Limited accommodation, perpetuated conflict: Kennedy, China, and the Laos crisis, 1961-1963

Diplomatic History

Volumn 26, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 95-135

  Kochavi, Noam ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0345807394     PISSN: 01452096     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-7709.00301     Document Type: Article

References (510)

1. See Gordon H. Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972 (Stanford, 1990), 217-52; James Fetzer, "Clinging to Containment: China Policy," in Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963, ed. Thomas G. Paterson (New York, 1989), 196; "Notes on the NSC Meeting," 15 November 1961, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1996), 1:607 (hereafter FRUS, with year and volume number); and Dennis Merrill, Bread and the Ballot: The United States and India's Economic Development (Chapel Hill, 1990), 142-48 .
2. See Gordon H. Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972 (Stanford, 1990), 217-52; James Fetzer, "Clinging to Containment: China Policy," in Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963, ed. Thomas G. Paterson (New York, 1989), 196; "Notes on the NSC Meeting," 15 November 1961, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1996), 1:607 (hereafter FRUS, with year and volume number); and Dennis Merrill, Bread and the Ballot: The United States and India's Economic Development (Chapel Hill, 1990), 142-48 .
3. See Gordon H. Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972 (Stanford, 1990), 217-52; James Fetzer, "Clinging to Containment: China Policy," in Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963, ed. Thomas G. Paterson (New York, 1989), 196; "Notes on the NSC Meeting," 15 November 1961, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1996), 1:607 (hereafter FRUS, with year and volume number); and Dennis Merrill, Bread and the Ballot: The United States and India's Economic Development (Chapel Hill, 1990), 142-48 .
4. See Gordon H. Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972 (Stanford, 1990), 217-52; James Fetzer, "Clinging to Containment: China Policy," in Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963, ed. Thomas G. Paterson (New York, 1989), 196; "Notes on the NSC Meeting," 15 November 1961, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1996), 1:607 (hereafter FRUS, with year and volume number); and Dennis Merrill, Bread and the Ballot: The United States and India's Economic Development (Chapel Hill, 1990), 142-48 .
5. Roderick MacFarquhar, The Coming of the Cultural Revolution, Vol. 3, The Coming of the Cataclysm (Oxford, 1997), 270-81, 298, 325; Rosemary Foot, The Practice of Power: US Relations with China since 1949 (Oxford, 1995), 263 ; Alfred D. Wilhelm, Jr., The Chinese at the Negotiating Table: Style and Characteristics (Washington, 1994), 214-15.
6. Roderick MacFarquhar, The Coming of the Cultural Revolution, Vol. 3, The Coming of the Cataclysm (Oxford, 1997), 270-81, 298, 325; Rosemary Foot, The Practice of Power: US Relations with China since 1949 (Oxford, 1995), 263 ; Alfred D. Wilhelm, Jr., The Chinese at the Negotiating Table: Style and Characteristics (Washington, 1994), 214-15.
7. Roderick MacFarquhar, The Coming of the Cultural Revolution, Vol. 3, The Coming of the Cataclysm (Oxford, 1997), 270-81, 298, 325; Rosemary Foot, The Practice of Power: US Relations with China since 1949 (Oxford, 1995), 263 ; Alfred D. Wilhelm, Jr., The Chinese at the Negotiating Table: Style and Characteristics (Washington, 1994), 214-15.
8. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, "No Common Ground: American-Chinese-Soviet Relations, 1948-1972," Diplomatic History 16 (Spring 1992): 321; Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy (Garden City, 1967), 347-48, 580-81; Hilsman letter to author, 7 May 1995; Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York, 1965), 665-66.
9. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, "No Common Ground: American-Chinese-Soviet Relations, 1948-1972," Diplomatic History 16 (Spring 1992): 321; Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy (Garden City, 1967), 347-48, 580-81; Hilsman letter to author, 7 May 1995; Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York, 1965), 665-66.
10. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, "No Common Ground: American-Chinese-Soviet Relations, 1948-1972," Diplomatic History 16 (Spring 1992): 321; Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy (Garden City, 1967), 347-48, 580-81; Hilsman letter to author, 7 May 1995; Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York, 1965), 665-66.
11. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, "No Common Ground: American-Chinese-Soviet Relations, 1948-1972," Diplomatic History 16 (Spring 1992): 321; Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy (Garden City, 1967), 347-48, 580-81; Hilsman letter to author, 7 May 1995; Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York, 1965), 665-66.
12. As historian Thomas Paterson explains, this conception of growth and unfulfilled promise, cultivated by many a Kennedy associate, has also been central to the interpretive framework of a number of historians. See Paterson, introduction to Kennedy's Quest, 6, 318-19n.15, 16. The image achieved an enduring hold over the American popular mind, in good part due to the trauma of Kennedy's assassination. For general discussions of Kennedy historiography and myth making see Thomas Brown, JFK: History of an Image (London, 1989); and Burton I. Kaufman, "John F. Kennedy as World Leader: A Perspective on the Literature," Diplomatic History 17 (Summer 1993): 447-69.
13. As historian Thomas Paterson explains, this conception of growth and unfulfilled promise, cultivated by many a Kennedy associate, has also been central to the interpretive framework of a number of historians. See Paterson, introduction to Kennedy's Quest, 6, 318-19n.15, 16. The image achieved an enduring hold over the American popular mind, in good part due to the trauma of Kennedy's assassination. For general discussions of Kennedy historiography and myth making see Thomas Brown, JFK: History of an Image (London, 1989); and Burton I. Kaufman, "John F. Kennedy as World Leader: A Perspective on the Literature," Diplomatic History 17 (Summer 1993): 447-69.
14. As historian Thomas Paterson explains, this conception of growth and unfulfilled promise, cultivated by many a Kennedy associate, has also been central to the interpretive framework of a number of historians. See Paterson, introduction to Kennedy's Quest, 6, 318-19n.15, 16. The image achieved an enduring hold over the American popular mind, in good part due to the trauma of Kennedy's assassination. For general discussions of Kennedy historiography and myth making see Thomas Brown, JFK: History of an Image (London, 1989); and Burton I. Kaufman, "John F. Kennedy as World Leader: A Perspective on the Literature," Diplomatic History 17 (Summer 1993): 447-69.
15. Fetzer, "Clinging to Containment," 178-97; Chang, Friends and Enemies, 217-52; Warren I. Cohen, "The United States and China since 1945," New Frontiers in American-East Asian Relations: Essays Presented to Dorothy Borg (New York, 1983), 160. The quotation is from Nancy B. Tucker, "Continuing Controversies in the Literature of U.S.-China Relations since 1945," in Pacific Passage: The Study of American-East Asian Relations on the Eve of the Twenty-First Century, ed. Warren I. Cohen (New York, 1996), 226.
16. Fetzer, "Clinging to Containment," 178-97; Chang, Friends and Enemies, 217-52; Warren I. Cohen, "The United States and China since 1945," New Frontiers in American-East Asian Relations: Essays Presented to Dorothy Borg (New York, 1983), 160. The quotation is from Nancy B. Tucker, "Continuing Controversies in the Literature of U.S.-China Relations since 1945," in Pacific Passage: The Study of American-East Asian Relations on the Eve of the Twenty-First Century, ed. Warren I. Cohen (New York, 1996), 226.
17. Fetzer, "Clinging to Containment," 178-97; Chang, Friends and Enemies, 217-52; Warren I. Cohen, "The United States and China since 1945," New Frontiers in American-East Asian Relations: Essays Presented to Dorothy Borg (New York, 1983), 160. The quotation is from Nancy B. Tucker, "Continuing Controversies in the Literature of U.S.-China Relations since 1945," in Pacific Passage: The Study of American-East Asian Relations on the Eve of the Twenty-First Century, ed. Warren I. Cohen (New York, 1996), 226.
18. Fetzer, "Clinging to Containment," 178-97; Chang, Friends and Enemies, 217-52; Warren I. Cohen, "The United States and China since 1945," New Frontiers in American-East Asian Relations: Essays Presented to Dorothy Borg (New York, 1983), 160. The quotation is from Nancy B. Tucker, "Continuing Controversies in the Literature of U.S.-China Relations since 1945," in Pacific Passage: The Study of American-East Asian Relations on the Eve of the Twenty-First Century, ed. Warren I. Cohen (New York, 1996), 226.
19. As historian Edmund Wehrle notes, the State Department's publication of relevant papers on both China policy and the Laotian crisis, and the opening of material in the Averell Harriman Papers in 1987, as well as of related materials at the John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Libraries, allows for a closer look at the issue at hand. Edmund F. Wehrle, "'A Good, Bad Deal': John F. Kennedy, W. Averell Harriman, and the Neutralization of Laos, 1961-1962," Pacific Historical Review 67, no. 3 (1998): 352n 4.
20. For analysis of the other episode, the 1962 straits crisis, see Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina (Ann Arbor, 1975), 63-70; and Wang Bingnan, Nine Years of Sino-American Talks in Retrospect: Memoirs of Wang Bingnan. Joint Publications Research Services, JPRS-CPS-85-069, 7 August 1985.
21. For analysis of the other episode, the 1962 straits crisis, see Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina (Ann Arbor, 1975), 63-70; and Wang Bingnan, Nine Years of Sino-American Talks in Retrospect: Memoirs of Wang Bingnan. Joint Publications Research Services, JPRS-CPS-85-069, 7 August 1985.
22. There is no denying that the study of Sino-American relations during the 1960s - as that of any other bilateral relationship - ideally entails careful attention to both countries' policies and attitudes as well as to the nature of the bilateral dynamic. The difficulties inherent in this mission are considerable, especially because of the current limits on research opportunities in Chinese archives. This article makes some cautious and preliminary steps in this direction, however, primarily by building on several pioneering works by Chinese and American scholars who have mined the growing trickle of evidence emanating from Beijing. For comments on the state of Sino-American historiography see Tucker, "Continuing Controversies," 214; Robert J. McMahon, "The Cold War in Asia," in America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations Since 1945, ed. Michael J. Hogan (Cambridge, England, 1995), 528-29; and Rosemary Foot, "Leadership, Perceptions and Interest: Chinese-American Relations in the Early Cold War," Diplomatic History 20 (Summer 1996): 474.
23. There is no denying that the study of Sino-American relations during the 1960s - as that of any other bilateral relationship - ideally entails careful attention to both countries' policies and attitudes as well as to the nature of the bilateral dynamic. The difficulties inherent in this mission are considerable, especially because of the current limits on research opportunities in Chinese archives. This article makes some cautious and preliminary steps in this direction, however, primarily by building on several pioneering works by Chinese and American scholars who have mined the growing trickle of evidence emanating from Beijing. For comments on the state of Sino-American historiography see Tucker, "Continuing Controversies," 214; Robert J. McMahon, "The Cold War in Asia," in America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations Since 1945, ed. Michael J. Hogan (Cambridge, England, 1995), 528-29; and Rosemary Foot, "Leadership, Perceptions and Interest: Chinese-American Relations in the Early Cold War," Diplomatic History 20 (Summer 1996): 474.
24. There is no denying that the study of Sino-American relations during the 1960s - as that of any other bilateral relationship - ideally entails careful attention to both countries' policies and attitudes as well as to the nature of the bilateral dynamic. The difficulties inherent in this mission are considerable, especially because of the current limits on research opportunities in Chinese archives. This article makes some cautious and preliminary steps in this direction, however, primarily by building on several pioneering works by Chinese and American scholars who have mined the growing trickle of evidence emanating from Beijing. For comments on the state of Sino-American historiography see Tucker, "Continuing Controversies," 214; Robert J. McMahon, "The Cold War in Asia," in America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations Since 1945, ed. Michael J. Hogan (Cambridge, England, 1995), 528-29; and Rosemary Foot, "Leadership, Perceptions and Interest: Chinese-American Relations in the Early Cold War," Diplomatic History 20 (Summer 1996): 474.
25. See Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 127-55; William J. Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy and the Conflict in Indochina (Stanford, 1994), 253-260; Wehrle, "'A Good, Bad Deal,'" 349-77; Rudy Abramson, Spanning the Century: The Life of W. Averell Harriman, 1891-1986 (New York, 1992), 582-91; and Stephen W. Twing, Myths, Models, and U.S. Foreign Policy: The Cultural Shaping of Three Cold Warriors (Boulder, 1998), 124-28.
26. See Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 127-55; William J. Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy and the Conflict in Indochina (Stanford, 1994), 253-260; Wehrle, "'A Good, Bad Deal,'" 349-77; Rudy Abramson, Spanning the Century: The Life of W. Averell Harriman, 1891-1986 (New York, 1992), 582-91; and Stephen W. Twing, Myths, Models, and U.S. Foreign Policy: The Cultural Shaping of Three Cold Warriors (Boulder, 1998), 124-28.
27. See Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 127-55; William J. Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy and the Conflict in Indochina (Stanford, 1994), 253-260; Wehrle, "'A Good, Bad Deal,'" 349-77; Rudy Abramson, Spanning the Century: The Life of W. Averell Harriman, 1891-1986 (New York, 1992), 582-91; and Stephen W. Twing, Myths, Models, and U.S. Foreign Policy: The Cultural Shaping of Three Cold Warriors (Boulder, 1998), 124-28.
28. See Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 127-55; William J. Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy and the Conflict in Indochina (Stanford, 1994), 253-260; Wehrle, "'A Good, Bad Deal,'" 349-77; Rudy Abramson, Spanning the Century: The Life of W. Averell Harriman, 1891-1986 (New York, 1992), 582-91; and Stephen W. Twing, Myths, Models, and U.S. Foreign Policy: The Cultural Shaping of Three Cold Warriors (Boulder, 1998), 124-28.
29. See Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 127-55; William J. Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy and the Conflict in Indochina (Stanford, 1994), 253-260; Wehrle, "'A Good, Bad Deal,'" 349-77; Rudy Abramson, Spanning the Century: The Life of W. Averell Harriman, 1891-1986 (New York, 1992), 582-91; and Stephen W. Twing, Myths, Models, and U.S. Foreign Policy: The Cultural Shaping of Three Cold Warriors (Boulder, 1998), 124-28.
30. For a seminal study in this vein see Timothy N. Castle, At War in the Shadow of Vietnam: U.S. Military Aid to the Royal Lao Government, 1955-1975 (New York, 1993), esp. 128-37. See also Roger Warner, Back Fire: The CIA's Secret War in Laos and Its Link to the War in Vietnam (New York, 1995), 93-94; Kenneth Conboy, Shadow War: The CIA's Secret War in Laos (Boulder, 1995); Jane Hamilton-Merritt, Tragic Mountains: The Hmong, the Americans, and the Secret Wars for Laos, 1942-1992 (Bloomington, 1993); and John Prados, The Blood Road: The Ho Chi Minh Trail and the Vietnam War (New York, 1999).
31. For a seminal study in this vein see Timothy N. Castle, At War in the Shadow of Vietnam: U.S. Military Aid to the Royal Lao Government, 1955-1975 (New York, 1993), esp. 128-37. See also Roger Warner, Back Fire: The CIA's Secret War in Laos and Its Link to the War in Vietnam (New York, 1995), 93-94; Kenneth Conboy, Shadow War: The CIA's Secret War in Laos (Boulder, 1995); Jane Hamilton-Merritt, Tragic Mountains: The Hmong, the Americans, and the Secret Wars for Laos, 1942-1992 (Bloomington, 1993); and John Prados, The Blood Road: The Ho Chi Minh Trail and the Vietnam War (New York, 1999).
32. For a seminal study in this vein see Timothy N. Castle, At War in the Shadow of Vietnam: U.S. Military Aid to the Royal Lao Government, 1955-1975 (New York, 1993), esp. 128-37. See also Roger Warner, Back Fire: The CIA's Secret War in Laos and Its Link to the War in Vietnam (New York, 1995), 93-94; Kenneth Conboy, Shadow War: The CIA's Secret War in Laos (Boulder, 1995); Jane Hamilton-Merritt, Tragic Mountains: The Hmong, the Americans, and the Secret Wars for Laos, 1942-1992 (Bloomington, 1993); and John Prados, The Blood Road: The Ho Chi Minh Trail and the Vietnam War (New York, 1999).
33. For a seminal study in this vein see Timothy N. Castle, At War in the Shadow of Vietnam: U.S. Military Aid to the Royal Lao Government, 1955-1975 (New York, 1993), esp. 128-37. See also Roger Warner, Back Fire: The CIA's Secret War in Laos and Its Link to the War in Vietnam (New York, 1995), 93-94; Kenneth Conboy, Shadow War: The CIA's Secret War in Laos (Boulder, 1995); Jane Hamilton-Merritt, Tragic Mountains: The Hmong, the Americans, and the Secret Wars for Laos, 1942-1992 (Bloomington, 1993); and John Prados, The Blood Road: The Ho Chi Minh Trail and the Vietnam War (New York, 1999).
34. For a seminal study in this vein see Timothy N. Castle, At War in the Shadow of Vietnam: U.S. Military Aid to the Royal Lao Government, 1955-1975 (New York, 1993), esp. 128-37. See also Roger Warner, Back Fire: The CIA's Secret War in Laos and Its Link to the War in Vietnam (New York, 1995), 93-94; Kenneth Conboy, Shadow War: The CIA's Secret War in Laos (Boulder, 1995); Jane Hamilton-Merritt, Tragic Mountains: The Hmong, the Americans, and the Secret Wars for Laos, 1942-1992 (Bloomington, 1993); and John Prados, The Blood Road: The Ho Chi Minh Trail and the Vietnam War (New York, 1999).
35. It should be emphasized that the goal of this article is not to suggest that China was the sole, or even the central, consideration affecting the administration's Laos policy. Like all policy, this one was shaped by a multiplicity of factors. Nevertheless, China was one important element in the policymaking process.
36. The evidence suggests that both the Eisenhower and Kennedy teams shared this image. To the extent that one may infer attitude from behavior, however, in the shaping of this image the New Frontiersmen seem to have been somewhat less influenced by racial bias than their predecessors. Compare Chang, Friends and Enemies, 157-74; Stevenson remarks, 21 March 1953, John Bartlow Martin Files on Adlai Stevenson, box 7, cited on p. 3154, folder "Ch. 9 - pp. 3021-3277," Seeley Mudd Library, Princeton, New Jersey; Stevenson draft for an article in Look magazine, 22 March 1953, Martin Files, box 7, cited on p. 3170, folder "Ch. 9 - pp. 3021-3277"; and Warren I. Cohen, Dean Rusk (Totowa, NJ, 1980), 126, 321-23.
37. The evidence suggests that both the Eisenhower and Kennedy teams shared this image. To the extent that one may infer attitude from behavior, however, in the shaping of this image the New Frontiersmen seem to have been somewhat less influenced by racial bias than their predecessors. Compare Chang, Friends and Enemies, 157-74; Stevenson remarks, 21 March 1953, John Bartlow Martin Files on Adlai Stevenson, box 7, cited on p. 3154, folder "Ch. 9 - pp. 3021-3277," Seeley Mudd Library, Princeton, New Jersey; Stevenson draft for an article in Look magazine, 22 March 1953, Martin Files, box 7, cited on p. 3170, folder "Ch. 9 - pp. 3021-3277"; and Warren I. Cohen, Dean Rusk (Totowa, NJ, 1980), 126, 321-23.
38. For analyses of these developments see Robert Jervis, "The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War," Journal of Conflict Resolution 24, no. 4 (1990): esp. 583-84; and Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict (Ithaca, 1985), esp. 27-28. Rusk was second to none as an embodiment of these processes. See Bancroft memcon on Korea, 23 September 1950, FRUS, 1950 (Washington, 1976), 7:760; Rusk memo, undated, ibid., 962; memo Allison to Rusk, 1 July 1950, ibid., 272; Barco memo, 25 August 1950, ibid., 646; and Cohen, Dean Rusk, 55, 57, 163.
39. For analyses of these developments see Robert Jervis, "The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War," Journal of Conflict Resolution 24, no. 4 (1990): esp. 583-84; and Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict (Ithaca, 1985), esp. 27-28. Rusk was second to none as an embodiment of these processes. See Bancroft memcon on Korea, 23 September 1950, FRUS, 1950 (Washington, 1976), 7:760; Rusk memo, undated, ibid., 962; memo Allison to Rusk, 1 July 1950, ibid., 272; Barco memo, 25 August 1950, ibid., 646; and Cohen, Dean Rusk, 55, 57, 163.
40. For analyses of these developments see Robert Jervis, "The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War," Journal of Conflict Resolution 24, no. 4 (1990): esp. 583-84; and Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict (Ithaca, 1985), esp. 27-28. Rusk was second to none as an embodiment of these processes. See Bancroft memcon on Korea, 23 September 1950, FRUS, 1950 (Washington, 1976), 7:760; Rusk memo, undated, ibid., 962; memo Allison to Rusk, 1 July 1950, ibid., 272; Barco memo, 25 August 1950, ibid., 646; and Cohen, Dean Rusk, 55, 57, 163.
41. For analyses of these developments see Robert Jervis, "The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War," Journal of Conflict Resolution 24, no. 4 (1990): esp. 583-84; and Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict (Ithaca, 1985), esp. 27-28. Rusk was second to none as an embodiment of these processes. See Bancroft memcon on Korea, 23 September 1950, FRUS, 1950 (Washington, 1976), 7:760; Rusk memo, undated, ibid., 962; memo Allison to Rusk, 1 July 1950, ibid., 272; Barco memo, 25 August 1950, ibid., 646; and Cohen, Dean Rusk, 55, 57, 163.
42. For analyses of these developments see Robert Jervis, "The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War," Journal of Conflict Resolution 24, no. 4 (1990): esp. 583-84; and Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict (Ithaca, 1985), esp. 27-28. Rusk was second to none as an embodiment of these processes. See Bancroft memcon on Korea, 23 September 1950, FRUS, 1950 (Washington, 1976), 7:760; Rusk memo, undated, ibid., 962; memo Allison to Rusk, 1 July 1950, ibid., 272; Barco memo, 25 August 1950, ibid., 646; and Cohen, Dean Rusk, 55, 57, 163.
43. For analyses of these developments see Robert Jervis, "The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War," Journal of Conflict Resolution 24, no. 4 (1990): esp. 583-84; and Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict (Ithaca, 1985), esp. 27-28. Rusk was second to none as an embodiment of these processes. See Bancroft memcon on Korea, 23 September 1950, FRUS, 1950 (Washington, 1976), 7:760; Rusk memo, undated, ibid., 962; memo Allison to Rusk, 1 July 1950, ibid., 272; Barco memo, 25 August 1950, ibid., 646; and Cohen, Dean Rusk, 55, 57, 163.
44. For analyses of these developments see Robert Jervis, "The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War," Journal of Conflict Resolution 24, no. 4 (1990): esp. 583-84; and Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict (Ithaca, 1985), esp. 27-28. Rusk was second to none as an embodiment of these processes. See Bancroft memcon on Korea, 23 September 1950, FRUS, 1950 (Washington, 1976), 7:760; Rusk memo, undated, ibid., 962; memo Allison to Rusk, 1 July 1950, ibid., 272; Barco memo, 25 August 1950, ibid., 646; and Cohen, Dean Rusk, 55, 57, 163.
45. Stevenson, "Putting First Things First," Foreign Affairs 38 (January 1960): 202-3; George F. Kennan to Kennedy, 17 August 1960, letter attached to Kennan Oral History, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts (hereafter JFKL); "U.S. Foreign Policy," Rusk testimony, 28 February 1961, in U.S. Senate, Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series) (hereafter Executive Sessions) (Washington, 1975-1993), 13 no.1, 205; Chester Bowles, "The 'China Problem' Reconsidered," Foreign Affairs 38 (April 1960): esp. 486; Chang, Friends and Enemies, 208-13.
46. Stevenson, "Putting First Things First," Foreign Affairs 38 (January 1960): 202-3; George F. Kennan to Kennedy, 17 August 1960, letter attached to Kennan Oral History, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts (hereafter JFKL); "U.S. Foreign Policy," Rusk testimony, 28 February 1961, in U.S. Senate, Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series) (hereafter Executive Sessions) (Washington, 1975-1993), 13 no.1, 205; Chester Bowles, "The 'China Problem' Reconsidered," Foreign Affairs 38 (April 1960): esp. 486; Chang, Friends and Enemies, 208-13.
47. Stevenson, "Putting First Things First," Foreign Affairs 38 (January 1960): 202-3; George F. Kennan to Kennedy, 17 August 1960, letter attached to Kennan Oral History, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts (hereafter JFKL); "U.S. Foreign Policy," Rusk testimony, 28 February 1961, in U.S. Senate, Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series) (hereafter Executive Sessions) (Washington, 1975-1993), 13 no.1, 205; Chester Bowles, "The 'China Problem' Reconsidered," Foreign Affairs 38 (April 1960): esp. 486; Chang, Friends and Enemies, 208-13.
48. Stevenson, "Putting First Things First," Foreign Affairs 38 (January 1960): 202-3; George F. Kennan to Kennedy, 17 August 1960, letter attached to Kennan Oral History, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts (hereafter JFKL); "U.S. Foreign Policy," Rusk testimony, 28 February 1961, in U.S. Senate, Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series) (hereafter Executive Sessions) (Washington, 1975-1993), 13 no.1, 205; Chester Bowles, "The 'China Problem' Reconsidered," Foreign Affairs 38 (April 1960): esp. 486; Chang, Friends and Enemies, 208-13.
49. Stevenson, "Putting First Things First," Foreign Affairs 38 (January 1960): 202-3; George F. Kennan to Kennedy, 17 August 1960, letter attached to Kennan Oral History, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts (hereafter JFKL); "U.S. Foreign Policy," Rusk testimony, 28 February 1961, in U.S. Senate, Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series) (hereafter Executive Sessions) (Washington, 1975-1993), 13 no.1, 205; Chester Bowles, "The 'China Problem' Reconsidered," Foreign Affairs 38 (April 1960): esp. 486; Chang, Friends and Enemies, 208-13.
50. See Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists: The United States Experience, 1953-1967 (New York, 1968), 253; Chang, Friends and Enemies, chap. 8; Fetzer, "Clinging to Containment," 179; and Foot, The Practice of Power, 178.
51. See Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists: The United States Experience, 1953-1967 (New York, 1968), 253; Chang, Friends and Enemies, chap. 8; Fetzer, "Clinging to Containment," 179; and Foot, The Practice of Power, 178.
52. See Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists: The United States Experience, 1953-1967 (New York, 1968), 253; Chang, Friends and Enemies, chap. 8; Fetzer, "Clinging to Containment," 179; and Foot, The Practice of Power, 178.
53. See Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists: The United States Experience, 1953-1967 (New York, 1968), 253; Chang, Friends and Enemies, chap. 8; Fetzer, "Clinging to Containment," 179; and Foot, The Practice of Power, 178.
54. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 13-2-60, "The Chinese Communist Atomic Energy Program," 13 December 1960, The U.S. Intelligence Community: Organization, Operations, and Management (Alexandria, VA, 1990), microfilm; State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) Report 8100.20, "Sino-Soviet Affairs," January 1961, James Thomson Papers, box 14, folder: "INR Report 8100.20," JFKL. Recent years have witnessed an animated controversy as to whether the success at predicting the Chinese detonation originated in a comedy of errors or sound intelligence performance. For this debate, which transcends the confines of this paper, see McCone OH interview, 19 August 1970, p. 19, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, Texas (hereafter LBJL); Willis C. Armstrong, William Leonhart, William J. McCaffrey, and Herbert C. Rothenberg, "The Hazards of Single-Outcome Forecasting," in Inside CIA's Private World, ed. H. Bradford Westerfield (New Haven, 1995), 244-46; and William Burr and Jeffrey T. Richelson, "A Chinese Puzzle," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 53, no. 4 (1997).
55. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 13-2-60, "The Chinese Communist Atomic Energy Program," 13 December 1960, The U.S. Intelligence Community: Organization, Operations, and Management (Alexandria, VA, 1990), microfilm; State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) Report 8100.20, "Sino-Soviet Affairs," January 1961, James Thomson Papers, box 14, folder: "INR Report 8100.20," JFKL. Recent years have witnessed an animated controversy as to whether the success at predicting the Chinese detonation originated in a comedy of errors or sound intelligence performance. For this debate, which transcends the confines of this paper, see McCone OH interview, 19 August 1970, p. 19, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, Texas (hereafter LBJL); Willis C. Armstrong, William Leonhart, William J. McCaffrey, and Herbert C. Rothenberg, "The Hazards of Single-Outcome Forecasting," in Inside CIA's Private World, ed. H. Bradford Westerfield (New Haven, 1995), 244-46; and William Burr and Jeffrey T. Richelson, "A Chinese Puzzle," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 53, no. 4 (1997).
56. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 13-2-60, "The Chinese Communist Atomic Energy Program," 13 December 1960, The U.S. Intelligence Community: Organization, Operations, and Management (Alexandria, VA, 1990), microfilm; State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) Report 8100.20, "Sino-Soviet Affairs," January 1961, James Thomson Papers, box 14, folder: "INR Report 8100.20," JFKL. Recent years have witnessed an animated controversy as to whether the success at predicting the Chinese detonation originated in a comedy of errors or sound intelligence performance. For this debate, which transcends the confines of this paper, see McCone OH interview, 19 August 1970, p. 19, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, Texas (hereafter LBJL); Willis C. Armstrong, William Leonhart, William J. McCaffrey, and Herbert C. Rothenberg, "The Hazards of Single-Outcome Forecasting," in Inside CIA's Private World, ed. H. Bradford Westerfield (New Haven, 1995), 244-46; and William Burr and Jeffrey T. Richelson, "A Chinese Puzzle," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 53, no. 4 (1997).
57. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 13-2-60, "The Chinese Communist Atomic Energy Program," 13 December 1960, The U.S. Intelligence Community: Organization, Operations, and Management (Alexandria, VA, 1990), microfilm; State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) Report 8100.20, "Sino-Soviet Affairs," January 1961, James Thomson Papers, box 14, folder: "INR Report 8100.20," JFKL. Recent years have witnessed an animated controversy as to whether the success at predicting the Chinese detonation originated in a comedy of errors or sound intelligence performance. For this debate, which transcends the confines of this paper, see McCone OH interview, 19 August 1970, p. 19, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, Texas (hereafter LBJL); Willis C. Armstrong, William Leonhart, William J. McCaffrey, and Herbert C. Rothenberg, "The Hazards of Single-Outcome Forecasting," in Inside CIA's Private World, ed. H. Bradford Westerfield (New Haven, 1995), 244-46; and William Burr and Jeffrey T. Richelson, "A Chinese Puzzle," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 53, no. 4 (1997).
58. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 13-2-60, "The Chinese Communist Atomic Energy Program," 13 December 1960, The U.S. Intelligence Community: Organization, Operations, and Management (Alexandria, VA, 1990), microfilm; State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) Report 8100.20, "Sino-Soviet Affairs," January 1961, James Thomson Papers, box 14, folder: "INR Report 8100.20," JFKL. Recent years have witnessed an animated controversy as to whether the success at predicting the Chinese detonation originated in a comedy of errors or sound intelligence performance. For this debate, which transcends the confines of this paper, see McCone OH interview, 19 August 1970, p. 19, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, Texas (hereafter LBJL); Willis C. Armstrong, William Leonhart, William J. McCaffrey, and Herbert C. Rothenberg, "The Hazards of Single-Outcome Forecasting," in Inside CIA's Private World, ed. H. Bradford Westerfield (New Haven, 1995), 244-46; and William Burr and Jeffrey T. Richelson, "A Chinese Puzzle," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 53, no. 4 (1997).
59. See Mark A. Ryan, Chinese Attitudes toward Nuclear Weapons: China and the United States during the Korean War (Armonk, NY, 1989), 181-86.
60. Chang, Friends and Enemies, 175-82; Rockefeller Brothers Report, Prospect for America (Garden City, 1961) 46-47; Leonard A. Kusnitz, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: America's China Policy, 1949-1979 (Westport, 1984), 96.
61. Chang, Friends and Enemies, 175-82; Rockefeller Brothers Report, Prospect for America (Garden City, 1961) 46-47; Leonard A. Kusnitz, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: America's China Policy, 1949-1979 (Westport, 1984), 96.
62. Chang, Friends and Enemies, 175-82; Rockefeller Brothers Report, Prospect for America (Garden City, 1961) 46-47; Leonard A. Kusnitz, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: America's China Policy, 1949-1979 (Westport, 1984), 96.
63. George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1950-1963 (New York, 1972), 268.
64. McNamara memo to Kennedy, 24 January 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1994), 24:42.
65. See "US Policy toward Asia," Bowles lecture, 6 April 1960, Records of Meetings 34 (July 1959-June 1960), Council of Foreign Relations, New York City (hereafter CFR). Bowles, ambassador to India (1950-1953) and representative from Connecticut (1958-1960), was appointed undersecretary of state by Kennedy. Effectively demoted (November 1961) to act as the president's special adviser on Asian, African, and Latin American affairs, he returned to the Delhi post in July 1963.
66. Michael D. Shafer, Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy (Princeton, 1988), 21; Moya Ann Ball, Vietnam on the Potomac (New York, 1992), 10 ; Fetzer, "Clinging to Containment," 196; Sorensen, Kennedy, 631-32.
67. Michael D. Shafer, Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy (Princeton, 1988), 21; Moya Ann Ball, Vietnam on the Potomac (New York, 1992), 10 ; Fetzer, "Clinging to Containment," 196; Sorensen, Kennedy, 631-32.
68. Michael D. Shafer, Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy (Princeton, 1988), 21; Moya Ann Ball, Vietnam on the Potomac (New York, 1992), 10 ; Fetzer, "Clinging to Containment," 196; Sorensen, Kennedy, 631-32.
69. Michael D. Shafer, Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy (Princeton, 1988), 21; Moya Ann Ball, Vietnam on the Potomac (New York, 1992), 10 ; Fetzer, "Clinging to Containment," 196; Sorensen, Kennedy, 631-32.
70. Kennedy remarks at Hood College, Maryland, 13 May 1960, Kennedy Pre-Presidential Papers, box 1030, folder: "Speeches, Statements and Sections," JFKL; Stevenson, "Putting First Things First," 196; Jeff Broadwater, Adlai Stevenson and American Politics: The Odyssey of a Cold War Liberal (New York, 1990), 179; Howard B. Schaffer, Chester Bowles: New Dealer in the Cold War (Cambridge, MA, 1993), 53, 83; Abramson, Spanning the Century, 572. This representation, during 1959-60, of China as projecting a menacing model of economic success reveals the almost total ignorance in the West of China's concurrent domestic predicament. For the causes underlying this misrepresentation see Noam Kochavi, "Mist Across the Bamboo Curtain: China's Internal Crisis and the American Intelligence Process, 1961-1962," Journal of American-East Asian Relations 5 (Summer 1996): 135-55.
71. Kennedy remarks at Hood College, Maryland, 13 May 1960, Kennedy Pre-Presidential Papers, box 1030, folder: "Speeches, Statements and Sections," JFKL; Stevenson, "Putting First Things First," 196; Jeff Broadwater, Adlai Stevenson and American Politics: The Odyssey of a Cold War Liberal (New York, 1990), 179; Howard B. Schaffer, Chester Bowles: New Dealer in the Cold War (Cambridge, MA, 1993), 53, 83; Abramson, Spanning the Century, 572. This representation, during 1959-60, of China as projecting a menacing model of economic success reveals the almost total ignorance in the West of China's concurrent domestic predicament. For the causes underlying this misrepresentation see Noam Kochavi, "Mist Across the Bamboo Curtain: China's Internal Crisis and the American Intelligence Process, 1961-1962," Journal of American-East Asian Relations 5 (Summer 1996): 135-55.
72. Kennedy remarks at Hood College, Maryland, 13 May 1960, Kennedy Pre-Presidential Papers, box 1030, folder: "Speeches, Statements and Sections," JFKL; Stevenson, "Putting First Things First," 196; Jeff Broadwater, Adlai Stevenson and American Politics: The Odyssey of a Cold War Liberal (New York, 1990), 179; Howard B. Schaffer, Chester Bowles: New Dealer in the Cold War (Cambridge, MA, 1993), 53, 83; Abramson, Spanning the Century, 572. This representation, during 1959-60, of China as projecting a menacing model of economic success reveals the almost total ignorance in the West of China's concurrent domestic predicament. For the causes underlying this misrepresentation see Noam Kochavi, "Mist Across the Bamboo Curtain: China's Internal Crisis and the American Intelligence Process, 1961-1962," Journal of American-East Asian Relations 5 (Summer 1996): 135-55.
73. Kennedy remarks at Hood College, Maryland, 13 May 1960, Kennedy Pre-Presidential Papers, box 1030, folder: "Speeches, Statements and Sections," JFKL; Stevenson, "Putting First Things First," 196; Jeff Broadwater, Adlai Stevenson and American Politics: The Odyssey of a Cold War Liberal (New York, 1990), 179; Howard B. Schaffer, Chester Bowles: New Dealer in the Cold War (Cambridge, MA, 1993), 53, 83; Abramson, Spanning the Century, 572. This representation, during 1959-60, of China as projecting a menacing model of economic success reveals the almost total ignorance in the West of China's concurrent domestic predicament. For the causes underlying this misrepresentation see Noam Kochavi, "Mist Across the Bamboo Curtain: China's Internal Crisis and the American Intelligence Process, 1961-1962," Journal of American-East Asian Relations 5 (Summer 1996): 135-55.
74. Kennedy remarks at Hood College, Maryland, 13 May 1960, Kennedy Pre-Presidential Papers, box 1030, folder: "Speeches, Statements and Sections," JFKL; Stevenson, "Putting First Things First," 196; Jeff Broadwater, Adlai Stevenson and American Politics: The Odyssey of a Cold War Liberal (New York, 1990), 179; Howard B. Schaffer, Chester Bowles: New Dealer in the Cold War (Cambridge, MA, 1993), 53, 83; Abramson, Spanning the Century, 572. This representation, during 1959-60, of China as projecting a menacing model of economic success reveals the almost total ignorance in the West of China's concurrent domestic predicament. For the causes underlying this misrepresentation see Noam Kochavi, "Mist Across the Bamboo Curtain: China's Internal Crisis and the American Intelligence Process, 1961-1962," Journal of American-East Asian Relations 5 (Summer 1996): 135-55.
75. Kennedy remarks at Hood College, Maryland, 13 May 1960, Kennedy Pre-Presidential Papers, box 1030, folder: "Speeches, Statements and Sections," JFKL; Stevenson, "Putting First Things First," 196; Jeff Broadwater, Adlai Stevenson and American Politics: The Odyssey of a Cold War Liberal (New York, 1990), 179; Howard B. Schaffer, Chester Bowles: New Dealer in the Cold War (Cambridge, MA, 1993), 53, 83; Abramson, Spanning the Century, 572. This representation, during 1959-60, of China as projecting a menacing model of economic success reveals the almost total ignorance in the West of China's concurrent domestic predicament. For the causes underlying this misrepresentation see Noam Kochavi, "Mist Across the Bamboo Curtain: China's Internal Crisis and the American Intelligence Process, 1961-1962," Journal of American-East Asian Relations 5 (Summer 1996): 135-55.
76. Kennedy remarks, "The Bases of U.S. Interest in India - Its New Dimensions," 4 May 1959, Pre-Presidential Papers, box 562, folder: "India 3/29/58-9/6/1960," JFKL;
77. Frank Ninkovich, Modernity and Power: A History of the Domino Theory in the Twentieth Century (Chicago, 1994), 242.
78. Kennedy address to the Senate, Congressional Record, 86th Cong, 1st sess., 19 February 1959, Vol.102, pt. 2:2737-40.
79. Shafer, Deadly Paradigms, 20-21.
80. Ely J. Kahn, The China Hands: America's Foreign Service Officers and What Befell Them (New York, 1975), 22; William P. Snyder, "Dean Rusk to John Foster Dulles, May-June 1953: The Office, the First 100 Days, and Red China," Diplomatic History 7 (Winter 1983): 87; Cohen, Dean Rusk, 35, 44-48; Kennedy statement, House of Representatives, Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 25 January 1949, 550; idem, speech at Salem, 30 January 1949, Pre-presidential Papers, box 95, folder: "Boston Speech Files."
81. Ely J. Kahn, The China Hands: America's Foreign Service Officers and What Befell Them (New York, 1975), 22; William P. Snyder, "Dean Rusk to John Foster Dulles, May-June 1953: The Office, the First 100 Days, and Red China," Diplomatic History 7 (Winter 1983): 87; Cohen, Dean Rusk, 35, 44-48; Kennedy statement, House of Representatives, Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 25 January 1949, 550; idem, speech at Salem, 30 January 1949, Pre-presidential Papers, box 95, folder: "Boston Speech Files."
82. Ely J. Kahn, The China Hands: America's Foreign Service Officers and What Befell Them (New York, 1975), 22; William P. Snyder, "Dean Rusk to John Foster Dulles, May-June 1953: The Office, the First 100 Days, and Red China," Diplomatic History 7 (Winter 1983): 87; Cohen, Dean Rusk, 35, 44-48; Kennedy statement, House of Representatives, Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 25 January 1949, 550; idem, speech at Salem, 30 January 1949, Pre-presidential Papers, box 95, folder: "Boston Speech Files."
83. Ely J. Kahn, The China Hands: America's Foreign Service Officers and What Befell Them (New York, 1975), 22; William P. Snyder, "Dean Rusk to John Foster Dulles, May-June 1953: The Office, the First 100 Days, and Red China," Diplomatic History 7 (Winter 1983): 87; Cohen, Dean Rusk, 35, 44-48; Kennedy statement, House of Representatives, Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 25 January 1949, 550; idem, speech at Salem, 30 January 1949, Pre-presidential Papers, box 95, folder: "Boston Speech Files."
84. Ely J. Kahn, The China Hands: America's Foreign Service Officers and What Befell Them (New York, 1975), 22; William P. Snyder, "Dean Rusk to John Foster Dulles, May-June 1953: The Office, the First 100 Days, and Red China," Diplomatic History 7 (Winter 1983): 87; Cohen, Dean Rusk, 35, 44-48; Kennedy statement, House of Representatives, Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 25 January 1949, 550; idem, speech at Salem, 30 January 1949, Pre-presidential Papers, box 95, folder: "Boston Speech Files."
85. The Rockefeller Brother Reports, Prospect for America, 45; Foster Rhea Dulles, American Policy toward Communist China, 1949-1969 (New York, 1972), 89; Theodore White, In Search of History: A Personal Adventure (New York, 1978), 470.
86. The Rockefeller Brother Reports, Prospect for America, 45; Foster Rhea Dulles, American Policy toward Communist China, 1949-1969 (New York, 1972), 89; Theodore White, In Search of History: A Personal Adventure (New York, 1978), 470.
87. The Rockefeller Brother Reports, Prospect for America, 45; Foster Rhea Dulles, American Policy toward Communist China, 1949-1969 (New York, 1972), 89; Theodore White, In Search of History: A Personal Adventure (New York, 1978), 470.
88. There is little doubt that this was how Eisenhower's stance was interpreted in Kennedy circles, even though contemporary summaries of the 19 January transition meeting did not record any discussion of China at all. See FRUS, 1961-1963 22:43n.2; Clark M. Clifford, Counsel to the President (New York, 1991), 341, 345; Prime Minister's Office Files (PREM) 11/4590, 28 February 1961, Public Record Office, Kew (hereafter PRO); Stevenson interview with Robert Blum, 28 April 1964, Records of Groups 103, folder: "Public Attitudes toward China," CFR.
89. There is little doubt that this was how Eisenhower's stance was interpreted in Kennedy circles, even though contemporary summaries of the 19 January transition meeting did not record any discussion of China at all. See FRUS, 1961-1963 22:43n.2; Clark M. Clifford, Counsel to the President (New York, 1991), 341, 345; Prime Minister's Office Files (PREM) 11/4590, 28 February 1961, Public Record Office, Kew (hereafter PRO); Stevenson interview with Robert Blum, 28 April 1964, Records of Groups 103, folder: "Public Attitudes toward China," CFR.
90. There is little doubt that this was how Eisenhower's stance was interpreted in Kennedy circles, even though contemporary summaries of the 19 January transition meeting did not record any discussion of China at all. See FRUS, 1961-1963 22:43n.2; Clark M. Clifford, Counsel to the President (New York, 1991), 341, 345; Prime Minister's Office Files (PREM) 11/4590, 28 February 1961, Public Record Office, Kew (hereafter PRO); Stevenson interview with Robert Blum, 28 April 1964, Records of Groups 103, folder: "Public Attitudes toward China," CFR.
91. There is little doubt that this was how Eisenhower's stance was interpreted in Kennedy circles, even though contemporary summaries of the 19 January transition meeting did not record any discussion of China at all. See FRUS, 1961-1963 22:43n.2; Clark M. Clifford, Counsel to the President (New York, 1991), 341, 345; Prime Minister's Office Files (PREM) 11/4590, 28 February 1961, Public Record Office, Kew (hereafter PRO); Stevenson interview with Robert Blum, 28 April 1964, Records of Groups 103, folder: "Public Attitudes toward China," CFR.
92. For illustrations see Bachrack, The Committee, 180, 182-83, 187.
93. John B. Martin, Adlai Stevenson and the World: The Life of Adlai E. Stevenson (Garden City, 1977), 573; Chester Bowles, Promises to Keep: My Years in Public Life, 1941-1969 (New York, 1971), 396-98; Schaffer, Chester Bowles, 212: Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearing on Nomination of Under Secretary of State-Designate Chester Bowles, 87th Cong., 1st sess., 19 January 1961; "Bowles' Views Attacked," New York Times, 18 January 1961, 16.
94. John B. Martin, Adlai Stevenson and the World: The Life of Adlai E. Stevenson (Garden City, 1977), 573; Chester Bowles, Promises to Keep: My Years in Public Life, 1941-1969 (New York, 1971), 396-98; Schaffer, Chester Bowles, 212: Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearing on Nomination of Under Secretary of State-Designate Chester Bowles, 87th Cong., 1st sess., 19 January 1961; "Bowles' Views Attacked," New York Times, 18 January 1961, 16.
95. John B. Martin, Adlai Stevenson and the World: The Life of Adlai E. Stevenson (Garden City, 1977), 573; Chester Bowles, Promises to Keep: My Years in Public Life, 1941-1969 (New York, 1971), 396-98; Schaffer, Chester Bowles, 212: Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearing on Nomination of Under Secretary of State-Designate Chester Bowles, 87th Cong., 1st sess., 19 January 1961; "Bowles' Views Attacked," New York Times, 18 January 1961, 16.
96. John B. Martin, Adlai Stevenson and the World: The Life of Adlai E. Stevenson (Garden City, 1977), 573; Chester Bowles, Promises to Keep: My Years in Public Life, 1941-1969 (New York, 1971), 396-98; Schaffer, Chester Bowles, 212: Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearing on Nomination of Under Secretary of State-Designate Chester Bowles, 87th Cong., 1st sess., 19 January 1961; "Bowles' Views Attacked," New York Times, 18 January 1961, 16.
97. John B. Martin, Adlai Stevenson and the World: The Life of Adlai E. Stevenson (Garden City, 1977), 573; Chester Bowles, Promises to Keep: My Years in Public Life, 1941-1969 (New York, 1971), 396-98; Schaffer, Chester Bowles, 212: Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearing on Nomination of Under Secretary of State-Designate Chester Bowles, 87th Cong., 1st sess., 19 January 1961; "Bowles' Views Attacked," New York Times, 18 January 1961, 16.
98. Kennedy press conference, 25 January 1961, Public Papers of the Presidents: John F. Kennedy, 1961 (Washington, 1962), 15;
99. "U.S. Foreign Policy," Rusk testimony, 28 February 1961, Executive Sessions 13 no.1 (1961): 205.
100. Rostow's China policy role is an important topic thus far overlooked in the literature. A professor of economic history at MIT in the 1950s, Rostow served in Kennedy's White House as deputy national security adviser. In November 1961 he moved to the State Department as counselor and chairman of the Policy Planning Council.
101. Walt W. Rostow et al., The Prospects for Communist China (Cambridge, MA, 1954), 301; idem and Richard W. Hatch, An American Policy in Asia (London, 1955), 33-34.
102. Walt W. Rostow et al., The Prospects for Communist China (Cambridge, MA, 1954), 301; idem and Richard W. Hatch, An American Policy in Asia (London, 1955), 33-34.
103. Rostow, An American Policy, 6. 36.
104. See Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge, MA, 1960)
105. ; Merrill, Bread and the Ballot, 154, 171.
106. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston, 1965), 277; Sorensen, Kennedy, 722; James N. Giglio, The Presidency of John F. Kennedy (Lawrence, 1991), 65-66; Castle, At War in the Shadow, 27.
107. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston, 1965), 277; Sorensen, Kennedy, 722; James N. Giglio, The Presidency of John F. Kennedy (Lawrence, 1991), 65-66; Castle, At War in the Shadow, 27.
108. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston, 1965), 277; Sorensen, Kennedy, 722; James N. Giglio, The Presidency of John F. Kennedy (Lawrence, 1991), 65-66; Castle, At War in the Shadow, 27.
109. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston, 1965), 277; Sorensen, Kennedy, 722; James N. Giglio, The Presidency of John F. Kennedy (Lawrence, 1991), 65-66; Castle, At War in the Shadow, 27.
110. Wehrle, "'A Good, Bad Deal,'" 352 Cohen, Dean Rusk, 125-26;
111. Robert J. McMahon, "Eisenhower and Third World Nationalism: A Critique of the Revisionists," Political Science Quarterly 101, no. 3 (1986): 460-61;
112. David K. Hall, "The Laos Neutralization Agreement, 1962," In U.S.-Soviet Security Co-operation, ed. Alexander L. George, Alexander Dallin, and Philip J. Farley (New York, 1988), 435-38.
113. As historian Castle notes, Eisenhower's actual comments, and how Kennedy and his advisers perceived this advice, are now under close historical scrutiny. U.S. diplomatic historians Immerman and Greenstein have recently located documentary evidence that indicates Eisenhower may not have recommended a unilateral U.S. response. Moreover, a number of people who attended the meeting have conflicting versions of what was said and by whom. See Richard Immerman and Fred I. Greenstein, "What did Eisenhower Tell Kennedy About Indochina? The Politics of Misperception," Journal of American History 79, no. 2 (1992): 568-88; Greenstein, "Taking Account of Individuals in International Political Psychology: Eisenhower, Kennedy and Indochina," Political Psychology 15, no. 1 (1994): 61-74; Castle, At War in the Shadow of Vietnam, 152, n. 3.
114. As historian Castle notes, Eisenhower's actual comments, and how Kennedy and his advisers perceived this advice, are now under close historical scrutiny. U.S. diplomatic historians Immerman and Greenstein have recently located documentary evidence that indicates Eisenhower may not have recommended a unilateral U.S. response. Moreover, a number of people who attended the meeting have conflicting versions of what was said and by whom. See Richard Immerman and Fred I. Greenstein, "What did Eisenhower Tell Kennedy About Indochina? The Politics of Misperception," Journal of American History 79, no. 2 (1992): 568-88; Greenstein, "Taking Account of Individuals in International Political Psychology: Eisenhower, Kennedy and Indochina," Political Psychology 15, no. 1 (1994): 61-74; Castle, At War in the Shadow of Vietnam, 152, n. 3.
115. As historian Castle notes, Eisenhower's actual comments, and how Kennedy and his advisers perceived this advice, are now under close historical scrutiny. U.S. diplomatic historians Immerman and Greenstein have recently located documentary evidence that indicates Eisenhower may not have recommended a unilateral U.S. response. Moreover, a number of people who attended the meeting have conflicting versions of what was said and by whom. See Richard Immerman and
116. Michael R. Beschloss, The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960-1963 (New York, 1991), 86;
117. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 340
118. . 41. See Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 129; "Capabilities of the Royal Laotian Armed Forces," Bundy memo to Kennedy, 21 February 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:624.
119. . 41. See Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 129; "Capabilities of the Royal Laotian Armed Forces," Bundy memo to Kennedy, 21 February 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:624.
120. Memcon Kennedy and others, 9 March 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:77. See also "U.S. Foreign Policy," Rusk testimony, 28 February 1961, Executive Sessions 13:1, 191; Castle, At War in the Shadow, 23-26; Earl H. Tilford, "Two Scorpions in a Cup: America and the Soviet Airlift to Laos," Aerospace Historian 27 (September 1980): 151-62.
121. Memcon Kennedy and others, 9 March 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:77. See also "U.S. Foreign Policy," Rusk testimony, 28 February 1961, Executive Sessions 13:1, 191; Castle, At War in the Shadow, 23-26; Earl H. Tilford, "Two Scorpions in a Cup: America and the Soviet Airlift to Laos," Aerospace Historian 27 (September 1980): 151-62.
122. Memcon Kennedy and others, 9 March 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:77. See also "U.S. Foreign Policy," Rusk testimony, 28 February 1961, Executive Sessions 13:1, 191; Castle, At War in the Shadow, 23-26; Earl H. Tilford, "Two Scorpions in a Cup: America and the Soviet Airlift to Laos," Aerospace Historian 27 (September 1980): 151-62.
123. Memcon Kennedy and others, 9 March 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:77. See also "U.S. Foreign Policy," Rusk testimony, 28 February 1961, Executive Sessions 13:1, 191; Castle, At War in the Shadow, 23-26; Earl H. Tilford, "Two Scorpions in a Cup: America and the Soviet Airlift to Laos," Aerospace Historian 27 (September 1980): 151-62.
124. Beschloss, The Crisis Years, 231; Kennedy Press Conference, 23 March 1961, PPP, 1961, 217; memo Bowles to Kennedy, 26 April 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:141;
125. Beschloss, The Crisis Years, 231; Kennedy Press Conference, 23 March 1961, PPP, 1961, 217; memo Bowles to Kennedy, 26 April 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:141;
126. Beschloss, The Crisis Years, 231; Kennedy Press Conference, 23 March 1961, PPP, 1961, 217; memo Bowles to Kennedy, 26 April 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:141;
127. memcon JFK and de Gaulle, 31 May 1961, ibid., 219-20;
128. "The Sino-Soviet dispute and its significance," 1 April 1961, CIA, Sino-Soviet Task Force, NSF:CO, box 22, JFKL.
129. Memcon on Laos, 29 April 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:153.
130. Marylin B. Young, The Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990 (New York, 1990), 77; Walt W. Rostow, The Diffusion of Power: An Essay in Recent History (New York, 1972), 282-84. For his depiction of Communists as "scavengers of the modernization process" see Rostow speech at the U.S. Army Special Warfare School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 28 June 1961, Department of State Bulletin 45 (7 August 1961): 234-37.
131. Marylin B. Young, The Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990 (New York, 1990), 77; Walt W. Rostow, The Diffusion of Power: An Essay in Recent History (New York, 1972), 282-84. For his depiction of Communists as "scavengers of the modernization process" see Rostow speech at the U.S. Army Special Warfare School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 28 June 1961, Department of State Bulletin 45 (7 August 1961): 234-37.
132. Marylin B. Young, The Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990 (New York, 1990), 77; Walt W. Rostow, The Diffusion of Power: An Essay in Recent History (New York, 1972), 282-84. For his depiction of Communists as "scavengers of the modernization process" see Rostow speech at the U.S. Army Special Warfare School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 28 June 1961, Department of State Bulletin 45 (7 August 1961): 234-37.
133. Rostow, The Diffusion of Power, 285.
134. Memo Rostow to JFK, 12 November 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, (Washington, 1988), 1:579.
135. See also memo Rostow to Kennedy, 14 July 1961, ibid., 216;
136. and Rostow, The Diffusion of Power, 287.
137. Rostow to Taylor, 31 July 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963, 22:299.
138. John M. Newman, JFK and Vietnam: Deception, Intrigue, and the Struggle for Power (New York, 1992), 13; memo Rostow to Kennedy, 21 July 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:308; Prados, The Blood Road, 34-40.
139. John M. Newman, JFK and Vietnam: Deception, Intrigue, and the Struggle for Power (New York, 1992), 13; memo Rostow to Kennedy, 21 July 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:308; Prados, The Blood Road, 34-40.
140. John M. Newman, JFK and Vietnam: Deception, Intrigue, and the Struggle for Power (New York, 1992), 13; memo Rostow to Kennedy, 21 July 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:308; Prados, The Blood Road, 34-40.
141. See Schaffer, Chester Bowles, 215;
142. Chang, Friends and Enemies, 218-19;
143. Bowles, "Areas of Possible Crises and Contingency Plans," 17 May 1961, Executive Sessions 13:1 (1961), 545, 551;
144. "Notes on the China Food Situation," memo Bowles to Kennedy, 15 January 1962, White House Files, Arthur Schlesinger Jr. Papers, box WH 3A, folder: "Bowles, Chester 8/28/61-1/31/62," JFKL;
145. memcon on Laos, 29 April 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:154.
146. Tosec Bowles to Rusk, 25 March 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:104n.1;
147. McNamara notes on the 481st NSC Meeting, 1 May 1961, ibid., 163.
148. Memcon on Laos, 29 April 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:150; "Alternative Courses of Action in Laos," memo McNamara and Gilpatric to Kennedy, 2 May 1961, ibid., 166-69. Gilpatric also chaired the Laos Task Force Kennedy established to expedite both the flow of intelligence and the coordination of policy recommendations. Peter S. Usowski, "Intelligence Estimates and US Policy Toward Laos, 1960-1963," Intelligence aad National Security 6, no. 2 (1991): 371.
149. Memcon on Laos, 29 April 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:150; "Alternative Courses of Action in Laos," memo McNamara and Gilpatric to Kennedy, 2 May 1961, ibid., 166-69. Gilpatric also chaired the Laos Task Force Kennedy established to expedite both the flow of intelligence and the coordination of policy recommendations. Peter S. Usowski, "Intelligence Estimates and US Policy Toward Laos, 1960-1963," Intelligence aad National Security 6, no. 2 (1991): 371.
150. Memcon on Laos, 29 April 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:150; "Alternative Courses of Action in Laos," memo McNamara and Gilpatric to Kennedy, 2 May 1961, ibid., 166-69. Gilpatric also chaired the Laos Task Force Kennedy established to expedite both the flow of intelligence and the coordination of policy recommendations. Peter S. Usowski, "Intelligence Estimates and US Policy Toward Laos, 1960-1963," Intelligence aad National Security 6, no. 2 (1991): 371.
151. This approach was probably best evinced in a top-level, "off the record" meeting at the White House on 20 March 1961. No primary evidence on the meeting has been found, but according to historian and Kennedy's special assistant Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., the JCS recommended either a large-scale intervention of sixty thousand troops with air cover, and even the use of nuclear weapons, or else no intervention at all. See Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 332-33; and Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 127-32. Other documents confirm that Lemnitzer and Decker advanced this approach. See Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 338;
152. This approach was probably best evinced in a top-level, "off the record" meeting at the White House on 20 March 1961. No primary evidence on the meeting has been found, but according to historian and Kennedy's special assistant Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., the JCS recommended either a large-scale intervention of sixty thousand troops with air cover, and even the use of nuclear weapons, or else no intervention at all. See Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 332-33; and Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 127-32. Other documents confirm that Lemnitzer and Decker advanced this approach. See Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 338;
153. This approach was probably best evinced in a top-level, "off the record" meeting at the White House on 20 March 1961. No primary evidence on the meeting has been found, but according to historian and Kennedy's special assistant Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., the JCS recommended either a large-scale intervention of sixty thousand troops with air cover, and even the use of nuclear weapons, or else no intervention at all. See Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 332-33; and Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 127-32. Other documents confirm that Lemnitzer and Decker advanced this approach. See Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 338;
154. memcon on Laos, 29 April 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:152. Hilsman's unabashed denigration of the "never again" approach almost certainly strained his relationship with the military.
155. See Michael Forrestal Oral History, 14 August 1964, 108, JFKL;
156. memo Bundy to JFK, "Weekend reading 4/20/62," 20 April 1962, folder: "General 1/62-6/62," NSF: M&M, box 318, JFKL.
157. Newman, JFK and Vietnam, 15-18;
158. tosec Bowles to Rusk, 27 April 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:147;
159. quote in memcon on Laos, 29 April 1961, ibid., 151.
160. Quote in secto 9 Rusk to DOS, 27 March 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:104;
161. secto 11 Rusk to DOS, 28 April 1961, ibid., 148;
162. memcon on Laos, 29 April 1961, ibid., 150-54.
163. "Laos Settlement," memo Rusk to Kennedy, 6 January 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:568.
164. For a similar view see Wehrle, "'A Good, Bad Deal,'" 358.
165. Usowski, "Intelligence Estimates," 371.
166. Lawrence J. Bassett and Stephen E. Pelz, "The Failed Search for Victory: Vietnam and the Politics of War," in Paterson, ed., Kennedy's Quest, 228. See also Hall, "The Laos Neutralization Agreement," 440-45; Warner, Back Fire, 93-94; Sullivan Oral History, 16 June 1970, 3, JFKL.
167. Lawrence J. Bassett and Stephen E. Pelz, "The Failed Search for Victory: Vietnam and the Politics of War," in Paterson, ed., Kennedy's Quest, 228. See also Hall, "The Laos Neutralization Agreement," 440-45; Warner, Back Fire, 93-94; Sullivan Oral History, 16 June 1970, 3, JFKL.
168. Lawrence J. Bassett and Stephen E. Pelz, "The Failed Search for Victory: Vietnam and the Politics of War," in Paterson, ed., Kennedy's Quest, 228. See also Hall, "The Laos Neutralization Agreement," 440-45; Warner, Back Fire, 93-94; Sullivan Oral History, 16 June 1970, 3, JFKL.
169. Lawrence J. Bassett and Stephen E. Pelz, "The Failed Search for Victory: Vietnam and the Politics of War," in Paterson, ed., Kennedy's Quest, 228. See also Hall, "The Laos Neutralization Agreement," 440-45; Warner, Back Fire, 93-94; Sullivan Oral History, 16 June 1970, 3, JFKL.
170. See Giglio, The Presidency, 66-67. Unsurprisingly, several leaders of the pro-Kuomintang China bloc, such as Senator Thomas J. Dodd (D-CT), did champion intervention strongly. See Newman, JFK and Vietnam, 92-93. The Cuban debacle not only spelled the merit of patience for Kennedy but fractured his confidence in the foreign policy bureaucracy in general and the Joint Chiefs in particular. This was matched by the Joint Chiefs' growing irritation with him. This suspicion may have confirmed Kennedy in his decision not to send troops to Laos. For illustrations see Newman, JFK and Vietnam, 55-56; Peter Wyden, Bay of Pigs (New York, 1979), 307; and Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy, 255-57.
171. See Giglio, The Presidency, 66-67. Unsurprisingly, several leaders of the pro-Kuomintang China bloc, such as Senator Thomas J. Dodd (D-CT), did champion intervention strongly. See Newman, JFK and Vietnam, 92-93. The Cuban debacle not only spelled the merit of patience for Kennedy but fractured his confidence in the foreign policy bureaucracy in general and the Joint Chiefs in particular. This was matched by the Joint Chiefs' growing irritation with him. This suspicion may have confirmed Kennedy in his decision not to send troops to Laos. For illustrations see Newman, JFK and Vietnam, 55-56; Peter Wyden, Bay of Pigs (New York, 1979), 307; and Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy, 255-57.
172. See Giglio, The Presidency, 66-67. Unsurprisingly, several leaders of the pro-Kuomintang China bloc, such as Senator Thomas J. Dodd (D-CT), did champion intervention strongly. See Newman, JFK and Vietnam, 92-93. The Cuban debacle not only spelled the merit of patience for Kennedy but fractured his confidence in the foreign policy bureaucracy in general and the Joint Chiefs in particular. This was matched by the Joint Chiefs' growing irritation with him. This suspicion may have confirmed Kennedy in his decision not to send troops to Laos. For illustrations see Newman, JFK and Vietnam, 55-56; Peter Wyden, Bay of Pigs (New York, 1979), 307; and Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy, 255-57.
173. See Giglio, The Presidency, 66-67. Unsurprisingly, several leaders of the pro-Kuomintang China bloc, such as Senator Thomas J. Dodd (D-CT), did champion intervention strongly. See Newman, JFK and Vietnam, 92-93. The Cuban debacle not only spelled the merit of patience for Kennedy but fractured his confidence in the foreign policy bureaucracy in general and the Joint Chiefs in particular. This was matched by the Joint Chiefs' growing irritation with him. This suspicion may have confirmed Kennedy in his decision not to send troops to Laos. For illustrations see Newman, JFK and Vietnam, 55-56; Peter Wyden, Bay of Pigs (New York, 1979), 307; and Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy, 255-57.
174. See Giglio, The Presidency, 66-67. Unsurprisingly, several leaders of the pro-Kuomintang China bloc, such as Senator Thomas J. Dodd (D-CT), did champion intervention strongly. See Newman, JFK and Vietnam, 92-93. The Cuban debacle not only spelled the merit of patience for Kennedy but fractured his confidence in the foreign policy bureaucracy in general and the Joint Chiefs in particular. This was matched by the Joint Chiefs' growing irritation with him. This suspicion may have confirmed Kennedy in his decision not to send troops to Laos. For illustrations see Newman, JFK and Vietnam, 55-56; Peter Wyden, Bay of Pigs (New York, 1979), 307; and Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy, 255-57.
175. Fredrick Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation for War in Vietnam (Berkeley, 1999), 24-25.
176. Montague Kern, Patricia W. Levering, and Ralph B. Levering. The Kennedy Crises: The Press, the Presidency, and Foreign Policy (Chapel Hill, 1983), 30-33; Bassett and Pelz, "The Failed Search for Victory," 230.
177. Montague Kern, Patricia W. Levering, and Ralph B. Levering. The Kennedy Crises: The Press, the Presidency, and Foreign Policy (Chapel Hill, 1983), 30-33; Bassett and Pelz, "The Failed Search for Victory," 230.
178. Memo Robert Komer to Bundy and Karl Kaysen, 9 January 1961, NSF: M&M, box 321, folder: "Komer 1/1/61-3/14/61," JFKL; memo Rostow to Bundy, 14 March 1961, NSF - Bundy Correspondence, box 398, JFKL.
179. As quoted in Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy, 257.
180. Memcon Kennedy and others, 9 March 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:77; memo McGeorge Bundy, 16 April 1961, ibid., 143; U. Alexis Johnson, The Right Hand of Power (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1984), 324; Prados, The Blood Road, 37; Rostow Oral History, LBJL; Sorensen, Kennedy, 645; quote in Giglio, The Presidency, 66.
181. Memcon Kennedy and others, 9 March 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:77; memo McGeorge Bundy, 16 April 1961, ibid., 143; U. Alexis Johnson, The Right Hand of Power (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1984), 324; Prados, The Blood Road, 37; Rostow Oral History, LBJL; Sorensen, Kennedy, 645; quote in Giglio, The Presidency, 66.
182. Memcon Kennedy and others, 9 March 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:77; memo McGeorge Bundy, 16 April 1961, ibid., 143; U. Alexis Johnson, The Right Hand of Power (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1984), 324; Prados, The Blood Road, 37; Rostow Oral History, LBJL; Sorensen, Kennedy, 645; quote in Giglio, The Presidency, 66.
183. Memcon Kennedy and others, 9 March 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:77; memo McGeorge Bundy, 16 April 1961, ibid., 143; U. Alexis Johnson, The Right Hand of Power (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1984), 324; Prados, The Blood Road, 37; Rostow Oral History, LBJL; Sorensen, Kennedy, 645; quote in Giglio, The Presidency, 66.
184. Memcon Kennedy and others, 9 March 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:77; memo McGeorge Bundy, 16 April 1961, ibid., 143; U. Alexis Johnson, The Right Hand of Power (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1984), 324; Prados, The Blood Road, 37; Rostow Oral History, LBJL; Sorensen, Kennedy, 645; quote in Giglio, The Presidency, 66.
185. Memcon Kennedy and others, 9 March 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:77; memo McGeorge Bundy, 16 April 1961, ibid., 143; U. Alexis Johnson, The Right Hand of Power (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1984), 324; Prados, The Blood Road, 37; Rostow Oral History, LBJL; Sorensen, Kennedy, 645; quote in Giglio, The Presidency, 66.
186. Usowski, "Intelligence Estimates," 378-79; Conboy, Shadow War, 69; Christopher Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush (New York, 1996), 271; Castle, At War in the Shadow, 30-46.
187. Usowski, "Intelligence Estimates," 378-79; Conboy, Shadow War, 69; Christopher Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush (New York, 1996), 271; Castle, At War in the Shadow, 30-46.
188. Usowski, "Intelligence Estimates," 378-79; Conboy, Shadow War, 69; Christopher Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush (New York, 1996), 271; Castle, At War in the Shadow, 30-46.
189. Usowski, "Intelligence Estimates," 378-79; Conboy, Shadow War, 69; Christopher Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush (New York, 1996), 271; Castle, At War in the Shadow, 30-46.
190. Newman, JFK and Vietnam, 13.
191. Usowski, "Intelligence Estimates," 382; Harriman to JFK and Rusk, 23 November 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:500-501; SNIE 13-3-61, 30 November 1961, "Chinese Communist Capabilities in the Far East," ibid., 531; memo Bagley to Taylor, 12 February 1962, ibid., 620-21; SNIE 10-62, "Communist Objectives, Capabilities, and Intentions in Southeast Asia," 21 February 1962, Records of the CIA, RG 263, box 8, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland. Rostow and Taylor still clung to the minority opinion that logistical shortcomings and domestic turmoil would impose a passive stance on the Chinese. See Taylor to JFK, 26 September 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 14:432;
192. Usowski, "Intelligence Estimates," 382; Harriman to JFK and Rusk, 23 November 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:500-501; SNIE 13-3-61, 30 November 1961, "Chinese Communist Capabilities in the Far East," ibid., 531; memo Bagley to Taylor, 12 February 1962, ibid., 620-21; SNIE 10-62, "Communist Objectives, Capabilities, and Intentions in Southeast Asia," 21 February 1962, Records of the CIA, RG 263, box 8, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland. Rostow and Taylor still clung to the minority opinion that logistical shortcomings and domestic turmoil would impose a passive stance on the Chinese. See Taylor to JFK, 26 September 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 14:432;
193. Usowski, "Intelligence Estimates," 382; Harriman to JFK and Rusk, 23 November 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:500-501; SNIE 13-3-61, 30 November 1961, "Chinese Communist Capabilities in the Far East," ibid., 531; memo Bagley to Taylor, 12 February 1962, ibid., 620-21; SNIE 10-62, "Communist Objectives, Capabilities, and Intentions in Southeast Asia," 21 February 1962, Records of the CIA, RG 263, box 8, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland. Rostow and Taylor still clung to the minority opinion that logistical shortcomings and domestic turmoil would impose a passive stance on the Chinese. See Taylor to JFK, 26 September 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 14:432;
194. Usowski, "Intelligence Estimates," 382; Harriman to JFK and Rusk, 23 November 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:500-501; SNIE 13-3-61, 30 November 1961, "Chinese Communist Capabilities in the Far East," ibid., 531; memo Bagley to Taylor, 12 February 1962, ibid., 620-21; SNIE 10-62, "Communist Objectives, Capabilities, and Intentions in Southeast Asia," 21 February 1962, Records of the CIA, RG 263, box 8, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland. Rostow and Taylor still clung to the minority opinion that logistical shortcomings and domestic turmoil would impose a passive stance on the Chinese. See Taylor to JFK, 26 September 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 14:432;
195. Usowski, "Intelligence Estimates," 382; Harriman to JFK and Rusk, 23 November 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:500-501; SNIE 13-3-61, 30 November 1961, "Chinese Communist Capabilities in the Far East," ibid., 531; memo Bagley to Taylor, 12 February 1962, ibid., 620-21; SNIE 10-62, "Communist Objectives, Capabilities, and Intentions in Southeast Asia," 21 February 1962, Records of the CIA, RG 263, box 8, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland. Rostow and Taylor still clung to the minority opinion that logistical shortcomings and domestic turmoil would impose a passive stance on the Chinese. See Taylor to JFK, 26 September 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 14:432;
196. Usowski, "Intelligence Estimates," 382; Harriman to JFK and Rusk, 23 November 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:500-501; SNIE 13-3-61, 30 November 1961, "Chinese Communist Capabilities in the Far East," ibid., 531; memo Bagley to Taylor, 12 February 1962, ibid., 620-21; SNIE 10-62, "Communist Objectives, Capabilities, and Intentions in Southeast Asia," 21 February 1962, Records of the CIA, RG 263, box 8, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland. Rostow and Taylor still clung to the minority opinion that logistical shortcomings and domestic turmoil would impose a passive stance on the Chinese. See Taylor to JFK, 26 September 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 14:432;
197. memo Rostow to JFK, 17 August 1961, ibid., 374.
198. See Claudious M. Colombo, "Chinese Communist Perceptions of the Foreign Policy of John F. Kennedy" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1982); MacFarquhar, The Coming of the Cataclysm, 20.
199. See Claudious M. Colombo, "Chinese Communist Perceptions of the Foreign Policy of John F. Kennedy" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1982); MacFarquhar, The Coming of the Cataclysm, 20.
200. See J. Chester Cheng, ed., The Politics of the Chinese Red Army (Stanford, 1966), 487. This volume consists of compilations of the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) secret Bulletin of Activities, which fell into Western hands.
201. Fetzer, "Clinging to Containment," 183; Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists, 245.
202. Fetzer, "Clinging to Containment," 183; Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists, 245.
203. Letter to the author by Roderick M. MacFarquhar, 14 August 1996; MacFarquhar, The Coming of the Cataclysm, 269-70.
204. Letter to the author by Roderick M. MacFarquhar, 14 August 1996; MacFarquhar, The Coming of the Cataclysm, 269-70.
205. Conte 279, Harriman to Rusk, 26 June 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:254n. 2; #1934 Embtel Beam to DOS, 30 June 1961, ibid., 87-89; "Wang Ping-nan's approach to Ambassador Beam," memo Hilsman to McConaughy, 7 July 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 Microfiche Supplement to vols. 22 and 24, doc. 15. Historian Gordon Chang ranks among the first scholars to realize this cross-current. See Chang, Friends and Enemies, 251. The ambassadorial talks began in the summer of 1955 in Geneva and were later moved to Warsaw. Washington's decision to meet with the Chinese was a response to Zhou Enlai's appeal at the Bandung Conference for direct contact. It was not long before the channel became the scene of ritualistic exchange. The major exception to this rule was Washington's unambiguous assurance that it had no intention of supporting a Chinese Nationalist attack on the People's Republic, a clear signal that helped defuse the June 1962 straits crisis. See Wilhelm, The Chinese at the Negotiating Table, 185-201; #84 Cabot to DOS, 15 July 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963 22:293n.1; Wang Bingnan, Nine Years, 249; MacFarquhar, The Coming of the Cataclysm, 273.
206. Conte 279, Harriman to Rusk, 26 June 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:254n. 2; #1934 Embtel Beam to DOS, 30 June 1961, ibid., 87-89; "Wang Ping-nan's approach to Ambassador Beam," memo Hilsman to McConaughy, 7 July 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 Microfiche Supplement to vols. 22 and 24, doc. 15. Historian Gordon Chang ranks among the first scholars to realize this cross-current. See Chang, Friends and Enemies, 251. The ambassadorial talks began in the summer of 1955 in Geneva and were later moved to Warsaw. Washington's decision to meet with the Chinese was a response to Zhou Enlai's appeal at the Bandung Conference for direct contact. It was not long before the channel became the scene of ritualistic exchange. The major exception to this rule was Washington's unambiguous assurance that it had no intention of supporting a Chinese Nationalist attack on the People's Republic, a clear signal that helped defuse the June 1962 straits crisis. See Wilhelm, The Chinese at the Negotiating Table, 185-201; #84 Cabot to DOS, 15 July 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963 22:293n.1; Wang Bingnan, Nine Years, 249; MacFarquhar, The Coming of the Cataclysm, 273.
207. Conte 279, Harriman to Rusk, 26 June 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:254n. 2; #1934 Embtel Beam to DOS, 30 June 1961, ibid., 87-89; "Wang Ping-nan's approach to Ambassador Beam," memo Hilsman to McConaughy, 7 July 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 Microfiche Supplement to vols. 22 and 24, doc. 15. Historian Gordon Chang ranks among the first scholars to realize this cross-current. See Chang, Friends and Enemies, 251. The ambassadorial talks began in the summer of 1955 in Geneva and were later moved to Warsaw. Washington's decision to meet with the Chinese was a response to Zhou Enlai's appeal at the Bandung Conference for direct contact. It was not long before the channel became the scene of ritualistic exchange. The major exception to this rule was Washington's unambiguous assurance that it had no intention of supporting a Chinese Nationalist attack on the People's Republic, a clear signal that helped defuse the June 1962 straits crisis. See Wilhelm, The Chinese at the Negotiating Table, 185-201; #84 Cabot to DOS, 15 July 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963 22:293n.1; Wang Bingnan, Nine Years, 249; MacFarquhar, The Coming of the Cataclysm, 273.
208. Conte 279, Harriman to Rusk, 26 June 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:254n. 2; #1934 Embtel Beam to DOS, 30 June 1961, ibid., 87-89; "Wang Ping-nan's approach to Ambassador Beam," memo Hilsman to McConaughy, 7 July 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 Microfiche Supplement to vols. 22 and 24, doc. 15. Historian Gordon Chang ranks among the first scholars to realize this cross-current. See Chang, Friends and Enemies, 251. The ambassadorial talks began in the summer of 1955 in Geneva and were later moved to Warsaw. Washington's decision to meet with the Chinese was a response to Zhou Enlai's appeal at the Bandung Conference for direct contact. It was not long before the channel became the scene of ritualistic exchange. The major exception to this rule was Washington's unambiguous assurance that it had no intention of supporting a Chinese Nationalist attack on the People's Republic, a clear signal that helped defuse the June 1962 straits crisis. See Wilhelm, The Chinese at the Negotiating Table, 185-201; #84 Cabot to DOS, 15 July 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963 22:293n.1; Wang Bingnan, Nine Years, 249; MacFarquhar, The Coming of the Cataclysm, 273.
209. Conte 279, Harriman to Rusk, 26 June 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:254n. 2; #1934 Embtel Beam to DOS, 30 June 1961, ibid., 87-89; "Wang Ping-nan's approach to Ambassador Beam," memo Hilsman to McConaughy, 7 July 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 Microfiche Supplement to vols. 22 and 24, doc. 15. Historian Gordon Chang ranks among the first scholars to realize this cross-current. See Chang, Friends and Enemies, 251. The ambassadorial talks began in the summer of 1955 in Geneva and were later moved to Warsaw. Washington's decision to meet with the Chinese was a response to Zhou Enlai's appeal at the Bandung Conference for direct contact. It was not long before the channel became the scene of ritualistic exchange. The major exception to this rule was Washington's unambiguous assurance that it had no intention of supporting a Chinese Nationalist attack on the People's Republic, a clear signal that helped defuse the June 1962 straits crisis. See Wilhelm, The Chinese at the Negotiating Table, 185-201; #84 Cabot to DOS, 15 July 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963 22:293n.1; Wang Bingnan, Nine Years, 249; MacFarquhar, The Coming of the Cataclysm, 273.
210. Conte 279, Harriman to Rusk, 26 June 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:254n. 2; #1934 Embtel Beam to DOS, 30 June 1961, ibid., 87-89; "Wang Ping-nan's approach to Ambassador Beam," memo Hilsman to McConaughy, 7 July 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 Microfiche Supplement to vols. 22 and 24, doc. 15. Historian Gordon Chang ranks among the first scholars to realize this cross-current. See Chang, Friends and Enemies, 251. The ambassadorial talks began in the summer of 1955 in Geneva and were later moved to Warsaw. Washington's decision to meet with the Chinese was a response to Zhou Enlai's appeal at the Bandung Conference for direct contact. It was not long before the channel became the scene of ritualistic exchange. The major exception to this rule was Washington's unambiguous assurance that it had no intention of supporting a Chinese Nationalist attack on the People's Republic, a clear signal that helped defuse the June 1962 straits crisis. See Wilhelm, The Chinese at the Negotiating Table, 185-201; #84 Cabot to DOS, 15 July 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963 22:293n.1; Wang Bingnan, Nine Years, 249; MacFarquhar, The Coming of the Cataclysm, 273.
211. Conte 279, Harriman to Rusk, 26 June 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:254n. 2; #1934 Embtel Beam to DOS, 30 June 1961, ibid., 87-89; "Wang Ping-nan's approach to Ambassador Beam," memo Hilsman to McConaughy, 7 July 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 Microfiche Supplement to vols. 22 and 24, doc. 15. Historian Gordon Chang ranks among the first scholars to realize this cross-current. See Chang, Friends and Enemies, 251. The ambassadorial talks began in the summer of 1955 in Geneva and were later moved to Warsaw. Washington's decision to meet with the Chinese was a response to Zhou Enlai's appeal at the Bandung Conference for direct contact. It was not long before the channel became the scene of ritualistic exchange. The major exception to this rule was Washington's unambiguous assurance that it had no intention of supporting a Chinese Nationalist attack on the People's Republic, a clear signal that helped defuse the June 1962 straits crisis. See Wilhelm, The Chinese at the Negotiating Table, 185-201; #84 Cabot to DOS, 15 July 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963 22:293n.1; Wang Bingnan, Nine Years, 249; MacFarquhar, The Coming of the Cataclysm, 273.
212. Conte 279, Harriman to Rusk, 26 June 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:254n. 2; #1934 Embtel Beam to DOS, 30 June 1961, ibid., 87-89; "Wang Ping-nan's approach to Ambassador Beam," memo Hilsman to McConaughy, 7 July 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 Microfiche Supplement to vols. 22 and 24, doc. 15. Historian Gordon Chang ranks among the first scholars to realize this cross-current. See Chang, Friends and Enemies, 251. The ambassadorial talks began in the summer of 1955 in Geneva and were later moved to Warsaw. Washington's decision to meet with the Chinese was a response to Zhou Enlai's appeal at the Bandung Conference for direct contact. It was not long before the channel became the scene of ritualistic exchange. The major exception to this rule was Washington's unambiguous assurance that it had no intention of supporting a Chinese Nationalist attack on the People's Republic, a clear signal that helped defuse the June 1962 straits crisis. See Wilhelm, The Chinese at the Negotiating Table, 185-201; #84 Cabot to DOS, 15 July 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963 22:293n.1; Wang Bingnan, Nine Years, 249; MacFarquhar, The Coming of the Cataclysm, 273.
213. CIA, "The Signs of Communist Chinese Friendliness," 17 July 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 Microfiche supplement to vols. 22 and 24, doc. 17.
214. "Wang Ping-nan's approach to Ambassador Beam," memo Hilsman to McConaughy, 7 July 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 Microfiche Supplement to vols. 22 and 24, doc. 15.
215. "A Memo for the thanksgiving weekend," Rostow to Kennedy, 22 November 1961, NSF: CO, box 22, folder: "China General 11/1/61-11/26/61," JFKL; memo Rostow to Kennedy, 12 November 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 1:216. Rostow drew this estimate almost certainly without knowledge of Wang's 2 September rejection of the American explorative feelers at Warsaw.
216. "A Memo for the thanksgiving weekend," Rostow to Kennedy, 22 November 1961, NSF: CO, box 22, folder: "China General 11/1/61-11/26/61," JFKL; memo Rostow to Kennedy, 12 November 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 1:216. Rostow drew this estimate almost certainly without knowledge of Wang's 2 September rejection of the American explorative feelers at Warsaw.
217. Abramson, Spanning the Century, 413-60, 535, 572; Chang, Friends and Enemies, 105.
218. Abramson, Spanning the Century, 413-60, 535, 572; Chang, Friends and Enemies, 105.
219. Abramson, Spanning the Century, 584-85
220. ; #2222 deptel Rusk to Harriman, 23 June 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:253;
221. confe 339 Steeves to Rusk, 6 July 1961, ibid., 289;
222. confe 408 Harriman to Rusk, 18 July 1961, ibid., 303;
223. fecon 281 Rusk to Harriman, 21 July 1961, ibid., 306.
224. Abramson, Spanning the Century, 585; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 514; John K. Galbraith, Ambassador's Journal: A Personal Account of the Kennedy Years (Boston, 1969), 154. Harriman was also clearly keen on minimizing the prospects of Chinese military intervention in Laos. In September 1961, for example, he prodded Phoumi to disband the Nationalist Chinese irregulars then fighting on Phoumi's side. See Wehrle, "'A Good, Bad Deal,'" 363.
225. Abramson, Spanning the Century, 585; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 514; John K. Galbraith, Ambassador's Journal: A Personal Account of the Kennedy Years (Boston, 1969), 154. Harriman was also clearly keen on minimizing the prospects of Chinese military intervention in Laos. In September 1961, for example, he prodded Phoumi to disband the Nationalist Chinese irregulars then fighting on Phoumi's side. See Wehrle, "'A Good, Bad Deal,'" 363.
226. Abramson, Spanning the Century, 585; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 514; John K. Galbraith, Ambassador's Journal: A Personal Account of the Kennedy Years (Boston, 1969), 154. Harriman was also clearly keen on minimizing the prospects of Chinese military intervention in Laos. In September 1961, for example, he prodded Phoumi to disband the Nationalist Chinese irregulars then fighting on Phoumi's side. See Wehrle, "'A Good, Bad Deal,'" 363.
227. Abramson, Spanning the Century, 585; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 514; John K. Galbraith, Ambassador's Journal: A Personal Account of the Kennedy Years (Boston, 1969), 154. Harriman was also clearly keen on minimizing the prospects of Chinese military intervention in Laos. In September 1961, for example, he prodded Phoumi to disband the Nationalist Chinese irregulars then fighting on Phoumi's side. See Wehrle, "'A Good, Bad Deal,'" 363.
228. Dean and Richard Rusk, As I Saw It (New York, 1990), 287; Rusk Oral History, "UUU" transcript, May 1985, Richard B. Russell Library, The University of Georgia, Athens. For the prevalent view of Rusk as the quintessential presidential "Good Soldier" see Warren I. Cohen, "New Light on Dean Rusk? A Review Essay," Political Science Quarterly 106, no. 1 (1991): 125.
229. Dean and Richard Rusk, As I Saw It (New York, 1990), 287; Rusk Oral History, "UUU" transcript, May 1985, Richard B. Russell Library, The University of Georgia, Athens. For the prevalent view of Rusk as the quintessential presidential "Good Soldier" see Warren I. Cohen, "New Light on Dean Rusk? A Review Essay," Political Science Quarterly 106, no. 1 (1991): 125.
230. Special Assistant to the Undersecretary James Thomson, Galbraith, Hilsman, and Foster Rhea Dulles have been among the most strident critics of Rusk on this score. See James Thomson, "On the Making of U.S. China Policy, 1961-1969: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics," China Quarterly 50 (April/June 1972): 233;
231. James Thomson Oral History, 22 July 1971, LBJL; Hilsman Oral History, 15 May 1969, LBJL;
232. Foster R. Dulles, American Policy toward Communist China, 192;
233. John K. Galbraith, A Life in Our Times (Boston, 1981), 402-6, 428n.3. Warren Cohen and James Fetzer have conversely pinned the lion's share of responsibility on Kennedy.
234. Fetzer, "Clinging to Containment," esp. 181;
235. Cohen, "The United States and China since 1945," 160.
236. For an overview of the strategies employed by the administration regarding the China representation problem, see Foot, The Practice of Power, 36-41.
237. #221 Deptel Rusk to Beam, 13 August 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 22:118-20; memo U. Alexis Johnson to Rusk, 13 August 1961, ibid., 118n. Whether Kennedy was privy to these moves is unascertainable from the documentary record; possibly, the doctrine of presidential "plausible deniability" was applied to this case.
238. #221 Deptel Rusk to Beam, 13 August 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 22:118-20; memo U. Alexis Johnson to Rusk, 13 August 1961, ibid., 118n. Whether Kennedy was privy to these moves is unascertainable from the documentary record; possibly, the doctrine of presidential "plausible deniability" was applied to this case.
239. #282 Embtel Beam to Rusk, 16 August 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 22:125-26; #402 embtel Beam to Rusk, 2 September 1961, ibid., 130-33.
240. #282 Embtel Beam to Rusk, 16 August 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 22:125-26; #402 embtel Beam to Rusk, 2 September 1961, ibid., 130-33.
241. FRUS, 1961-1963, 22:169 n.2; Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 309; Kennedy Press Conference, 11 October 1961, PPP 1961, 658.
242. FRUS, 1961-1963, 22:169 n.2; Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 309; Kennedy Press Conference, 11 October 1961, PPP 1961, 658.
243. FRUS, 1961-1963, 22:169 n.2; Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 309; Kennedy Press Conference, 11 October 1961, PPP 1961, 658.
244. "Defensibility of Southeast Asia and United States Commitments," memo Kenneth T. Young to Taylor, 27 October 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, (Washington, 1995), 23:28. A number of Kennedy officials later came to regret the preponderance of the domino belief. For instance, Charles Yost, Stevenson's UN deputy, deplored it as leading to gross underestimation of China's preoccupation with domestic problems. Charles F. Yost, History and Memory: A Statesman's Perceptions of the Twentieth Century (New York, 1980), 150.
245. "Defensibility of Southeast Asia and United States Commitments," memo Kenneth T. Young to Taylor, 27 October 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, (Washington, 1995), 23:28. A number of Kennedy officials later came to regret the preponderance of the domino belief. For instance, Charles Yost, Stevenson's UN deputy, deplored it as leading to gross underestimation of China's preoccupation with domestic problems. Charles F. Yost, History and Memory: A Statesman's Perceptions of the Twentieth Century (New York, 1980), 150.
246. Krock interview with JFK, 11 October 1961, book III, 343, Arthur Krock Papers, Seeley Mudd Library, Princeton, New Jersey.
247. Young, The Vietnam Wars, 81; Logevall, Choosing War, 28-32;
248. Young, The Vietnam Wars, 81; Logevall, Choosing War, 28-32;
249. memo of discussion, July 28, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 1:254;
250. "Notes on the NSC Meeting, Washington, November 15, 1961," ibid., 607-8;
251. "Notes on a Meeting, the White House, Washington, November 11, 1961, 12:10 p.m.," memo Lemnitzer, n.d., ibid., 578. Elaboration on the import of the China factor in the Vietnam context falls outside the purview of this paper.
252. Compare Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 127-55; Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy, 253-60; Wehrle, "'A Good, Bad Deal,'" 349-77; Abramson, Spanning the Century, 582-91; Twing, Myths, Models, and U.S. Foreign Policy, 124-2; Castle, At War in the Shadow of Vietnam, esp. 128-37; Warner, Back Fire, 93-94; Conboy, Shadow War; Hamilton-Merritt, Tragic Mountains; Prados, The Blood Road; and Logevall, Choosing War, 41.
253. Compare Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 127-55; Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy, 253-60; Wehrle, "'A Good, Bad Deal,'" 349-77; Abramson, Spanning the Century, 582-91; Twing, Myths, Models, and U.S. Foreign Policy, 124-2; Castle, At War in the Shadow of Vietnam, esp. 128-37; Warner, Back Fire, 93-94; Conboy, Shadow War; Hamilton-Merritt, Tragic Mountains; Prados, The Blood Road; and Logevall, Choosing War, 41.
254. Compare Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 127-55; Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy, 253-60; Wehrle, "'A Good, Bad Deal,'" 349-77; Abramson, Spanning the Century, 582-91; Twing, Myths, Models, and U.S. Foreign Policy, 124-2; Castle, At War in the Shadow of Vietnam, esp. 128-37; Warner, Back Fire, 93-94; Conboy, Shadow War; Hamilton-Merritt, Tragic Mountains; Prados, The Blood Road; and Logevall, Choosing War, 41.
255. Compare Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 127-55; Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy, 253-60; Wehrle, "'A Good, Bad Deal,'" 349-77; Abramson, Spanning the Century, 582-91; Twing, Myths, Models, and U.S. Foreign Policy, 124-2; Castle, At War in the Shadow of Vietnam, esp. 128-37; Warner, Back Fire, 93-94; Conboy, Shadow War; Hamilton-Merritt, Tragic Mountains; Prados, The Blood Road; and Logevall, Choosing War, 41.
256. Compare Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 127-55; Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy, 253-60; Wehrle, "'A Good, Bad Deal,'" 349-77; Abramson, Spanning the Century, 582-91; Twing, Myths, Models, and U.S. Foreign Policy, 124-2; Castle, At War in the Shadow of Vietnam, esp. 128-37; Warner, Back Fire, 93-94; Conboy, Shadow War; Hamilton-Merritt, Tragic Mountains; Prados, The Blood Road; and Logevall, Choosing War, 41.
257. Compare Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 127-55; Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy, 253-60; Wehrle, "'A Good, Bad Deal,'" 349-77; Abramson, Spanning the Century, 582-91; Twing, Myths, Models, and U.S. Foreign Policy, 124-2; Castle, At War in the Shadow of Vietnam, esp. 128-37; Warner, Back Fire, 93-94; Conboy, Shadow War; Hamilton-Merritt, Tragic Mountains; Prados, The Blood Road; and Logevall, Choosing War, 41.
258. Compare Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 127-55; Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy, 253-60; Wehrle, "'A Good, Bad Deal,'" 349-77; Abramson, Spanning the Century, 582-91; Twing, Myths, Models, and U.S. Foreign Policy, 124-2; Castle, At War in the Shadow of Vietnam, esp. 128-37; Warner, Back Fire, 93-94; Conboy, Shadow War; Hamilton-Merritt, Tragic Mountains; Prados, The Blood Road; and Logevall, Choosing War, 41.
259. Compare Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 127-55; Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy, 253-60; Wehrle, "'A Good, Bad Deal,'" 349-77; Abramson, Spanning the Century, 582-91; Twing, Myths, Models, and U.S. Foreign Policy, 124-2; Castle, At War in the Shadow of Vietnam, esp. 128-37; Warner, Back Fire, 93-94; Conboy, Shadow War; Hamilton-Merritt, Tragic Mountains; Prados, The Blood Road; and Logevall, Choosing War, 41.
260. Compare Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 127-55; Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy, 253-60; Wehrle, "'A Good, Bad Deal,'" 349-77; Abramson, Spanning the Century, 582-91; Twing, Myths, Models, and U.S. Foreign Policy, 124-2; Castle, At War in the Shadow of Vietnam, esp. 128-37; Warner, Back Fire, 93-94; Conboy, Shadow War; Hamilton-Merritt, Tragic Mountains; Prados, The Blood Road; and Logevall, Choosing War, 41.
261. Compare Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 127-55; Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy, 253-60; Wehrle, "'A Good, Bad Deal,'" 349-77; Abramson, Spanning the Century, 582-91; Twing, Myths, Models, and U.S. Foreign Policy, 124-2; Castle, At War in the Shadow of Vietnam, esp. 128-37; Warner, Back Fire, 93-94; Conboy, Shadow War; Hamilton-Merritt, Tragic Mountains; Prados, The Blood Road; and Logevall, Choosing War, 41.
262. Compare Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 127-55; Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy, 253-60; Wehrle, "'A Good, Bad Deal,'" 349-77; Abramson, Spanning the Century, 582-91; Twing, Myths, Models, and U.S. Foreign Policy, 124-2; Castle, At War in the Shadow of Vietnam, esp. 128-37; Warner, Back Fire, 93-94; Conboy, Shadow War; Hamilton-Merritt, Tragic Mountains; Prados, The Blood Road; and Logevall, Choosing War, 41.
263. Usowski, "Intelligence Estimates," 384. See also Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 140-41; Conboy, Shadow War, 169-73; and Wehrle, "'A Good, Bad Deal,'" 366-69.
264. Usowski, "Intelligence Estimates," 384. See also Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 140-41; Conboy, Shadow War, 169-73; and Wehrle, "'A Good, Bad Deal,'" 366-69.
265. Usowski, "Intelligence Estimates," 384. See also Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 140-41; Conboy, Shadow War, 169-73; and Wehrle, "'A Good, Bad Deal,'" 366-69.
266. Usowski, "Intelligence Estimates," 384. See also Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 140-41; Conboy, Shadow War, 169-73; and Wehrle, "'A Good, Bad Deal,'" 366-69.
267. Stephen E. Pelz, "'When Do I Have Time to Think?' John F. Kennedy, Roger Hilsman, and the Laotian Crisis of 1962," Diplomatic History 3 (Spring 1979): 217; Colombo, "Chinese Communist Perceptions," 78-81.
268. Stephen E. Pelz, "'When Do I Have Time to Think?' John F. Kennedy, Roger Hilsman, and the Laotian Crisis of 1962," Diplomatic History 3 (Spring 1979): 217; Colombo, "Chinese Communist Perceptions," 78-81.
269. Telcon Ball and Harriman, 6 May 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:720n.2; telcon Ball and McGeorge Bundy, 6 May 1962, ibid., 721; citation from the New York Times, 11 May 1962.
270. Telcon Ball and Harriman, 6 May 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:720n.2; telcon Ball and McGeorge Bundy, 6 May 1962, ibid., 721; citation from the New York Times, 11 May 1962.
271. Telcon Ball and Harriman, 6 May 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:720n.2; telcon Ball and McGeorge Bundy, 6 May 1962, ibid., 721; citation from the New York Times, 11 May 1962.
272. See Pelz, "When Do I Have Time to Think?" Even Hilsman, in his subsequent rebuke of Pelz's analysis, did not dispute this particular point. See Roger Hilsman and Stephen E. Pelz, "When is a Document Not a Document - And Other Thoughts," Diplomatic History 3 (Summer 1979): 345-46.
273. See Pelz, "When Do I Have Time to Think?" Even Hilsman, in his subsequent rebuke of Pelz's analysis, did not dispute this particular point. See Roger Hilsman and Stephen E. Pelz, "When is a Document Not a Document - And Other Thoughts," Diplomatic History 3 (Summer 1979): 345-46.
274. "The Situation in Laos," Rusk testimony, Executive Sessions, 14 (1962), 649; telcon Ball and McGeorge Bundy, 6 May 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:721; memo Hilsman to Harriman, 9 May 1962, ibid., 731-32; SNIE 58-3-62, "Implications of the Fall of Nam Tha," 9 May 1962, ibid., 726-29 (quotes are from 727 and 729, respectively). See also "The Current Military Situation and Outlook in Laos," 14 May 1962, ibid., 769; "Meeting with Congressional Leaders," 15 May 1962, ibid., 773.
275. "The Situation in Laos," Rusk testimony, Executive Sessions, 14 (1962), 649; telcon Ball and McGeorge Bundy, 6 May 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:721; memo Hilsman to Harriman, 9 May 1962, ibid., 731-32; SNIE 58-3-62, "Implications of the Fall of Nam Tha," 9 May 1962, ibid., 726-29 (quotes are from 727 and 729, respectively). See also "The Current Military Situation and Outlook in Laos," 14 May 1962, ibid., 769; "Meeting with Congressional Leaders," 15 May 1962, ibid., 773.
276. "The Situation in Laos," Rusk testimony, Executive Sessions, 14 (1962), 649; telcon Ball and McGeorge Bundy, 6 May 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:721; memo Hilsman to Harriman, 9 May 1962, ibid., 731-32; SNIE 58-3-62, "Implications of the Fall of Nam Tha," 9 May 1962, ibid., 726-29 (quotes are from 727 and 729, respectively). See also "The Current Military Situation and Outlook in Laos," 14 May 1962, ibid., 769; "Meeting with Congressional Leaders," 15 May 1962, ibid., 773.
277. "The Situation in Laos," Rusk testimony, Executive Sessions, 14 (1962), 649; telcon Ball and McGeorge Bundy, 6 May 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:721; memo Hilsman to Harriman, 9 May 1962, ibid., 731-32; SNIE 58-3-62, "Implications of the Fall of Nam Tha," 9 May 1962, ibid., 726-29 (quotes are from 727 and 729, respectively). See also "The Current Military Situation and Outlook in Laos," 14 May 1962, ibid., 769; "Meeting with Congressional Leaders," 15 May 1962, ibid., 773.
278. "The Situation in Laos," Rusk testimony, Executive Sessions, 14 (1962), 649; telcon Ball and McGeorge Bundy, 6 May 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:721; memo Hilsman to Harriman, 9 May 1962, ibid., 731-32; SNIE 58-3-62, "Implications of the Fall of Nam Tha," 9 May 1962, ibid., 726-29 (quotes are from 727 and 729, respectively). See also "The Current Military Situation and Outlook in Laos," 14 May 1962, ibid., 769; "Meeting with Congressional Leaders," 15 May 1962, ibid., 773.
279. "The Situation in Laos," Rusk testimony, Executive Sessions, 14 (1962), 649; telcon Ball and McGeorge Bundy, 6 May 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:721; memo Hilsman to Harriman, 9 May 1962, ibid., 731-32; SNIE 58-3-62, "Implications of the Fall of Nam Tha," 9 May 1962, ibid., 726-29 (quotes are from 727 and 729, respectively). See also "The Current Military Situation and Outlook in Laos," 14 May 1962, ibid., 769; "Meeting with Congressional Leaders," 15 May 1962, ibid., 773.
280. Pelz, "When Do I have Time to Think?" 221; SNIE 58-3-62, 9 May 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:727; Hilsman memo, 9 May 1962, ibid., 732. The administration also sent the Seventh Fleet to the Gulf of Siam. For further details on the military measures chosen by the administration see Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 142-50.
281. Pelz, "When Do I have Time to Think?" 221; SNIE 58-3-62, 9 May 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:727; Hilsman memo, 9 May 1962, ibid., 732. The administration also sent the Seventh Fleet to the Gulf of Siam. For further details on the military measures chosen by the administration see Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 142-50.
282. Pelz, "When Do I have Time to Think?" 221; SNIE 58-3-62, 9 May 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:727; Hilsman memo, 9 May 1962, ibid., 732. The administration also sent the Seventh Fleet to the Gulf of Siam. For further details on the military measures chosen by the administration see Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 142-50.
283. Pelz, "When Do I have Time to Think?" 221; SNIE 58-3-62, 9 May 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:727; Hilsman memo, 9 May 1962, ibid., 732. The administration also sent the Seventh Fleet to the Gulf of Siam. For further details on the military measures chosen by the administration see Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 142-50.
284. See memcon Kennedy and Rusk, 13 May 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:759.
285. Sorensen, Kennedy, 646.
286. See Hilsman memo, 9 May 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:731; Kern et al., The Kennedy Crises, 48.
287. See Hilsman memo, 9 May 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:731; Kern et al., The Kennedy Crises, 48.
288. For illustrations, see memo Forrestal to Bundy, 3 August 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963 22:299-301; Harriman to Kirk, 8 August 1962, ibid., 301-2; Harriman to Kirk, 16 August 1962, ibid., 305n.1; Kirk to Harriman, 23 August 1962, ibid., 305-6; memcon Kirk and Chiang Kai-shek, 6 September 1962, ibid., 507-12; "Impressions from Taiwan," Taylor paper, 20 September 1962, ibid., 314-17.
289. For illustrations, see memo Forrestal to Bundy, 3 August 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963 22:299-301; Harriman to Kirk, 8 August 1962, ibid., 301-2; Harriman to Kirk, 16 August 1962, ibid., 305n.1; Kirk to Harriman, 23 August 1962, ibid., 305-6; memcon Kirk and Chiang Kai-shek, 6 September 1962, ibid., 507-12; "Impressions from Taiwan," Taylor paper, 20 September 1962, ibid., 314-17.
290. For illustrations, see memo Forrestal to Bundy, 3 August 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963 22:299-301; Harriman to Kirk, 8 August 1962, ibid., 301-2; Harriman to Kirk, 16 August 1962, ibid., 305n.1; Kirk to Harriman, 23 August 1962, ibid., 305-6; memcon Kirk and Chiang Kai-shek, 6 September 1962, ibid., 507-12; "Impressions from Taiwan," Taylor paper, 20 September 1962, ibid., 314-17.
291. For illustrations, see memo Forrestal to Bundy, 3 August 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963 22:299-301; Harriman to Kirk, 8 August 1962, ibid., 301-2; Harriman to Kirk, 16 August 1962, ibid., 305n.1; Kirk to Harriman, 23 August 1962, ibid., 305-6; memcon Kirk and Chiang Kai-shek, 6 September 1962, ibid., 507-12; "Impressions from Taiwan," Taylor paper, 20 September 1962, ibid., 314-17.
292. For illustrations, see memo Forrestal to Bundy, 3 August 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963 22:299-301; Harriman to Kirk, 8 August 1962, ibid., 301-2; Harriman to
293. For illustrations, see memo Forrestal to Bundy, 3 August 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963 22:299-301; Harriman to Kirk, 8 August 1962, ibid., 301-2; Harriman to Kirk, 16 August 1962, ibid., 305n.1; Kirk to Harriman, 23 August 1962, ibid., 305-6; memcon Kirk and Chiang Kai-shek, 6 September 1962, ibid., 507-12; "Impressions from Taiwan," Taylor paper, 20 September 1962, ibid., 314-17.
294. Rostow testimony, 26 June 1962, Executive Sessions 14 (1962): 578-79; "The Impact of the Food Crisis on Peiping's Policies," Hilsman to Rusk, 9 July 1962, James Thomson Papers, box 15, folder: "Food for China 6/62-7/62 and undated," JFKL.
295. Rostow testimony, 26 June 1962, Executive Sessions 14 (1962): 578-79; "The Impact of the Food Crisis on Peiping's Policies," Hilsman to Rusk, 9 July 1962, James Thomson Papers, box 15, folder: "Food for China 6/62-7/62 and undated," JFKL.
296. Memcon Rusk, Home, and Macmillan, 25 June 1962, PREM 11/4583, PRO.
297. #85 "Eyes only" Deptel Rusk to Cabot, 28 July 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963 22:296-98. Significantly, this conciliatory message does not jibe with the concurrent hardening of China's Southeast Asia policies, apparently endorsed by Chen. Settlement of this issue awaits further declassification; Allen S. Whiting proposes that Chen spoke here out of church. Allen S. Whiting letter to author, 13 October 1998. One may also surmise that Chen sought here to ascertain Washington's evacuation of Laos by assuming a false conciliatory demeanor.
298. 23 November 1962, Foreign Office Files (FO) 371/164931, PRO.
299. Rusk to Ball and Kennedy, 20 July 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963 22:296 n.1.
300. Bundy to Kennedy, 21 July 1962, NSF: M&M, box 318, folder: "Index of Weekend papers General, 7/62-12/62," JFKL.
301. Bowles, "Draft Memo on East and Southeast Asia," 20 March 1962, James Thomson Papers, box 7, folder: "General 1962," JFKL; Bowles, "A Balance Sheet on Asia," DSB 46, 23 March 1962, 674-78; Bowles, "U.S. Policies in the Far East," 4 April 1962, Schlesinger Papers, box WH-3a, folder: "Bowles, Chester 4/62," JFKL; memo Harriman to Rusk, 30 July 1962, Harriman Papers, box 438, folder: "Bowles, Chester," Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Washington, DC; memcon Grant and Ruzic (counselor at Yugoslav embassy), 21 August 1962, box 1309, folder: "611.93/6-661," National Archives. The quote is from the 4 April paper. For further information on the Bowles initiative see Wehrle, "'A Good, Bad Deal,'" 372-74; Young, The Vietnam Wars, 80-82; and Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy, 288-90.
302. Bowles, "Draft Memo on East and Southeast Asia," 20 March 1962, James Thomson Papers, box 7, folder: "General 1962," JFKL; Bowles, "A Balance Sheet on Asia," DSB 46, 23 March 1962, 674-78; Bowles, "U.S. Policies in the Far East," 4 April 1962, Schlesinger Papers, box WH-3a, folder: "Bowles, Chester 4/62," JFKL; memo Harriman to Rusk, 30 July 1962, Harriman Papers, box 438, folder: "Bowles, Chester," Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Washington, DC; memcon Grant and Ruzic (counselor at Yugoslav embassy), 21 August 1962, box 1309, folder: "611.93/6-661," National Archives. The quote is from the 4 April paper. For further information on the Bowles initiative see Wehrle, "'A Good, Bad Deal,'" 372-74; Young, The Vietnam Wars, 80-82; and Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy, 288-90.
303. Bowles, "Draft Memo on East and Southeast Asia," 20 March 1962, James Thomson Papers, box 7, folder: "General 1962," JFKL; Bowles, "A Balance Sheet on Asia," DSB 46, 23 March 1962, 674-78; Bowles, "U.S. Policies in the Far East," 4 April 1962, Schlesinger Papers, box WH-3a, folder: "Bowles, Chester 4/62," JFKL; memo Harriman to Rusk, 30 July 1962, Harriman Papers, box 438, folder: "Bowles, Chester," Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Washington, DC; memcon Grant and Ruzic (counselor at Yugoslav embassy), 21 August 1962, box 1309, folder: "611.93/6-661," National Archives. The quote is from the 4 April paper. For further information on the Bowles initiative see Wehrle, "'A Good, Bad Deal,'" 372-74; Young, The Vietnam Wars, 80-82; and Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy, 288-90.
304. William H. Sullivan, Obbligato, 1939-1979: Notes on a Foreign Service Career (New York, 1984), 170; Chester L. Cooper, The Lost Crusade in Vietnam (New York, 1970), 183-84.
305. William H. Sullivan, Obbligato, 1939-1979: Notes on a Foreign Service Career (New York, 1984), 170; Chester L. Cooper, The Lost Crusade in Vietnam (New York, 1970), 183-84.
306. Wehrle, "'A Good, Bad Deal,'" 373; Harriman to John Czyzak, 23 July 1962, "Memorandum for Files: Personal and Secret," 21 July 1962, Harriman Papers, box 530; Harriman Oral History interview by Schlesinger, 67-68, JFKL; Abramson, Spanning the Century, 585. Whether Harriman coordinated this move fully with the State Department is unascertainable from the record.
307. Wehrle, "'A Good, Bad Deal,'" 373; Harriman to John Czyzak, 23 July 1962, "Memorandum for Files: Personal and Secret," 21 July 1962, Harriman Papers, box 530; Harriman Oral History interview by Schlesinger, 67-68, JFKL; Abramson, Spanning the Century, 585. Whether Harriman coordinated this move fully with the State Department is unascertainable from the record.
308. Quoted in Young, The Vietnam Wars, 81.
309. Bowles's demotion had little to do directly with Asian policies. For renditions of that familiar story see Schaffer, Chester Bowles, 205-8; James Thomson, "Random Musings About CB and the Department of State," 29 May 1963, Thomson Papers, box 7, folder: "Thomson thoughts on CB and State Dep.," JFKL.
310. Forrestal Oral History, JFKL; Thomson and Hilsman Oral History, LBJL; Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 6, 57; John Prados, Keepers of the Keys: The History of the National Security Council from Truman to Bush (New York, 1991), 128-29.
311. Forrestal Oral History, JFKL; Thomson and Hilsman Oral History, LBJL; Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 6, 57; John Prados, Keepers of the Keys: The History of the National Security Council from Truman to Bush (New York, 1991), 128-29.
312. Memo Forrestal to Bundy, 10 April 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963 23:61. According to Arthur Schlesinger, Forrestal's argument appealed to Kennedy. Schlesinger believes Kennedy's line in Vietnam represented "a de facto deal with the National Security establishment," which grudgingly accepted the neutralization of Laos for a more aggressive policy in Vietnam. Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy and His Times (Boston, 1978), 703.
313. Memo Forrestal to Bundy, 10 April 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963 23:61. According to Arthur Schlesinger, Forrestal's argument appealed to Kennedy. Schlesinger believes Kennedy's line in Vietnam represented "a de facto deal with the National Security establishment," which grudgingly accepted the neutralization of Laos for a more aggressive policy in Vietnam. Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy and His Times (Boston, 1978), 703.
314. Memo Harriman to Rusk, 30 July 1962, Harriman Papers, box 438, folder. "Bowles, Chester", #913 Rusk Deptel to Delhi, 5 September 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1990), 2:614. For details on Harriman's July 1962 abortive attempt to negotiate with North Vietnamese delegates in Geneva see Wehrle, "'A Good, Bad Deal,'" 372-73. As has been widely recognized in the literature, still more profoundly injurious to the neutralization bid was the firm belief, at that point in Kennedy's entourage, in the winnability of the Vietnam War, or in the doctrine that the problems of Vietnam lent themselves to an American solution. See Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy, 289-300.
315. Memcon, Rusk, Home and Macmillan, 24 June 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963 22:277.
316. Memcon, Kennedy, and Souvanna Phouma, 27 July 1962, ibid. 24:876.
317. Colombo, "Chinese Communist Perceptions," 270-74.
318. "Problems and Prospects in Communist China," INR research memo, Hilsman to Rusk, NSF: CO, box 24, folder: "China General 1/63-3/63," JFKL; Felix Greene, A Curtain of Ignorance (New York, 1964), 234; Cohen, Dean Rusk, 170.
319. "Problems and Prospects in Communist China," INR research memo, Hilsman to Rusk, NSF: CO, box 24, folder: "China General 1/63-3/63," JFKL; Felix Greene, A Curtain of Ignorance (New York, 1964), 234; Cohen, Dean Rusk, 170.
320. Galbraith, A Life, 434-35; "The Five-Fold Dilemma: The Implications of the Sino-Indian Conflict," Hilsman to Rusk, 17 November 1962, Hilsman Papers, box 1, folder: "Sino-Indian Border Clash 1962, Implications Analysis," JFKL; "Briefing on the World Situation," Rusk testimony, 11 January 1963, Executive Sessions 15 (1963): 35.
321. Galbraith, A Life, 434-35; "The Five-Fold Dilemma: The Implications of the Sino-Indian Conflict," Hilsman to Rusk, 17 November 1962, Hilsman Papers, box 1, folder: "Sino-Indian Border Clash 1962, Implications Analysis," JFKL; "Briefing on the World Situation," Rusk testimony, 11 January 1963, Executive Sessions 15 (1963): 35.
322. See Cohen, Dean Rusk, 170; and Greene, A Curtain of Ignorance, 139.
323. See Cohen, Dean Rusk, 170; and Greene, A Curtain of Ignorance, 139.
324. "U.S. Policy Toward Communist China," S/P paper, 30 November 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963 22:325-32. For an extended version of this paper see "A U.S. Policy Toward Communist China," S/P draft paper, 15 November 1962, Thomson Papers, box 15, folder: "A U.S. Policy Toward Communist China," JFKL. For assessments of the administration's handling of the Chinese famine see Kochavi, "Mist Across the Bamboo Curtain."
325. "U.S. Policy Toward Communist China," S/P paper, 30 November 1962, FRUS, 1961-1963 22:325-32. For an extended version of this paper see "A U.S. Policy Toward Communist China," S/P draft paper, 15 November 1962, Thomson Papers, box 15, folder: "A U.S. Policy Toward Communist China," JFKL. For assessments of the administration's handling of the Chinese famine see Kochavi, "Mist Across the Bamboo Curtain."
326. Castle, At War, 50-52; Prados, Blood Road, 56-57, 69.
327. Castle, At War, 50-52; Prados, Blood Road, 56-57, 69.
328. Hall, "The Laos Neutralization Agreement," 457-58; State Department memo, n.d., FRUS, 1961-1963 24:960.
329. Hall, "The Laos Neutralization Agreement," 457-58; State Department memo, n.d., FRUS, 1961-1963 24:960.
330. Memo Forrestal to Kennedy, 18 June 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:1022.
331. "Operational Planning On Laos - Presidential Meeting 19 June 1963," CIA memo, n.d., ibid., 1032.
332. Attachment 2 to Summary Record of the 512th NSC Meeting, 20 April 1963, ibid., 983; "Tab A," attached to memo Forrestal to Kennedy, 18 June 1963, ibid., 1024.
333. Attachment 2 to Summary Record of the 512th NSC Meeting, 20 April 1963, ibid., 983; "Tab A," attached to memo Forrestal to Kennedy, 18 June 1963, ibid., 1024.
334. Hall, "The Laos Neutralization Agreement," 459; memo CIA Directorate of Plans to Director of Central Intelligence John A. McCone, n.d., FRUS, 1961-1963 24:974; memo for the record, 30 April 1963, ibid., 1006; memcon, Kennedy and Unger, 18 July 1963, ibid., 1035; memcon, Rusk and Khrushchev, 9 August 1963, ibid., 1045; memcon, Harriman and Dobrynin, 3 September 1963, ibid., 1045n.1.
335. Hall, "The Laos Neutralization Agreement," 459; memo CIA Directorate of Plans to Director of Central Intelligence John A. McCone, n.d., FRUS, 1961-1963 24:974; memo for the record, 30 April 1963, ibid., 1006; memcon, Kennedy and Unger, 18 July 1963, ibid., 1035; memcon, Rusk and Khrushchev, 9 August 1963, ibid., 1045; memcon, Harriman and Dobrynin, 3 September 1963, ibid., 1045n.1.
336. Hall, "The Laos Neutralization Agreement," 459; memo CIA Directorate of Plans to Director of Central Intelligence John A. McCone, n.d., FRUS, 1961-1963 24:974; memo for the record, 30 April 1963, ibid., 1006; memcon, Kennedy and Unger, 18 July 1963, ibid., 1035; memcon, Rusk and Khrushchev, 9 August 1963, ibid., 1045; memcon, Harriman and Dobrynin, 3 September 1963, ibid., 1045n.1.
337. Hall, "The Laos Neutralization Agreement," 459; memo CIA Directorate of Plans to Director of Central Intelligence John A. McCone, n.d., FRUS, 1961-1963 24:974; memo for the record, 30 April 1963, ibid., 1006; memcon, Kennedy and Unger, 18 July 1963, ibid., 1035; memcon, Rusk and Khrushchev, 9 August 1963, ibid., 1045; memcon, Harriman and Dobrynin, 3 September 1963, ibid., 1045n.1.
338. Hall, "The Laos Neutralization Agreement," 459; memo CIA Directorate of Plans to Director of Central Intelligence John A. McCone, n.d., FRUS, 1961-1963 24:974; memo for the record, 30 April 1963, ibid., 1006; memcon, Kennedy and Unger, 18 July 1963, ibid., 1035; memcon, Rusk and Khrushchev, 9 August 1963, ibid., 1045; memcon, Harriman and Dobrynin, 3 September 1963, ibid., 1045n.1.
339. Hall, "The Laos Neutralization Agreement," 459; memo CIA Directorate of Plans to Director of Central Intelligence John A. McCone, n.d., FRUS, 1961-1963 24:974; memo for the record, 30 April 1963, ibid., 1006; memcon, Kennedy and Unger, 18 July 1963, ibid., 1035; memcon, Rusk and Khrushchev, 9 August 1963, ibid., 1045; memcon, Harriman and Dobrynin, 3 September 1963, ibid., 1045n.1.
340. "The Impact of the Sino-Soviet Dispute on North Vietnam and Its Policies," SNIE 14-3-63, 26 June 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963 (Washington, 1991), 3:416-22.
341. "Situation in Laos," OCI [Office of Current Intelligence, CIA] memo, 29 March 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:950.
342. See Kennedy's allusions to the possibility of Laos falling "under the Chinese orbit." Memcon, Kennedy and Sri Savang Vatthana (king of Laos), 27 February 1963, ibid., 944. For compatible statements by Harriman see FO 371/164931, 17 December 1962, PRO; memo Harriman to Alan Kirk, 27 December 1962, Harriman Papers, box 480, folder: "Kirk."
343. SNIE 58-63, "Communist Reactions to US Actions Taken with Regard to Laos," 18 June 1963, Records of the CIA, RG 263, folder: "NIC Memoranda - NIEs Concerning the Soviet Union," National Archives.
344. S/P Paper, "A U.S. Policy Toward Communist China," 15 November 1962, Thomson Papers, box 15, folder: "A U.S. Policy Toward Communist China," JFKL.
345. "Comments on Senator Mansfield Report," memo, Director of the Vietnam Working Group Wood to Harriman, 31 January 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963 3:72.
346. "Summary Record of the 513th National Security Council Meeting," 22 April 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:993. McCone pointed out the heretofore disappointing operational benefits of the device, and the proposal was apparently shelved.
347. "Problems and Prospects in Communist China," NIE 13-63, 1 May 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963 22:366-67.
348. Colombo, "Chinese Communist Perceptions," 198-201; 24 and 28 July 1963, PREM 11/4867/30716, PRO.
349. "Summary Record of the 513th National Security Council Meeting," 22 April 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:993; #2274 deptel Rusk to Moscow, 23 April 1963, ibid., 998;
350. "Summary Record of the 513th National Security Council Meeting," 22 April 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:993; #2274 deptel Rusk to Moscow, 23 April 1963, ibid., 998;
351. memcon, Kennedy, Forrestal, and Unger, 18 July 1963, ibid., 1036.
352. "Possibilities of Greater Militancy by the Chinese Communists," SNIE 13-4-63, 31 July 1963, NSF: M&M, box 314, folder: "NSC Meetings, No. 516," JFKL.
353. Footnotes to SNIE 13-4-63; "Some Thoughts on Strategy for Dealing with Possibilities of Greater Militancy by the Chinese Communists," 30 July 1963, "US Response to Communist Chinese Moves in the Far East," 31 July both memos prepared in Hilsman's office, Hilsman Papers, box 1, folder: "Communist China-Chinese Communist Intentions 7/63," JFKL. For renditions of the China policy review Hilsman spearheaded in the second half of 1963, see Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 346-52; Thomson, "On the Making," 228-31; Marshall Green, John H. Holbridge, William N. Stokes, War and Peace with China: First-Hand Experiences in the Foreign Service of the United States (Bethesda, 1994), 59-63.
354. Footnotes to SNIE 13-4-63; "Some Thoughts on Strategy for Dealing with Possibilities of Greater Militancy by the Chinese Communists," 30 July 1963, "US Response to Communist Chinese Moves in the Far East," 31 July both memos prepared in Hilsman's office, Hilsman Papers, box 1, folder: "Communist China-Chinese Communist Intentions 7/63," JFKL. For renditions of the China policy review Hilsman spearheaded in the second half of 1963, see Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 346-52; Thomson, "On the Making," 228-31; Marshall Green, John H. Holbridge, William N. Stokes, War and Peace with China: First-Hand Experiences in the Foreign Service of the United States (Bethesda, 1994), 59-63.
355. Footnotes to SNIE 13-4-63; "Some Thoughts on Strategy for Dealing with Possibilities of Greater Militancy by the Chinese Communists," 30 July 1963, "US Response to Communist Chinese Moves in the Far East," 31 July both memos prepared in Hilsman's office, Hilsman Papers, box 1, folder: "Communist China-Chinese Communist Intentions 7/63," JFKL. For renditions of the China policy review Hilsman spearheaded in the second half of 1963, see Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 346-52; Thomson, "On the Making," 228-31; Marshall Green, John H. Holbridge, William N. Stokes, War and Peace with China: First-Hand Experiences in the Foreign Service of the United States (Bethesda, 1994), 59-63.
356. "Chinese Communist Intentions," Summary Record of the 516th Meeting of the National Security Council, 31 July 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963 22:371-74.
357. Memcon, Gilpatric, and Ohira, 5 August 1963, ibid., 790.
358. Kennedy Press Conference, 1 August 1965, PPP 1963 (Washington, 1964), 614.
359. Kennedy Press Conference, 1 August 1963, ibid., 616. For evidence that Kennedy spoke (if somewhat dramatically) to the majority view see memcon, Gilpatric and Ohira, 5 August 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963 22:787.
360. For catalogs of the difficulties involved in imputing intentions see Raymond L. Garthoff, "On Estimating and Imputing Intentions," International Security 2 (Winter 1978): 22-32; Richard K. Betts, "Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable," World Politics 31, no.1 (1978): 961-88. For an analysis of the serious obstacles China presented to American watchers as an intelligence target see Kochavi, "Mist Across the Bamboo Curtain," 141-42.
361. For catalogs of the difficulties involved in imputing intentions see Raymond L. Garthoff, "On Estimating and Imputing Intentions," International Security 2 (Winter 1978): 22-32; Richard K. Betts, "Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable," World Politics 31, no.1 (1978): 961-88. For an analysis of the serious obstacles China presented to American watchers as an intelligence target see Kochavi, "Mist Across the Bamboo Curtain," 141-42.
362. For catalogs of the difficulties involved in imputing intentions see Raymond L. Garthoff, "On Estimating and Imputing Intentions," International Security 2 (Winter 1978): 22-32; Richard K. Betts, "Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable," World Politics 31, no.1 (1978): 961-88. For an analysis of the serious obstacles China presented to American watchers as an intelligence target see Kochavi, "Mist Across the Bamboo Curtain," 141-42.
363. The last sentence draws on political scientist Robert Jervis's prescription for deescalation, "War and Misperception," Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18 (Spring 1988): 686. Jervis goes on to cogently note that "the task is difficult, and neither decisionmakers nor academics have fully come to grips with it."
364. It is not impossible that Kennedy entertained second thoughts toward the very end of his tenure. Pertaining to Vietnam rather than Laos, this discussion falls outside the purview of this paper. For this debate see Fetzer, "Clinging to Containment," esp. 197; Hilsman, To Move, 347-48; Hilsman Oral History, LBJL.
365. It is not impossible that Kennedy entertained second thoughts toward the very end of his tenure. Pertaining to Vietnam rather than Laos, this discussion falls outside the purview of this paper. For this debate see Fetzer, "Clinging to Containment," esp. 197; Hilsman, To Move, 347-48; Hilsman Oral History, LBJL.
366. Allen S. Whiting letter to author, 13 October 1998; Sorensen, Kennedy, 4-5, 284; Cohen, Dean Rusk, 99; U. Alexis Johnson, The Right Hand of Power, 320-21; preface to FRUS, 1961-1963 22:vii; Michael Forrestal Oral History, JFKL; "Using the Chen Ch'eng visit," memo Komer to Bundy, 20 July 1961, NSF CO, box 22, folder: "China General 7/15/61-7/24/61," JFKL.
367. Allen S. Whiting letter to author, 13 October 1998; Sorensen, Kennedy, 4-5, 284; Cohen, Dean Rusk, 99; U. Alexis Johnson, The Right Hand of Power, 320-21; preface to FRUS, 1961-1963 22:vii; Michael Forrestal Oral History, JFKL; "Using the Chen Ch'eng visit," memo Komer to Bundy, 20 July 1961, NSF CO, box 22, folder: "China General 7/15/61-7/24/61," JFKL.
368. Allen S. Whiting letter to author, 13 October 1998; Sorensen, Kennedy, 4-5, 284; Cohen, Dean Rusk, 99; U. Alexis Johnson, The Right Hand of Power, 320-21; preface to FRUS, 1961-1963 22:vii; Michael Forrestal Oral History, JFKL; "Using the Chen Ch'eng visit," memo Komer to Bundy, 20 July 1961, NSF CO, box 22, folder: "China General 7/15/61-7/24/61," JFKL.
369. Allen S. Whiting letter to author, 13 October 1998; Sorensen, Kennedy, 4-5, 284; Cohen, Dean Rusk, 99; U. Alexis Johnson, The Right Hand of Power, 320-21; preface to FRUS, 1961-1963 22:vii; Michael Forrestal Oral History, JFKL; "Using the Chen Ch'eng visit," memo Komer to Bundy, 20 July 1961, NSF CO, box 22, folder: "China General 7/15/61-7/24/61," JFKL.
370. See George C. Herring, America's Longest War The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, 3d ed. (New York, 1996), 83; Foster Rhea Dulles, American Policy toward Communist China, 89; White, In Search of History, 470.
371. See George C. Herring, America's Longest War The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, 3d ed. (New York, 1996), 83; Foster Rhea Dulles, American Policy toward Communist China, 89; White, In Search of History, 470.
372. See George C. Herring, America's Longest War The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, 3d ed. (New York, 1996), 83; Foster Rhea Dulles, American Policy toward Communist China, 89; White, In Search of History, 470.
373. See Dean and Richard Rusk, As I Saw It, 282-83; Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Waging Peace and War: Dean Rusk and the Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson Years (New York, 1988), 387-88; Cohen, Dean Rusk, 165; memcon, Kennedy and Ikeda, 20 June 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 22:681; PPP, 1962, 14 December 1962, 549.
374. See Dean and Richard Rusk, As I Saw It, 282-83; Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Waging Peace and War: Dean Rusk and the Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson Years (New York, 1988), 387-88; Cohen, Dean Rusk, 165; memcon, Kennedy and Ikeda, 20 June 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 22:681; PPP, 1962, 14 December 1962, 549.
375. See Dean and Richard Rusk, As I Saw It, 282-83; Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Waging Peace and War: Dean Rusk and the Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson Years (New York, 1988), 387-88; Cohen, Dean Rusk, 165; memcon, Kennedy and Ikeda, 20 June 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 22:681; PPP, 1962, 14 December 1962, 549.
376. See Dean and Richard Rusk, As I Saw It, 282-83; Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Waging Peace and War: Dean Rusk and the Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson Years (New York, 1988), 387-88; Cohen, Dean Rusk, 165; memcon, Kennedy and Ikeda, 20 June 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 22:681; PPP, 1962, 14 December 1962, 549.
377. R. W. Barnett paper, "Foreign Policy and China," 25 April 1962, Thomson Papers, box 15, folder: "General, 4/62-6/62," JFKL.
378. See Robert Jervis, "Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behaviour," in, Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland, ed. Jervis and Jack Snyder (New York, 1991), 20-50; and Earnest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, eds., The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis (Cambridge, MA, 1997), 2-3.
379. See Robert Jervis, "Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behaviour," in, Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland, ed. Jervis and Jack Snyder (New York, 1991), 20-50; and Earnest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, eds., The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis (Cambridge, MA, 1997), 2-3.
380. For the argument that Kennedy's general need for credibility rose after the Bay of Pigs and fell following the Cuban missile crisis see Kai Bird, The Color of Truth (New York, 1998), 214, 226-50.
381. For illustrations of Kennedy's approach see "Mr. Hilsman's Remarks at Director's Meeting," 22 January 1963, Hilsman Papers, box 5, folder: "Hilsman Summary of President's views. 22.1.63," JFKL. See also FRUS, 1961-1963 22:341. For a more comprehensive treatment of the Kennedy record vis-à-vis the split see Chang, Friends and Enemies, chap. 7;
382. For illustrations of Kennedy's approach see "Mr. Hilsman's Remarks at Director's Meeting," 22 January 1963, Hilsman Papers, box 5, folder: "Hilsman Summary of President's views. 22.1.63," JFKL. See also FRUS, 1961-1963 22:341. For a more comprehensive treatment of the Kennedy record vis-à-vis the split see Chang, Friends and Enemies, chap. 7;
383. and Noam Kochavi, "From Puzzled Prudence to Bold Experimentation: Washington's View of the Sino-Soviet Split, 1961-1963," Intelligence and National Security 15 (Spring 2000): 50-79.
384. Tucker, "Continuing Controversies," 227; Kusnitz, Public Opinion, 106.
385. Tucker, "Continuing Controversies," 227; Kusnitz, Public Opinion, 106.
386. As has been widely recognized in the literature, the problem of empirical proof is endemic to the task of ferreting out the cognitive map of decision makers. Inferring attitudes from behavior poses problems of validity. For elaborations on this point see Yaacov Y.I. Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition, and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking (Stanford, 1990), 169.
387. The record reveals Rusk's central role in approving these probes but remains mute on Kennedy's. Virtually all previous renditions of Rusk's concept of proper secretary of stateship have stressed his determination to project solid alignment between himself and the president in the public eye. See Cohen, Dean Rusk, 95-97. Thus, it is quite inconceivable that Rusk executed or authorized the various probes into China's intentions without Kennedy's knowledge. In the absence of solid evidence, one may cautiously surmise that Kennedy and Rusk tacitly agreed on presidential plausible deniability - namely, that Kennedy would turn a blind eye to Rusk's discreet approaches and deny any knowledge of them should the issue surface and burn Rusk's fingers.
388. This historiographical overview draws on Kaufman, "John F. Kennedy," esp. 463, 466, 469. See also Robert J. McMahon, "US-Vietnamese Relations: A Historiographical Survey," in Cohen, ed., Pacific Passage, 313-36; and Mark J. White, "A New Synthesis for the New Frontier," in Kennedy: The New Frontier Revisited, ed. White (Basingstoke, 1998), 1-17.
389. This historiographical overview draws on Kaufman, "John F. Kennedy," esp. 463, 466, 469. See also Robert J. McMahon, "US-Vietnamese Relations: A Historiographical Survey," in Cohen, ed., Pacific Passage, 313-36; and Mark J. White, "A New Synthesis for the New Frontier," in Kennedy: The New Frontier Revisited, ed. White (Basingstoke, 1998), 1-17.
390. This historiographical overview draws on Kaufman, "John F. Kennedy," esp. 463, 466, 469. See also Robert J. McMahon, "US-Vietnamese Relations: A Historiographical Survey," in Cohen, ed., Pacific Passage, 313-36; and Mark J. White, "A New Synthesis for the New Frontier," in Kennedy: The New Frontier Revisited, ed. White (Basingstoke, 1998), 1-17.
391. Kusnitz, Public Opinion, 102, 108, 123n.45; Foot, The Practice of Power, 99.
392. Kusnitz, Public Opinion, 102, 108, 123n.45; Foot, The Practice of Power, 99.
393. For elucidations of the spiral model see Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, 1976), 58-113; idem, "War and Misperception," 685; Jervis, Richard N. Lebow, and Janice G. Stein, eds., Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore, 1985).
394. For elucidations of the spiral model see Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, 1976), 58-113; idem, "War and Misperception," 685; Jervis, Richard N. Lebow, and Janice G. Stein, eds., Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore, 1985).
395. For elucidations of the spiral model see Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, 1976), 58-113; idem, "War and Misperception," 685; Jervis, Richard N. Lebow, and Janice G. Stein, eds., Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore, 1985).
396. See Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975 (Chapel Hill, 2000); Stein Tonnesson, "Tracking Multi-Directional Dominoes," in "77 Conversations Between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964-1977," ed. Odd Arne Westad, Chen Jian, Stein Tonnesson, Nguyen Vu Tung, James G. Hershberg, Cold War International History Project working paper No. 22, 1998.
397. See Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975 (Chapel Hill, 2000); Stein Tonnesson, "Tracking Multi-Directional Dominoes," in "77 Conversations Between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964-1977," ed. Odd Arne Westad, Chen Jian, Stein Tonnesson, Nguyen Vu Tung, James G. Hershberg, Cold War International History Project working paper No. 22, 1998.
398. See Carol Lee Harmin, "Elite Politics and Foreign Relations," in Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, ed. David Shambaugh (Oxford, 1994), 87; Chen Jian, "China's Involvement in the Vietnam War, 1964-1969," China Quarterly 142 (June 1995): 362; Qiang Zhai, "Beijing and the Vietnam Conflict, 1964-1965: New Chinese Evidence," Cold War International History Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996): 233-34;
399. See Carol Lee Harmin, "Elite Politics and Foreign Relations," in Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, ed. David Shambaugh (Oxford, 1994), 87; Chen Jian, "China's Involvement in the Vietnam War, 1964-1969," China Quarterly 142 (June 1995): 362; Qiang Zhai, "Beijing and the Vietnam Conflict, 1964-1965: New Chinese Evidence," Cold War International History Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996): 233-34;
400. See Carol Lee Harmin, "Elite Politics and Foreign Relations," in Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, ed. David Shambaugh (Oxford, 1994), 87; Chen Jian, "China's Involvement in the Vietnam War, 1964-1969," China Quarterly 142 (June 1995): 362; Qiang Zhai, "Beijing and the Vietnam Conflict, 1964-1965: New Chinese Evidence," Cold War International History Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996): 233-34;
401. and MacFarquhar, The Coming of the Cataclysm, 270-81, 298, 325.
402. Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 112-19, 4-8.
403. Ibid, 104-7; Hamilton-Merritt, Tragic Mountains, 106.
404. Ibid, 104-7; Hamilton-Merritt, Tragic Mountains, 106.
405. Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 98, 111.
406. See Chen Jian, "China's Involvement in the Vietnam War," 362; Qiang Zhai, "Beijing and the Vietnam Conflict," 234-35; and MacFarquhar, The Coming of the Cataclysm, 270-81, 298, 325. While historians agree that other leaders did not actively oppose Mao's denunciation of Wang Jiaxiang, they diverge on the extent to which this lack of opposition reflected Mao's coercive power or a genuine consensus within the senior leadership core. For first position see Chen Jian, Mao's China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill, 2001) 210; For second, see Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 114-16.
407. See Chen Jian, "China's Involvement in the Vietnam War," 362; Qiang Zhai, "Beijing and the Vietnam Conflict," 234-35; and MacFarquhar, The Coming of the Cataclysm, 270-81, 298, 325. While historians agree that other leaders did not actively oppose Mao's denunciation of Wang Jiaxiang, they diverge on the extent to which this lack of opposition reflected Mao's coercive power or a genuine consensus within the senior leadership core. For first position see Chen Jian, Mao's China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill, 2001) 210; For second, see Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 114-16.
408. See Chen Jian, "China's Involvement in the Vietnam War," 362; Qiang Zhai, "Beijing and the Vietnam Conflict," 234-35; and MacFarquhar, The Coming of the Cataclysm, 270-81, 298, 325. While historians agree that other leaders did not actively oppose Mao's denunciation of Wang Jiaxiang, they diverge on the extent to which this lack of opposition reflected Mao's coercive power or a genuine consensus within the senior leadership core. For first position see Chen Jian, Mao's China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill, 2001) 210; For second, see Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 114-16.
409. See Chen Jian, "China's Involvement in the Vietnam War," 362; Qiang Zhai, "Beijing and the Vietnam Conflict," 234-35; and MacFarquhar, The Coming of the Cataclysm, 270-81, 298, 325. While historians agree that other leaders did not actively oppose Mao's denunciation of Wang Jiaxiang, they diverge on the extent to which this lack of opposition reflected Mao's coercive power or a genuine consensus within the senior leadership core. For first position see Chen Jian, Mao's China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill, 2001) 210; For second, see Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 114-16.
410. See Chen Jian, "China's Involvement in the Vietnam War," 362; Qiang Zhai, "Beijing and the Vietnam Conflict," 234-35; and MacFarquhar, The Coming of the Cataclysm, 270-81, 298, 325. While historians agree that other leaders did not actively oppose Mao's denunciation of Wang Jiaxiang, they diverge on the extent to which this lack of opposition reflected Mao's coercive power or a genuine consensus within the senior leadership core. For first position see Chen Jian, Mao's China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill, 2001) 210; For second, see Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 114-16.
411. Chen Jian, "China's Involvement," 361-62; John W. Garver, "Little Chance," Diplomatic History 21 (Winter 1997): 87; MacFarquhar, The Coming of the Cataclysm, 11-348. The question of power relations within China's top echelon during the crisis years of 1960-1963 has remained an elusive and slippery terrain, fraught with information gaps. One point of continuous debate has been the degree to which Mao actually suffered political eclipse between mid-1960 and mid-1962. Relying heavily on the new evidence marshalled by Qiang Zhai, the interpretation here tends toward the view, argued principally by political scientist Frederick C. Teiwes, that Mao retained an unassailable authority even during these years. See Teiwes, Politics and Purges in China, 2d ed. (Armonk, NY, 1993), 349, 359; Teiwes and Warren Sun, China's Road to Disaster (Armonk, NY, 1999), 213-29;
412. Chen Jian, "China's Involvement," 361-62; John W. Garver, "Little Chance," Diplomatic History 21 (Winter 1997): 87; MacFarquhar, The Coming of the Cataclysm, 11-348. The question of power relations within China's top echelon during the crisis years of 1960-1963 has remained an elusive and slippery terrain, fraught with information gaps. One point of continuous debate has been the degree to which Mao actually suffered political eclipse between mid-1960 and mid-1962. Relying heavily on the new evidence marshalled by Qiang Zhai, the interpretation here tends toward the view, argued principally by political scientist Frederick C. Teiwes, that Mao retained an unassailable authority even during these years. See Teiwes, Politics and Purges in China, 2d ed. (Armonk, NY, 1993), 349, 359; Teiwes and Warren Sun, China's Road to Disaster (Armonk, NY, 1999), 213-29;
413. Chen Jian, "China's Involvement," 361-62; John W. Garver, "Little Chance," Diplomatic History 21 (Winter 1997): 87; MacFarquhar, The Coming of the Cataclysm, 11-348. The question of power relations within China's top echelon during the crisis years of 1960-1963 has remained an elusive and slippery terrain, fraught with information gaps. One point of continuous debate has been the degree to which Mao actually suffered political eclipse between mid-1960 and mid-1962. Relying heavily on the new evidence marshalled by Qiang Zhai, the interpretation here tends toward the view, argued principally by political scientist Frederick C. Teiwes, that Mao retained an unassailable authority even during these years. See Teiwes, Politics and Purges in China, 2d ed. (Armonk, NY, 1993), 349, 359; Teiwes and Warren Sun, China's Road to Disaster (Armonk, NY, 1999), 213-29;
414. Chen Jian, "China's Involvement," 361-62; John W. Garver, "Little Chance," Diplomatic History 21 (Winter 1997): 87; MacFarquhar, The Coming of the Cataclysm, 11-348. The question of power relations within China's top echelon during the crisis years of 1960-1963 has remained an elusive and slippery terrain, fraught with information gaps. One point of continuous debate has been the degree to which Mao actually suffered political eclipse between mid-1960 and mid-1962. Relying heavily on the new evidence marshalled by Qiang Zhai, the interpretation here tends toward the view, argued principally by political scientist Frederick C. Teiwes, that Mao retained an unassailable authority even during these years. See Teiwes, Politics and Purges in China, 2d ed. (Armonk, NY, 1993), 349, 359; Teiwes and Warren Sun, China's Road to Disaster (Armonk, NY, 1999), 213-29;
415. Chen Jian, "China's Involvement," 361-62; John W. Garver, "Little Chance," Diplomatic History 21 (Winter 1997): 87; MacFarquhar, The Coming of the Cataclysm, 11-348. The question of power relations within China's top echelon during the crisis years of 1960-1963 has remained an elusive and slippery terrain, fraught with information gaps. One point of continuous debate has been the degree to which Mao actually suffered political eclipse between mid-1960 and mid-1962. Relying heavily on the new evidence marshalled by Qiang Zhai, the interpretation here tends toward the view, argued principally by political scientist Frederick C. Teiwes, that Mao retained an unassailable authority even during these years. See Teiwes, Politics and Purges in China, 2d ed. (Armonk, NY, 1993), 349, 359; Teiwes and Warren Sun, China's Road to Disaster (Armonk, NY, 1999), 213-29;
416. and also Lowell Dittmer, "The Chinese Cultural Revolution Revisited: The Role of the Nemesis," Journal of Contemporary China 5 (November 1996): 257.
417. Chen Jian, "China's Involvement," 362-63; MacFarquhar, The Coming of the Cataclysm, 347-77.
418. Chen Jian, "China's Involvement," 362-63; MacFarquhar, The Coming of the Cataclysm, 347-77.
419. For a detailed discussion peppered with illustrations see Colombo, "Chinese Communist Perceptions," 311-44.
420. Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 115-18; Chen Jian, "China in the Vietnam War," 357-60; MacFarquhar, The Coming of the Cataclysm, 368.
421. Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 115-18; Chen Jian, "China in the Vietnam War," 357-60; MacFarquhar, The Coming of the Cataclysm, 368.
422. Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 115-18; Chen Jian, "China in the Vietnam War," 357-60; MacFarquhar, The Coming of the Cataclysm, 368.
423. Undated CIA memo on presidential meeting on Laos, 19 June 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:1032.
424. The affect of the China factor on Kennedy's Vietnam conduct, although suggested here, deserves separate treatment.
425. For illustrations of this see Qiang, China and the Vietnam Wars, chap. 4.
426. "Situation in Laos," OCI [Office of Current Intelligence, CIA] memo, 29 March 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:950.
427. See Kennedy's allusions to the possibility of Laos falling "under the Chinese orbit." Memcon, Kennedy and Sri Savang Vatthana (king of Laos), 27 February 1963, ibid., 944. For compatible statements by Harriman see FO 371/164931, 17 December 1962, PRO; memo Harriman to Alan Kirk, 27 December 1962, Harriman Papers, box 480, folder: "Kirk."
428. SNIE 58-63, "Communist Reactions to US Actions Taken with Regard to Laos," 18 June 1963, Records of the CIA, RG 263, folder: "NIC Memoranda - NIEs Concerning the Soviet Union," National Archives.
429. S/P Paper, "A U.S. Policy Toward Communist China," 15 November 1962, Thomson Papers, box 15, folder: "A U.S. Policy Toward Communist China," JFKL.
430. "Comments on Senator Mansfield Report," memo, Director of the Vietnam Working Group Wood to Harriman, 31 January 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963 3:72.
431. "Summary Record of the 513th National Security Council Meeting," 22 April 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:993. McCone pointed out the heretofore disappointing operational benefits of the device, and the proposal was apparently shelved.
432. "Problems and Prospects in Communist China," NIE 13-63, 1 May 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963 22:366-67.
433. Colombo, "Chinese Communist Perceptions," 198-201; 24 and 28 July 1963, PREM 11/4867/30716, PRO.
434. "Summary Record of the 513th National Security Council Meeting," 22 April 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:993; #2274 deptel Rusk to Moscow, 23 April 1963, ibid., 998;
435. "Summary Record of the 513th National Security Council Meeting," 22 April 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:993; #2274 deptel Rusk to Moscow, 23 April 1963, ibid., 998;
436. memcon, Kennedy, Forrestal, and Unger, 18 July 1963, ibid., 1036.
437. "Possibilities of Greater Militancy by the Chinese Communists," SNIE 13-4-63, 31 July 1963, NSF: M&M, box 314, folder: "NSC Meetings, No. 516," JFKL.
438. Footnotes to SNIE 13-4-63; "Some Thoughts on Strategy for Dealing with Possibilities of Greater Militancy by the Chinese Communists," 30 July 1963, "US Response to Communist Chinese Moves in the Far East," 31 July both memos prepared in Hilsman's office, Hilsman Papers, box 1, folder: "Communist China-Chinese Communist Intentions 7/63," JFKL. For renditions of the China policy review Hilsman spearheaded in the second half of 1963, see Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 346-52; Thomson, "On the Making," 228-31; Marshall Green, John H. Holbridge, William N. Stokes, War and Peace with China: First-Hand Experiences in the Foreign Service of the United States (Bethesda, 1994), 59-63.
439. Footnotes to SNIE 13-4-63; "Some Thoughts on Strategy for Dealing with Possibilities of Greater Militancy by the Chinese Communists," 30 July 1963, "US Response to Communist Chinese Moves in the Far East," 31 July both memos prepared in Hilsman's office, Hilsman Papers, box 1, folder: "Communist China-Chinese Communist Intentions 7/63," JFKL. For renditions of the China policy review Hilsman spearheaded in the second half of 1963, see Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 346-52; Thomson, "On the Making," 228-31; Marshall Green, John H. Holbridge, William N. Stokes, War and Peace with China: First-Hand Experiences in the Foreign Service of the United States (Bethesda, 1994), 59-63.
440. Footnotes to SNIE 13-4-63; "Some Thoughts on Strategy for Dealing with Possibilities of Greater Militancy by the Chinese Communists," 30 July 1963, "US Response to Communist Chinese Moves in the Far East," 31 July both memos prepared in Hilsman's office, Hilsman Papers, box 1, folder: "Communist China-Chinese Communist Intentions 7/63," JFKL. For renditions of the China policy review Hilsman spearheaded in the second half of 1963, see Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 346-52; Thomson, "On the Making," 228-31; Marshall Green, John H. Holbridge, William N. Stokes, War and Peace with China: First-Hand Experiences in the Foreign Service of the United States (Bethesda, 1994), 59-63.
441. "Chinese Communist Intentions," Summary Record of the 516th Meeting of the National Security Council, 31 July 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963 22:371-74.
442. Memcon, Gilpatric, and Ohira, 5 August 1963, ibid., 790.
443. Kennedy Press Conference, 1 August 1965, PPP 1963 (Washington, 1964), 614.
444. Kennedy Press Conference, 1 August 1963, ibid., 616. For evidence that Kennedy spoke (if somewhat dramatically) to the majority view see memcon, Gilpatric and Ohira, 5 August 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963 22:787.
445. For catalogs of the difficulties involved in imputing intentions see Raymond L. Garthoff, "On Estimating and Imputing Intentions," International Security 2 (Winter 1978): 22-32; Richard K. Betts, "Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable," World Politics 31, no.1 (1978): 961-88. For an analysis of the serious obstacles China presented to American watchers as an intelligence target see Kochavi, "Mist Across the Bamboo Curtain," 141-42.
446. For catalogs of the difficulties involved in imputing intentions see Raymond L. Garthoff, "On Estimating and Imputing Intentions," International Security 2 (Winter 1978): 22-32; Richard K. Betts, "Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable," World Politics 31, no.1 (1978): 961-88. For an analysis of the serious obstacles China presented to American watchers as an intelligence target see Kochavi, "Mist Across the Bamboo Curtain," 141-42.
447. For catalogs of the difficulties involved in imputing intentions see Raymond L. Garthoff, "On Estimating and Imputing Intentions," International Security 2 (Winter 1978): 22-32; Richard K. Betts, "Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable," World Politics 31, no.1 (1978): 961-88. For an analysis of the serious obstacles China presented to American watchers as an intelligence target see Kochavi, "Mist Across the Bamboo Curtain," 141-42.
448. The last sentence draws on political scientist Robert Jervis's prescription for deescalation, "War and Misperception," Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18 (Spring 1988): 686. Jervis goes on to cogently note that "the task is difficult, and neither decisionmakers nor academics have fully come to grips with it."
449. It is not impossible that Kennedy entertained second thoughts toward the very end of his tenure. Pertaining to Vietnam rather than Laos, this discussion falls outside the purview of this paper. For this debate see Fetzer, "Clinging to Containment," esp. 197; Hilsman, To Move, 347-48; Hilsman Oral History, LBJL.
450. It is not impossible that Kennedy entertained second thoughts toward the very end of his tenure. Pertaining to Vietnam rather than Laos, this discussion falls outside the purview of this paper. For this debate see Fetzer, "Clinging to Containment," esp. 197; Hilsman, To Move, 347-48; Hilsman Oral History, LBJL.
451. Allen S. Whiting letter to author, 13 October 1998; Sorensen, Kennedy, 4-5, 284; Cohen, Dean Rusk, 99; U. Alexis Johnson, The Right Hand of Power, 320-21; preface to FRUS, 1961-1963 22:vii; Michael Forrestal Oral History, JFKL; "Using the Chen Ch'eng visit," memo Komer to Bundy, 20 July 1961, NSF CO, box 22, folder: "China General 7/15/61-7/24/61," JFKL.
452. Allen S. Whiting letter to author, 13 October 1998; Sorensen, Kennedy, 4-5, 284; Cohen, Dean Rusk, 99; U. Alexis Johnson, The Right Hand of Power, 320-21; preface to FRUS, 1961-1963 22:vii; Michael Forrestal Oral History, JFKL; "Using the Chen Ch'eng visit," memo Komer to Bundy, 20 July 1961, NSF CO, box 22, folder: "China General 7/15/61-7/24/61," JFKL.
453. Allen S. Whiting letter to author, 13 October 1998; Sorensen, Kennedy, 4-5, 284; Cohen, Dean Rusk, 99; U. Alexis Johnson, The Right Hand of Power, 320-21; preface to FRUS, 1961-1963 22:vii; Michael Forrestal Oral History, JFKL; "Using the Chen Ch'eng visit," memo Komer to Bundy, 20 July 1961, NSF CO, box 22, folder: "China General 7/15/61-7/24/61," JFKL.
454. Allen S. Whiting letter to author, 13 October 1998; Sorensen, Kennedy, 4-5, 284; Cohen, Dean Rusk, 99; U. Alexis Johnson, The Right Hand of Power, 320-21; preface to FRUS, 1961-1963 22:vii; Michael Forrestal Oral History, JFKL; "Using the Chen Ch'eng visit," memo Komer to Bundy, 20 July 1961, NSF CO, box 22, folder: "China General 7/15/61-7/24/61," JFKL.
455. See George C. Herring, America's Longest War The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, 3d ed. (New York, 1996), 83; Foster Rhea Dulles, American Policy toward Communist China, 89; White, In Search of History, 470.
456. See George C. Herring, America's Longest War The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, 3d ed. (New York, 1996), 83; Foster Rhea Dulles, American Policy toward Communist China, 89; White, In Search of History, 470.
457. See George C. Herring, America's Longest War The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, 3d ed. (New York, 1996), 83; Foster Rhea Dulles, American Policy toward Communist China, 89; White, In Search of History, 470.
458. See Dean and Richard Rusk, As I Saw It, 282-83; Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Waging Peace and War: Dean Rusk and the Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson Years (New York, 1988), 387-88; Cohen, Dean Rusk, 165; memcon, Kennedy and Ikeda, 20 June 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 22:681; PPP, 1962, 14 December 1962, 549.
459. See Dean and Richard Rusk, As I Saw It, 282-83; Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Waging Peace and War: Dean Rusk and the Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson Years (New York, 1988), 387-88; Cohen, Dean Rusk, 165; memcon, Kennedy and Ikeda, 20 June 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 22:681; PPP, 1962, 14 December 1962, 549.
460. See Dean and Richard Rusk, As I Saw It, 282-83; Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Waging Peace and War: Dean Rusk and the Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson Years (New York, 1988), 387-88; Cohen, Dean Rusk, 165; memcon, Kennedy and Ikeda, 20 June 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 22:681; PPP, 1962, 14 December 1962, 549.
461. See Dean and Richard Rusk, As I Saw It, 282-83; Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Waging Peace and War: Dean Rusk and the Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson Years (New York, 1988), 387-88; Cohen, Dean Rusk, 165; memcon, Kennedy and Ikeda, 20 June 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963 22:681; PPP, 1962, 14 December 1962, 549.
462. R. W. Barnett paper, "Foreign Policy and China," 25 April 1962, Thomson Papers, box 15, folder: "General, 4/62-6/62," JFKL.
463. See Robert Jervis, "Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behaviour," in, Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland, ed. Jervis and Jack Snyder (New York, 1991), 20-50; and
464. See Robert Jervis, "Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behaviour," in, Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland, ed. Jervis and Jack Snyder (New York, 1991), 20-50; and Earnest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, eds., The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis (Cambridge, MA, 1997), 2-3.
465. For the argument that Kennedy's general need for credibility rose after the Bay of Pigs and fell following the Cuban missile crisis see Kai Bird, The Color of Truth (New York, 1998), 214, 226-50.
466. For illustrations of Kennedy's approach see "Mr. Hilsman's Remarks at Director's Meeting," 22 January 1963, Hilsman Papers, box 5, folder: "Hilsman Summary of President's views. 22.1.63," JFKL. See also FRUS, 1961-1963 22:341. For a more comprehensive treatment of the Kennedy record vis-à-vis the split see Chang, Friends and Enemies, chap. 7;
467. For illustrations of Kennedy's approach see "Mr. Hilsman's Remarks at Director's Meeting," 22 January 1963, Hilsman Papers, box 5, folder: "Hilsman Summary of President's views. 22.1.63," JFKL. See also FRUS, 1961-1963 22:341. For a more comprehensive treatment of the Kennedy record vis-à-vis the split see Chang, Friends and Enemies, chap. 7;
468. and Noam Kochavi, "From Puzzled Prudence to Bold Experimentation: Washington's View of the Sino-Soviet Split, 1961-1963," Intelligence and National Security 15 (Spring 2000): 50-79.
469. Tucker, "Continuing Controversies," 227; Kusnitz, Public Opinion, 106.
470. Tucker, "Continuing Controversies," 227; Kusnitz, Public Opinion, 106.
471. As has been widely recognized in the literature, the problem of empirical proof is endemic to the task of ferreting out the cognitive map of decision makers. Inferring attitudes from behavior poses problems of validity. For elaborations on this point see Yaacov Y.I. Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition, and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking (Stanford, 1990), 169.
472. The record reveals Rusk's central role in approving these probes but remains mute on Kennedy's. Virtually all previous renditions of Rusk's concept of proper secretary of stateship have stressed his determination to project solid alignment between himself and the president in the public eye. See Cohen, Dean Rusk, 95-97. Thus, it is quite inconceivable that Rusk executed or authorized the various probes into China's intentions without Kennedy's knowledge. In the absence of solid evidence, one may cautiously surmise that Kennedy and Rusk tacitly agreed on presidential plausible deniability - namely, that Kennedy would turn a blind eye to Rusk's discreet approaches and deny any knowledge of them should the issue surface and burn Rusk's fingers.
473. This historiographical overview draws on Kaufman, "John F. Kennedy," esp. 463, 466, 469. See also Robert J. McMahon, "US-Vietnamese Relations: A Historiographical Survey," in Cohen, ed., Pacific Passage, 313-36; and Mark J. White, "A New Synthesis for the New Frontier," in Kennedy: The New Frontier Revisited, ed. White (Basingstoke, 1998), 1-17.
474. This historiographical overview draws on Kaufman, "John F. Kennedy," esp. 463, 466, 469. See also Robert J. McMahon, "US-Vietnamese Relations: A Historiographical Survey," in Cohen, ed., Pacific Passage, 313-36; and Mark J. White, "A New Synthesis for the New Frontier," in Kennedy: The New Frontier Revisited, ed. White (Basingstoke, 1998), 1-17.
475. This historiographical overview draws on Kaufman, "John F. Kennedy," esp. 463, 466, 469. See also Robert J. McMahon, "US-Vietnamese Relations: A Historiographical Survey," in Cohen, ed., Pacific Passage, 313-36; and Mark J. White, "A New Synthesis for the New Frontier," in Kennedy: The New Frontier Revisited, ed. White (Basingstoke, 1998), 1-17.
476. Kusnitz, Public Opinion, 102, 108, 123n.45; Foot, The Practice of Power, 99.
477. Kusnitz, Public Opinion, 102, 108, 123n.45; Foot, The Practice of Power, 99.
478. For elucidations of the spiral model see Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, 1976), 58-113; idem, "War and Misperception," 685; Jervis, Richard N. Lebow, and Janice G. Stein, eds., Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore, 1985).
479. For elucidations of the spiral model see Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, 1976), 58-113; idem, "War and Misperception," 685; Jervis, Richard N. Lebow, and Janice G. Stein, eds., Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore, 1985).
480. For elucidations of the spiral model see Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, 1976), 58-113; idem, "War and Misperception," 685; Jervis, Richard N. Lebow, and Janice G. Stein, eds., Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore, 1985).
481. See Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975 (Chapel Hill, 2000); Stein Tonnesson, "Tracking Multi-Directional Dominoes," in "77 Conversations Between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964-1977," ed. Odd Arne Westad, Chen Jian, Stein Tonnesson, Nguyen Vu Tung, James G. Hershberg, Cold War International History Project working paper No. 22, 1998.
482. See Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975 (Chapel Hill, 2000); Stein Tonnesson, "Tracking Multi-Directional Dominoes," in "77 Conversations Between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964-1977," ed. Odd Arne Westad, Chen Jian, Stein Tonnesson, Nguyen Vu Tung, James G. Hershberg, Cold War International History Project working paper No. 22, 1998.
483. See Carol Lee Harmin, "Elite Politics and Foreign Relations," in Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, ed. David Shambaugh (Oxford, 1994), 87; Chen Jian, "China's Involvement in the Vietnam War, 1964-1969," China Quarterly 142 (June 1995): 362; Qiang Zhai, "Beijing and the Vietnam Conflict, 1964-1965: New Chinese Evidence," Cold War International History Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996): 233-34;
484. See Carol Lee Harmin, "Elite Politics and Foreign Relations," in Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, ed. David Shambaugh (Oxford, 1994), 87; Chen Jian, "China's Involvement in the Vietnam War, 1964-1969," China Quarterly 142 (June 1995): 362; Qiang Zhai, "Beijing and the Vietnam Conflict, 1964-1965: New Chinese Evidence," Cold War International History Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996): 233-34;
485. See Carol Lee Harmin, "Elite Politics and Foreign Relations," in Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, ed. David Shambaugh (Oxford, 1994), 87; Chen Jian, "China's Involvement in the Vietnam War, 1964-1969," China Quarterly 142 (June 1995): 362; Qiang Zhai, "Beijing and the Vietnam Conflict, 1964-1965: New Chinese Evidence," Cold War International History Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996): 233-34;
486. and MacFarquhar, The Coming of the Cataclysm, 270-81, 298, 325.
487. Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 112-19, 4-8.
488. Ibid, 104-7; Hamilton-Merritt, Tragic Mountains, 106.
489. Ibid, 104-7; Hamilton-Merritt, Tragic Mountains, 106.
490. Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 98, 111.
491. See Chen Jian, "China's Involvement in the Vietnam War," 362; Qiang Zhai, "Beijing and the Vietnam Conflict," 234-35; and MacFarquhar, The Coming of the Cataclysm, 270-81, 298, 325. While historians agree that other leaders did not actively oppose Mao's denunciation of Wang Jiaxiang, they diverge on the extent to which this lack of opposition reflected Mao's coercive power or a genuine consensus within the senior leadership core. For first position see Chen Jian, Mao's China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill, 2001) 210; For second, see Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 114-16.
492. See Chen Jian, "China's Involvement in the Vietnam War," 362; Qiang Zhai, "Beijing and the Vietnam Conflict," 234-35; and MacFarquhar, The Coming of the Cataclysm, 270-81, 298, 325. While historians agree that other leaders did not actively oppose Mao's denunciation of Wang Jiaxiang, they diverge on the extent to which this lack of opposition reflected Mao's coercive power or a genuine consensus within the senior leadership core. For first position see Chen Jian, Mao's China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill, 2001) 210; For second, see Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 114-16.
493. See Chen Jian, "China's Involvement in the Vietnam War," 362; Qiang Zhai, "Beijing and the Vietnam Conflict," 234-35; and MacFarquhar, The Coming of the Cataclysm, 270-81, 298, 325. While historians agree that other leaders did not actively oppose Mao's denunciation of Wang Jiaxiang, they diverge on the extent to which this lack of opposition reflected Mao's coercive power or a genuine consensus within the senior leadership core. For first position see Chen Jian, Mao's China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill, 2001) 210; For second, see Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 114-16.
494. See Chen Jian, "China's Involvement in the Vietnam War," 362; Qiang Zhai, "Beijing and the Vietnam Conflict," 234-35; and MacFarquhar, The Coming of the Cataclysm, 270-81, 298, 325. While historians agree that other leaders did not actively oppose Mao's denunciation of Wang Jiaxiang, they diverge on the extent to which this lack of opposition reflected Mao's coercive power or a genuine consensus within the senior leadership core. For first position see Chen Jian, Mao's China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill, 2001) 210; For second, see Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 114-16.
495. See Chen Jian, "China's Involvement in the Vietnam War," 362; Qiang Zhai, "Beijing and the Vietnam Conflict," 234-35; and MacFarquhar, The Coming of the Cataclysm, 270-81, 298, 325. While historians agree that other leaders did not actively oppose Mao's denunciation of Wang Jiaxiang, they diverge on the extent to which this lack of opposition reflected Mao's coercive power or a genuine consensus within the senior leadership core. For first position see Chen Jian, Mao's China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill, 2001) 210; For second, see Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 114-16.
496. Chen Jian, "China's Involvement," 361-62; John W. Garver, "Little Chance," Diplomatic History 21 (Winter 1997): 87; MacFarquhar, The Coming of the Cataclysm, 11-348. The question of power relations within China's top echelon during the crisis years of 1960-1963 has remained an elusive and slippery terrain, fraught with information gaps. One point of continuous debate has been the degree to which Mao actually suffered political eclipse between mid-1960 and mid-1962. Relying heavily on the new evidence marshalled by Qiang Zhai, the interpretation here tends toward the view, argued principally by political scientist Frederick C. Teiwes, that Mao retained an unassailable authority even during these years. See Teiwes, Politics and Purges in China, 2d ed. (Armonk, NY, 1993), 349, 359; Teiwes and Warren Sun, China's Road to Disaster (Armonk, NY, 1999), 213-29;
497. Chen Jian, "China's Involvement," 361-62; John W. Garver, "Little Chance," Diplomatic History 21 (Winter 1997): 87; MacFarquhar, The Coming of the Cataclysm, 11-348. The question of power relations within China's top echelon during the crisis years of 1960-1963 has remained an elusive and slippery terrain, fraught with information gaps. One point of continuous debate has been the degree to which Mao actually suffered political eclipse between mid-1960 and mid-1962. Relying heavily on the new evidence marshalled by Qiang Zhai, the interpretation here tends toward the view, argued principally by political scientist Frederick C. Teiwes, that Mao retained an unassailable authority even during these years. See Teiwes, Politics and Purges in China, 2d ed. (Armonk, NY, 1993), 349, 359; Teiwes and Warren Sun, China's Road to Disaster (Armonk, NY, 1999), 213-29;
498. Chen Jian, "China's Involvement," 361-62; John W. Garver, "Little Chance," Diplomatic History 21 (Winter 1997): 87; MacFarquhar, The Coming of the Cataclysm, 11-348. The question of power relations within China's top echelon during the crisis years of 1960-1963 has remained an elusive and slippery terrain, fraught with information gaps. One point of continuous debate has been the degree to which Mao actually suffered political eclipse between mid-1960 and mid-1962. Relying heavily on the new evidence marshalled by Qiang Zhai, the interpretation here tends toward the view, argued principally by political scientist Frederick C. Teiwes, that Mao retained an unassailable authority even during these years. See Teiwes, Politics and Purges in China, 2d ed. (Armonk, NY, 1993), 349, 359; Teiwes and Warren Sun, China's Road to Disaster (Armonk, NY, 1999), 213-29;
499. Chen Jian, "China's Involvement," 361-62; John W. Garver, "Little Chance," Diplomatic History 21 (Winter 1997): 87; MacFarquhar, The Coming of the Cataclysm, 11-348. The question of power relations within China's top echelon during the crisis years of 1960-1963 has remained an elusive and slippery terrain, fraught with information gaps. One point of continuous debate has been the degree to which Mao actually suffered political eclipse between mid-1960 and mid-1962. Relying heavily on the new evidence marshalled by Qiang Zhai, the interpretation here tends toward the view, argued principally by political scientist Frederick C. Teiwes, that Mao retained an unassailable authority even during these years. See Teiwes, Politics and Purges in China, 2d ed. (Armonk, NY, 1993), 349, 359; Teiwes and Warren Sun, China's Road to Disaster (Armonk, NY, 1999), 213-29;
500. Chen Jian, "China's Involvement," 361-62; John W. Garver, "Little Chance," Diplomatic History 21 (Winter 1997): 87; MacFarquhar, The Coming of the Cataclysm, 11-348. The question of power relations within China's top echelon during the crisis years of 1960-1963 has remained an elusive and slippery terrain, fraught with information gaps. One point of continuous debate has been the degree to which Mao actually suffered political eclipse between mid-1960 and mid-1962. Relying heavily on the new evidence marshalled by Qiang Zhai, the interpretation here tends toward the view, argued principally by political scientist Frederick C. Teiwes, that Mao retained an unassailable authority even during these years. See Teiwes, Politics and Purges in China, 2d ed. (Armonk, NY, 1993), 349, 359; Teiwes and Warren Sun, China's Road to Disaster (Armonk, NY, 1999), 213-29;
501. and also Lowell Dittmer, "The Chinese Cultural Revolution Revisited: The Role of the Nemesis," Journal of Contemporary China 5 (November 1996): 257.
502. Chen Jian, "China's Involvement," 362-63; MacFarquhar, The Coming of the Cataclysm, 347-77.
503. Chen Jian, "China's Involvement," 362-63; MacFarquhar, The Coming of the Cataclysm, 347-77.
504. For a detailed discussion peppered with illustrations see Colombo, "Chinese Communist Perceptions," 311-44.
505. Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 115-18; Chen Jian, "China in the Vietnam War," 357-60; MacFarquhar, The Coming of the Cataclysm, 368.
506. Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 115-18; Chen Jian, "China in the Vietnam War," 357-60; MacFarquhar, The Coming of the Cataclysm, 368.
507. Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 115-18; Chen Jian, "China in the Vietnam War," 357-60; MacFarquhar, The Coming of the Cataclysm, 368.
508. Undated CIA memo on presidential meeting on Laos, 19 June 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963 24:1032.
509. The affect of the China factor on Kennedy's Vietnam conduct, although suggested here, deserves separate treatment.
510. For illustrations of this see Qiang, China and the Vietnam Wars, chap. 4.