Essential facility financing and market structure

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 88, Issue 3-4, 2004, Pages 667-694

  Caillaud, Bernard ^a   Tirole, Jean ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITÉ PARIS EST   (France)

^b MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Essential facility; Exclusive franchise; Market structure; Open access

Indexed keywords

EID: 0345490639     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(02)00189-5     Document Type: Article

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