Tacit collusion and international commodity taxation

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 88, Issue 3-4, 2004, Pages 577-600

  Haufler, Andreas ^a   Schjelderup, Guttorm ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH   (Germany)

^b NORWEGIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Norway)

Author keywords

Commodity taxation; Dynamic price competition

Indexed keywords

EID: 0344628488     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(02)00184-6     Document Type: Article

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