Accelerating information revelation in ascending-bid auctions - Avoiding last minute bidding -

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2001, Pages 29-37

  Matsubara, Shigeo ^a  

^a NTT Communication Science Laboratories   (Japan)

Author keywords

Auction; Information revelation; Last minute bidding; Multi agent systems

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; COMPUTER SIMULATION; ECONOMICS; GAME THEORY; INTERNET; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS; NETWORK PROTOCOLS;

AUCTION; INFORMATION REVELATION; LAST MINUTE BIDDING;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

EID: 0242456300     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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