Tax competition and tax co-ordination under destination and origin principles: A synthesis

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 81, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 279-319

  Lockwood, Ben ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Destination and origin principles; H21; H23; H77; Tax competition; Tax reform

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000233655     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00131-6     Document Type: Article

References (39)

1. Bovenberg L. Destination and origin-based taxation under international capital mobility. International Tax and Public Finance. 1:1994;247-273.
2. de Crombrugghe A., Tulkens H. On Pareto-improving commodity tax changes under fiscal competition. Journal of Economics. 41:1990;335-350.
3. Delipalla S. Commodity tax harmonization and public goods. Journal of Public Economics. 63:1996;447-466.
4. Due J.F. The retail sales tax: the US experience. Cnossen S. Comparative Tax Studies. 1983;North-Holland.
5. Friedlander A.F., Vandendorpe A.L. Excise taxes and the gains from trade. Journal of Political Economy. 76:1968;1058-1068.
6. Grossman H. Border tax adjustments: do they distort trade. Journal of International Economics. 10:1980.
7. Haufler A. Tax coordination with different preferences for public goods: conflict or harmony of interest? International Tax and Public Finance. 3:1996;5-28.
8. Haufler A. Asymmetric commodity tax competition-comment on de Crombrugghe and Tulkens. Journal of Public Economics. 67:1998;135-144.
9. Haufler A., Nielsen S.B. Dynamic effects of an anticipated switch from destination- to origin-based commodity taxation. Journal of Economics. 66:1997;43-69.
10. Georgakopoulos T., Hitiris T. On the equivalence of the destination and the origin principles of taxation in the case of non-general product taxes. Osaka Economic Papers. 39:1991.
11. Georgakopoulos T., Hitiris T. On the superiority of the destination over the origin principle of taxation for intra-union trade. Economic Journal. 102:1992;117-126.
12. Gordon R. An optimal tax approach to fiscal federalism. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 48:1983;566-586.
13. Huizinga H., Nielsen S.B. Capital income and profit taxation with foreign ownership of firms. Journal of International Economics. 42:1997;149-165.
14. Kanbur R., Keen M. Jeux sans frontiers: tax competition and tax coordination when countries differ in size. American Economic Review. 63:1993;877-892.
15. Keen M. Welfare effects of commodity tax harmonization. Journal of Public Economics. 33:1987;107-114.
16. Keen M. Pareto-improving indirect tax harmonization. European Economic Review. 33:1989;1-12.
17. Keen M., Lahiri S. Domestic tax reform and international oligopoly. Journal of Public Economics. 51:1993;55-74.
18. Keen M., Lahiri S. The comparison between destination and origin principles under imperfect competition. Journal of Public Economics. 45:1998;323-350.
19. Keen, M., Lahiri, S., Raimondos-Moller, P., 1998. When is policy harmonization desirable? EPRU Working Paper, 98-02, University of Copenhagen.
20. Keen M., Smith S. The future of VAT in the European Union. Economic Policy. 23:1996;373-411.
21. Kennan J., Riezman R. Do big countries win tariff wars? International Economic Review. 29:1998;81-85.
22. Krelove R. Efficient tax exporting. Canadian Journal of Economics. 25:1992;145-155.
23. Lahiri S., Raimondos-Moller P. Public good provision and the welfare effects of indirect tax harmonization. Journal of Public Economics. 67:1998;253-267.
24. Lockwood B. Commodity tax competition under destination and origin principles. Journal of Public Economics. 52:1993;141-162.
25. Lockwood B. Can commodity tax harmonization be Pareto-improving when governments supply public goods? Journal of International Economics. 43:1997;387-408.
26. Lockwood, B., 2000. Tax competition and tax co-ordination under destination and origin principles: A synthesis. CEPR Discussion Paper 2556.
27. Lockwood B., de Meza D., Myles G. When are origin and destination regimes equivalent? International Tax and Public Finance. 1:1994;5-25.
28. Lockwood B., de Meza D., Myles G. The equivalence between destination and non-reciprocal restricted origin tax regimes. Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 96:1994;311-328.
29. McMillan J. Game Theory in International Economics. 1986;Harwood.
30. Lopez-Garcia M.-J. The origin principle and the welfare gains from indirect tax harmonization. International Tax and Public Finance. 3:1996;83-93.
31. Lopez-Garcia, 1997. On welfare and revenue effects of indirect tax harmonization. unpublished paper. Universidad Autonoma de Barcelona.
32. Mintz J., Tulkens H. Commodity tax competition between member states of a federation: equilibrium and efficiency. Journal of Public Economics. 29:1986;133-172.
33. Nielsen, S.B., 1998. A simple model of commodity taxation and cross-border shopping. Unpublished paper, EPRU, Copenhagen Business School.
34. Shibata H. The theory of economic unions, Shoup C.S. Fiscal Harmonization in Common Markets. 1967;Columbia University Press.
35. Trandel G. Interstate commodity tax differentials and the distribution of residents. Journal of Public Economics. 53:1994;435-457.
36. Venables A. Optimal tariffs for trade in monopolistically competitive commodities. Journal of International Economics. 11:1982;225-241.
37. Whalley J. Uniform domestic tax rates, trade distortions, and economic integration. Journal of Public Economics. 11:1979;213-221.
38. Wilson J. A theory of interregional tax competition. Journal of Urban Economics. 39:1986;296-315.
39. Zodrow G., Miezowski P. Pigou, Tiebout, property taxation and the underprovision of local Public Goods. Journal of Urban Economics. 19:1986;356-370.