Precautionary incentives for privately informed victims

International Review of Law and Economics

Volumn 23, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 237-251

  Clements, Matthew T ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

Author keywords

Mechanism design; Private information; Spillover benefits

Indexed keywords

EID: 0345687180     PISSN: 01448188     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2003.09.006     Document Type: Article

References (12)

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