Adaptive Incrementalism and Complexity: Experiments with Two-Person Cooperative Signaling Games

Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

Volumn 13, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 341-366

  Knott, Jack H ^a   Miller, Gary J ^b   Verkuilen, Jay ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0242593081     PISSN: 7653697     EISSN: 1782155X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (35)

1. Allison, Graham T. 1971. Essence of decision: Explaining the Cuban missile crisis, Boston: Little, Brown.
2. Bendor, Jonathan. 1995. A model of muddling through. American Political Science Review 89, no. 4:819-40.
3. Bendor, Jonathan, and Terry Moe. 1985. An adaptive model of bureaucratic politics. American Political Science Review 79, no. 3:755-74.
4. Bendor, Jonathan, and Thomas H. Hammond. 1992. Rethinking Allison's models. American Political Science Review 86, no. 2:301-22.
5. Coase, Ronald. 1937. The nature of the firm. Economica 4:386-405.
6. Crecine, John P. 1969. Governmental problem solving: A computer simulation of municipal budgeting. Chicago: Rand McNally.
7. Davis, Otto A., M. A. H. Dempster, and Aaron Wildavsky. 1966. A theory of the budgetary process. American Political Science Review 60, no. 3:529-47.
8. Dixit, Avinash, and Barry Nalebuff. 1991. Thinking strategically: The competitive edge in business, politics, and everyday life. New York: W. W. Norton.
9. Dixit, Avinash, and Susan Skeath. 1999. Games of strategy. New York: W. W. Norton.
10. Fouraker, Lawrence E., and Sidney Siegel. 1963. Bargaining behavior. New York: McGraw-Hill.
11. Gintis, Herbert. 2000. Game theory evolving. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
12. Henderson, James M., and Richard E. Quandt. 1980. Microeconomic theory: A mathematical approach. 3d ed. New York: McGraw-Hill.
13. Jones, Bryan D. 1999. Bounded rationality. Annual Review of Political Science 2:297-321.
14. Kalbfleisch, J. D., and R. L. Prentice. 1980. The statistical analysis of failure time data. New York: Wiley.
15. Knott, Jack H., and Gary Miller. 1992. The dynamics of convergence and cooperation: Rational choice and adaptive incrementalism. Unpublished ms. Michigan State University.
16. Lindblom, Charles. 1959. The science of "muddling through." Public Administration Review 19, no. 1:78-88.
17. Lindblom, Charles. 1965. The intelligence of democracy. New York: Free Press.
18. Lustick, Ian S. 1981. Explaining the variable utility of disjointed incrementalism. American Political Science Review 74, no. 3:342-53.
19. March, James G., and Herbert A. Simon. 1958. Organizations. New York: Wiley.
20. March, James G., and Johan P. Olson. 1976. Ambiguity and choice in organizations. Bergen, Germany: Universitetsforlaget.
21. McCubbins, Mathew D., and Thomas Schwartz. 1984. Congressional oversight overlooked: Police patrols vs. fire alarms. American Journal of Political Science 28, no. 1:165-79.
22. Milgram, Stanley. 1974. Obedience to authority. New York: Harper & Row.
23. Oehlert, Gary W. 2000. A first course in design and analysis of experiments. New York: W. H. Freeman.
24. Poundstone, William. 1992. Prisoner's dilemma. New York: Doubleday.
25. Pindyck, Robert S., and Daniel L. Rubinfeld. 2001. Microeconomics. 5th ed. New York: Prentice Hall.
26. Quattrone, George A., and Amos Tversky. 1984. Causal versus diagnostic contingencies: On self-deception and on the voter's illusion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 46, no. 2:237-48.
27. Rourke, Francis. 1984. Bureaucracy, politics, and public policy. Boston: Little, Brown.
28. Schelling, Thomas. 1960. The strategy of conflict. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
29. Shepsle, Kenneth A. 1979. Institutional arrangements and equilibrium in multidimensional voting models. American Journal of Political Science 23, no. 1: 27-59.
30. Simon, Herbert A. 1957. Models of man. New York: Wiley.
31. Steinbrunner, John D. 1974. The cybernetic theory of decision. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
32. Tsebelis, George 1989. The abuse of probability in political analysis: The Robinson Crusoe fallacy. American Political Science Review 83, no. 1:77-91.
33. Wildavsky, Aaron. 1964. The politics of the budgetary process. Boston: Little, Brown.
34. Williamson, Oliver. 1985. The economic institutions of capitalism. New York: Free Press.
35. Zimmerman, H.-J., and P. Zysno. 1983. Decisions and evaluations by hierarchical aggregation of information. Fuzzy Sets and Systems 10:243-60.