The American Century: From Sarajevo to Sarajevo

Diplomatic History

Volumn 23, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 285-319

  Hoff, Joan ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0345763471     PISSN: 01452096     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-7709.00167     Document Type: Article

References (190)

1. Mathew Horsman and Andrew Marshall, After the Nation-State: Citizens, Tribalism, and the New World Disorder (New York, 1994), x, 260-61; Jean-Marie Guéhenno, The END of the NATION STATE, trans. Victoria Elliott (Minneapolis, 1995), 43-45; Robert Kaplan, "Was Democracy Just a Moment?" The Atlantic Monthly, December 1997, 55-56; Benjamin R. Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld (New York, 1995), 3-8 (first quotation, 5); and Kenichi Ohmae, The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies (New York, 1995), 5, 79-100, 141-49.
2. Mathew Horsman and Andrew Marshall, After the Nation-State: Citizens, Tribalism, and the New World Disorder (New York, 1994), x, 260-61; Jean-Marie Guéhenno, The END of the NATION STATE, trans. Victoria Elliott (Minneapolis, 1995), 43-45; Robert Kaplan, "Was Democracy Just a Moment?" The Atlantic Monthly, December 1997, 55-56; Benjamin R. Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld (New York, 1995), 3-8 (first quotation, 5); and Kenichi Ohmae, The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies (New York, 1995), 5, 79-100, 141-49.
3. Mathew Horsman and Andrew Marshall, After the Nation-State: Citizens, Tribalism, and the New World Disorder (New York, 1994), x, 260-61; Jean-Marie Guéhenno, The END of the NATION STATE, trans. Victoria Elliott (Minneapolis, 1995), 43-45; Robert Kaplan, "Was Democracy Just a Moment?" The Atlantic Monthly, December 1997, 55-56; Benjamin R. Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld (New York, 1995), 3-8 (first quotation, 5); and Kenichi Ohmae, The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies (New York, 1995), 5, 79-100, 141-49.
4. Mathew Horsman and Andrew Marshall, After the Nation-State: Citizens, Tribalism, and the New World Disorder (New York, 1994), x, 260-61; Jean-Marie Guéhenno, The END of the NATION STATE, trans. Victoria Elliott (Minneapolis, 1995), 43-45; Robert Kaplan, "Was Democracy Just a Moment?" The Atlantic Monthly, December 1997, 55-56; Benjamin R. Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld (New York, 1995), 3-8 (first quotation, 5); and Kenichi Ohmae, The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies (New York, 1995), 5, 79-100, 141-49.
5. Mathew Horsman and Andrew Marshall, After the Nation-State: Citizens, Tribalism, and the New World Disorder (New York, 1994), x, 260-61; Jean-Marie Guéhenno, The END of the NATION STATE, trans. Victoria Elliott (Minneapolis, 1995), 43-45; Robert Kaplan, "Was Democracy Just a Moment?" The Atlantic Monthly, December 1997, 55-56; Benjamin R. Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld (New York, 1995), 3-8 (first quotation, 5); and Kenichi Ohmae, The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies (New York, 1995), 5, 79-100, 141-49.
6. Joan Hoff Wilson, American Business and Foreign Policy, 1920-1933 (Lexington, KY, 1971), xiv-xvii, 26, 241.
7. Ronald Steel, Temptations of a Superpower (Cambridge, MA, 1995), 47; and Eugene R. Wittkopf, ed., The Future of American Foreign Policy, 2d ed. (New York, 1994), 10, 61, 77. Debates over these dichotomies and terms reached a point of saturation in academic arguments over the origins of the Cold War and Vietnam War in the 1960s and 1970s and seem about to do the same in the next decade over why the Cold War ended. While some historians have argued that Woodrow Wilson sought a New World Order as a result of World War I, he did not use the phrase. Unfortunately, the words bring to mind the Pan-German foreign policy of the 1930s promoting the idea of a European New Order, and the Japanese employed the term, New Order, after proclaiming their East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in 1938. In both instances the United States protested these "new order" proclamations, specifically denying in a note to the Japanese on 31 December 1938 that "there was need or warrant for any one Power to take upon itself to prescribe what shall be the terms and conditions of a 'new order' in areas not under its sovereignty and to constitute itself the repository of authority and the agent of destiny in regard thereto." See Thomas J. Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order (New York, 1992); Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Wilsonian Statecraft: Theory and Practice of Liberal Internationalism (Wilmington, DE, 1991); Howard Jablon, "Cordell Hull, His 'Associates,' and Relations with Japan, 1933-1936," Mid-America 56 (July 1974): 160-75; and Noam Chomsky, Ramparts 5 (April 1967): 48. President George Bush revived the phrase New World Order in connection with the fall of communism in 1989, particularly during the celebrations over the Gulf War in 1991. Now New World Economic Order is being used to describe free-trade globalism, or what used to be described by Wilsonians as liberal (capitalist) internationalism.
8. Ronald Steel, Temptations of a Superpower (Cambridge, MA, 1995), 47; and Eugene R. Wittkopf, ed., The Future of American Foreign Policy, 2d ed. (New York, 1994), 10, 61, 77. Debates over these dichotomies and terms reached a point of saturation in academic arguments over the origins of the Cold War and Vietnam War in the 1960s and 1970s and seem about to do the same in the next decade over why the Cold War ended. While some historians have argued that Woodrow Wilson sought a New World Order as a result of World War I, he did not use the phrase. Unfortunately, the words bring to mind the Pan-German foreign policy of the 1930s promoting the idea of a European New Order, and the Japanese employed the term, New Order, after proclaiming their East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in 1938. In both instances the United States protested these "new order" proclamations, specifically denying in a note to the Japanese on 31 December 1938 that "there was need or warrant for any one Power to take upon itself to prescribe what shall be the terms and conditions of a 'new order' in areas not under its sovereignty and to constitute itself the repository of authority and the agent of destiny in regard thereto." See Thomas J. Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order (New York, 1992); Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Wilsonian Statecraft: Theory and Practice of Liberal Internationalism (Wilmington, DE, 1991); Howard Jablon, "Cordell Hull, His 'Associates,' and Relations with Japan, 1933-1936," Mid-America 56 (July 1974): 160-75; and Noam Chomsky, Ramparts 5 (April 1967): 48. President George Bush revived the phrase New World Order in connection with the fall of communism in 1989, particularly during the celebrations over the Gulf War in 1991. Now New World Economic Order is being used to describe free-trade globalism, or what used to be described by Wilsonians as liberal (capitalist) internationalism.
9. Ronald Steel, Temptations of a Superpower (Cambridge, MA, 1995), 47; and Eugene R. Wittkopf, ed., The Future of American Foreign Policy, 2d ed. (New York, 1994), 10, 61, 77. Debates over these dichotomies and terms reached a point of saturation in academic arguments over the origins of the Cold War and Vietnam War in the 1960s and 1970s and seem about to do the same in the next decade over why the Cold War ended. While some historians have argued that Woodrow Wilson sought a New World Order as a result of World War I, he did not use the phrase. Unfortunately, the words bring to mind the Pan-German foreign policy of the 1930s promoting the idea of a European New Order, and the Japanese employed the term, New Order, after proclaiming their East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in 1938. In both instances the United States protested these "new order" proclamations, specifically denying in a note to the Japanese on 31 December 1938 that "there was need or warrant for any one Power to take upon itself to prescribe what shall be the terms and conditions of a 'new order' in areas not under its sovereignty and to constitute itself the repository of authority and the agent of destiny in regard thereto." See Thomas J. Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order (New York, 1992); Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Wilsonian Statecraft: Theory and Practice of Liberal Internationalism (Wilmington, DE, 1991); Howard Jablon, "Cordell Hull, His 'Associates,' and Relations with Japan, 1933-1936," Mid-America 56 (July 1974): 160-75; and Noam Chomsky, Ramparts 5 (April 1967): 48. President George Bush revived the phrase New World Order in connection with the fall of communism in 1989, particularly during the celebrations over the Gulf War in 1991. Now New World Economic Order is being used to describe free-trade globalism, or what used to be described by Wilsonians as liberal (capitalist) internationalism.
10. Ronald Steel, Temptations of a Superpower (Cambridge, MA, 1995), 47; and Eugene R. Wittkopf, ed., The Future of American Foreign Policy, 2d ed. (New York, 1994), 10, 61, 77. Debates over these dichotomies and terms reached a point of saturation in academic arguments over the origins of the Cold War and Vietnam War in the 1960s and 1970s and seem about to do the same in the next decade over why the Cold War ended. While some historians have argued that Woodrow Wilson sought a New World Order as a result of World War I, he did not use the phrase. Unfortunately, the words bring to mind the Pan-German foreign policy of the 1930s promoting the idea of a European New Order, and the Japanese employed the term, New Order, after proclaiming their East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in 1938. In both instances the United States protested these "new order" proclamations, specifically denying in a note to the Japanese on 31 December 1938 that "there was need or warrant for any one Power to take upon itself to prescribe what shall be the terms and conditions of a 'new order' in areas not under its sovereignty and to constitute itself the repository of authority and the agent of destiny in regard thereto." See Thomas J. Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order (New York, 1992); Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Wilsonian Statecraft: Theory and Practice of Liberal Internationalism (Wilmington, DE, 1991); Howard Jablon, "Cordell Hull, His 'Associates,' and Relations with Japan, 1933-1936," Mid-America 56 (July 1974): 160-75; and Noam Chomsky, Ramparts 5 (April 1967): 48. President George Bush revived the phrase New World Order in connection with the fall of communism in 1989, particularly during the celebrations over the Gulf War in 1991. Now New World Economic Order is being used to describe free-trade globalism, or what used to be described by Wilsonians as liberal (capitalist) internationalism.
11. Ronald Steel, Temptations of a Superpower (Cambridge, MA, 1995), 47; and Eugene R. Wittkopf, ed., The Future of American Foreign Policy, 2d ed. (New York, 1994), 10, 61, 77. Debates over these dichotomies and terms reached a point of saturation in academic arguments over the origins of the Cold War and Vietnam War in the 1960s and 1970s and seem about to do the same in the next decade over why the Cold War ended. While some historians have argued that Woodrow Wilson sought a New World Order as a result of World War I, he did not use the phrase. Unfortunately, the words bring to mind the Pan-German foreign policy of the 1930s promoting the idea of a European New Order, and the Japanese employed the term, New Order, after proclaiming their East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in 1938. In both instances the United States protested these "new order" proclamations, specifically denying in a note to the Japanese on 31 December 1938 that "there was need or warrant for any one Power to take upon itself to prescribe what shall be the terms and conditions of a 'new order' in areas not under its sovereignty and to constitute itself the repository of authority and the agent of destiny in regard thereto." See Thomas J. Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order (New York, 1992); Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Wilsonian Statecraft: Theory and Practice of Liberal Internationalism (Wilmington, DE, 1991); Howard Jablon, "Cordell Hull, His 'Associates,' and Relations with Japan, 1933-1936," Mid-America 56 (July 1974): 160-75; and Noam Chomsky, Ramparts 5 (April 1967): 48. President George Bush revived the phrase New World Order in connection with the fall of communism in 1989, particularly during the celebrations over the Gulf War in 1991. Now New World Economic Order is being used to describe free-trade globalism, or what used to be described by Wilsonians as liberal (capitalist) internationalism.
12. Ronald Steel, Temptations of a Superpower (Cambridge, MA, 1995), 47; and Eugene R. Wittkopf, ed., The Future of American Foreign Policy, 2d ed. (New York, 1994), 10, 61, 77. Debates over these dichotomies and terms reached a point of saturation in academic arguments over the origins of the Cold War and Vietnam War in the 1960s and 1970s and seem about to do the same in the next decade over why the Cold War ended. While some historians have argued that Woodrow Wilson sought a New World Order as a result of World War I, he did not use the phrase. Unfortunately, the words bring to mind the Pan-German foreign policy of the 1930s promoting the idea of a European New Order, and the Japanese employed the term, New Order, after proclaiming their East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in 1938. In both instances the United States protested these "new order" proclamations, specifically denying in a note to the Japanese on 31 December 1938 that "there was need or warrant for any one Power to take upon itself to prescribe what shall be the terms and conditions of a 'new order' in areas not under its sovereignty and to constitute itself the repository of authority and the agent of destiny in regard thereto." See Thomas J. Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order (New York, 1992); Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Wilsonian Statecraft: Theory and Practice of Liberal Internationalism (Wilmington, DE, 1991); Howard Jablon, "Cordell Hull, His 'Associates,' and Relations with Japan, 1933-1936," Mid-America 56 (July 1974): 160-75; and Noam Chomsky, Ramparts 5 (April 1967): 48. President George Bush revived the phrase New World Order in connection with the fall of communism in 1989, particularly during the celebrations over the Gulf War in 1991. Now New World Economic Order is being used to describe free-trade globalism, or what used to be described by Wilsonians as liberal (capitalist) internationalism.
13. Richard Rosecrance, "A New Concert of Powers and U.S. Foreign Policy," in Wittkopf, ed., The Future of American Foreign Policy, 61; Dædalus 124 (Spring 1995): xiv; Susan Strange, "The Defective State," in Wittkopf, ed., The Future of American Foreign Policy, 72; Horsman and Marshall, After the Nation-State, 236; Ohmae, End of the Nation State, vii, passim.
14. Richard Rosecrance, "A New Concert of Powers and U.S. Foreign Policy," in Wittkopf, ed., The Future of American Foreign Policy, 61; Dædalus 124 (Spring 1995): xiv; Susan Strange, "The Defective State," in Wittkopf, ed., The Future of American Foreign Policy, 72; Horsman and Marshall, After the Nation-State, 236; Ohmae, End of the Nation State, vii, passim.
15. Richard Rosecrance, "A New Concert of Powers and U.S. Foreign Policy," in Wittkopf, ed., The Future of American Foreign Policy, 61; Dædalus 124 (Spring 1995): xiv; Susan Strange, "The Defective State," in Wittkopf, ed., The Future of American Foreign Policy, 72; Horsman and Marshall, After the Nation-State, 236; Ohmae, End of the Nation State, vii, passim.
16. Richard Rosecrance, "A New Concert of Powers and U.S. Foreign Policy," in Wittkopf, ed., The Future of American Foreign Policy, 61; Dædalus 124 (Spring 1995): xiv; Susan Strange, "The Defective State," in Wittkopf, ed., The Future of American Foreign Policy, 72; Horsman and Marshall, After the Nation-State, 236; Ohmae, End of the Nation State, vii, passim.
17. Richard Rosecrance, "A New Concert of Powers and U.S. Foreign Policy," in Wittkopf, ed., The Future of American Foreign Policy, 61; Dædalus 124 (Spring 1995): xiv; Susan Strange, "The Defective State," in Wittkopf, ed., The Future of American Foreign Policy, 72; Horsman and Marshall, After the Nation-State, 236; Ohmae, End of the Nation State, vii, passim.
18. Wittkopf, ed., Future of American Foreign Policy, 10-11; Horsman and Marshall, After the Nation-State, 263. For the "long peace" theory see John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War(New York, 1987); idem, "The Cold War, the Long Peace, and the Future," Diplomatic History 16 (Spring 1992): 234-46; and Charles W. Kegley, Jr., ed., The Long Postwar Peace (New York, 1991). New York Times, 5 June 1998, reporting that the United States, Russia, China, Britain, and France - the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and all nuclear powers themselves - asked India and Pakistan to freeze their nuclear weapons development in return for help in reducing their tension over the disputed territory of Kashmir, but disagreed over whether to enforce economic sanctions. While the United States was first to impose economic sanctions on both countries, Germany and Japan suspended nonhumanitarian aid to India and these two countries, plus the United States, Canada, and Italy have pressed India and Pakistan to sign the 1996 nuclear test-ban treaty.
19. Wittkopf, ed., Future of American Foreign Policy, 10-11; Horsman and Marshall, After the Nation-State, 263. For the "long peace" theory see John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War(New York, 1987); idem, "The Cold War, the Long Peace, and the Future," Diplomatic History 16 (Spring 1992): 234-46; and Charles W. Kegley, Jr., ed., The Long Postwar Peace (New York, 1991). New York Times, 5 June 1998, reporting that the United States, Russia, China, Britain, and France - the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and all nuclear powers themselves - asked India and Pakistan to freeze their nuclear weapons development in return for help in reducing their tension over the disputed territory of Kashmir, but disagreed over whether to enforce economic sanctions. While the United States was first to impose economic sanctions on both countries, Germany and Japan suspended nonhumanitarian aid to India and these two countries, plus the United States, Canada, and Italy have pressed India and Pakistan to sign the 1996 nuclear test-ban treaty.
20. Wittkopf, ed., Future of American Foreign Policy, 10-11; Horsman and Marshall, After the Nation-State, 263. For the "long peace" theory see John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War(New York, 1987); idem, "The Cold War, the Long Peace, and the Future," Diplomatic History 16 (Spring 1992): 234-46; and Charles W. Kegley, Jr., ed., The Long Postwar Peace (New York, 1991). New York Times, 5 June 1998, reporting that the United States, Russia, China, Britain, and France - the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and all nuclear powers themselves - asked India and Pakistan to freeze their nuclear weapons development in return for help in reducing their tension over the disputed territory of Kashmir, but disagreed over whether to enforce economic sanctions. While the United States was first to impose economic sanctions on both countries, Germany and Japan suspended nonhumanitarian aid to India and these two countries, plus the United States, Canada, and Italy have pressed India and Pakistan to sign the 1996 nuclear test-ban treaty.
21. Wittkopf, ed., Future of American Foreign Policy, 10-11; Horsman and Marshall, After the Nation-State, 263. For the "long peace" theory see John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War(New York, 1987); idem, "The Cold War, the Long Peace, and the Future," Diplomatic History 16 (Spring 1992): 234-46; and Charles W. Kegley, Jr., ed., The Long Postwar Peace (New York, 1991). New York Times, 5 June 1998, reporting that the United States, Russia, China, Britain, and France - the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and all nuclear powers themselves - asked India and Pakistan to freeze their nuclear weapons development in return for help in reducing their tension over the disputed territory of Kashmir, but disagreed over whether to enforce economic sanctions. While the United States was first to impose economic sanctions on both countries, Germany and Japan suspended nonhumanitarian aid to India and these two countries, plus the United States, Canada, and Italy have pressed India and Pakistan to sign the 1996 nuclear test-ban treaty.
22. Wittkopf, ed., Future of American Foreign Policy, 10-11; Horsman and Marshall, After the Nation-State, 263. For the "long peace" theory see John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War(New York, 1987); idem, "The Cold War, the Long Peace, and the Future," Diplomatic History 16 (Spring 1992): 234-46; and Charles W. Kegley, Jr., ed., The Long Postwar Peace (New York, 1991). New York Times, 5 June 1998, reporting that the United States, Russia, China, Britain, and France - the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and all nuclear powers themselves - asked India and Pakistan to freeze their nuclear weapons development in return for help in reducing their tension over the disputed territory of Kashmir, but disagreed over whether to enforce economic sanctions. While the United States was first to impose economic sanctions on both countries, Germany and Japan suspended nonhumanitarian aid to India and these two countries, plus the United States, Canada, and Italy have pressed India and Pakistan to sign the 1996 nuclear test-ban treaty.
23. Wittkopf, ed., Future of American Foreign Policy, 10-11; Horsman and Marshall, After the Nation-State, 263. For the "long peace" theory see John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War(New York, 1987); idem, "The Cold War, the Long Peace, and the Future," Diplomatic History 16 (Spring 1992): 234-46; and Charles W. Kegley, Jr., ed., The Long Postwar Peace (New York, 1991). New York Times, 5 June 1998, reporting that the United States, Russia, China, Britain, and France - the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and all nuclear powers themselves - asked India and Pakistan to freeze their nuclear weapons development in return for help in reducing their tension over the disputed territory of Kashmir, but disagreed over whether to enforce economic sanctions. While the United States was first to impose economic sanctions on both countries, Germany and Japan suspended nonhumanitarian aid to India and these two countries, plus the United States, Canada, and Italy have pressed India and Pakistan to sign the 1996 nuclear test-ban treaty.
24. Rosecrance, "A New Concert of Powers," 61-75, Wittkopf, ed., The Future of American Foreign Policy, 10-11; Terry L. Deibel, "Strategies before Containment: Patterns for the Future," in Wittkopf, ed., The Future of American Foreign Policy, 76-90. See also Edward Vose Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power (Ithaca, 1955); and Marc Trachtenberg, "The Meaning of Mobilization in 1914," International Security 15 (Winter 1990/91): 120-50.
25. Rosecrance, "A New Concert of Powers," 61-75, Wittkopf, ed., The Future of American Foreign Policy, 10-11; Terry L. Deibel, "Strategies before Containment: Patterns for the Future," in Wittkopf, ed., The Future of American Foreign Policy, 76-90. See also Edward Vose Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power (Ithaca, 1955); and Marc Trachtenberg, "The Meaning of Mobilization in 1914," International Security 15 (Winter 1990/91): 120-50.
26. Rosecrance, "A New Concert of Powers," 61-75, Wittkopf, ed., The Future of American Foreign Policy, 10-11; Terry L. Deibel, "Strategies before Containment: Patterns for the Future," in Wittkopf, ed., The Future of American Foreign Policy, 76-90. See also Edward Vose Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power (Ithaca, 1955); and Marc Trachtenberg, "The Meaning of Mobilization in 1914," International Security 15 (Winter 1990/91): 120-50.
27. Rosecrance, "A New Concert of Powers," 61-75, Wittkopf, ed., The Future of American Foreign Policy, 10-11; Terry L. Deibel, "Strategies before Containment: Patterns for the Future," in Wittkopf, ed., The Future of American Foreign Policy, 76-90. See also Edward Vose Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power (Ithaca, 1955); and Marc Trachtenberg, "The Meaning of Mobilization in 1914," International Security 15 (Winter 1990/91): 120-50.
28. Rosecrance, "A New Concert of Powers," 61-75, Wittkopf, ed., The Future of American Foreign Policy, 10-11; Terry L. Deibel, "Strategies before Containment: Patterns for the Future," in Wittkopf, ed., The Future of American Foreign Policy, 76-90. See also Edward Vose Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of Power (Ithaca, 1955); and Marc Trachtenberg, "The Meaning of Mobilization in 1914," International Security 15 (Winter 1990/91): 120-50.
29. Alfred E. Eckes, "Cowboy Capitalism: Lessons from the Asian Meltdown," Chronicles, July 1998, 26-28; idem, "'The End of Globalization' Will the Dinosaurs Return?" 30 September 1998, unpublished paper; "Globalization in Crisis," Multinational Monitor 19 (January-February 1998): 5-6, 10-27; William Greider, "The Global Crisis Deepens," The Nation, 19 October 1998, 11-16.
30. Alfred E. Eckes, "Cowboy Capitalism: Lessons from the Asian Meltdown," Chronicles, July 1998, 26-28; idem, "'The End of Globalization' Will the Dinosaurs Return?" 30 September 1998, unpublished paper; "Globalization in Crisis," Multinational Monitor 19 (January-February 1998): 5-6, 10-27; William Greider, "The Global Crisis Deepens," The Nation, 19 October 1998, 11-16.
31. Alfred E. Eckes, "Cowboy Capitalism: Lessons from the Asian Meltdown," Chronicles, July 1998, 26-28; idem, "'The End of Globalization' Will the Dinosaurs Return?" 30 September 1998, unpublished paper; "Globalization in Crisis," Multinational Monitor 19 (January-February 1998): 5-6, 10-27; William Greider, "The Global Crisis Deepens," The Nation, 19 October 1998, 11-16.
32. Alfred E. Eckes, "Cowboy Capitalism: Lessons from the Asian Meltdown," Chronicles, July 1998, 26-28; idem, "'The End of Globalization' Will the Dinosaurs Return?" 30 September 1998, unpublished paper; "Globalization in Crisis," Multinational Monitor 19 (January-February 1998): 5-6, 10-27; William Greider, "The Global Crisis Deepens," The Nation, 19 October 1998, 11-16.
33. Alan Tonelson, "What Is the National Interest?" The Atlantic Monthly, July 1991, 35. The Truman Doctrine (1947), proclaimed initially in reference to Greece and Turkey, but later applied to other parts of the world, stated that "it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." The Elsenhower Doctrine (1957) gave unilateral notice that the United States would intervene in the Middle East if any government threatened by a Communist takeover requested aid. The Johnson Doctrine (1965) stated that the president could use military force whenever he thought communism threatened the Western Hemisphere and was first issued when LBJ sent troops into the Dominican Republic. The Nixon Doctrine (1969), originally aimed at "southern tier" Third World countries in East Asia, came to represent the formal institutionalization of the policy of Vietnamization; that is, it noted that while the United States continued to support regional security and national self-sufficiency for nations in the Far East, it would no longer commit American troops to this effort. The Carter Doctrine (1980) maintained that any attempt by the Soviet Union "to gain control of the Persian Gulf will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States." The Reagan Doctrine (1986) announced that American foreign policy would actively promote democracy throughout the world by giving humanitarian and military aid to "democratic revolutions" wherever they occurred.
34. Gaddis Smith, The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine, 1945-1993 (New York, 1994), 7; William M. LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 1977-1992 (Chapel Hill, 1998); Glenn Hastedt, American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, Future, 2d. ed. (Englewoods Cliffs, NJ, 1991), 217-37. Of the six cases of alleged U.S. attempts to assassinate foreign leaders (Fidel Castro, Cuba; Patrice Lumumba, Congo [Zaire]; Rafael Trujillo, Dominican Republic; General Rene Schneider and Salvador Allende, Chile; and Ngo Dinh Diem, Vietnam) only two were found to be substantiated by evidence: Castro and Lumumba.
35. Gaddis Smith, The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine, 1945-1993 (New York, 1994), 7; William M. LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 1977-1992 (Chapel Hill, 1998); Glenn Hastedt, American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, Future, 2d. ed. (Englewoods Cliffs, NJ, 1991), 217-37. Of the six cases of alleged U.S. attempts to assassinate foreign leaders (Fidel Castro, Cuba; Patrice Lumumba, Congo [Zaire]; Rafael Trujillo, Dominican Republic; General Rene Schneider and Salvador Allende, Chile; and Ngo Dinh Diem, Vietnam) only two were found to be substantiated by evidence: Castro and Lumumba.
36. Gaddis Smith, The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine, 1945-1993 (New York, 1994), 7; William M. LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 1977-1992 (Chapel Hill, 1998); Glenn Hastedt, American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, Future, 2d. ed. (Englewoods Cliffs, NJ, 1991), 217-37. Of the six cases of alleged U.S. attempts to assassinate foreign leaders (Fidel Castro, Cuba; Patrice Lumumba, Congo [Zaire]; Rafael Trujillo, Dominican Republic; General Rene Schneider and Salvador Allende, Chile; and Ngo Dinh Diem, Vietnam) only two were found to be substantiated by evidence: Castro and Lumumba.
37. Melanie Billings-Yun, Decision against War: Eisenhower and Dien Bien Phu, 1954 (New York, 1988); George Herring, America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975 (New York, 1986), 25-72; Richard H. Immerman, "The United States and the Geneva Conference of 1954," Diplomatic History 14 (Winter 1990): 43-66; idem, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist: An Agonizing Reappraisal," Diplomatic History 14 (Summer 1990): 319-42; Robert F. Burk, "Eisenhower Revisionism Revisited: Reflections on the Eisenhower Scholarship," Historian 50 (February 1988): 196-209; Stephen G. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anti-Communism (Chapel Hill 1988); Robert McMahon, "Eisenhower and Third World Nationalism: A Critique of the Revisionists," Political Science Quarterly 101 (Fall 1986): 453-73; Stephen Rabe, "The Caribbean Triangle: Betancourt, Castro, and Trujillo and US Foreign Policy," Diplomatic History 20 (Winter 1996): 55-78; and Piero Gleijeses, The Dominican Crisis: The 1065 Constitutional Revolt and American Intervention (Baltimore, 1978).
38. Melanie Billings-Yun, Decision against War: Eisenhower and Dien Bien Phu, 1954 (New York, 1988); George Herring, America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975 (New York, 1986), 25-72; Richard H. Immerman, "The United States and the Geneva Conference of 1954," Diplomatic History 14 (Winter 1990): 43-66; idem, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist: An Agonizing Reappraisal," Diplomatic History 14 (Summer 1990): 319-42; Robert F. Burk, "Eisenhower Revisionism Revisited: Reflections on the Eisenhower Scholarship," Historian 50 (February 1988): 196-209; Stephen G. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anti-Communism (Chapel Hill 1988); Robert McMahon, "Eisenhower and Third World Nationalism: A Critique of the Revisionists," Political Science Quarterly 101 (Fall 1986): 453-73; Stephen Rabe, "The Caribbean Triangle: Betancourt, Castro, and Trujillo and US Foreign Policy," Diplomatic History 20 (Winter 1996): 55-78; and Piero Gleijeses, The Dominican Crisis: The 1065 Constitutional Revolt and American Intervention (Baltimore, 1978).
39. Melanie Billings-Yun, Decision against War: Eisenhower and Dien Bien Phu, 1954 (New York, 1988); George Herring, America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975 (New York, 1986), 25-72; Richard H. Immerman, "The United States and the Geneva Conference of 1954," Diplomatic History 14 (Winter 1990): 43-66; idem, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist: An Agonizing Reappraisal," Diplomatic History 14 (Summer 1990): 319-42; Robert F. Burk, "Eisenhower Revisionism Revisited: Reflections on the Eisenhower Scholarship," Historian 50 (February 1988): 196-209; Stephen G. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anti-Communism (Chapel Hill 1988); Robert McMahon, "Eisenhower and Third World Nationalism: A Critique of the Revisionists," Political Science Quarterly 101 (Fall 1986): 453-73; Stephen Rabe, "The Caribbean Triangle: Betancourt, Castro, and Trujillo and US Foreign Policy," Diplomatic History 20 (Winter 1996): 55-78; and Piero Gleijeses, The Dominican Crisis: The 1065 Constitutional Revolt and American Intervention (Baltimore, 1978).
40. Melanie Billings-Yun, Decision against War: Eisenhower and Dien Bien Phu, 1954 (New York, 1988); George Herring, America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975 (New York, 1986), 25-72; Richard H. Immerman, "The United States and the Geneva Conference of 1954," Diplomatic History 14 (Winter 1990): 43-66; idem, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist: An Agonizing Reappraisal," Diplomatic History 14 (Summer 1990): 319-42; Robert F. Burk, "Eisenhower Revisionism Revisited: Reflections on the Eisenhower Scholarship," Historian 50 (February 1988): 196-209; Stephen G. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anti-Communism (Chapel Hill 1988); Robert McMahon, "Eisenhower and Third World Nationalism: A Critique of the Revisionists," Political Science Quarterly 101 (Fall 1986): 453-73; Stephen Rabe, "The Caribbean Triangle: Betancourt, Castro, and Trujillo and US Foreign Policy," Diplomatic History 20 (Winter 1996): 55-78; and Piero Gleijeses, The Dominican Crisis: The 1065 Constitutional Revolt and American Intervention (Baltimore, 1978).
41. Melanie Billings-Yun, Decision against War: Eisenhower and Dien Bien Phu, 1954 (New York, 1988); George Herring, America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975 (New York, 1986), 25-72; Richard H. Immerman, "The United States and the Geneva Conference of 1954," Diplomatic History 14 (Winter 1990): 43-66; idem, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist: An Agonizing Reappraisal," Diplomatic History 14 (Summer 1990): 319-42; Robert F. Burk, "Eisenhower Revisionism Revisited: Reflections on the Eisenhower Scholarship," Historian 50 (February 1988): 196-209; Stephen G. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anti-Communism (Chapel Hill 1988); Robert McMahon, "Eisenhower and Third World Nationalism: A Critique of the Revisionists," Political Science Quarterly 101 (Fall 1986): 453-73; Stephen Rabe, "The Caribbean Triangle: Betancourt, Castro, and Trujillo and US Foreign Policy," Diplomatic History 20 (Winter 1996): 55-78; and Piero Gleijeses, The Dominican Crisis: The 1065 Constitutional Revolt and American Intervention (Baltimore, 1978).
42. Melanie Billings-Yun, Decision against War: Eisenhower and Dien Bien Phu, 1954 (New York, 1988); George Herring, America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975 (New York, 1986), 25-72; Richard H. Immerman, "The United States and the Geneva Conference of 1954," Diplomatic History 14 (Winter 1990): 43-66; idem, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist: An Agonizing Reappraisal," Diplomatic History 14 (Summer 1990): 319-42; Robert F. Burk, "Eisenhower Revisionism Revisited: Reflections on the Eisenhower Scholarship," Historian 50 (February 1988): 196-209; Stephen G. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anti-Communism (Chapel Hill 1988); Robert McMahon, "Eisenhower and Third World Nationalism: A Critique of the Revisionists," Political Science Quarterly 101 (Fall 1986): 453-73; Stephen Rabe, "The Caribbean Triangle: Betancourt, Castro, and Trujillo and US Foreign Policy," Diplomatic History 20 (Winter 1996): 55-78; and Piero Gleijeses, The Dominican Crisis: The 1065 Constitutional Revolt and American Intervention (Baltimore, 1978).
43. Melanie Billings-Yun, Decision against War: Eisenhower and Dien Bien Phu, 1954 (New York, 1988); George Herring, America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975 (New York, 1986), 25-72; Richard H. Immerman, "The United States and the Geneva Conference of 1954," Diplomatic History 14 (Winter 1990): 43-66; idem, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist: An Agonizing Reappraisal," Diplomatic History 14 (Summer 1990): 319-42; Robert F. Burk, "Eisenhower Revisionism Revisited: Reflections on the Eisenhower Scholarship," Historian 50 (February 1988): 196-209; Stephen G. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anti-Communism (Chapel Hill 1988); Robert McMahon, "Eisenhower and Third World Nationalism: A Critique of the Revisionists," Political Science Quarterly 101 (Fall 1986): 453-73; Stephen Rabe, "The Caribbean Triangle: Betancourt, Castro, and Trujillo and US Foreign Policy," Diplomatic History 20 (Winter 1996): 55-78; and Piero Gleijeses, The Dominican Crisis: The 1065 Constitutional Revolt and American Intervention (Baltimore, 1978).
44. Melanie Billings-Yun, Decision against War: Eisenhower and Dien Bien Phu, 1954 (New York, 1988); George Herring, America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975 (New York, 1986), 25-72; Richard H. Immerman, "The United States and the Geneva Conference of 1954," Diplomatic History 14 (Winter 1990): 43-66; idem, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist: An Agonizing Reappraisal," Diplomatic History 14 (Summer 1990): 319-42; Robert F. Burk, "Eisenhower Revisionism Revisited: Reflections on the Eisenhower Scholarship," Historian 50 (February 1988): 196-209; Stephen G. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anti-Communism (Chapel Hill 1988); Robert McMahon, "Eisenhower and Third World Nationalism: A Critique of the Revisionists," Political Science Quarterly 101 (Fall 1986): 453-73; Stephen Rabe, "The Caribbean Triangle: Betancourt, Castro, and Trujillo and US Foreign Policy," Diplomatic History 20 (Winter 1996): 55-78; and Piero Gleijeses, The Dominican Crisis: The 1065 Constitutional Revolt and American Intervention (Baltimore, 1978).
45. Melanie Billings-Yun, Decision against War: Eisenhower and Dien Bien Phu, 1954 (New York, 1988); George Herring, America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975 (New York, 1986), 25-72; Richard H. Immerman, "The United States and the Geneva Conference of 1954," Diplomatic History 14 (Winter 1990): 43-66; idem, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist: An Agonizing Reappraisal," Diplomatic History 14 (Summer 1990): 319-42; Robert F. Burk, "Eisenhower Revisionism Revisited: Reflections on the Eisenhower Scholarship," Historian 50 (February 1988): 196-209; Stephen G. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anti-Communism (Chapel Hill 1988); Robert McMahon, "Eisenhower and Third World Nationalism: A Critique of the Revisionists," Political Science Quarterly 101 (Fall 1986): 453-73; Stephen Rabe, "The Caribbean Triangle: Betancourt, Castro, and Trujillo and US Foreign Policy," Diplomatic History 20 (Winter 1996): 55-78; and Piero Gleijeses, The Dominican Crisis: The 1065 Constitutional Revolt and American Intervention (Baltimore, 1978).
46. Hastedt, American Foreign Policy, 1-8; Phyllis Bennis, Calling the Shots: How Washington Dominates Today's UN (New York, 1996), 25; LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, Thomas J. McCormick, America's Half-Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War (Baltimore, 1989); and Thomas G. Paterson, On Every Front: The Making and Unmaking of the Cold War, rev. ed. (New York, 1992).
47. Hastedt, American Foreign Policy, 1-8; Phyllis Bennis, Calling the Shots: How Washington Dominates Today's UN (New York, 1996), 25; LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, Thomas J. McCormick, America's Half-Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War (Baltimore, 1989); and Thomas G. Paterson, On Every Front: The Making and Unmaking of the Cold War, rev. ed. (New York, 1992).
48. Hastedt, American Foreign Policy, 1-8; Phyllis Bennis, Calling the Shots: How Washington Dominates Today's UN (New York, 1996), 25; LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, Thomas J. McCormick, America's Half-Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War (Baltimore, 1989); and Thomas G. Paterson, On Every Front: The Making and Unmaking of the Cold War, rev. ed. (New York, 1992).
49. Hastedt, American Foreign Policy, 1-8; Phyllis Bennis, Calling the Shots: How Washington Dominates Today's UN (New York, 1996), 25; LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, Thomas J. McCormick, America's Half-Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War (Baltimore, 1989); and Thomas G. Paterson, On Every Front: The Making and Unmaking of the Cold War, rev. ed. (New York, 1992).
50. Hastedt, American Foreign Policy, 1-8; Phyllis Bennis, Calling the Shots: How Washington Dominates Today's UN (New York, 1996), 25; LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, Thomas J. McCormick, America's Half-Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War (Baltimore, 1989); and Thomas G. Paterson, On Every Front: The Making and Unmaking of the Cold War, rev. ed. (New York, 1992).
51. Horsman and Marshall, After the Nation-State, 33; Bennis, Calling the Shots, 11-12. Diane Kunz is one of the few economic historians to argue that the American economy successfully provided both guns and butter throughout the Cold War, but her argument is less persuasive for the period after 1970, as is her insistence that GATT produced a free-trade system, ignoring the many postwar concessions the United States made to its economic allies at the expense of some of its own industries and workers. See Kunz, Butter and Guns: America's Cold War Economic Diplomacy (New York, 1997).
52. Horsman and Marshall, After the Nation-State, 33; Bennis, Calling the Shots, 11-12. Diane Kunz is one of the few economic historians to argue that the American economy successfully provided both guns and butter throughout the Cold War, but her argument is less persuasive for the period after 1970, as is her insistence that GATT produced a free-trade system, ignoring the many postwar concessions the United States made to its economic allies at the expense of some of its own industries and workers. See Kunz, Butter and Guns: America's Cold War Economic Diplomacy (New York, 1997).
53. Horsman and Marshall, After the Nation-State, 33; Bennis, Calling the Shots, 11-12. Diane Kunz is one of the few economic historians to argue that the American economy successfully provided both guns and butter throughout the Cold War, but her argument is less persuasive for the period after 1970, as is her insistence that GATT produced a free-trade system, ignoring the many postwar concessions the United States made to its economic allies at the expense of some of its own industries and workers. See Kunz, Butter and Guns: America's Cold War Economic Diplomacy (New York, 1997).
54. Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (New York, 1987), 427-45; Geir Lundestad, "Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945-52," SHAFR Newsletter 15 (September 1954): 1-21; Melvyn P. Leffler, "National Security and US Foreign Policy," Michael MccGwire, "National Security and Soviet Foreign Policy," Charles S. Maier, "Hegemony and Autonomy within the Western Alliance," and Charles Gati, "Hegemony and Repression in the Eastern Alliance," all in Origins of the Cold War. An International History, ed. Leffler and David S. Painter (New York, 1994), 15, 76, 154-98; Sonia L. Nelson, "The Impact of U.S. International Economic Plans on Czechoslovakia's Postwar Development, 1945-1948" (Ph.D. diss., Northern Illinois University, 1994).
55. Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (New York, 1987), 427-45; Geir Lundestad, "Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945-52," SHAFR Newsletter 15 (September 1954): 1-21; Melvyn P. Leffler, "National Security and US Foreign Policy," Michael MccGwire, "National Security and Soviet Foreign Policy," Charles S. Maier, "Hegemony and Autonomy within the Western Alliance," and Charles Gati, "Hegemony and Repression in the Eastern Alliance," all in Origins of the Cold War. An International History, ed. Leffler and David S. Painter (New York, 1994), 15, 76, 154-98; Sonia L. Nelson, "The Impact of U.S. International Economic Plans on Czechoslovakia's Postwar Development, 1945-1948" (Ph.D. diss., Northern Illinois University, 1994).
56. Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (New York, 1987), 427-45; Geir Lundestad, "Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945-52," SHAFR Newsletter 15 (September 1954): 1-21; Melvyn P. Leffler, "National Security and US Foreign Policy," Michael MccGwire, "National Security and Soviet Foreign Policy," Charles S. Maier, "Hegemony and Autonomy within the Western Alliance," and Charles Gati, "Hegemony and Repression in the Eastern Alliance," all in Origins of the Cold War. An International History, ed. Leffler and David S. Painter (New York, 1994), 15, 76, 154-98; Sonia L. Nelson, "The Impact of U.S. International Economic Plans on Czechoslovakia's Postwar Development, 1945-1948" (Ph.D. diss., Northern Illinois University, 1994).
57. Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (New York, 1987), 427-45; Geir Lundestad, "Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945-52," SHAFR Newsletter 15 (September 1954): 1-21; Melvyn P. Leffler, "National Security and US Foreign Policy," Michael MccGwire, "National Security and Soviet Foreign Policy," Charles S. Maier, "Hegemony and Autonomy within the Western Alliance," and Charles Gati, "Hegemony and Repression in the Eastern Alliance," all in Origins of the Cold War. An International History, ed. Leffler and David S. Painter (New York, 1994), 15, 76, 154-98; Sonia L. Nelson, "The Impact of U.S. International Economic Plans on Czechoslovakia's Postwar Development, 1945-1948" (Ph.D. diss., Northern Illinois University, 1994).
58. Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (New York, 1987), 427-45; Geir Lundestad, "Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945-52," SHAFR Newsletter 15 (September 1954): 1-21; Melvyn P. Leffler, "National Security and US Foreign Policy," Michael MccGwire, "National Security and Soviet Foreign Policy," Charles S. Maier, "Hegemony and Autonomy within the Western Alliance," and Charles Gati, "Hegemony and Repression in the Eastern Alliance," all in Origins of the Cold War. An International History, ed. Leffler and David S. Painter (New York, 1994), 15, 76, 154-98; Sonia L. Nelson, "The Impact of U.S. International Economic Plans on Czechoslovakia's Postwar Development, 1945-1948" (Ph.D. diss., Northern Illinois University, 1994).
59. Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (New York, 1987), 427-45; Geir Lundestad, "Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945-52," SHAFR Newsletter 15 (September 1954): 1-21; Melvyn P. Leffler, "National Security and US Foreign Policy," Michael MccGwire, "National Security and Soviet Foreign Policy," Charles S. Maier, "Hegemony and Autonomy within the Western Alliance," and Charles Gati, "Hegemony and Repression in the Eastern Alliance," all in Origins of the Cold War. An International History, ed. Leffler and David S. Painter (New York, 1994), 15, 76, 154-98; Sonia L. Nelson, "The Impact of U.S. International Economic Plans on Czechoslovakia's Postwar Development, 1945-1948" (Ph.D. diss., Northern Illinois University, 1994).
60. Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (New York, 1987), 427-45; Geir Lundestad, "Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945-52," SHAFR Newsletter 15 (September 1954): 1-21; Melvyn P. Leffler, "National Security and US Foreign Policy," Michael MccGwire, "National Security and Soviet Foreign Policy," Charles S. Maier, "Hegemony and Autonomy within the Western Alliance," and Charles Gati, "Hegemony and Repression in the Eastern Alliance," all in Origins of the Cold War. An International History, ed. Leffler and David S. Painter (New York, 1994), 15, 76, 154-98; Sonia L. Nelson, "The Impact of U.S. International Economic Plans on Czechoslovakia's Postwar Development, 1945-1948" (Ph.D. diss., Northern Illinois University, 1994).
61. Georg Schild, Between Ideology and Realpolitik: Woodrow Wilson and the Russian Revolution, 1917-1921 (Westport, 1995), 126 (quotation); Lloyd C. Gardner, Safe for Democracy: The Anglo-American Response to Revolution, 1913-1923 (New York, 1984), 125-202. For a more favorable view of Wilson's decision to intervene militarily in Russia see Betty Unterberger, The United States, Revolutionary Russia, and the Rise of Czechoslovakia (Chapel Hill, 1989), 196-318.
62. Georg Schild, Between Ideology and Realpolitik: Woodrow Wilson and the Russian Revolution, 1917-1921 (Westport, 1995), 126 (quotation); Lloyd C. Gardner, Safe for Democracy: The Anglo-American Response to Revolution, 1913-1923 (New York, 1984), 125-202. For a more favorable view of Wilson's decision to intervene militarily in Russia see Betty Unterberger, The United States, Revolutionary Russia, and the Rise of Czechoslovakia (Chapel Hill, 1989), 196-318.
63. Georg Schild, Between Ideology and Realpolitik: Woodrow Wilson and the Russian Revolution, 1917-1921 (Westport, 1995), 126 (quotation); Lloyd C. Gardner, Safe for Democracy: The Anglo-American Response to Revolution, 1913-1923 (New York, 1984), 125-202. For a more favorable view of Wilson's decision to intervene militarily in Russia see Betty Unterberger, The United States, Revolutionary Russia, and the Rise of Czechoslovakia (Chapel Hill, 1989), 196-318.
64. K. Hogan, The Marshall Plan, 54-87, 187-88, 427-45; idem, "The Search for a 'Creative Peace': The United States, European Unity, and the Origins of the Marshall Plan," Diplomatic History 6 (Summer 1982): 267-85; Alan S. Milward, "Was the Marshall Plan Necessary?" ibid, 13 (Spring 1989): 231-53; Melvyn P. Leffler, "The United States and the Strategic Dimensions of the Marshall Plan," ibid. 12 (Summer 1988): 277-306; Robert E. Wood, "From the Marshall Plan to the Third World," in Leffler and Painter, eds., Origins of the Cold War, 201-14; Wittkopf, ed., Future of American Foreign Policy, 282.
65. K. Hogan, The Marshall Plan, 54-87, 187-88, 427-45; idem, "The Search for a 'Creative Peace': The United States, European Unity, and the Origins of the Marshall Plan," Diplomatic History 6 (Summer 1982): 267-85; Alan S. Milward, "Was the Marshall Plan Necessary?" ibid, 13 (Spring 1989): 231-53; Melvyn P. Leffler, "The United States and the Strategic Dimensions of the Marshall Plan," ibid. 12 (Summer 1988): 277-306; Robert E. Wood, "From the Marshall Plan to the Third World," in Leffler and Painter, eds., Origins of the Cold War, 201-14; Wittkopf, ed., Future of American Foreign Policy, 282.
66. K. Hogan, The Marshall Plan, 54-87, 187-88, 427-45; idem, "The Search for a 'Creative Peace': The United States, European Unity, and the Origins of the Marshall Plan," Diplomatic History 6 (Summer 1982): 267-85; Alan S. Milward, "Was the Marshall Plan Necessary?" ibid, 13 (Spring 1989): 231-53; Melvyn P. Leffler, "The United States and the Strategic Dimensions of the Marshall Plan," ibid. 12 (Summer 1988): 277-306; Robert E. Wood, "From the Marshall Plan to the Third World," in Leffler and Painter, eds., Origins of the Cold War, 201-14; Wittkopf, ed., Future of American Foreign Policy, 282.
67. K. Hogan, The Marshall Plan, 54-87, 187-88, 427-45; idem, "The Search for a 'Creative Peace': The United States, European Unity, and the Origins of the Marshall Plan," Diplomatic History 6 (Summer 1982): 267-85; Alan S. Milward, "Was the Marshall Plan Necessary?" ibid, 13 (Spring 1989): 231-53; Melvyn P. Leffler, "The United States and the Strategic Dimensions of the Marshall Plan," ibid. 12 (Summer 1988): 277-306; Robert E. Wood, "From the Marshall Plan to the Third World," in Leffler and Painter, eds., Origins of the Cold War, 201-14; Wittkopf, ed., Future of American Foreign Policy, 282.
68. K. Hogan, The Marshall Plan, 54-87, 187-88, 427-45; idem, "The Search for a 'Creative Peace': The United States, European Unity, and the Origins of the Marshall Plan," Diplomatic History 6 (Summer 1982): 267-85; Alan S. Milward, "Was the Marshall Plan Necessary?" ibid, 13 (Spring 1989): 231-53; Melvyn P. Leffler, "The United States and the Strategic Dimensions of the Marshall Plan," ibid. 12 (Summer 1988): 277-306; Robert E. Wood, "From the Marshall Plan to the Third World," in Leffler and Painter, eds., Origins of the Cold War, 201-14; Wittkopf, ed., Future of American Foreign Policy, 282.
69. K. Hogan, The Marshall Plan, 54-87, 187-88, 427-45; idem, "The Search for a 'Creative Peace': The United States, European Unity, and the Origins of the Marshall Plan," Diplomatic History 6 (Summer 1982): 267-85; Alan S. Milward, "Was the Marshall Plan Necessary?" ibid, 13 (Spring 1989): 231-53; Melvyn P. Leffler, "The United States and the Strategic Dimensions of the Marshall Plan," ibid. 12 (Summer 1988): 277-306; Robert E. Wood, "From the Marshall Plan to the Third World," in Leffler and Painter, eds., Origins of the Cold War, 201-14; Wittkopf, ed., Future of American Foreign Policy, 282.
70. Wittkopf, ed., Future of American Foreign Policy, 282-83; and Leonard Silk, "Dangers of Slow Growth," in ibid., 329-36.
71. Wittkopf, ed., Future of American Foreign Policy, 282-83; and Leonard Silk, "Dangers of Slow Growth," in ibid., 329-36.
72. The Ferengi are an ugly Star Trek race of "perfect" capitalists driven only by their quest for profit and governed by numerous rules of commerce. Thanks to the Supreme Court, money is free speech in the United States and without campaign finance reform, political offices, especially at the national level, appear to be for sale to the largest contributors. For copious documentation of the obvious, namely that "the richest among us . . . have the greatest influence over political power," see Charles Lewis and the Center for Public Integrity, The Buying of Congress: How Special Interests Have Stolen Your Right to Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness (New York, 1998).
73. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946 (Washington, 1972), 6:709; Kennan, Memoirs: 1925-1950 (Boston, 1967), 559.
74. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946 (Washington, 1972), 6:709; Kennan, Memoirs: 1925-1950 (Boston, 1967), 559.
75. Dæddus 124 (Spring 1995): xxi.
76. Wilson quoted in Arthur Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917 (New York, 1954), 119, 281.
77. Bennis, Calling the Shots, 39-40, 246.
78. Larry Diamond, "Promoting Democracy," in Wittkopf, ed., The Future of American Foreign Policy, 101-16 (quotation at 105); Guéhenno, The END of the NATION STATE, 31-32. I disagree with Tony Smith's conclusion that "the American impact was greater on democratization in Japan than in West Germany" for all of the reasons he goes on to cite about Japan not "play[ing] by the rules." See Smith, America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, 1994), 146-76 (quotations, 173-74). Part of the reason Japan has developed at best its own distinctive brand of cultural democracy and capitalism lies in the fact that even MacArthur had to exercise his unlimited authority in Japan through the symbol of the Emperor and such prewar institutions as the Diet and an entrenched bureaucratic structure. For more on the distinctive and questionable democratic nature of Japanese policies see Masuru Tamamoto, "Reflections on Japan's Postwar State," in Dædalus 124 (Spring 1995): 1-22; Kenichi Ohmae, The Mind of the Strategist: The Art of Japanese Business (New York, 1982); Guéhenno, The END of the NATION STATE, 10-16, 50-51, 107-10; and articles in International Security 17 (Spring 1993) by Samuel Huntington, Nobuo Okawara, and Thomas U. Berger.
79. Larry Diamond, "Promoting Democracy," in Wittkopf, ed., The Future of American Foreign Policy, 101-16 (quotation at 105); Guéhenno, The END of the NATION STATE, 31-32. I disagree with Tony Smith's conclusion that "the American impact was greater on democratization in Japan than in West Germany" for all of the reasons he goes on to cite about Japan not "play[ing] by the rules." See Smith, America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, 1994), 146-76 (quotations, 173-74). Part of the reason Japan has developed at best its own distinctive brand of cultural democracy and capitalism lies in the fact that even MacArthur had to exercise his unlimited authority in Japan through the symbol of the Emperor and such prewar institutions as the Diet and an entrenched bureaucratic structure. For more on the distinctive and questionable democratic nature of Japanese policies see Masuru Tamamoto, "Reflections on Japan's Postwar State," in Dædalus 124 (Spring 1995): 1-22; Kenichi Ohmae, The Mind of the Strategist: The Art of Japanese Business (New York, 1982); Guéhenno, The END of the NATION STATE, 10-16, 50-51, 107-10; and articles in International Security 17 (Spring 1993) by Samuel Huntington, Nobuo Okawara, and Thomas U. Berger.
80. Larry Diamond, "Promoting Democracy," in Wittkopf, ed., The Future of American Foreign Policy, 101-16 (quotation at 105); Guéhenno, The END of the NATION STATE, 31-32. I disagree with Tony Smith's conclusion that "the American impact was greater on democratization in Japan than in West Germany" for all of the reasons he goes on to cite about Japan not "play[ing] by the rules." See Smith, America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, 1994), 146-76 (quotations, 173-74). Part of the reason Japan has developed at best its own distinctive brand of cultural democracy and capitalism lies in the fact that even MacArthur had to exercise his unlimited authority in Japan through the symbol of the Emperor and such prewar institutions as the Diet and an entrenched bureaucratic structure. For more on the distinctive and questionable democratic nature of Japanese policies see Masuru Tamamoto, "Reflections on Japan's Postwar State," in Dædalus 124 (Spring 1995): 1-22; Kenichi Ohmae, The Mind of the Strategist: The Art of Japanese Business (New York, 1982); Guéhenno, The END of the NATION STATE, 10-16, 50-51, 107-10; and articles in International Security 17 (Spring 1993) by Samuel Huntington, Nobuo Okawara, and Thomas U. Berger.
81. Larry Diamond, "Promoting Democracy," in Wittkopf, ed., The Future of American Foreign Policy, 101-16 (quotation at 105); Guéhenno, The END of the NATION STATE, 31-32. I disagree with Tony Smith's conclusion that "the American impact was greater on democratization in Japan than in West Germany" for all of the reasons he goes on to cite about Japan not "play[ing] by the rules." See Smith, America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, 1994), 146-76 (quotations, 173-74). Part of the reason Japan has developed at best its own distinctive brand of cultural democracy and capitalism lies in the fact that even MacArthur had to exercise his unlimited authority in Japan through the symbol of the Emperor and such prewar institutions as the Diet and an entrenched bureaucratic structure. For more on the distinctive and questionable democratic nature of Japanese policies see Masuru Tamamoto, "Reflections on Japan's Postwar State," in Dædalus 124 (Spring 1995): 1-22; Kenichi Ohmae, The Mind of the Strategist: The Art of Japanese Business (New York, 1982); Guéhenno, The END of the NATION STATE, 10-16, 50-51, 107-10; and articles in International Security 17 (Spring 1993) by Samuel Huntington, Nobuo Okawara, and Thomas U. Berger.
82. Larry Diamond, "Promoting Democracy," in Wittkopf, ed., The Future of American Foreign Policy, 101-16 (quotation at 105); Guéhenno, The END of the NATION STATE, 31-32. I disagree with Tony Smith's conclusion that "the American impact was greater on democratization in Japan than in West Germany" for all of the reasons he goes on to cite about Japan not "play[ing] by the rules." See Smith, America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, 1994), 146-76 (quotations, 173-74). Part of the reason Japan has developed at best its own distinctive brand of cultural democracy and capitalism lies in the fact that even MacArthur had to exercise his unlimited authority in Japan through the symbol of the Emperor and such prewar institutions as the Diet and an entrenched bureaucratic structure. For more on the distinctive and questionable democratic nature of Japanese policies see Masuru Tamamoto, "Reflections on Japan's Postwar State," in Dædalus 124 (Spring 1995): 1-22; Kenichi Ohmae, The Mind of the Strategist: The Art of Japanese Business (New York, 1982); Guéhenno, The END of the NATION STATE, 10-16, 50-51, 107-10; and articles in International Security 17 (Spring 1993) by Samuel Huntington, Nobuo Okawara, and Thomas U. Berger.
83. Larry Diamond, "Promoting Democracy," in Wittkopf, ed., The Future of American Foreign Policy, 101-16 (quotation at 105); Guéhenno, The END of the NATION STATE, 31-32. I disagree with Tony Smith's conclusion that "the American impact was greater on democratization in Japan than in West Germany" for all of the reasons he goes on to cite about Japan not "play[ing] by the rules." See Smith, America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, 1994), 146-76 (quotations, 173-74). Part of the reason Japan has developed at best its own distinctive brand of cultural democracy and capitalism lies in the fact that even MacArthur had to exercise his unlimited authority in Japan through the symbol of the Emperor and such prewar institutions as the Diet and an entrenched bureaucratic structure. For more on the distinctive and questionable democratic nature of Japanese policies see Masuru Tamamoto, "Reflections on Japan's Postwar State," in Dædalus 124 (Spring 1995): 1-22; Kenichi Ohmae, The Mind of the Strategist: The Art of Japanese Business (New York, 1982); Guéhenno, The END of the NATION STATE, 10-16, 50-51, 107-10; and articles in International Security 17 (Spring 1993) by Samuel Huntington, Nobuo Okawara, and Thomas U. Berger.
84. Larry Diamond, "Promoting Democracy," in Wittkopf, ed., The Future of American Foreign Policy, 101-16 (quotation at 105); Guéhenno, The END of the NATION STATE, 31-32. I disagree with Tony Smith's conclusion that "the American impact was greater on democratization in Japan than in West Germany" for all of the reasons he goes on to cite about Japan not "play[ing] by the rules." See Smith, America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, 1994), 146-76 (quotations, 173-74). Part of the reason Japan has developed at best its own distinctive brand of cultural democracy and capitalism lies in the fact that even MacArthur had to exercise his unlimited authority in Japan through the symbol of the Emperor and such prewar institutions as the Diet and an entrenched bureaucratic structure. For more on the distinctive and questionable democratic nature of Japanese policies see Masuru Tamamoto, "Reflections on Japan's Postwar State," in Dædalus 124 (Spring 1995): 1-22; Kenichi Ohmae, The Mind of the Strategist: The Art of Japanese Business (New York, 1982); Guéhenno, The END of the NATION STATE, 10-16, 50-51, 107-10; and articles in International Security 17 (Spring 1993) by Samuel Huntington, Nobuo Okawara, and Thomas U. Berger.
85. Fareed Zakaria, "Democracies That Take Liberties," New York Times, 2 November 1997; idem, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," Foreign Affairs 76 (November-December 1997): 22-43; Oscar Schacter, "The Decline of the Nation-State and its Implications for International Law," Columbia Journal of Transitional Law 36 (1997): 12; Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld, 11, 13; Wolfgang H. Reinicke, "Global Public Policy," Foreign Affairs 76 (November-December 1997): 127. To speak of China as aiding the worldwide cause of nuclear nonproliferation, especially in relation to the "vibrant democracy" of Pakistan, as Clinton has, is to insult common sense, to say nothing of the intelligence of many non-governmental foreign policy experts. New York Times, June 1998.
86. Fareed Zakaria, "Democracies That Take Liberties," New York Times, 2 November 1997; idem, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," Foreign Affairs 76 (November-December 1997): 22-43; Oscar Schacter, "The Decline of the Nation-State and its Implications for International Law," Columbia Journal of Transitional Law 36 (1997): 12; Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld, 11, 13; Wolfgang H. Reinicke, "Global Public Policy," Foreign Affairs 76 (November-December 1997): 127. To speak of China as aiding the worldwide cause of nuclear nonproliferation, especially in relation to the "vibrant democracy" of Pakistan, as Clinton has, is to insult common sense, to say nothing of the intelligence of many non-governmental foreign policy experts. New York Times, June 1998.
87. Fareed Zakaria, "Democracies That Take Liberties," New York Times, 2 November 1997; idem, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," Foreign Affairs 76 (November-December 1997): 22-43; Oscar Schacter, "The Decline of the Nation-State and its Implications for International Law," Columbia Journal of Transitional Law 36 (1997): 12; Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld, 11, 13; Wolfgang H. Reinicke, "Global Public Policy," Foreign Affairs 76 (November-December 1997): 127. To speak of China as aiding the worldwide cause of nuclear nonproliferation, especially in relation to the "vibrant democracy" of Pakistan, as Clinton has, is to insult common sense, to say nothing of the intelligence of many non-governmental foreign policy experts. New York Times, June 1998.
88. Fareed Zakaria, "Democracies That Take Liberties," New York Times, 2 November 1997; idem, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," Foreign Affairs 76 (November-December 1997): 22-43; Oscar Schacter, "The Decline of the Nation-State and its Implications for International Law," Columbia Journal of Transitional Law 36 (1997): 12; Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld, 11, 13; Wolfgang H. Reinicke, "Global Public Policy," Foreign Affairs 76 (November-December 1997): 127. To speak of China as aiding the worldwide cause of nuclear nonproliferation, especially in relation to the "vibrant democracy" of Pakistan, as Clinton has, is to insult common sense, to say nothing of the intelligence of many non-governmental foreign policy experts. New York Times, June 1998.
89. Fareed Zakaria, "Democracies That Take Liberties," New York Times, 2 November 1997; idem, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," Foreign Affairs 76 (November-December 1997): 22-43; Oscar Schacter, "The Decline of the Nation-State and its Implications for International Law," Columbia Journal of Transitional Law 36 (1997): 12; Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld, 11, 13; Wolfgang H. Reinicke, "Global Public Policy," Foreign Affairs 76 (November-December 1997): 127. To speak of China as aiding the worldwide cause of nuclear nonproliferation, especially in relation to the "vibrant democracy" of Pakistan, as Clinton has, is to insult common sense, to say nothing of the intelligence of many non-governmental foreign policy experts. New York Times, June 1998.
90. Fareed Zakaria, "Democracies That Take Liberties," New York Times, 2 November 1997; idem, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," Foreign Affairs 76 (November-December 1997): 22-43; Oscar Schacter, "The Decline of the Nation-State and its Implications for International Law," Columbia Journal of Transitional Law 36 (1997): 12; Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld, 11, 13; Wolfgang H. Reinicke, "Global Public Policy," Foreign Affairs 76 (November-December 1997): 127. To speak of China as aiding the worldwide cause of nuclear nonproliferation, especially in relation to the "vibrant democracy" of Pakistan, as Clinton has, is to insult common sense, to say nothing of the intelligence of many non-governmental foreign policy experts. New York Times, June 1998.
91. Dædalus 124 (Spring 1995): xix (first quotation), xxiii; Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," 38; idem, "Our Hollow Hegemony: Why Foreign Policy Can't Be Left to the Market," New York Times Magazine, 1 November 1998, 44ff, quotations at 74.
92. Dædalus 124 (Spring 1995): xix (first quotation), xxiii; Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," 38; idem, "Our Hollow Hegemony: Why Foreign Policy Can't Be Left to the Market," New York Times Magazine, 1 November 1998, 44ff, quotations at 74.
93. Dædalus 124 (Spring 1995): xix (first quotation), xxiii; Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," 38; idem, "Our Hollow Hegemony: Why Foreign Policy Can't Be Left to the Market," New York Times Magazine, 1 November 1998, 44ff, quotations at 74.
94. Smith, America's Mission, 4.
95. Derek Heater, National Self-Determination: Woodrow Wilson and His Legacy (New York , 1994), 1-2; Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin, and Shelley Wright, "Feminist Approaches to International Law," American Journal of International Law 85 (October 1991): 643.
96. Derek Heater, National Self-Determination: Woodrow Wilson and His Legacy (New York , 1994), 1-2; Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin, and Shelley Wright, "Feminist Approaches to International Law," American Journal of International Law 85 (October 1991): 643.
97. Dankwart A. Rustow, "Democracy: A Global Revolution?" Foreign Affairs 69 (Fall 1990): 74.
98. Steven J. Valone, "Seward and the Reassertion of the Monroe Doctrine," Diplomatic History 19 (Fall 1995): 583-600.
99. Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven, 1987), 17, 171, passim, Jerald A. Combs American Diplomatic History: Two Centuries of Changing Interpretations (Berkeley, 1983), x, passim Smith, America's Mission, 19-27; Jeffrey Kimball, "The Influence of Ideology on Interpretive Disagreement: A Report on a Survey of Diplomatic, Military and Peace Historians on the Causes of 20th Century U.S. Wars," The History Teacher 17 (May 1984): 355-81.
100. Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven, 1987), 17, 171, passim, Jerald A. Combs American Diplomatic History: Two Centuries of Changing Interpretations (Berkeley, 1983), x, passim Smith, America's Mission, 19-27; Jeffrey Kimball, "The Influence of Ideology on Interpretive Disagreement: A Report on a Survey of Diplomatic, Military and Peace Historians on the Causes of 20th Century U.S. Wars," The History Teacher 17 (May 1984): 355-81.
101. Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven, 1987), 17, 171, passim, Jerald A. Combs American Diplomatic History: Two Centuries of Changing Interpretations (Berkeley, 1983), x, passim Smith, America's Mission, 19-27; Jeffrey Kimball, "The Influence of Ideology on Interpretive Disagreement: A Report on a Survey of Diplomatic, Military and Peace Historians on the Causes of 20th Century U.S. Wars," The History Teacher 17 (May 1984): 355-81.
102. Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven, 1987), 17, 171, passim, Jerald A. Combs American Diplomatic History: Two Centuries of Changing Interpretations (Berkeley, 1983), x, passim Smith, America's Mission, 19-27; Jeffrey Kimball, "The Influence of Ideology on Interpretive Disagreement: A Report on a Survey of Diplomatic, Military and Peace Historians on the Causes of 20th Century U.S. Wars," The History Teacher 17 (May 1984): 355-81.
103. John Vloyantes, Spheres of Influence: A Framework for Analysis (Tucson, 1970); Walter LaFeber, "The Evolution of the Monroe Doctrine from Monroe to Reagan," in Redefining the Past: Essays in Diplomatic History in Honor of William Appleman Williams, ed. Lloyd C. Gardner (Corvallis, OR, 1986), 121-41; Smith, The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine, 8-9, 28-29.
104. John Vloyantes, Spheres of Influence: A Framework for Analysis (Tucson, 1970); Walter LaFeber, "The Evolution of the Monroe Doctrine from Monroe to Reagan," in Redefining the Past: Essays in Diplomatic History in Honor of William Appleman Williams, ed. Lloyd C. Gardner (Corvallis, OR, 1986), 121-41; Smith, The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine, 8-9, 28-29.
105. John Vloyantes, Spheres of Influence: A Framework for Analysis (Tucson, 1970); Walter LaFeber, "The Evolution of the Monroe Doctrine from Monroe to Reagan," in Redefining the Past: Essays in Diplomatic History in Honor of William Appleman Williams, ed. Lloyd C. Gardner (Corvallis, OR, 1986), 121-41; Smith, The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine, 8-9, 28-29.
106. Heater, National Self-Determination, 25, 32 (last quotation, Wilson replying to Pope Benedict XV's appeal for peace after the United States entered World War I). See also Knock, To End All Wan, 34-35, 42-45, 56-57, 249-50; Arthur Walworth, America's Moment, 1918: American Diplomacy at the End of World War I (New York, 1977), 172-94; Lloyd E. Ambrosius, "Wilsonian Self-Determinarion," Diplomatic History 16 (Winter 1992): 141-48. For a more positive view of Wilson's definition and practice of self-determination see Betty Unterberger, "The United States and National Self-Determination: A Wilsonian Perspective," Presidential Studies Quarterly 26 (Fall 1996): 926-41.
107. Heater, National Self-Determination, 25, 32 (last quotation, Wilson replying to Pope Benedict XV's appeal for peace after the United States entered World War I). See also Knock, To End All Wan, 34-35, 42-45, 56-57, 249-50; Arthur Walworth, America's Moment, 1918: American Diplomacy at the End of World War I (New York, 1977), 172-94; Lloyd E. Ambrosius, "Wilsonian Self-Determinarion," Diplomatic History 16 (Winter 1992): 141-48. For a more positive view of Wilson's definition and practice of self-determination see Betty Unterberger, "The United States and National Self-Determination: A Wilsonian Perspective," Presidential Studies Quarterly 26 (Fall 1996): 926-41.
108. Heater, National Self-Determination, 25, 32 (last quotation, Wilson replying to Pope Benedict XV's appeal for peace after the United States entered World War I). See also Knock, To End All Wan, 34-35, 42-45, 56-57, 249-50; Arthur Walworth, America's Moment, 1918: American Diplomacy at the End of World War I (New York, 1977), 172-94; Lloyd E. Ambrosius, "Wilsonian Self-Determinarion," Diplomatic History 16 (Winter 1992): 141-48. For a more positive view of Wilson's definition and practice of self-determination see Betty Unterberger, "The United States and National Self-Determination: A Wilsonian Perspective," Presidential Studies Quarterly 26 (Fall 1996): 926-41.
109. Heater, National Self-Determination, 25, 32 (last quotation, Wilson replying to Pope Benedict XV's appeal for peace after the United States entered World War I). See also Knock, To End All Wan, 34-35, 42-45, 56-57, 249-50; Arthur Walworth, America's Moment, 1918: American Diplomacy at the End of World War I (New York, 1977), 172-94; Lloyd E. Ambrosius, "Wilsonian Self-Determination," Diplomatic History 16 (Winter 1992): 141-48. For a more positive view of Wilson's definition and practice of self-determination see Betty Unterberger, "The United States and National Self-Determination: A Wilsonian Perspective," Presidential Studies Quarterly 26 (Fall 1996): 926-41.
110. Heater, National Self-Determination, 25, 32 (last quotation, Wilson replying to Pope Benedict XV's appeal for peace after the United States entered World War I). See also Knock, To End All Wan, 34-35, 42-45, 56-57, 249-50; Arthur Walworth, America's Moment, 1918: American Diplomacy at the End of World War I (New York, 1977), 172-94; Lloyd E. Ambrosius, "Wilsonian Self-Determinarion," Diplomatic History 16 (Winter 1992): 141-48. For a more positive view of Wilson's definition and practice of self-determination see Betty Unterberger, "The United States and National Self-Determination: A Wilsonian Perspective," Presidential Studies Quarterly 26 (Fall 1996): 926-41.
111. Heater, National Self-Determination, 93.
112. Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," 38, 40-41; Dædalus, vi; Rustow, "Democracy: A Global Revolution?" 85-89; Smith, America's Mission, 13-19; Steel, Temptations of a Superpower, 110; Kaplan, "Was Democracy Just a Moment?" 58, 61.
113. Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," 38, 40-41; Dædalus, vi; Rustow, "Democracy: A Global Revolution?" 85-89; Smith, America's Mission, 13-19; Steel, Temptations of a Superpower, 110; Kaplan, "Was Democracy Just a Moment?" 58, 61.
114. Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," 38, 40-41; Dædalus, vi; Rustow, "Democracy: A Global Revolution?" 85-89; Smith, America's Mission, 13-19; Steel, Temptations of a Superpower, 110; Kaplan, "Was Democracy Just a Moment?" 58, 61.
115. Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," 38, 40-41; Dædalus, vi; Rustow, "Democracy: A Global Revolution?" 85-89; Smith, America's Mission, 13-19; Steel, Temptations of a Superpower, 110; Kaplan, "Was Democracy Just a Moment?" 58, 61.
116. Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," 38, 40-41; Dædalus, vi; Rustow, "Democracy: A Global Revolution?" 85-89; Smith, America's Mission, 13-19; Steel, Temptations of a Superpower, 110; Kaplan, "Was Democracy Just a Moment?" 58, 61.
117. Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," 38, 40-41; Dædalus, vi; Rustow, "Democracy: A Global Revolution?" 85-89; Smith, America's Mission, 13-19; Steel, Temptations of a Superpower, 110; Kaplan, "Was Democracy Just a Moment?" 58, 61.
118. Lapham, "Lights, Camera, Democracy!" Harpers Magazine, August 1996, 33-38 (quotations, 35-36).
119. Jon Lee Anderson, "The Dictator [Pinochet]," The New Yorker, 19 October 1998, 44-57; Schacter, "The Decline of the Nation-State," 18; Kaplan, "Was Democracy Just a Moment?" 58, 60. Henry Kamm, Cambodia: Report From a Stricken Land (New York, 1998).
120. Jon Lee Anderson, "The Dictator [Pinochet]," The New Yorker, 19 October 1998, 44-57; Schacter, "The Decline of the Nation-State," 18; Kaplan, "Was Democracy Just a Moment?" 58, 60. Henry Kamm, Cambodia: Report From a Stricken Land (New York, 1998).
121. Jon Lee Anderson, "The Dictator [Pinochet]," The New Yorker, 19 October 1998, 44-57; Schacter, "The Decline of the Nation-State," 18; Kaplan, "Was Democracy Just a Moment?" 58, 60. Henry Kamm, Cambodia: Report From a Stricken Land (New York, 1998).
122. Jon Lee Anderson, "The Dictator [Pinochet]," The New Yorker, 19 October 1998, 44-57; Schacter, "The Decline of the Nation-State," 18; Kaplan, "Was Democracy Just a Moment?" 58, 60. Henry Kamm, Cambodia: Report From a Stricken Land (New York, 1998).
123. Charlesworth et al., "Feminist Approaches to International Law," 642; Cynthia Enloe, Bananas, Beaches, and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics (New York, 1989), 57.
124. Charlesworth et al., "Feminist Approaches to International Law," 642; Cynthia Enloe, Bananas, Beaches, and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics (New York, 1989), 57.
125. Nicole Loraux, Citizenship and Women: The Children of Athena: Athenian Ideas about Citizenship and the Division of Labor between the Sexes, trans. Caroline Levine (Princeton, 1995), 6-21, passim. While teaching in Dublin in 1993-94, I reconsidered what citizenship meant for women outside the United States. But more importantly, the disintegration of Yugoslavia (and later the peace in Northern Ireland) also made me think about the meaning of nationalism for women and the connection between citizenship and nationalism. Neither subject has been given enough consideration by historians of women in the last thirty years, despite their other often dramatic reinterpretations of history. I have argued for a number of years that women in the United States and most other Western democracies remain second-class citizens because they lack three basic freedoms enjoyed by men under most constitutional or other forms of government. These three basic freedoms usually denied to women citizens are: 1) freedom from inferior legislative, constitutional, or juridical status (usually meaning the denial of economic and legal privileges enjoyed by mainstream men); 2) freedom from fertility and family discrimination (denial of reproductive rights, including restricted access to abortion and an inferior position within traditional family hierarchies, otherwise known today as the return to family values); 3) freedom from fear (denial of protections from the uncontrolled and often ignored violence against women throughout the world). For details see Joan Hoff, Gender, Law, and Injustice: A Legal History of U.S. Women (New York, 1994), ix-xvii, passim, and idem, "The Impact &Implications of Women's History," in Women & Irish History, eds. Maryann Gialanella Valiulis and Mary O'Dowd (Dublin, 1997), 15-24.
126. Nicole Loraux, Citizenship and Women: The Children of Athena: Athenian Ideas about Citizenship and the Division of Labor between the Sexes, trans. Caroline Levine (Princeton, 1995), 6-21, passim. While teaching in Dublin in 1993-94, I reconsidered what citizenship meant for women outside the United States. But more importantly, the disintegration of Yugoslavia (and later the peace in Northern Ireland) also made me think about the meaning of nationalism for women and the connection between citizenship and nationalism. Neither subject has been given enough consideration by historians of women in the last thirty years, despite their other often dramatic reinterpretations of history. I have argued for a number of years that women in the United States and most other Western democracies remain second-class citizens because they lack three basic freedoms enjoyed by men under most constitutional or other forms of government. These three basic freedoms usually denied to women citizens are: 1) freedom from inferior legislative, constitutional, or juridical status (usually meaning the denial of economic and legal privileges enjoyed by mainstream men); 2) freedom from fertility and family discrimination (denial of reproductive rights, including restricted access to abortion and an inferior position within traditional family hierarchies, otherwise known today as the return to family values); 3) freedom from fear (denial of protections from the uncontrolled and often ignored violence against women throughout the world). For details see Joan Hoff, Gender, Law, and Injustice: A Legal History of U.S. Women (New York, 1994), ix-xvii, passim, and idem, "The Impact &Implications of Women's History," in Women & Irish History, eds. Maryann Gialanella Valiulis and Mary O'Dowd (Dublin, 1997), 15-24.
127. Nicole Loraux, Citizenship and Women: The Children of Athena: Athenian Ideas about Citizenship and the Division of Labor between the Sexes, trans. Caroline Levine (Princeton, 1995), 6-21, passim. While teaching in Dublin in 1993-94, I reconsidered what citizenship meant for women outside the United States. But more importantly, the disintegration of Yugoslavia (and later the peace in Northern Ireland) also made me think about the meaning of nationalism for women and the connection between citizenship and nationalism. Neither subject has been given enough consideration by historians of women in the last thirty years, despite their other often dramatic reinterpretations of history. I have argued for a number of years that women in the United States and most other Western democracies remain second-class citizens because they lack three basic freedoms enjoyed by men under most constitutional or other forms of government. These three basic freedoms usually denied to women citizens are: 1) freedom from inferior legislative, constitutional, or juridical status (usually meaning the denial of economic and legal privileges enjoyed by mainstream men); 2) freedom from fertility and family discrimination (denial of reproductive rights, including restricted access to abortion and an inferior position within traditional family hierarchies, otherwise known today as the return to family values); 3) freedom from fear (denial of protections from the uncontrolled and often ignored violence against women throughout the world). For details see Joan Hoff, Gender, Law, and Injustice: A Legal History of U.S. Women (New York, 1994), ix-xvii, passim, and idem, "The Impact &Implications of Women's History," in Women & Irish History, eds. Maryann Gialanella Valiulis and Mary O'Dowd (Dublin, 1997), 15-24.
128. Charlesworth et al., "Feminist Approaches to International Law," 637-38; Hilary Charles worth, "Alienating Oscar? Feminist Analysis of International Law," in Reconceiving Reality: Women and International Law, ed. Dorinda G. Dallmeyer, Studies in Transnational Legal Policy, No. 25 (The American Society of International Law, 1993), 1-18.
129. Charlesworth et al., "Feminist Approaches to International Law," 637-38; Hilary Charles worth, "Alienating Oscar? Feminist Analysis of International Law," in Reconceiving Reality: Women and International Law, ed. Dorinda G. Dallmeyer, Studies in Transnational Legal Policy, No. 25 (The American Society of International Law, 1993), 1-18.
130. Zakaria, "Democracies That Take Liberties," 15; idem, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," Foreign Affairs 76 (November-December, 1997): 22-45. The four treaties are: The Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, the American Convention on Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.
131. Zakaria, "Democracies That Take Liberties," 15; idem, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," Foreign Affairs 76 (November-December, 1997): 22-45. The four treaties are: The Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, the American Convention on Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.
132. Lawrence Osborne, "The Women Warriors," and Eyal Press, "The Free Trade Faith," Lingua franca 7 (December 1997-January 1998): 56, 39; William Finnegan, Cold New World: Growing Up in a Harder Country ( New York, 1998); James K. Galbraith, Created unequal: The Crisis in American Pay (New York, 1998). In the United States, for example, the "great American middle class is, by any measure, shrinking," with a smaller percentage of homeowners than in 1973, a 28 percent decline in entry level wages in real dollars for male high school graduates, and a decline in wages and benefits for all unskilled labor, New York Times, 12 and 14 June, and 19 July 1998. See also New York Times, 11 June 1998, for the negative impact of shrinking Asian economies on the educational and economic status of women.
133. Lawrence Osborne, "The Women Warriors," and Eyal Press, "The Free Trade Faith," Lingua franca 7 (December 1997-January 1998): 56, 39; William Finnegan, Cold New World: Growing Up in a Harder Country ( New York, 1998); James K. Galbraith, Created unequal: The Crisis in American Pay (New York, 1998). In the United States, for example, the "great American middle class is, by any measure, shrinking," with a smaller percentage of homeowners than in 1973, a 28 percent decline in entry level wages in real dollars for male high school graduates, and a decline in wages and benefits for all unskilled labor, New York Times, 12 and 14 June, and 19 July 1998. See also New York Times, 11 June 1998, for the negative impact of shrinking Asian economies on the educational and economic status of women.
134. Lawrence Osborne, "The Women Warriors," and Eyal Press, "The Free Trade Faith," Lingua franca 7 (December 1997-January 1998): 56, 39; William Finnegan, Cold New World: Growing Up in a Harder Country ( New York, 1998); James K. Galbraith, Created unequal: The Crisis in American Pay (New York, 1998). In the United States, for example, the "great American middle class is, by any measure, shrinking," with a smaller percentage of homeowners than in 1973, a 28 percent decline in entry level wages in real dollars for male high school graduates, and a decline in wages and benefits for all unskilled labor, New York Times, 12 and 14 June, and 19 July 1998. See also New York Times, 11 June 1998, for the negative impact of shrinking Asian economies on the educational and economic status of women.
135. Lawrence Osborne, "The Women Warriors," and Eyal Press, "The Free Trade Faith," Lingua franca 7 (December 1997-January 1998): 56, 39; William Finnegan, Cold New World: Growing Up in a Harder Country ( New York, 1998); James K. Galbraith, Created unequal: The Crisis in American Pay (New York, 1998). In the United States, for example, the "great American middle class is, by any measure, shrinking," with a smaller percentage of homeowners than in 1973, a 28 percent decline in entry level wages in real dollars for male high school graduates, and a decline in wages and benefits for all unskilled labor, New York Times, 12 and 14 June, and 19 July 1998. See also New York Times, 11 June 1998, for the negative impact of shrinking Asian economies on the educational and economic status of women.
136. Lawrence Osborne, "The Women Warriors," and Eyal Press, "The Free Trade Faith," Lingua franca 7 (December 1997-January 1998): 56, 39; William Finnegan, Cold New World: Growing Up in a Harder Country ( New York, 1998); James K. Galbraith, Created unequal: The Crisis in American Pay (New York, 1998). In the United States, for example, the "great American middle class is, by any measure, shrinking," with a smaller percentage of homeowners than in 1973, a 28 percent decline in entry level wages in real dollars for male high school graduates, and a decline in wages and benefits for all unskilled labor, New York Times, 12 and 14 June, and 19 July 1998. See also New York Times, 11 June 1998, for the negative impact of shrinking Asian economies on the educational and economic status of women.
137. Lawrence Osborne, "The Women Warriors," and Eyal Press, "The Free Trade Faith," Lingua franca 7 (December 1997-January 1998): 56, 39; William Finnegan, Cold New World: Growing Up in a Harder Country ( New York, 1998); James K. Galbraith, Created unequal: The Crisis in American Pay (New York, 1998). In the United States, for example, the "great American middle class is, by any measure, shrinking," with a smaller percentage of homeowners than in 1973, a 28 percent decline in entry level wages in real dollars for male high school graduates, and a decline in wages and benefits for all unskilled labor, New York Times, 12 and 14 June, and 19 July 1998. See also New York Times, 11 June 1998, for the negative impact of shrinking Asian economies on the educational and economic status of women.
138. John Ralston Saul, Voltaire's Bastards: The Dictatorship of Reason in the West (London: 1992), 359-61; "Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld, 14-15 (quotation); Joan Hoff, "The City on the Hill: America's Role in the World," in The Humanities and the Art of Public Discussion (Washington, 1991), 16-26.
139. John Ralston Saul, Voltaire's Bastards: The Dictatorship of Reason in the West (London: 1992), 359-61; "Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld, 14-15 (quotation); Joan Hoff, "The City on the Hill: America's Role in the World," in The Humanities and the Art of Public Discussion (Washington, 1991), 16-26.
140. John Ralston Saul, Voltaire's Bastards: The Dictatorship of Reason in the West (London: 1992), 359-61; "Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld, 14-15 (quotation); Joan Hoff, "The City on the Hill: America's Role in the World," in The Humanities and the Art of Public Discussion (Washington, 1991), 16-26.
141. New York Review of Books, 23 April 1998, 27-30 (quotation, 28); Martin Stone, The Agony of Algeria (New York, 1997).
142. New York Review of Books, 23 April 1998, 27-30 (quotation, 28); Martin Stone, The Agony of Algeria (New York, 1997).
143. Barber Jihad vs. McWorld, 14, 305 n. 22; Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, 34.
144. Barber Jihad vs. McWorld, 14, 305 n. 22; Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, 34.
145. Zakaria, "Our Hollow Hegemony," 44; Melvyn Leffler, Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, 1992), 5,7, quoting the Bureau of the Budget for 14 April 1950; Steve Drever, Trade Warriors: STR and the American Crusade for Free Trade (New York 1995) 38; Alfred Eckes, "Trading American Interests," Foreign Affairs 71 (Fall 1992): 133-54.
146. Zakaria, "Our Hollow Hegemony," 44; Melvyn Leffler, Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, 1992), 5,7, quoting the Bureau of the Budget for 14 April 1950; Steve Drever, Trade Warriors: STR and the American Crusade for Free Trade (New York 1995) 38; Alfred Eckes, "Trading American Interests," Foreign Affairs 71 (Fall 1992): 133-54.
147. Zakaria, "Our Hollow Hegemony," 44; Melvyn Leffler, Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, 1992), 5,7, quoting the Bureau of the Budget for 14 April 1950; Steve Drever, Trade Warriors: STR and the American Crusade for Free Trade (New York 1995) 38; Alfred Eckes, "Trading American Interests," Foreign Affairs 71 (Fall 1992): 133-54.
148. Zakaria, "Our Hollow Hegemony," 44; Melvyn Leffler, Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, 1992), 5,7, quoting the Bureau of the Budget for 14 April 1950; Steve Drever, Trade Warriors: STR and the American Crusade for Free Trade (New York 1995) 38; Alfred Eckes, "Trading American Interests," Foreign Affairs 71 (Fall 1992): 133-54.
149. Paul A. Tiffany, The Decline of American Steel: How Management, Labor, and Government Went Wrong (New York, 1988), 77 (quoting Eugene Grace of Bethlehem Steel); Stephen D. Krasner, "The Tokyo Round: Paticularistic Interests and Prospects for Stability in the Global Trading System," International Studies Quarterly 23 (December 1979): 494 See also Victoria and Gerard Curzon, "The Management of Trade Relations in the GATT," in International Economic Relations of the Western World, 1959-1971, ed. Andrew Shonfield (London, 1976), 1:200.
150. Paul A. Tiffany, The Decline of American Steel: How Management, Labor, and Government Went Wrong (New York, 1988), 77 (quoting Eugene Grace of Bethlehem Steel); Stephen D. Krasner, "The Tokyo Round: Paticularistic Interests and Prospects for Stability in the Global Trading System," International Studies Quarterly 23 (December 1979): 494 See also Victoria and Gerard Curzon, "The Management of Trade Relations in the GATT," in International Economic Relations of the Western World, 1959-1971, ed. Andrew Shonfield (London, 1976), 1:200.
151. Paul A. Tiffany, The Decline of American Steel: How Management, Labor, and Government Went Wrong (New York, 1988), 77 (quoting Eugene Grace of Bethlehem Steel); Stephen D. Krasner, "The Tokyo Round: Paticularistic Interests and Prospects for Stability in the Global Trading System," International Studies Quarterly 23 (December 1979): 494 See also Victoria and Gerard Curzon, "The Management of Trade Relations in the GATT," in International Economic Relations of the Western World, 1959-1971, ed. Andrew Shonfield (London, 1976), 1:200.
152. Judith Goldstein, Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy (Ithaca, 1993), 163-68; Dreyer, Trade Warriors, 146; Robert Pastor, Congress and the Politics of Foreign Economic Policies, 1929-1976 (Berkeley, 1980), 128-34; Susan Strange, States and Markets (New York, 1988), 45-78, 161-85.
153. Judith Goldstein, Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy (Ithaca, 1993), 163-68; Dreyer, Trade Warriors, 146; Robert Pastor, Congress and the Politics of Foreign Economic Policies, 1929-1976 (Berkeley, 1980), 128-34; Susan Strange, States and Markets (New York, 1988), 45-78, 161-85.
154. Judith Goldstein, Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy (Ithaca, 1993), 163-68; Dreyer, Trade Warriors, 146; Robert Pastor, Congress and the Politics of Foreign Economic Policies, 1929-1976 (Berkeley, 1980), 128-34; Susan Strange, States and Markets (New York, 1988), 45-78, 161-85.
155. Judith Goldstein, Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy (Ithaca, 1993), 163-68; Dreyer, Trade Warriors, 146; Robert Pastor, Congress and the Politics of Foreign Economic Policies, 1929-1976 (Berkeley, 1980), 128-34; Susan Strange, States and Markets (New York, 1988), 45-78, 161-85.
156. Carole Fink, "1968: An International Perspective," Occasional Paper Series, Contemporary History Institute, Ohio University, May 1998, 8 (quotations); Joan Hoff, Nixon Reconsidered (New York, 1994), 140, 143-44.
157. Carole Fink, "1968: An International Perspective," Occasional Paper Series, Contemporary History Institute, Ohio University, May 1998, 8 (quotations); Joan Hoff, Nixon Reconsidered (New York, 1994), 140, 143-44.
158. Horsman and Marshall, After the Nation-State, 32-40; Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw, The Commanding Heights: The Battle Between Government and the Marketplace That Is Remaking the World (New York, 1998).
159. Horsman and Marshall, After the Nation-State, 32-40; Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw, The Commanding Heights: The Battle Between Government and the Marketplace That Is Remaking the World (New York, 1998).
160. Vincent Cable, "The Diminished Nation-State: A Study in the Loss of Economic Power," Dædalus 124 (Spring 1995): 23-54; Kaplan, "Was Democracy Just a Moment?" 71; Schacter, "Decline of the Nation State," 7-8, n. 2.
161. Vincent Cable, "The Diminished Nation-State: A Study in the Loss of Economic Power," Dædalus 124 (Spring 1995): 23-54; Kaplan, "Was Democracy Just a Moment?" 71; Schacter, "Decline of the Nation State," 7-8, n. 2.
162. Vincent Cable, "The Diminished Nation-State: A Study in the Loss of Economic Power," Dædalus 124 (Spring 1995): 23-54; Kaplan, "Was Democracy Just a Moment?" 71; Schacter, "Decline of the Nation State," 7-8, n. 2.
163. Schacter, "Decline of the Nation-State," 9 (quotations); Ohmae, End of the "Nation State, vii-viii, 4-5; Jeffrey Goldberg, "The Crude Face of Global Capitalism," The New York Times Magazine, 4 October 1998, 51-56; George Soros, "The Capitalist Threat," The Atlantic Monthly, February 1997, 45-58.
164. Schacter, "Decline of the Nation-State," 9 (quotations); Ohmae, End of the "Nation State, vii-viii, 4-5; Jeffrey Goldberg, "The Crude Face of Global Capitalism," The New York Times Magazine, 4 October 1998, 51-56; George Soros, "The Capitalist Threat," The Atlantic Monthly, February 1997, 45-58.
165. Schacter, "Decline of the Nation-State," 9 (quotations); Ohmae, End of the "Nation State, vii-viii, 4-5; Jeffrey Goldberg, "The Crude Face of Global Capitalism," The New York Times Magazine, 4 October 1998, 51-56; George Soros, "The Capitalist Threat," The Atlantic Monthly, February 1997, 45-58.
166. Schacter, "Decline of the Nation-State," 9 (quotations); Ohmae, End of the "Nation State, vii-viii, 4-5; Jeffrey Goldberg, "The Crude Face of Global Capitalism," The New York Times Magazine, 4 October 1998, 51-56; George Soros, "The Capitalist Threat," The Atlantic Monthly, February 1997, 45-58.
167. Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld, 271; Robert Reich, Work of Nations (New York, 1991), chap. 23. Instead of a "melting pot," the United States has become a "salad," whose demographic ingredients mixed, but did not merge. The difference between a "melting pot" and a "salad" assumes postmodern overtones when it is remembered that "E pluribus unum" dates back to a recipe in an early poem by Virgil in which he said that the "ingredients do not merge; the union is simply the sum of its parts." The Economist, 5 September 1992, 23.
168. Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld, 271; Robert Reich, Work of Nations (New York, 1991), chap. 23. Instead of a "melting pot," the United States has become a "salad," whose demographic ingredients mixed, but did not merge. The difference between a "melting pot" and a "salad" assumes postmodern overtones when it is remembered that "E pluribus unum" dates back to a recipe in an early poem by Virgil in which he said that the "ingredients do not merge; the union is simply the sum of its parts." The Economist, 5 September 1992, 23.
169. Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld, 271; Robert Reich, Work of Nations (New York, 1991), chap. 23. Instead of a "melting pot," the United States has become a "salad," whose demographic ingredients mixed, but did not merge. The difference between a "melting pot" and a "salad" assumes postmodern overtones when it is remembered that "E pluribus unum" dates back to a recipe in an early poem by Virgil in which he said that the "ingredients do not merge; the union is simply the sum of its parts." The Economist, 5 September 1992, 23.
170. Maria Green Cowles, "The Politics of Big Business in the European Community: Setting the Agenda for a New Europe" (Ph.D. diss., The American University, 1994); Schacter, "Decline of the Nation-State," 13-17; Guéhenno, The END of the NATIONSTATE, 133; Horsman and Marshall, After the Nation-State, 249-55.
171. Maria Green Cowles, "The Politics of Big Business in the European Community: Setting the Agenda for a New Europe" (Ph.D. diss., The American University, 1994); Schacter, "Decline of the Nation-State," 13-17; Guéhenno, The END of the NATIONSTATE, 133; Horsman and Marshall, After the Nation-State, 249-55.
172. Maria Green Cowles, "The Politics of Big Business in the European Community: Setting the Agenda for a New Europe" (Ph.D. diss., The American University, 1994); Schacter, "Decline of the Nation-State," 13-17; Guéhenno, The END of the NATIONSTATE, 133; Horsman and Marshall, After the Nation-State, 249-55.
173. Maria Green Cowles, "The Politics of Big Business in the European Community: Setting the Agenda for a New Europe" (Ph.D. diss., The American University, 1994); Schacter, "Decline of the Nation-State," 13-17; Guéhenno, The END of the NATIONSTATE, 133; Horsman and Marshall, After the Nation-State, 249-55.
174. Roger J. Goebel, "European Economic and Monetary Union: Will the EMU Ever Fly?" Columbia Journal of European Law 4 (Spring 1998): 250-320; Martin Feldstein, "EMU and Interna• tional Conflict," Foreign Affairs 76 (November-December 1997): 60-73.
175. Roger J. Goebel, "European Economic and Monetary Union: Will the EMU Ever Fly?" Columbia Journal of European Law 4 (Spring 1998): 250-320; Martin Feldstein, "EMU and International Conflict," Foreign Affairs 76 (November-December 1997): 60-73.
176. Horsman and Marshall, After the Nation-State, ix-xx; Tamamoto, "Reflections on Japan's Postwar State," 15-21.
177. Horsman and Marshall, After the Nation-State, ix-xx; Tamamoto, "Reflections on Japan's Postwar State," 15-21.
178. Schacter, "The Decline of the Nation-State," 19-20. The most recent controversial case occurred when the Security Council demanded the ouster of the military regime in Haiti in 1993. So many governments expressed reservations about this action that the council had to make clear this was a "unique and exceptional" case.
179. Guéhenno, The END of the NATION STATE, 1-3; Antonio Casese, "Self-Determination of Peoples and the recent Break-Up of USSR and Yugoslavia," and Rein Mullerson, "Self-Determination of Peoples and the Dissolution of the USSR," both in Essays in Honor of Wang Tieya, ed. Ronald St. John MacDonald (Dordrecht, The Netherlands, 1994), 351-44, 567-86; Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld, 303, n. 6.
180. Guéhenno, The END of the NATION STATE, 1-3; Antonio Casese, "Self-Determination of Peoples and the recent Break-Up of USSR and Yugoslavia," and Rein Mullerson, "Self-Determination of Peoples and the Dissolution of the USSR," both in Essays in Honor of Wang Tieya, ed. Ronald St. John MacDonald (Dordrecht, The Netherlands, 1994), 351-44, 567-86; Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld, 303, n. 6.
181. Guéhenno, The END of the NATION STATE, 1-3; Antonio Casese, "Self-Determination of Peoples and the recent Break-Up of USSR and Yugoslavia," and Rein Mullerson, "Self-Determination of Peoples and the Dissolution of the USSR," both in Essays in Honor of Wang Tieya, ed. Ronald St. John MacDonald (Dordrecht, The Netherlands, 1994), 351-44, 567-86; Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld, 303, n. 6.
182. Guéhenno, The END of the NATION STATE, 1-3; Antonio Casese, "Self-Determination of Peoples and the recent Break-Up of USSR and Yugoslavia," and Rein Mullerson, "Self-Determination of Peoples and the Dissolution of the USSR," both in Essays in Honor of Wang Tieya, ed. Ronald St. John MacDonald (Dordrecht, The Netherlands, 1994), 351-44, 567-86; Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld, 303, n. 6.
183. Testimony of Ralph Johnson, deputy assistant secretary of state for European and Cana-dian affairs, 17 October 1991, Foreign Policy Bulletin 2 (November-December 1991): 39, 42 (quotation); John Mattras and Marjorie Lightman, "Clinton's Second Term: Making Women's Rights a Foreign Policy Issue," Presidential Studies Quarterly 27 (Winter 1997): 122-26.
184. Testimony of Ralph Johnson, deputy assistant secretary of state for European and Cana-dian affairs, 17 October 1991, Foreign Policy Bulletin 2 (November-December 1991): 39, 42 (quotation); John Mattras and Marjorie Lightman, "Clinton's Second Term: Making Women's Rights a Foreign Policy Issue," Presidential Studies Quarterly 27 (Winter 1997): 122-26.
185. John Mueller, "Quiet Cataclysm: Some Afterthoughts about World War III," Diplomatic History 16 (Winter 1992); 66; Horsman and Marshall, After the Nation-State, 40; Kaplan, "Was Democracy Just a Moment?" 55; Zakaria, "Our Hollow Hegemony," 80; "Redrawing the Free Market," New York Times, 14 November 1998; James E. Hickey, Jr., ed., International Legal Personality, The Hofstra Law and Policy Symposium, 1977 (vol. 2).
186. John Mueller, "Quiet Cataclysm: Some Afterthoughts about World War III," Diplomatic History 16 (Winter 1992); 66; Horsman and Marshall, After the Nation-State, 40; Kaplan, "Was Democracy Just a Moment?" 55; Zakaria, "Our Hollow Hegemony," 80; "Redrawing the Free Market," New York Times, 14 November 1998; James E. Hickey, Jr., ed., International Legal Personality, The Hofstra Law and Policy Symposium, 1977 (vol. 2).
187. John Mueller, "Quiet Cataclysm: Some Afterthoughts about World War III," Diplomatic History 16 (Winter 1992); 66; Horsman and Marshall, After the Nation-State, 40; Kaplan, "Was Democracy Just a Moment?" 55; Zakaria, "Our Hollow Hegemony," 80; "Redrawing the Free Market," New York Times, 14 November 1998; James E. Hickey, Jr., ed., International Legal Personality, The Hofstra Law and Policy Symposium, 1977 (vol. 2).
188. John Mueller, "Quiet Cataclysm: Some Afterthoughts about World War III," Diplomatic History 16 (Winter 1992); 66; Horsman and Marshall, After the Nation-State, 40; Kaplan, "Was Democracy Just a Moment?" 55; Zakaria, "Our Hollow Hegemony," 80; "Redrawing the Free Market," New York Times, 14 November 1998; James E. Hickey, Jr., ed., International Legal Personality, The Hofstra Law and Policy Symposium, 1977 (vol. 2).
189. John Mueller, "Quiet Cataclysm: Some Afterthoughts about World War III," Diplomatic History 16 (Winter 1992); 66; Horsman and Marshall, After the Nation-State, 40; Kaplan, "Was Democracy Just a Moment?" 55; Zakaria, "Our Hollow Hegemony," 80; "Redrawing the Free Market," New York Times, 14 November 1998; James E. Hickey, Jr., ed., International Legal Personality, The Hofstra Law and Policy Symposium, 1977 (vol. 2).
190. John Mueller, "Quiet Cataclysm: Some Afterthoughts about World War III," Diplomatic History 16 (Winter 1992); 66; Horsman and Marshall, After the Nation-State, 40; Kaplan, "Was Democracy Just a Moment?" 55; Zakaria, "Our Hollow Hegemony," 80; "Redrawing the Free Market," New York Times, 14 November 1998; James E. Hickey, Jr., ed., International Legal Personality, The Hofstra Law and Policy Symposium, 1977 (vol. 2).