Profit guaranteeing mechanisms for multicast networks

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 190-191

  Chawla, S ^a   Kitchin, D ^a   Rajan, U ^a   Ravi, R ^a   Sinha, A ^a  

^a CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Mechanism design; Multicast game; Profit maximization

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; ECONOMICS; GAME THEORY; MULTICASTING; OPTIMIZATION;

MULTICAST GAME; PROFIT GUARANTEEING; PROFIT MAXIMIZATION;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

EID: 0242624704     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/779950.779953     Document Type: Conference Paper

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