoxical if we conflate confidence with philosophical certainly. The greatest confidence we can have in a belief is the confidence produced, or rather constituted by, the absence of sincere doubt. The absence of such doubt requires no certainty of the kind foundationalism deems possible. An excellent source on this subject is 1 CHARLES S. PEIRCE, THE ESSENTIAL PEIRCE: SELECTED PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS (Nathan Houser & Christian Kloesel eds., 1992) (see especially essay 7: The Fixation of Belief). Included in this volume is Peirce's 1868 article, Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man. This is a classic critique of foundationalism.
154. Two such accounts are mentioned in note 46. The claim that confidence is at home with nonfoundationalism will seem paradoxical if we conflate confidence with philosophical certainly. The greatest confidence we can have in a belief is the confidence produced, or rather constituted by, the absence of sincere doubt. The absence of such doubt requires no certainty of the kind foundationalism deems possible. An excellent source on this subject is 1 CHARLES S. PEIRCE, THE ESSENTIAL PEIRCE: SELECTED PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS (Nathan Houser & Christian Kloesel eds., 1992) (see especially essay 7: The Fixation of Belief). Included in this volume is Peirce's 1868 article, Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man. This is a classic critique of foundationalism.
155. For the kind of confusion that gives rise to the empirical outlook argument, see CHOI & MURPHY, supra note 59, at 41-42.
156. Nor does it refute most other versions of universalism, e.g., those proposed by Nussbaum, supra note 3, at 212-46; POJMAN, supra note 4, ch. 3; STACE, supra note 4, ch. 7; HATCH, supra note 7, ch. 7; RESCHER, supra note 48, chs. 9-10; SINGER, supra note 48, chs. 1-5.
157. Whether respecting cultural integrity involves condoning all that is customary within a culture is another question. And whether disapproving of a custom requires interfering with it is still another question. Discussion of these issues becomes muddled if they are not distinguished, and even more muddled if we mistakenly think that the injunction to respect cultural integrity requires cultural relativism for its support. Not only does the injunction to respect cultural integrity stand in no need of relativism, it finds relativism a troublesome bedfellow. According to cultural relativism, the judgment "showing respect for cultural integrity is morally right" is not valid for all cultures.
158. For more on how universalism makes room for pluralism, see Nussbaum, supra note 3, at 224-25; Perry, supra note 4, at 471-75; HATCH, supra note 7, ch. 7; WIREDU, supra note 50, chs. 3, 6.
159. SUMNER, supra note 7, § 232; BENEDICT, supra note 6, at 2-3; HERSKOVITS, supra note 6, at 15-20, 56, 58, 84-85.
160. Suppose, for instance, that a thesis counts as biased if questions, interests, or assumptions shared by only some of the world's cultures contributed to its genesis. Then no doubt is cast on the thesis by showing it to be biased. The Pythagorean theorem is biased in this sense, but it's not implausible on that account.
161. Renteln seems to advocate this strategy. See RENTELN, supra note 3, at 69, 71, 74-76.
162. On this topic, Elvin Hatch is illuminating. See HATCH, supra note 7, chs. 2-3. See especially id. at 50. See also Bidney, supra note 21, §§ 5-6; CARL N. DEGLER, IN SEARCH OF HUMAN NATURE chs. 3, 8 (1991).
163. For another angle on the confusion in the naiveté argument, see Beckwith, supra note 59, at 587.
164. I discuss this argument more fully, along with some empirical research that may seem, but in fact fails, to buttress it, in John J. Tilley, Moral Arguments for Cultural Relativism, 17 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 36 (1999).
165. See, e.g., DOWNS, supra note 6; BENEDICT, supra note 6, at 37, 278; HERSKOVITS, supra note 6, at 15, 33, 93-94, 101; LEACH, supra note 7, ch. 4.
166. Nor is this a matter of blind faith. Plausible arguments for universalism are easier to produce than relativists suppose. (What is not so easy to produce are plausible arguments for theories that propose a simple, universal algorithm for moral decisions. Relativists often confuse the arguments for such algorithms with arguments for universalism.) For a brief one, see WIREDU, supra note 50, at 29. For more elaborate ones in the same spirit, see WHITE, supra note 4, chs. 4-5; RESCHER, supra note 48, ch. 9; G.J. WARNOCK, THE OBJECT OF MORALITY (1971).
167. Renteln takes care to avoid the mistake discussed here. See RENTELN, supra note 3, ch. 3.
168. This is emphasized in RENTELN, supra note 3, at 73-74.