Optimal design of bank bailouts: The case of transition economies

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

Volumn 155, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 51-70

  Aghion, Philippe ^a   Bolton, Patrick ^b   Fries, Steven ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033243361     PISSN: 09324569     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (5)

1. BERGLOF, E. AND G. ROLAND [1995], "Bank Restructuring and Soft Budget Constraints in Financial Transition", CEPR Discussion Paper No. 1250, Centre for Economic Policy Research, London.
2. BOLTON, P. AND D. S. SCHARFSTEIN [1990], "A Theory of Predation Based on Agency Problems in Financial Contracting", American Economic Review, 80(1), 93-106.
3. MITCHELL, J. [1995], "Cancelling, Transferring or Repaying bad Debts: Cleaning Banks' Balance Sheets in Economies in Transition", Mimeo, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY.
4. POVEL, P. [1997], "Optimal 'Soft' or Tough' Bankruptcy Procedures", Financial Markets Group Discussion Paper No. 240, London School of Economics.
5. SUAREZ, J. [1995], "Closure Rules and the Prudential Regulation of Banks", Mimeo, Centro di Economia Monetaria e Finanziaria, Università Commerciale Luigi Bocconi, Milano, Italy.