Cultural relativism, universalism, and the burden of proof

Millenium

Volumn 27, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 275-297

  Tilley, John J ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 9744234110     PISSN: 03058298     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/03058298980270020601     Document Type: Article

References (102)

1. I say 'roughly put' because the terms 'valid' and 'all cultures' could stand clarification. I will leave the first term undefined, for two reasons. First, I have explicated it elsewhere (in 'Cultural Relativism', as yet unpublished). Second, it is similar enough to 'true' that the reader can substitute that term for it without affecting the results of this paper. The second term, 'all cultures', presents us with a choice. We can read it either as a reference to all actual cultures, or as a reference not only to all actual cultures, but to all cultures that are genuine possibilities on this earth (cultures we can imagine without, say, suspending what we know about the biological nature of humans or about the material conditions on our planet). I favour the second option because 1 think it superior to the first in making the definition of cultural relativism true to the intentions of cultural relativists. But we need not settle the matter here; the results of this paper do not hinge on it. The classic sources for cultural relativism are William Graham Sumner, Folkways (Boston, MA: Ginn, 1906); Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1934); Ruth Benedict, 'Anthropology and the Abnormal', Journal of General Psychology (Vol. 10, No. 2, 1934), pp. 59-82; Melville J. Herskovits, Man and His Works (New York, NY: Knopf, 1948); and Melville J. Herskovits, Cultural Relativism: Perspectives in Cultural Pluralism (New York, NY: Vintage, 1973). A useful history of cultural relativism is Elvin Hatch, Culture and Morality: The Relativity of Values in Anthropology (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1983).
2. I say 'roughly put' because the terms 'valid' and 'all cultures' could stand clarification. I will leave the first term undefined, for two reasons. First, I have explicated it elsewhere (in 'Cultural Relativism', as yet unpublished). Second, it is similar enough to 'true' that the reader can substitute that term for it without affecting the results of this paper. The second term, 'all cultures', presents us with a choice. We can read it either as a reference to all actual cultures, or as a reference not only to all actual cultures, but to all cultures that are genuine possibilities on this earth (cultures we can imagine without, say, suspending what we know about the biological nature of humans or about the material conditions on our planet). I favour the second option because 1 think it superior to the first in making the definition of cultural relativism true to the intentions of cultural relativists. But we need not settle the matter here; the results of this paper do not hinge on it. The classic sources for cultural relativism are William Graham Sumner, Folkways (Boston, MA: Ginn, 1906); Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1934); Ruth Benedict, 'Anthropology and the Abnormal', Journal of General Psychology (Vol. 10, No. 2, 1934), pp. 59-82; Melville J. Herskovits, Man and His Works (New York, NY: Knopf, 1948); and Melville J. Herskovits, Cultural Relativism: Perspectives in Cultural Pluralism (New York, NY: Vintage, 1973). A useful history of cultural relativism is Elvin Hatch, Culture and Morality: The Relativity of Values in Anthropology (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1983).
3. I say 'roughly put' because the terms 'valid' and 'all cultures' could stand clarification. I will leave the first term undefined, for two reasons. First, I have explicated it elsewhere (in 'Cultural Relativism', as yet unpublished). Second, it is similar enough to 'true' that the reader can substitute that term for it without affecting the results of this paper. The second term, 'all cultures', presents us with a choice. We can read it either as a reference to all actual cultures, or as a reference not only to all actual cultures, but to all cultures that are genuine possibilities on this earth (cultures we can imagine without, say, suspending what we know about the biological nature of humans or about the material conditions on our planet). I favour the second option because 1 think it superior to the first in making the definition of cultural relativism true to the intentions of cultural relativists. But we need not settle the matter here; the results of this paper do not hinge on it. The classic sources for cultural relativism are William Graham Sumner, Folkways (Boston, MA: Ginn, 1906); Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1934); Ruth Benedict, 'Anthropology and the Abnormal', Journal of General Psychology (Vol. 10, No. 2, 1934), pp. 59-82; Melville J. Herskovits, Man and His Works (New York, NY: Knopf, 1948); and Melville J. Herskovits, Cultural Relativism: Perspectives in Cultural Pluralism (New York, NY: Vintage, 1973). A useful history of cultural relativism is Elvin Hatch, Culture and Morality: The Relativity of Values in Anthropology (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1983).
4. I say 'roughly put' because the terms 'valid' and 'all cultures' could stand clarification. I will leave the first term undefined, for two reasons. First, I have explicated it elsewhere (in 'Cultural Relativism', as yet unpublished). Second, it is similar enough to 'true' that the reader can substitute that term for it without affecting the results of this paper. The second term, 'all cultures', presents us with a choice. We can read it either as a reference to all actual cultures, or as a reference not only to all actual cultures, but to all cultures that are genuine possibilities on this earth (cultures we can imagine without, say, suspending what we know about the biological nature of humans or about the material conditions on our planet). I favour the second option because 1 think it superior to the first in making the definition of cultural relativism true to the intentions of cultural relativists. But we need not settle the matter here; the results of this paper do not hinge on it. The classic sources for cultural relativism are William Graham Sumner, Folkways (Boston, MA: Ginn, 1906); Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1934); Ruth Benedict, 'Anthropology and the Abnormal', Journal of General Psychology (Vol. 10, No. 2, 1934), pp. 59-82; Melville J. Herskovits, Man and His Works (New York, NY: Knopf, 1948); and Melville J. Herskovits, Cultural Relativism: Perspectives in Cultural Pluralism (New York, NY: Vintage, 1973). A useful history of cultural relativism is Elvin Hatch, Culture and Morality: The Relativity of Values in Anthropology (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1983).
5. I say 'roughly put' because the terms 'valid' and 'all cultures' could stand clarification. I will leave the first term undefined, for two reasons. First, I have explicated it elsewhere (in 'Cultural Relativism', as yet unpublished). Second, it is similar enough to 'true' that the reader can substitute that term for it without affecting the results of this paper. The second term, 'all cultures', presents us with a choice. We can read it either as a reference to all actual cultures, or as a reference not only to all actual cultures, but to all cultures that are genuine possibilities on this earth (cultures we can imagine without, say, suspending what we know about the biological nature of humans or about the material conditions on our planet). I favour the second option because 1 think it superior to the first in making the definition of cultural relativism true to the intentions of cultural relativists. But we need not settle the matter here; the results of this paper do not hinge on it. The classic sources for cultural relativism are William Graham Sumner, Folkways (Boston, MA: Ginn, 1906); Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1934); Ruth Benedict, 'Anthropology and the Abnormal', Journal of General Psychology (Vol. 10, No. 2, 1934), pp. 59-82; Melville J. Herskovits, Man and His Works (New York, NY: Knopf, 1948); and Melville J. Herskovits, Cultural Relativism: Perspectives in Cultural Pluralism (New York, NY: Vintage, 1973). A useful history of cultural relativism is Elvin Hatch, Culture and Morality: The Relativity of Values in Anthropology (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1983).
6. I say 'roughly put' because the terms 'valid' and 'all cultures' could stand clarification. I will leave the first term undefined, for two reasons. First, I have explicated it elsewhere (in 'Cultural Relativism', as yet unpublished). Second, it is similar enough to 'true' that the reader can substitute that term for it without affecting the results of this paper. The second term, 'all cultures', presents us with a choice. We can read it either as a reference to all actual cultures, or as a reference not only to all actual cultures, but to all cultures that are genuine possibilities on this earth (cultures we can imagine without, say, suspending what we know about the biological nature of humans or about the material conditions on our planet). I favour the second option because 1 think it superior to the first in making the definition of cultural relativism true to the intentions of cultural relativists. But we need not settle the matter here; the results of this paper do not hinge on it. The classic sources for cultural relativism are William Graham Sumner, Folkways (Boston, MA: Ginn, 1906); Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1934); Ruth Benedict, 'Anthropology and the Abnormal', Journal of General Psychology (Vol. 10, No. 2, 1934), pp. 59-82; Melville J. Herskovits, Man and His Works (New York, NY: Knopf, 1948); and Melville J. Herskovits, Cultural Relativism: Perspectives in Cultural Pluralism (New York, NY: Vintage, 1973). A useful history of cultural relativism is Elvin Hatch, Culture and Morality: The Relativity of Values in Anthropology (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1983).
7. See, for example, Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989); Alison Dundes Renteln, International Human Rights: Universalism versus Relativism (London: Sage, 1990); Rhoda E. Howard, 'Cultural Absolutism and the Nostalgia for Community', Human Rights Quarterly (Vol. 15, No. 2, 1993), pp. 315-38; Ray Kiely, Third Worldist Relativism: A New Form of Imperialism', Journal of Contemporary Asia (Vol. 25, No. 2, 1995), pp. 159-78; Donald J. Puchala, 'The Ethics of Globalism', Reports and Papers (No. 3, 1995), http://cgi-user.brown.edu/Departments/ACUNS/NEW_publicalions/95_Holmes_Lecture. html; and Anne F. Bayefsky, 'Cultural Sovereignty, Relativism, and International Human Rights: New Excuses for Old Strategies', Ratio Juris (Vol. 9, No. 1, 1996), pp. 42-59. See also the Journal of Anthropological Research (Vol. 53, No. 3, 1997), which is devoted entirely to cultural relativism and international human rights.
8. See, for example, Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989); Alison Dundes Renteln, International Human Rights: Universalism versus Relativism (London: Sage, 1990); Rhoda E. Howard, 'Cultural Absolutism and the Nostalgia for Community', Human Rights Quarterly (Vol. 15, No. 2, 1993), pp. 315-38; Ray Kiely, Third Worldist Relativism: A New Form of Imperialism', Journal of Contemporary Asia (Vol. 25, No. 2, 1995), pp. 159-78; Donald J. Puchala, 'The Ethics of Globalism', Reports and Papers (No. 3, 1995), http://cgi-user.brown.edu/Departments/ACUNS/NEW_publicalions/95_Holmes_Lecture. html; and Anne F. Bayefsky, 'Cultural Sovereignty, Relativism, and International Human Rights: New Excuses for Old Strategies', Ratio Juris (Vol. 9, No. 1, 1996), pp. 42-59. See also the Journal of Anthropological Research (Vol. 53, No. 3, 1997), which is devoted entirely to cultural relativism and international human rights.
9. See, for example, Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989); Alison Dundes Renteln, International Human Rights: Universalism versus Relativism (London: Sage, 1990); Rhoda E. Howard, 'Cultural Absolutism and the Nostalgia for Community', Human Rights Quarterly (Vol. 15, No. 2, 1993), pp. 315-38; Ray Kiely, Third Worldist Relativism: A New Form of Imperialism', Journal of Contemporary Asia (Vol. 25, No. 2, 1995), pp. 159-78; Donald J. Puchala, 'The Ethics of Globalism', Reports and Papers (No. 3, 1995), http://cgi-user.brown.edu/Departments/ACUNS/NEW_publicalions/95_Holmes_Lecture. html; and Anne F. Bayefsky, 'Cultural Sovereignty, Relativism, and International Human Rights: New Excuses for Old Strategies', Ratio Juris (Vol. 9, No. 1, 1996), pp. 42-59. See also the Journal of Anthropological Research (Vol. 53, No. 3, 1997), which is devoted entirely to cultural relativism and international human rights.
10. See, for example, Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989); Alison Dundes Renteln, International Human Rights: Universalism versus Relativism (London: Sage, 1990); Rhoda E. Howard, 'Cultural Absolutism and the Nostalgia for Community', Human Rights Quarterly (Vol. 15, No. 2, 1993), pp. 315-38; Ray Kiely, Third Worldist Relativism: A New Form of Imperialism', Journal of Contemporary Asia (Vol. 25, No. 2, 1995), pp. 159-78; Donald J. Puchala, 'The Ethics of Globalism', Reports and Papers (No. 3, 1995), http://cgi-user.brown.edu/Departments/ACUNS/NEW_publicalions/95_Holmes_Lecture. html; and Anne F. Bayefsky, 'Cultural Sovereignty, Relativism, and International Human Rights: New Excuses for Old Strategies', Ratio Juris (Vol. 9, No. 1, 1996), pp. 42-59. See also the Journal of Anthropological Research (Vol. 53, No. 3, 1997), which is devoted entirely to cultural relativism and international human rights.
11. See, for example, Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989); Alison Dundes Renteln, International Human Rights: Universalism versus Relativism (London: Sage, 1990); Rhoda E. Howard, 'Cultural Absolutism and the Nostalgia for Community', Human Rights Quarterly (Vol. 15, No. 2, 1993), pp. 315-38; Ray Kiely, Third Worldist Relativism: A New Form of Imperialism', Journal of Contemporary Asia (Vol. 25, No. 2, 1995), pp. 159-78; Donald J. Puchala, 'The Ethics of Globalism', Reports and Papers (No. 3, 1995), http://cgi-user.brown.edu/Departments/ACUNS/NEW_publicalions/95_Holmes_Lecture. html; and Anne F. Bayefsky, 'Cultural Sovereignty, Relativism, and International Human Rights: New Excuses for Old Strategies', Ratio Juris (Vol. 9, No. 1, 1996), pp. 42-59. See also the Journal of Anthropological Research (Vol. 53, No. 3, 1997), which is devoted entirely to cultural relativism and international human rights.
12. See, for example, Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989); Alison Dundes Renteln, International Human Rights: Universalism versus Relativism (London: Sage, 1990); Rhoda E. Howard, 'Cultural Absolutism and the Nostalgia for Community', Human Rights Quarterly (Vol. 15, No. 2, 1993), pp. 315-38; Ray Kiely, Third Worldist Relativism: A New Form of Imperialism', Journal of Contemporary Asia (Vol. 25, No. 2, 1995), pp. 159-78; Donald J. Puchala, 'The Ethics of Globalism', Reports and Papers (No. 3, 1995), http://cgi-user.brown.edu/Departments/ACUNS/NEW_publicalions/95_Holmes_Lecture. html; and Anne F. Bayefsky, 'Cultural Sovereignty, Relativism, and International Human Rights: New Excuses for Old Strategies', Ratio Juris (Vol. 9, No. 1, 1996), pp. 42-59. See also the Journal of Anthropological Research (Vol. 53, No. 3, 1997), which is devoted entirely to cultural relativism and international human rights.
13. See, for example, Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989); Alison Dundes Renteln, International Human Rights: Universalism versus Relativism (London: Sage, 1990); Rhoda E. Howard, 'Cultural Absolutism and the Nostalgia for Community', Human Rights Quarterly (Vol. 15, No. 2, 1993), pp. 315-38; Ray Kiely, Third Worldist Relativism: A New Form of Imperialism', Journal of Contemporary Asia (Vol. 25, No. 2, 1995), pp. 159-78; Donald J. Puchala, 'The Ethics of Globalism', Reports and Papers (No. 3, 1995), http://cgi-user.brown.edu/Departments/ACUNS/NEW_publicalions/95_Holmes_Lecture. html; and Anne F. Bayefsky, 'Cultural Sovereignty, Relativism, and International Human Rights: New Excuses for Old Strategies', Ratio Juris (Vol. 9, No. 1, 1996), pp. 42-59. See also the Journal of Anthropological Research (Vol. 53, No. 3, 1997), which is devoted entirely to cultural relativism and international human rights.
14. Actually, what was used was a collection of ideas for which the word 'relativism' is a common and indiscriminate label. One of those ideas, in most cases operating implicitly rather than explicitly, was the moral theory with which this paper is concerned. It operated unsuccessfully in that the universalism affirmed in the UN Declaration was reaffirmed by the World Conference. See the 'Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (12 July 1993)', UN Doc. A/CONF. 157/23, http://www.unhchr.ch:80/ html/menu5/d/vienna.htm, Part I, §§ 1 and 5. A useful report on the World Conference is Kevin Boyle, 'Stock-taking on Human Rights: The World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna 1993', Political Studies (Vol. 43, Special Issue, 1995), pp. 79-95.
15. Actually, what was used was a collection of ideas for which the word 'relativism' is a common and indiscriminate label. One of those ideas, in most cases operating implicitly rather than explicitly, was the moral theory with which this paper is concerned. It operated unsuccessfully in that the universalism affirmed in the UN Declaration was reaffirmed by the World Conference. See the 'Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (12 July 1993)', UN Doc. A/CONF. 157/23, http://www.unhchr.ch:80/ html/menu5/d/vienna.htm, Part I, §§ 1 and 5. A useful report on the World Conference is Kevin Boyle, 'Stock-taking on Human Rights: The World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna 1993', Political Studies (Vol. 43, Special Issue, 1995), pp. 79-95.
16. This idea underlies Renteln's project (op. cit., in note 2), though she does not state it explicitly (but see pp. 9-15 and 46-51 ). An explicit endorsement of it is in Walter T. Stace, The Concept of Morals (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1937), p. 44-45. (Frankly, Stace should know better than to accept the idea; his book contains plenty of resources for refuting it.) For endorsements of the same or a similar idea, see A. Campbell Garnett, 'Relativism and Absolutism in Ethics', Ethics (Vol. 54, No. 3, 1944), p. 191, col. 2; Terry Nardin, 'The Problem of Relativism in International Ethics', Millennium: Journal of International Studies (Vol. 18, No. 2, 1989), p. 149; Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, 'Relativism: A Lecture', Journal of Social Philosophy (Vol. 25, Special Anniversary Issue, 1994), pp. 181-82; and Elvin Hatch, 'The Good Side of Relativism', Journal of Anthropological Research (Vol. 53, No. 3, 1997), pp. 373-74.
17. This idea underlies Renteln's project (op. cit., in note 2), though she does not state it explicitly (but see pp. 9-15 and 46-51 ). An explicit endorsement of it is in Walter T. Stace, The Concept of Morals (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1937), p. 44-45. (Frankly, Stace should know better than to accept the idea; his book contains plenty of resources for refuting it.) For endorsements of the same or a similar idea, see A. Campbell Garnett, 'Relativism and Absolutism in Ethics', Ethics (Vol. 54, No. 3, 1944), p. 191, col. 2; Terry Nardin, 'The Problem of Relativism in International Ethics', Millennium: Journal of International Studies (Vol. 18, No. 2, 1989), p. 149; Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, 'Relativism: A Lecture', Journal of Social Philosophy (Vol. 25, Special Anniversary Issue, 1994), pp. 181-82; and Elvin Hatch, 'The Good Side of Relativism', Journal of Anthropological Research (Vol. 53, No. 3, 1997), pp. 373-74.
18. This idea underlies Renteln's project (op. cit., in note 2), though she does not state it explicitly (but see pp. 9-15 and 46-51 ). An explicit endorsement of it is in Walter T. Stace, The Concept of Morals (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1937), p. 44-45. (Frankly, Stace should know better than to accept the idea; his book contains plenty of resources for refuting it.) For endorsements of the same or a similar idea, see A. Campbell Garnett, 'Relativism and Absolutism in Ethics', Ethics (Vol. 54, No. 3, 1944), p. 191, col. 2; Terry Nardin, 'The Problem of Relativism in International Ethics', Millennium: Journal of International Studies (Vol. 18, No. 2, 1989), p. 149; Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, 'Relativism: A Lecture', Journal of Social Philosophy (Vol. 25, Special Anniversary Issue, 1994), pp. 181-82; and Elvin Hatch, 'The Good Side of Relativism', Journal of Anthropological Research (Vol. 53, No. 3, 1997), pp. 373-74.
19. This idea underlies Renteln's project (op. cit., in note 2), though she does not state it explicitly (but see pp. 9-15 and 46-51 ). An explicit endorsement of it is in Walter T. Stace, The Concept of Morals (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1937), p. 44-45. (Frankly, Stace should know better than to accept the idea; his book contains plenty of resources for refuting it.) For endorsements of the same or a similar idea, see A. Campbell Garnett, 'Relativism and Absolutism in Ethics', Ethics (Vol. 54, No. 3, 1944), p. 191, col. 2; Terry Nardin, 'The Problem of Relativism in International Ethics', Millennium: Journal of International Studies (Vol. 18, No. 2, 1989), p. 149; Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, 'Relativism: A Lecture', Journal of Social Philosophy (Vol. 25, Special Anniversary Issue, 1994), pp. 181-82; and Elvin Hatch, 'The Good Side of Relativism', Journal of Anthropological Research (Vol. 53, No. 3, 1997), pp. 373-74.
20. This idea underlies Renteln's project (op. cit., in note 2), though she does not state it explicitly (but see pp. 9-15 and 46-51 ). An explicit endorsement of it is in Walter T. Stace, The Concept of Morals (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1937), p. 44-45. (Frankly, Stace should know better than to accept the idea; his book contains plenty of resources for refuting it.) For endorsements of the same or a similar idea, see A. Campbell Garnett, 'Relativism and Absolutism in Ethics', Ethics (Vol. 54, No. 3, 1944), p. 191, col. 2; Terry Nardin, 'The Problem of Relativism in International Ethics', Millennium: Journal of International Studies (Vol. 18, No. 2, 1989), p. 149; Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, 'Relativism: A Lecture', Journal of Social Philosophy (Vol. 25, Special Anniversary Issue, 1994), pp. 181-82; and Elvin Hatch, 'The Good Side of Relativism', Journal of Anthropological Research (Vol. 53, No. 3, 1997), pp. 373-74.
21. A prime example of someone who has many of these views entangled with cultural relativism is James F. Downs. See James F. Downs, Cultures in Crisis, Second Edition (Beverly Hills, CA: Glencoe Press, 1975), Chapter 2. See also Nardin, op. cit., in note 4, pp. 156-58. He seems to think that nonrationalism conflicts with universalism. Nonrationalism indeed conflicts with some forms of universalism - e.g., Kantianism-but that's beside the point. See note 7 and the accompanying text. (A final point: Anyone interested in the general topic of this section would profit from the following article [which, regrettably, appeared too recently to be put to use here]: William Max Knorpp Jr., 'What Relativism Isn't', Philosophy [Vol. 73, No. 284, 1998], pp. 277-300.)
22. A prime example of someone who has many of these views entangled with cultural relativism is James F. Downs. See James F. Downs, Cultures in Crisis, Second Edition (Beverly Hills, CA: Glencoe Press, 1975), Chapter 2. See also Nardin, op. cit., in note 4, pp. 156-58. He seems to think that nonrationalism conflicts with universalism. Nonrationalism indeed conflicts with some forms of universalism - e.g., Kantianism-but that's beside the point. See note 7 and the accompanying text. (A final point: Anyone interested in the general topic of this section would profit from the following article [which, regrettably, appeared too recently to be put to use here]: William Max Knorpp Jr., 'What Relativism Isn't', Philosophy [Vol. 73, No. 284, 1998], pp. 277-300.)
23. This, by the way, is a purely logical point. It does not presuppose a view about which moral principles are valid. The point is simply that acceptance and validity are different properties. The claim that no moral principle is universally accepted neither implies, nor is implied by, the claim that no moral principle is universally valid. (If all this talk about 'validity' is puzzling, see note 1. Note 43 is relevant also.)
24. Indeed, it receives explicit endorsement from many universalists. Examples include Stace, op. cit., in note 4, Chapter 12, especially p. 294; Geoffrey J. Warnock, The Object of Morality (London: Methuen, 1971), pp. 162-66; David A. J. Richards, A Theory of Reasons for Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 281-82; Ronald D. Milo, Immorality (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 210-17; and Bernard Gert, Morality (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 227 and 231.
25. Indeed, it receives explicit endorsement from many universalists. Examples include Stace, op. cit., in note 4, Chapter 12, especially p. 294; Geoffrey J. Warnock, The Object of Morality (London: Methuen, 1971), pp. 162-66; David A. J. Richards, A Theory of Reasons for Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 281-82; Ronald D. Milo, Immorality (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 210-17; and Bernard Gert, Morality (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 227 and 231.
26. Indeed, it receives explicit endorsement from many universalists. Examples include Stace, op. cit., in note 4, Chapter 12, especially p. 294; Geoffrey J. Warnock, The Object of Morality (London: Methuen, 1971), pp. 162-66; David A. J. Richards, A Theory of Reasons for Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 281-82; Ronald D. Milo, Immorality (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 210-17; and Bernard Gert, Morality (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 227 and 231.
27. Indeed, it receives explicit endorsement from many universalists. Examples include Stace, op. cit., in note 4, Chapter 12, especially p. 294; Geoffrey J. Warnock, The Object of Morality (London: Methuen, 1971), pp. 162-66; David A. J. Richards, A Theory of Reasons for Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 281-82; Ronald D. Milo, Immorality (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 210-17; and Bernard Gert, Morality (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 227 and 231.
28. 'But this is only because cultural relativists have forced them to concede it! Were it not for cultural relativists, whose work in this century has amply revealed that what is wrong in one setting is right in others, moral thought would still be hampered by the old-fashioned view that variations in circumstances have no bearing on right and wrong'. This objection, which I sometimes encounter in conversations, is seriously mistaken. Situational relativism has been acknowledged for ages, and has been embraced by moral thinkers of many kinds. Consider the following remarks-by no means unusual-from a nineteenth century moralist who was anything but an ethical relativist: 'The life-rules that grow out of this [the moral] law, among different persons and nations and under different conditions in life, must evidently also be relatively different. The correct shaping of the moral law into life-rules correspondent to the peculiarity of persons and circumstances, constitutes the principle work of practical wisdom....The moral idea, though essentially one, yet shapes itself into a variegated diversity, just as the light of day, though in itself essentially colorless, is reflected back from flowers in a thousand varying tints....The duties that spring from the same law are different for different men and for different circumstances'. Adolf Wuttke, Christian Ethics [1864-65], trans. J. P. Lacroix, Volume 2 (Edinburgh: Clark, 1873), pp. 133-34 and 136, emphasis in original. For further examples of situational relativism, see Cicero, Offices (44 B.C.), trans. T. Cockman (London: Dent & Sons, 1909), Book 1, Chapter 10, and Book 3, Chapters 4 and 6; Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica [1273], I, q. 19, a. 6, ad. 1, and I-II, q. 94, a. 4; Edward Bentham, An Introduction to Moral Philosophy (Bristol: Thoemmes, 1994 [1745]), pp. 27-31; Adam Ferguson, Institutes of Moral Philosophy, Second Edition (New York, NY: Garland, 1978 [1773]), pp. 163-64; Richard Price, A Review of the Principal Questions in Morals, Third Edition, ed. D.D. Raphael (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948 [1787]), pp. 164-65 and 175-76; Dugald Stewart, The Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man, Volume 2 (Boston, MA: Wells and Lilly, 1828), p. 326; and Walter H. Hill, Ethics, Second Edition (Baltimore, MD: John Murphy, 1878), pp. 62-64. Not one of these authors is a moral relativist.
29. 'But this is only because cultural relativists have forced them to concede it! Were it not for cultural relativists, whose work in this century has amply revealed that what is wrong in one setting is right in others, moral thought would still be hampered by the old-fashioned view that variations in circumstances have no bearing on right and wrong'. This objection, which I sometimes encounter in conversations, is seriously mistaken. Situational relativism has been acknowledged for ages, and has been embraced by moral thinkers of many kinds. Consider the following remarks-by no means unusual-from a nineteenth century moralist who was anything but an ethical relativist: 'The life-rules that grow out of this [the moral] law, among different persons and nations and under different conditions in life, must evidently also be relatively different. The correct shaping of the moral law into life-rules correspondent to the peculiarity of persons and circumstances, constitutes the principle work of practical wisdom....The moral idea, though essentially one, yet shapes itself into a variegated diversity, just as the light of day, though in itself essentially colorless, is reflected back from flowers in a thousand varying tints....The duties that spring from the same law are different for different men and for different circumstances'. Adolf Wuttke, Christian Ethics [1864-65], trans. J. P. Lacroix, Volume 2 (Edinburgh: Clark, 1873), pp. 133-34 and 136, emphasis in original. For further examples of situational relativism, see Cicero, Offices (44 B.C.), trans. T. Cockman (London: Dent & Sons, 1909), Book 1, Chapter 10, and Book 3, Chapters 4 and 6; Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica [1273], I, q. 19, a. 6, ad. 1, and I-II, q. 94, a. 4; Edward Bentham, An Introduction to Moral Philosophy (Bristol: Thoemmes, 1994 [1745]), pp. 27-31; Adam Ferguson, Institutes of Moral Philosophy, Second Edition (New York, NY: Garland, 1978 [1773]), pp. 163-64; Richard Price, A Review of the Principal Questions in Morals, Third Edition, ed. D.D. Raphael (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948 [1787]), pp. 164-65 and 175-76; Dugald Stewart, The Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man, Volume 2 (Boston, MA: Wells and Lilly, 1828), p. 326; and Walter H. Hill, Ethics, Second Edition (Baltimore, MD: John Murphy, 1878), pp. 62-64. Not one of these authors is a moral relativist.
30. 'But this is only because cultural relativists have forced them to concede it! Were it not for cultural relativists, whose work in this century has amply revealed that what is wrong in one setting is right in others, moral thought would still be hampered by the old-fashioned view that variations in circumstances have no bearing on right and wrong'. This objection, which I sometimes encounter in conversations, is seriously mistaken. Situational relativism has been acknowledged for ages, and has been embraced by moral thinkers of many kinds. Consider the following remarks-by no means unusual-from a nineteenth century moralist who was anything but an ethical relativist: 'The life-rules that grow out of this [the moral] law, among different persons and nations and under different conditions in life, must evidently also be relatively different. The correct shaping of the moral law into life-rules correspondent to the peculiarity of persons and circumstances, constitutes the principle work of practical wisdom....The moral idea, though essentially one, yet shapes itself into a variegated diversity, just as the light of day, though in itself essentially colorless, is reflected back from flowers in a thousand varying tints....The duties that spring from the same law are different for different men and for different circumstances'. Adolf Wuttke, Christian Ethics [1864-65], trans. J. P. Lacroix, Volume 2 (Edinburgh: Clark, 1873), pp. 133-34 and 136, emphasis in original. For further examples of situational relativism, see Cicero, Offices (44 B.C.), trans. T. Cockman (London: Dent & Sons, 1909), Book 1, Chapter 10, and Book 3, Chapters 4 and 6; Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica [1273], I, q. 19, a. 6, ad. 1, and I-II, q. 94, a. 4; Edward Bentham, An Introduction to Moral Philosophy (Bristol: Thoemmes, 1994 [1745]), pp. 27-31; Adam Ferguson, Institutes of Moral Philosophy, Second Edition (New York, NY: Garland, 1978 [1773]), pp. 163-64; Richard Price, A Review of the Principal Questions in Morals, Third Edition, ed. D.D. Raphael (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948 [1787]), pp. 164-65 and 175-76; Dugald Stewart, The Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man, Volume 2 (Boston, MA: Wells and Lilly, 1828), p. 326; and Walter H. Hill, Ethics, Second Edition (Baltimore, MD: John Murphy, 1878), pp. 62-64. Not one of these authors is a moral relativist.
31. 'But this is only because cultural relativists have forced them to concede it! Were it not for cultural relativists, whose work in this century has amply revealed that what is wrong in one setting is right in others, moral thought would still be hampered by the old-fashioned view that variations in circumstances have no bearing on right and wrong'. This objection, which I sometimes encounter in conversations, is seriously mistaken. Situational relativism has been acknowledged for ages, and has been embraced by moral thinkers of many kinds. Consider the following remarks-by no means unusual-from a nineteenth century moralist who was anything but an ethical relativist: 'The life-rules that grow out of this [the moral] law, among different persons and nations and under different conditions in life, must evidently also be relatively different. The correct shaping of the moral law into life-rules correspondent to the peculiarity of persons and circumstances, constitutes the principle work of practical wisdom....The moral idea, though essentially one, yet shapes itself into a variegated diversity, just as the light of day, though in itself essentially colorless, is reflected back from flowers in a thousand varying tints....The duties that spring from the same law are different for different men and for different circumstances'. Adolf Wuttke, Christian Ethics [1864-65], trans. J. P. Lacroix, Volume 2 (Edinburgh: Clark, 1873), pp. 133-34 and 136, emphasis in original. For further examples of situational relativism, see Cicero, Offices (44 B.C.), trans. T. Cockman (London: Dent & Sons, 1909), Book 1, Chapter 10, and Book 3, Chapters 4 and 6; Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica [1273], I, q. 19, a. 6, ad. 1, and I-II, q. 94, a. 4; Edward Bentham, An Introduction to Moral Philosophy (Bristol: Thoemmes, 1994 [1745]), pp. 27-31; Adam Ferguson, Institutes of Moral Philosophy, Second Edition (New York, NY: Garland, 1978 [1773]), pp. 163-64; Richard Price, A Review of the Principal Questions in Morals, Third Edition, ed. D.D. Raphael (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948 [1787]), pp. 164-65 and 175-76; Dugald Stewart, The Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man, Volume 2 (Boston, MA: Wells and Lilly, 1828), p. 326; and Walter H. Hill, Ethics, Second Edition (Baltimore, MD: John Murphy, 1878), pp. 62-64. Not one of these authors is a moral relativist.
32. 'But this is only because cultural relativists have forced them to concede it! Were it not for cultural relativists, whose work in this century has amply revealed that what is wrong in one setting is right in others, moral thought would still be hampered by the old-fashioned view that variations in circumstances have no bearing on right and wrong'. This objection, which I sometimes encounter in conversations, is seriously mistaken. Situational relativism has been acknowledged for ages, and has been embraced by moral thinkers of many kinds. Consider the following remarks-by no means unusual-from a nineteenth century moralist who was anything but an ethical relativist: 'The life-rules that grow out of this [the moral] law, among different persons and nations and under different conditions in life, must evidently also be relatively different. The correct shaping of the moral law into life-rules correspondent to the peculiarity of persons and circumstances, constitutes the principle work of practical wisdom....The moral idea, though essentially one, yet shapes itself into a variegated diversity, just as the light of day, though in itself essentially colorless, is reflected back from flowers in a thousand varying tints....The duties that spring from the same law are different for different men and for different circumstances'. Adolf Wuttke, Christian Ethics [1864-65], trans. J. P. Lacroix, Volume 2 (Edinburgh: Clark, 1873), pp. 133-34 and 136, emphasis in original. For further examples of situational relativism, see Cicero, Offices (44 B.C.), trans. T. Cockman (London: Dent & Sons, 1909), Book 1, Chapter 10, and Book 3, Chapters 4 and 6; Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica [1273], I, q. 19, a. 6, ad. 1, and I-II, q. 94, a. 4; Edward Bentham, An Introduction to Moral Philosophy (Bristol: Thoemmes, 1994 [1745]), pp. 27-31; Adam Ferguson, Institutes of Moral Philosophy, Second Edition (New York, NY: Garland, 1978 [1773]), pp. 163-64; Richard Price, A Review of the Principal Questions in Morals, Third Edition, ed. D.D. Raphael (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948 [1787]), pp. 164-65 and 175-76; Dugald Stewart, The Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man, Volume 2 (Boston, MA: Wells and Lilly, 1828), p. 326; and Walter H. Hill, Ethics, Second Edition (Baltimore, MD: John Murphy, 1878), pp. 62-64. Not one of these authors is a moral relativist.
33. 'But this is only because cultural relativists have forced them to concede it! Were it not for cultural relativists, whose work in this century has amply revealed that what is wrong in one setting is right in others, moral thought would still be hampered by the old-fashioned view that variations in circumstances have no bearing on right and wrong'. This objection, which I sometimes encounter in conversations, is seriously mistaken. Situational relativism has been acknowledged for ages, and has been embraced by moral thinkers of many kinds. Consider the following remarks-by no means unusual-from a nineteenth century moralist who was anything but an ethical relativist: 'The life-rules that grow out of this [the moral] law, among different persons and nations and under different conditions in life, must evidently also be relatively different. The correct shaping of the moral law into life-rules correspondent to the peculiarity of persons and circumstances, constitutes the principle work of practical wisdom....The moral idea, though essentially one, yet shapes itself into a variegated diversity, just as the light of day, though in itself essentially colorless, is reflected back from flowers in a thousand varying tints....The duties that spring from the same law are different for different men and for different circumstances'. Adolf Wuttke, Christian Ethics [1864-65], trans. J. P. Lacroix, Volume 2 (Edinburgh: Clark, 1873), pp. 133-34 and 136, emphasis in original. For further examples of situational relativism, see Cicero, Offices (44 B.C.), trans. T. Cockman (London: Dent & Sons, 1909), Book 1, Chapter 10, and Book 3, Chapters 4 and 6; Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica [1273], I, q. 19, a. 6, ad. 1, and I-II, q. 94, a. 4; Edward Bentham, An Introduction to Moral Philosophy (Bristol: Thoemmes, 1994 [1745]), pp. 27-31; Adam Ferguson, Institutes of Moral Philosophy, Second Edition (New York, NY: Garland, 1978 [1773]), pp. 163-64; Richard Price, A Review of the Principal Questions in Morals, Third Edition, ed. D.D. Raphael (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948 [1787]), pp. 164-65 and 175-76; Dugald Stewart, The Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man, Volume 2 (Boston, MA: Wells and Lilly, 1828), p. 326; and Walter H. Hill, Ethics, Second Edition (Baltimore, MD: John Murphy, 1878), pp. 62-64. Not one of these authors is a moral relativist.
34. 'But this is only because cultural relativists have forced them to concede it! Were it not for cultural relativists, whose work in this century has amply revealed that what is wrong in one setting is right in others, moral thought would still be hampered by the old-fashioned view that variations in circumstances have no bearing on right and wrong'. This objection, which I sometimes encounter in conversations, is seriously mistaken. Situational relativism has been acknowledged for ages, and has been embraced by moral thinkers of many kinds. Consider the following remarks-by no means unusual-from a nineteenth century moralist who was anything but an ethical relativist: 'The life-rules that grow out of this [the moral] law, among different persons and nations and under different conditions in life, must evidently also be relatively different. The correct shaping of the moral law into life-rules correspondent to the peculiarity of persons and circumstances, constitutes the principle work of practical wisdom....The moral idea, though essentially one, yet shapes itself into a variegated diversity, just as the light of day, though in itself essentially colorless, is reflected back from flowers in a thousand varying tints....The duties that spring from the same law are different for different men and for different circumstances'. Adolf Wuttke, Christian Ethics [1864-65], trans. J. P. Lacroix, Volume 2 (Edinburgh: Clark, 1873), pp. 133-34 and 136, emphasis in original. For further examples of situational relativism, see Cicero, Offices (44 B.C.), trans. T. Cockman (London: Dent & Sons, 1909), Book 1, Chapter 10, and Book 3, Chapters 4 and 6; Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica [1273], I, q. 19, a. 6, ad. 1, and I-II, q. 94, a. 4; Edward Bentham, An Introduction to Moral Philosophy (Bristol: Thoemmes, 1994 [1745]), pp. 27-31; Adam Ferguson, Institutes of Moral Philosophy, Second Edition (New York, NY: Garland, 1978 [1773]), pp. 163-64; Richard Price, A Review of the Principal Questions in Morals, Third Edition, ed. D.D. Raphael (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948 [1787]), pp. 164-65 and 175-76; Dugald Stewart, The Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man, Volume 2 (Boston, MA: Wells and Lilly, 1828), p. 326; and Walter H. Hill, Ethics, Second Edition (Baltimore, MD: John Murphy, 1878), pp. 62-64. Not one of these authors is a moral relativist.
35. 'But this is only because cultural relativists have forced them to concede it! Were it not for cultural relativists, whose work in this century has amply revealed that what is wrong in one setting is right in others, moral thought would still be hampered by the old-fashioned view that variations in circumstances have no bearing on right and wrong'. This objection, which I sometimes encounter in conversations, is seriously mistaken. Situational relativism has been acknowledged for ages, and has been embraced by moral thinkers of many kinds. Consider the following remarks-by no means unusual-from a nineteenth century moralist who was anything but an ethical relativist: 'The life-rules that grow out of this [the moral] law, among different persons and nations and under different conditions in life, must evidently also be relatively different. The correct shaping of the moral law into life-rules correspondent to the peculiarity of persons and circumstances, constitutes the principle work of practical wisdom....The moral idea, though essentially one, yet shapes itself into a variegated diversity, just as the light of day, though in itself essentially colorless, is reflected back from flowers in a thousand varying tints....The duties that spring from the same law are different for different men and for different circumstances'. Adolf Wuttke, Christian Ethics [1864-65], trans. J. P. Lacroix, Volume 2 (Edinburgh: Clark, 1873), pp. 133-34 and 136, emphasis in original. For further examples of situational relativism, see Cicero, Offices (44 B.C.), trans. T. Cockman (London: Dent & Sons, 1909), Book 1, Chapter 10, and Book 3, Chapters 4 and 6; Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica [1273], I, q. 19, a. 6, ad. 1, and I-II, q. 94, a. 4; Edward Bentham, An Introduction to Moral Philosophy (Bristol: Thoemmes, 1994 [1745]), pp. 27-31; Adam Ferguson, Institutes of Moral Philosophy, Second Edition (New York, NY: Garland, 1978 [1773]), pp. 163-64; Richard Price, A Review of the Principal Questions in Morals, Third Edition, ed. D.D. Raphael (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948 [1787]), pp. 164-65 and 175-76; Dugald Stewart, The Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man, Volume 2 (Boston, MA: Wells and Lilly, 1828), p. 326; and Walter H. Hill, Ethics, Second Edition (Baltimore, MD: John Murphy, 1878), pp. 62-64. Not one of these authors is a moral relativist.
36. Lest an objection come to mind here, it is worth jumping ahead to note 35 and its accompanying text. The points made there are indirectly, but not unimportantly, relevant to those made here.
37. Edmund Leach, A Runaway World? (London: British Broadcasting, 1968), p. 54. His endorsement of cultural relativism is on page 48.
38. For further examples of cultural relativists sliding into liberalism, see Downs, op. cit., in note 5, p. 39; Benedict, Patterns of Culture, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 37 and 278; Herskovits, Man and His Works, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 653-55; Herskovits, Cultural Relativism, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 33 and 93-94; and Melville J. Herskovits, 'Statement on Human Rights', American Anthropologist (Vol. 49, No. 4, 1947), p. 543. (The latter document does not hear the name of Herskovits, but the fact that Herskovits drafted it is well known.)
39. For further examples of cultural relativists sliding into liberalism, see Downs, op. cit., in note 5, p. 39; Benedict, Patterns of Culture, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 37 and 278; Herskovits, Man and His Works, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 653-55; Herskovits, Cultural Relativism, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 33 and 93-94; and Melville J. Herskovits, 'Statement on Human Rights', American Anthropologist (Vol. 49, No. 4, 1947), p. 543. (The latter document does not hear the name of Herskovits, but the fact that Herskovits drafted it is well known.)
40. For further examples of cultural relativists sliding into liberalism, see Downs, op. cit., in note 5, p. 39; Benedict, Patterns of Culture, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 37 and 278; Herskovits, Man and His Works, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 653-55; Herskovits, Cultural Relativism, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 33 and 93-94; and Melville J. Herskovits, 'Statement on Human Rights', American Anthropologist (Vol. 49, No. 4, 1947), p. 543. (The latter document does not hear the name of Herskovits, but the fact that Herskovits drafted it is well known.)
41. For further examples of cultural relativists sliding into liberalism, see Downs, op. cit., in note 5, p. 39; Benedict, Patterns of Culture, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 37 and 278; Herskovits, Man and His Works, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 653-55; Herskovits, Cultural Relativism, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 33 and 93-94; and Melville J. Herskovits, 'Statement on Human Rights', American Anthropologist (Vol. 49, No. 4, 1947), p. 543. (The latter document does not hear the name of Herskovits, but the fact that Herskovits drafted it is well known.)
42. Fallibilists who reject relativism are numerous. Two examples are Jeffrey Stout, Ethics After Babel (Boston, MA: Beacon, 1988), and David O. Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). A second point: The footnoted sentence suggests that just as fallibilists can be universalists, nonfallibilists can be cultural relativists. This is indeed the case. Nonfallibilism, or foundationalism, asserts that some beliefs are incorrigible and that others are justified insofar as they are, or can be, reliably derived from the incorrigible ones. This thesis comports with the view that every moral truth tacitly refers to, and in that sense is 'relative to', a specific culture. In short, a moral belief can be founded on incorrigible truths and at the same time be indexed to, or tacitly about, a particular culture. (I think that Sumner and Herskovits can be interpreted along these lines, though it would take some work to show this.) Thus, the debate over fallibilism cannot settle the debate over relativism, and vice versa. We must keep these issues distinct.
43. Fallibilists who reject relativism are numerous. Two examples are Jeffrey Stout, Ethics After Babel (Boston, MA: Beacon, 1988), and David O. Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). A second point: The footnoted sentence suggests that just as fallibilists can be universalists, nonfallibilists can be cultural relativists. This is indeed the case. Nonfallibilism, or foundationalism, asserts that some beliefs are incorrigible and that others are justified insofar as they are, or can be, reliably derived from the incorrigible ones. This thesis comports with the view that every moral truth tacitly refers to, and in that sense is 'relative to', a specific culture. In short, a moral belief can be founded on incorrigible truths and at the same time be indexed to, or tacitly about, a particular culture. (I think that Sumner and Herskovits can be interpreted along these lines, though it would take some work to show this.) Thus, the debate over fallibilism cannot settle the debate over relativism, and vice versa. We must keep these issues distinct.
44. Foundationalism is defined in note 12. Alternatives to it include coherentism and minimal (or fallibilist) foundationalism. Each of these views incorporates fallibilism. Neither entails cultural relativism or anything close to it. Both views are usefully discussed in Robert Audi, The Structure of Justification (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Coherentism is also discussed by Brink, op. cit., in note 12, Chapter 5.
45. See Benedict, Patterns of Culture, op. cit., in note 1, p. 126. I am not saying (nor am I denying) that Benedict thinks certainty is attainable. Confidence and certainty are two different things. See note 16.
46. Benedict does some confident moralising in Benedict, Patterns of Culture, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 32, 37, and 247-50.
47. Two such theories are mentioned in note 13. The claim that confidence is at home with nonfoundationalism will seem paradoxical if we conflate confidence with philosophical certainty. The greatest confidence we can have in a belief is the confidence produced, or rather constituted by, the absence of sincere doubt. The absence of such doubt requires no certainty of the kind foundationalism deems possible. An excellent source on this subject is Charles S. Peirce, The Essential Peirce, ed. N. Houser and C. Kloesel, Volume I (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1992), especially Essay 7, 'The Fixation of Belief'. Included in this volume is Peirce's 1868 article, 'Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man'. This is a classic critique of foundationalism.
48. For methodological contextual ism, see Carol R. Ember and Melvin Ember, Anthropology: A Brief Introduction (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1992), p. 140; Michael C. Howard, Contemporary Cultural Anthropology; Fourth Edition (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 1993), pp. 5-6 and 14; and Serena Nanda, Cultural Anthropology, Fifth Edition (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1994), pp. 17 and 19. For methodological neutralism, see Hatch, op. cit., in note 1, p. 11; Marvin Harris, Cultural Anthropology, Third Edition (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 1991), pp. 10-11; and David H. P. Maybury-Lewis, 'A Special Sort of Pleading: Anthropology at the Service of Ethnic Groups', in William A. Haviland and Robert J. Gordon (eds.), Talking About People: Readings in Contemporary Cultural Anthropology (Mountain View, CA: May field, 1993), p. 18.
49. For methodological contextual ism, see Carol R. Ember and Melvin Ember, Anthropology: A Brief Introduction (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1992), p. 140; Michael C. Howard, Contemporary Cultural Anthropology; Fourth Edition (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 1993), pp. 5-6 and 14; and Serena Nanda, Cultural Anthropology, Fifth Edition (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1994), pp. 17 and 19. For methodological neutralism, see Hatch, op. cit., in note 1, p. 11; Marvin Harris, Cultural Anthropology, Third Edition (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 1991), pp. 10-11; and David H. P. Maybury-Lewis, 'A Special Sort of Pleading: Anthropology at the Service of Ethnic Groups', in William A. Haviland and Robert J. Gordon (eds.), Talking About People: Readings in Contemporary Cultural Anthropology (Mountain View, CA: May field, 1993), p. 18.
50. For methodological contextual ism, see Carol R. Ember and Melvin Ember, Anthropology: A Brief Introduction (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1992), p. 140; Michael C. Howard, Contemporary Cultural Anthropology; Fourth Edition (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 1993), pp. 5-6 and 14; and Serena Nanda, Cultural Anthropology, Fifth Edition (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1994), pp. 17 and 19. For methodological neutralism, see Hatch, op. cit., in note 1, p. 11; Marvin Harris, Cultural Anthropology, Third Edition (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 1991), pp. 10-11; and David H. P. Maybury-Lewis, 'A Special Sort of Pleading: Anthropology at the Service of Ethnic Groups', in William A. Haviland and Robert J. Gordon (eds.), Talking About People: Readings in Contemporary Cultural Anthropology (Mountain View, CA: May field, 1993), p. 18.
51. For methodological contextual ism, see Carol R. Ember and Melvin Ember, Anthropology: A Brief Introduction (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1992), p. 140; Michael C. Howard, Contemporary Cultural Anthropology; Fourth Edition (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 1993), pp. 5-6 and 14; and Serena Nanda, Cultural Anthropology, Fifth Edition (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1994), pp. 17 and 19. For methodological neutralism, see Hatch, op. cit., in note 1, p. 11; Marvin Harris, Cultural Anthropology, Third Edition (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 1991), pp. 10-11; and David H. P. Maybury-Lewis, 'A Special Sort of Pleading: Anthropology at the Service of Ethnic Groups', in William A. Haviland and Robert J. Gordon (eds.), Talking About People: Readings in Contemporary Cultural Anthropology (Mountain View, CA: May field, 1993), p. 18.
52. For methodological contextual ism, see Carol R. Ember and Melvin Ember, Anthropology: A Brief Introduction (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1992), p. 140; Michael C. Howard, Contemporary Cultural Anthropology; Fourth Edition (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 1993), pp. 5-6 and 14; and Serena Nanda, Cultural Anthropology, Fifth Edition (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1994), pp. 17 and 19. For methodological neutralism, see Hatch, op. cit., in note 1, p. 11; Marvin Harris, Cultural Anthropology, Third Edition (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 1991), pp. 10-11; and David H. P. Maybury-Lewis, 'A Special Sort of Pleading: Anthropology at the Service of Ethnic Groups', in William A. Haviland and Robert J. Gordon (eds.), Talking About People: Readings in Contemporary Cultural Anthropology (Mountain View, CA: May field, 1993), p. 18.
53. For some examples see. Hatch, op. cit., in note 1, p. 11; Howard, op. cit., in note 17, pp. 5-6; and Maybury-Lewis, op. cit., in note 17.
54. This argument is popular among nonacademics. It is also found, either in implicit or in embryonic form, in some of the classic sources for cultural relativism. See, especially, Herskovits, Man and His Works, op. cit., in note 1, p. 78; Herskovits, Cultural Relativism, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 14-15, 39, 51, and 101; and Herskovits, 'Statement on Human Rights', op. cit., in note 11, p. 542.
55. This argument is popular among nonacademics. It is also found, either in implicit or in embryonic form, in some of the classic sources for cultural relativism. See, especially, Herskovits, Man and His Works, op. cit., in note 1, p. 78; Herskovits, Cultural Relativism, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 14-15, 39, 51, and 101; and Herskovits, 'Statement on Human Rights', op. cit., in note 11, p. 542.
56. This argument is popular among nonacademics. It is also found, either in implicit or in embryonic form, in some of the classic sources for cultural relativism. See, especially, Herskovits, Man and His Works, op. cit., in note 1, p. 78; Herskovits, Cultural Relativism, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 14-15, 39, 51, and 101; and Herskovits, 'Statement on Human Rights', op. cit., in note 11, p. 542.
57. See the following authors and the many others they cite: Richard B. Brandt, Ethical Theory (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1959), pp. 285-88; William H. Davis, 'Cultural Relativity in Ethics', Southern Humanities Review (Vol. 9, No. 1, 1975), pp. 51-62; and Frances V. Harbour, 'Basic Moral Values: A Shared Core', Ethics and International Affairs (Vol. 9, 1995), pp. 155-70. Also relevant is Amitai Etzioni, The New Golden Rule (London: Profile, 1997), pp. 241-42.
58. See the following authors and the many others they cite: Richard B. Brandt, Ethical Theory (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1959), pp. 285-88; William H. Davis, 'Cultural Relativity in Ethics', Southern Humanities Review (Vol. 9, No. 1, 1975), pp. 51-62; and Frances V. Harbour, 'Basic Moral Values: A Shared Core', Ethics and International Affairs (Vol. 9, 1995), pp. 155-70. Also relevant is Amitai Etzioni, The New Golden Rule (London: Profile, 1997), pp. 241-42.
59. See the following authors and the many others they cite: Richard B. Brandt, Ethical Theory (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1959), pp. 285-88; William H. Davis, 'Cultural Relativity in Ethics', Southern Humanities Review (Vol. 9, No. 1, 1975), pp. 51-62; and Frances V. Harbour, 'Basic Moral Values: A Shared Core', Ethics and International Affairs (Vol. 9, 1995), pp. 155-70. Also relevant is Amitai Etzioni, The New Golden Rule (London: Profile, 1997), pp. 241-42.
60. See the following authors and the many others they cite: Richard B. Brandt, Ethical Theory (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1959), pp. 285-88; William H. Davis, 'Cultural Relativity in Ethics', Southern Humanities Review (Vol. 9, No. 1, 1975), pp. 51-62; and Frances V. Harbour, 'Basic Moral Values: A Shared Core', Ethics and International Affairs (Vol. 9, 1995), pp. 155-70. Also relevant is Amitai Etzioni, The New Golden Rule (London: Profile, 1997), pp. 241-42.
61. My labels for these views-agent relativism' and 'appraiser
62. Benedict, 'Anthropology and the Abnormal', op. cit., in note 1, p. 73;
63. Herskovits, Cultural Relativism, op. cit., in note 1, p. 101;
64. Clarence C. Ayres, Holier Than Thou (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1929), pp. 11 and 15;
65. and Allen Wheelis, The Quest for Identity (New York, NY: Norton, 1958), p. 95.
66. This is not to deny that they have some rough edges. For example, neither of the two tells us how to identify the culture to which a person belongs. How do we know whether a deed accords with the norms of 'Chen's culture' if Chen was born and raised in Peking but now resides in Cairo?
67. If the difference between agent and appraiser relativism is not fully clear, an example will help. Suppose the norms of Obi's culture differ from those of Ravi's. Suppose also that Ravi is doing something that accords with the norms of his culture, but not with those of Obi's. Obi states that Ravi's deed is wrong. According to appraiser relativism. Obi's statement is true because the deed she is evaluating conflicts with the norms of her culture. However, according to agent relativism, Obi's statement is false because the evaluated deed accords with the norms of the agent's culture, the agent being Ravi.
68. Jonathan Harrison, Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong (London: Allen and Unwin, 1971), p. 230; see also pp. 120-21.
69. Variants of this view appear in Sumner, op. cit., in note 1, § 439, and Benedict, 'Anthropology and the Abnormal', op. cit., in note 1, p. 73.
70. Or, it is a rare one who would do so. I put it this way because the examples are mine; they are not taken verbatim from any cultural relativist. There is little question that Sumner, Benedict, and Herskovits would treat (1) and (3) as valid across the board; this emerges from even a cursory reading of their work (provided we are aware that polyandry is customary among the Nyinba). The same goes for Downs, op. cit., in note 5; and Wheelis, op. cil., in note 21. Statement (2) is a theme in the work of Downs, op .cit., in note 5; Benedict, Patterns of Culture, op. cit., in note I, pp. 37 and 278, and Herskovits, Man and His Works, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 76 and 78. Its proponents do not treat it as a culturally restricted truth.
71. Or, it is a rare one who would do so. I put it this way because the examples are mine; they are not taken verbatim from any cultural relativist. There is little question that Sumner, Benedict, and Herskovits would treat (1) and (3) as valid across the board; this emerges from even a cursory reading of their work (provided we are aware that polyandry is customary among the Nyinba). The same goes for Downs, op. cit., in note 5; and Wheelis, op. cil., in note 21. Statement (2) is a theme in the work of Downs, op .cit., in note 5; Benedict, Patterns of Culture, op. cit., in note I, pp. 37 and 278, and Herskovits, Man and His Works, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 76 and 78. Its proponents do not treat it as a culturally restricted truth.
72. For a prime example-'prime' in that it avoids moral statements altogether-see Herskovits, Cultural Relativism, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 97-101.
73. Objection: 'But many of the statements in List I refer not just to actions but to motives; so the statements are of the wrong form to be moral judgements'. This is false. The statements 'torturing children for the fun of hearing them scream is wrong' and 'torturing children is wrong' both have the form 'X is wrong', where 'X' is an act-description. In other words, the phrase 'for the fun of hearing them scream' is not something in addition to the act-description; it is part of it. We commonly individuate actions according to motives.
74. Recall the quotation from Leach, in Section 1 (see op. cit., in note 10). See also the works of Herskovits, which, in spite of containing sincere avowals of cultural relativism, are sprinkled with evidence that, at bottom, Herskovits treats (or would treat) much of List 1 as universally valid. Examples: Herskovits, Man and His Works, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 76 and 653-55; Herskovits, Cultural Relativism, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 21, 33, and 74; Herskovits, 'Statement on Human Rights', op. cit., in note 11, pp. 540-41 and 543. Similar remarks apply to Downs, op. cit., in note 5, and to Benedict, Patterns of Culture, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 32 and 247-50.
75. Recall the quotation from Leach, in Section 1 (see op. cit., in note 10). See also the works of Herskovits, which, in spite of containing sincere avowals of cultural relativism, are sprinkled with evidence that, at bottom, Herskovits treats (or would treat) much of List 1 as universally valid. Examples: Herskovits, Man and His Works, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 76 and 653-55; Herskovits, Cultural Relativism, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 21, 33, and 74; Herskovits, 'Statement on Human Rights', op. cit., in note 11, pp. 540-41 and 543. Similar remarks apply to Downs, op. cit., in note 5, and to Benedict, Patterns of Culture, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 32 and 247-50.
76. Recall the quotation from Leach, in Section 1 (see op. cit., in note 10). See also the works of Herskovits, which, in spite of containing sincere avowals of cultural relativism, are sprinkled with evidence that, at bottom, Herskovits treats (or would treat) much of List 1 as universally valid. Examples: Herskovits, Man and His Works, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 76 and 653-55; Herskovits, Cultural Relativism, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 21, 33, and 74; Herskovits, 'Statement on Human Rights', op. cit., in note 11, pp. 540-41 and 543. Similar remarks apply to Downs, op. cit., in note 5, and to Benedict, Patterns of Culture, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 32 and 247-50.
77. Recall the quotation from Leach, in Section 1 (see op. cit., in note 10). See also the works of Herskovits, which, in spite of containing sincere avowals of cultural relativism, are sprinkled with evidence that, at bottom, Herskovits treats (or would treat) much of List 1 as universally valid. Examples: Herskovits, Man and His Works, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 76 and 653-55; Herskovits, Cultural Relativism, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 21, 33, and 74; Herskovits, 'Statement on Human Rights', op. cit., in note 11, pp. 540-41 and 543. Similar remarks apply to Downs, op. cit., in note 5, and to Benedict, Patterns of Culture, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 32 and 247-50.
78. See Herskovits. Cultural Relativism, op. cit., in note 1, p. 14, and Benedict. Patterns of Culture, op. cit., in note 1, p. 278.
79. See Herskovits. Cultural Relativism, op. cit., in note 1, p. 14, and Benedict. Patterns of Culture, op. cit., in note 1, p. 278.
80. An excellent critique of creationism is Philip Kiteher, Abusing Science: The Case Against Creationism (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 1982). on which I have drawn in writing this paragraph. I have also drawn on Kitcher's debate with creationist Duane Gish, held on 18 February 1985 at the Twin Cities campus of the University of Minnesota. A videotape of the debate is owned by the Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science.
81. A more detailed discussion of the contrast is in Marcus George Singer, Generalization in Ethics (New York, NY: Atheneum, 1971), Chapter 5. My definition of absolutism also reflects the influence of Marcus George Singer, 'The Ideal of a Rational Morality', Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association (Vol. 60, No. 1, 1986), p. 28.
82. A more detailed discussion of the contrast is in Marcus George Singer, Generalization in Ethics (New York, NY: Atheneum, 1971), Chapter 5. My definition of absolutism also reflects the influence of Marcus George Singer, 'The Ideal of a Rational Morality', Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association (Vol. 60, No. 1, 1986), p. 28.
83. See, for example, Singer, Generalisation in Ethics, op. cit., in note 32, pp. 123-24; Friedrich Paulsen, A System of Ethics, trans. F. Thilly (New York, NY: Scribners, 1899), pp. 233-35 and 360-63; Louis P. Pojman, Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong, Second Edition (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1995), p. 47; and Kwasi Wiredu, Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996), pp. 65-66.
84. See, for example, Singer, Generalisation in Ethics, op. cit., in note 32, pp. 123-24; Friedrich Paulsen, A System of Ethics, trans. F. Thilly (New York, NY: Scribners, 1899), pp. 233-35 and 360-63; Louis P. Pojman, Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong, Second Edition (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1995), p. 47; and Kwasi Wiredu, Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996), pp. 65-66.
85. See, for example, Singer, Generalisation in Ethics, op. cit., in note 32, pp. 123-24; Friedrich Paulsen, A System of Ethics, trans. F. Thilly (New York, NY: Scribners, 1899), pp. 233-35 and 360-63; Louis P. Pojman, Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong, Second Edition (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1995), p. 47; and Kwasi Wiredu, Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996), pp. 65-66.
86. See, for example, Singer, Generalisation in Ethics, op. cit., in note 32, pp. 123-24; Friedrich Paulsen, A System of Ethics, trans. F. Thilly (New York, NY: Scribners, 1899), pp. 233-35 and 360-63; Louis P. Pojman, Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong, Second Edition (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1995), p. 47; and Kwasi Wiredu, Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996), pp. 65-66.
87. Nor does it refute most other versions of universalism, for example, those proposed by the authors in notes 7 and 33. By a 'version' of universalism I mean a combination of universalism either with a belief that this or that moral judgement is universally valid, or with a proposal about how to distinguish valid from invalid moral judgements.
88. The point is not that those who abide by the judgements will exhibit exactly the same behaviour, or even that they will exhibit roughly similar behaviour. The point is that in similar circumstances they will exhibit (at least) roughly similar behaviour; also that their actions will differ markedly from those of people who turn their backs on the above judgements. This is enough to show that the judgements are nonvacuous.
89. Also worth noting is that the ethnocentrism argument is, at bottom, a moral argument. It trades on the assumption that ethnocentrism is bad, wrong, or undesirable. This raises a question: Is the badness, etc., of ethnocentrism universal? If it is, cultural relativism stands refuted.
90. Whether respecting cultural integrity involves condoning all that is customary within a culture is another question. And whether disapproving of a custom requires interfering with it is still another question. Discussion of these issues becomes muddled if they are not distinguished, and even more muddled if we mistakenly think that the injunction to respect cultural integrity requires cultural relativism for its support. Not only does the injunction to respect cultural integrity stand in no need of cultural relativism, it finds cultural relativism a troublesome bedfellow. Cultural relativism implies that for some cultures, the injunction to respect cultural integrity is invalid. In fact, some versions of cultural relativism imply that for some cultures, what is valid is the injunction to disrespect cultural integrity. The cultures in question are those in which such disrespect is customary.
91. For more on how universalism makes room for pluralism, see Wiredu, op. cit., in note 33, especially Chapters 3 and 6.
92. See Benedict, Patterns of Culture, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 2-3, and Herskovits, Cultural Relativism, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 15, 56, 58. and 84-85.
93. See Benedict, Patterns of Culture, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 2-3, and Herskovits, Cultural Relativism, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 15, 56, 58. and 84-85.
94. A version of this argument is in Renteln, op. cit., in note 2, p. 76.
95. See note 26 and the accompanying text.
96. Worth adding here is that plausible arguments for (A) are easier to produce than relativists suppose. (What is not so easy to produce are plausible arguments for theories that propose a simple, universal algorithm for moral decisions. We must not confuse the arguments for such algorithms with arguments for universalism.) For a brief one, see Wiredu, op. cit., in note 33, p. 29. For more elaborate ones in the same spirit, see Warnock, op. cit., in note 7, and Frank C. White, Knowledge and Relativism: An Essay in the Philosophy of Education (Assen, the Netherlands: Van Gorcum, 1983), Chapters 4 and 5.
97. For documentation consult Herskovits, Man and His Works, op. cit., in note I, pp. 77 and 655; Herskovits, Cultural Relativism, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 31 and 33; and Nardin, op. cit., in note 4, p. 150. See also the remarks in Benedict, 'Anthropology and the Abnormal', op. cit., in note 1, p. 73, and Sumner, op. cit., in note 1, § 439. These remarks imply a reductionist view of moral statements, not a nihilistic view.
98. For documentation consult Herskovits, Man and His Works, op. cit., in note I, pp. 77 and 655; Herskovits, Cultural Relativism, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 31 and 33; and Nardin, op. cit., in note 4, p. 150. See also the remarks in Benedict, 'Anthropology and the Abnormal', op. cit., in note 1, p. 73, and Sumner, op. cit., in note 1, § 439. These remarks imply a reductionist view of moral statements, not a nihilistic view.
99. For documentation consult Herskovits, Man and His Works, op. cit., in note I, pp. 77 and 655; Herskovits, Cultural Relativism, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 31 and 33; and Nardin, op. cit., in note 4, p. 150. See also the remarks in Benedict, 'Anthropology and the Abnormal', op. cit., in note 1, p. 73, and Sumner, op. cit., in note 1, § 439. These remarks imply a reductionist view of moral statements, not a nihilistic view.
100. See, for example, Richard A. Shweder, 'Ethical Relativism: Is There a Defensible Version?', Ethos (Vol. 18, No. 2, 1990), pp. 209 and 211. See also Sumner, op. cil., in note 1, § 15; and Benedict, Patterns of Culture, op. cit., in note 1, p. 254.
101. See, for example, Richard A. Shweder, 'Ethical Relativism: Is There a Defensible Version?', Ethos (Vol. 18, No. 2, 1990), pp. 209 and 211. See also Sumner, op. cil., in note 1, § 15; and Benedict, Patterns of Culture, op. cit., in note 1, p. 254.
102. Indeed, to have done so would have been to assume a burden of proof which, given my intended audience which includes relativists, I have no obligation to carry. All the same, the burden is not prohibitively heavy. See note 42.