Civil society and social order: Demarcating and combining market, state and community

Archives Europeennes de Sociologie

Volumn 41, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 71-94

  Offe, Claus ^a  

^a HUMBOLDT UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0242452291     PISSN: 00039756     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/s000397560000789x     Document Type: Article

References (39)

1. Rather than the unambiguously desirable ones brought about by Smith's 'invisible hand'!
2. Cf. Peter HALL and Rosemary TAYLOR, Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms, Political Studies, XLIV (1996): 952-973.
3. Cf. the telling title of a collection edited by Brian BARRY and Russel HARDIN, Rational Man in Irrational Society? (London: Sage, 1982).
4. We might note, however, that in a world of international regimes and security alliances, democracy is a sufficient, but not a necessary, condition for the prevention of international war. The Gulf War had demonstrated that even dictators can be stopped from attacking and occupying neighbors.
5. It used to be argued by the 'structuralist' school of democratic theorists that an advanced economy is a determinant or prerequisite of democracy, and that in turn democracy will enhance the potential for growth and prosperity. Neither side of this feedback model is supported by much of the current evidence.
6. Cf. David BEETHAM, Defining and Measuring Democracy (London: Sage, 1994) and Larry DIAMOND, Is the Third Wave Over?, Journal of Democracy, 7 (1996), No. 3: 20-37.
7. Cf. David BEETHAM, Defining and Measuring Democracy (London: Sage, 1994) and Larry DIAMOND, Is the Third Wave Over?, Journal of Democracy, 7 (1996), No. 3: 20-37.
8. Cf. Guillermo O'DONNELL, Delegative Democracy, Journal of Democracy, 5 (1995), No. 1: 55-69.
9. Cf. Juan LINZ and Alfred STEPAN, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: John Hopkins UP, 1996).
10. As some have argued, to the point of making democracy pointless. Cf. Jean-Marie GUÉHENNO, La fin de la démocratie (Paris: Flammarion, 1993).
11. It is worth noting in passing that one item, a seventh M, is missing from this list. The moral ideas and principles governing particular national communities have largely proved to be resistant to 'globalizing' processes of diffusion and convergence.
12. At any rate, from the mineral-rich Congo province of Katanga in the early 1960s to the rise of Catalan demands for independence in the 1980s to the independence of the Baltic States, as well as of Croatia and Slovenia in the post-Soviet early 1990s, it was consistently the richest regional sub-units of established states that have had strong motives to defect from the encompassing unit.
13. Cf. Wolgang STREECK and Philippe C. SCHMITTER, Community, Market, State - and Associations? The Prospective Contribution of Interest Governance to Social Order, European Sociological Review, 1 (1985), No. 2, 119-138.
14. Streeck and Schmitter, op. cit. 119f.
15. Cf. Amitai ETZIONI, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations (New York: The Free Press, 1961) for a similar conceptualization of modes of coordination through social norms, coercive power and material incentives. Also, Gunnar Folke SCHUPPERT, Assoziative Demokratie. Zum Platz des organisierten Menschen in der Demokratietheorie, in Ansgar KLEIN, Rainer SCHMALZ-BRUNS (eds), Politische Beteiligung und Bürgerengagement in Deutschland (Baden-Baden: Nomos 1997), 114-152.
16. Cf. Amitai ETZIONI, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations (New York: The Free Press, 1961) for a similar conceptualization of modes of coordination through social norms, coercive power and material incentives. Also, Gunnar Folke SCHUPPERT, Assoziative Demokratie. Zum Platz des organisierten Menschen in der Demokratietheorie, in Ansgar KLEIN, Rainer SCHMALZ-BRUNS (eds), Politische Beteiligung und Bürgerengagement in Deutschland (Baden-Baden: Nomos 1997), 114-152.
17. Cf. David MILLER, Social Justice (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1979).
18. The standard cases of such undercutting and mutual displacement are, on the one hand, the 'dependent state' whose regulatory and governing capacity is reduced by national and international monetary markets and investors' decisions and, on the other, the 'overregulated' economy. Cf. also the notion of a 'depletion of the moral heritage' by political and economic modernization in Fred HIRSCH, Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1976).
19. STRETTON, Hugh and Lion ORCHARD, Public Goods, Public Enterprise, Public Choice: Theoretical Foundations of the Contemporary Attack on Government (London: Saint Martin's, 1994).
20. Cf. World Bank, The state in a changing world. World development report 1997 (New York: Oxford UP, 1997).
21. For instance, it can be easily demonstrated that the system of tertiary education in Germany, an almost entirely statist system, serves the professional upper middle class and their offspring much better than it does any other stratum in German society. In contrast, private university systems might easily be regulated in ways that give greater weight to considerations of social equality.
22. Cf. Stephen HOLMES and Cass R. SUNSTEIN, The Costs of Rights. Why Liberty depends on Taxes (New York: Norton, 1999).
23. Cf. Robert KAUFMAN, The Politics of State Reform: A Review of Theoretical Approaches and idem, The Next Challenges for Latin America, Working Papers No. 98 and No. 108 (Madrid: Institute Juan March, 1997).
24. Cf. Robert E. LANE, The Market Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991); also Andrew J. OSWALD, Happiness and Economic Performance and Robert H. FRANK, The Frame of Reference as a Public Good, The Economic Journal, 107 (1997): 1815-1831 and 1832-1847.
25. Cf. Robert E. LANE, The Market Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991); also Andrew J. OSWALD, Happiness and Economic Performance and Robert H. FRANK, The Frame of Reference as a Public Good, The Economic Journal, 107 (1997): 1815-1831 and 1832-1847.
26. Charles E. LINDDLOM, The Market as Prison, Journal of Politics, vol 44 (1982): 324-336.
27. Cf. the 'satanic mill' argument in Karl POLANYI, The Great Transformation. The Political and Economic Origins of our Time (Boston: Beacon, 1944).
28. Arguably, there is also the reverse paradox of a 'high level trap', with 'big' welfare states (such as the Netherlands) defying downward revisions and behaving stubbornly path-dependent.
29. Albert O. HIRSCHMAN, The Passions and the Interests, Political Arguments for Capitalism before its Triumph (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1977).
30. This is a view of how markets operate that is widely to be encountered in post-socialist economies with their sudden and conspicuous emergence of the nouveaux riches.
31. This is nicely illustrated by a story that was being told in the context of the economic transition in Poland. Suppose the price of coal doubles during a cold winter. In response, people will economize on heating and work harder (which in itself keeps them warm) in order to earn the necessary additional income to buy coal. Now suppose the price of coal increases by the factor of five. What will be the response? People give up and stay in bed.
32. It is this experience of escaping the control of power holders that young entrants to the labor market enjoy when for the first time 'earning their own money' and thus escaping the control of parents, or that clients of newly privatized telephone companies enjoy when given the chance to put together their own service package, rather than being forced to pay for what the former state monopoly would offer as the single standard package. It must be noted, however, that the experience of such enthusiastic feelings of liberation may be more of a transition phenomenon than something attached to the steady state of market routines. Nevertheless, the desire of both states and communities to extend authoritarian or paternalistic control over individuals can only be checked by keeping the exit option of markets permanently open.
33. Agnès HELLER, Biopolitics. The Politics of the Body, Race and Nature (Aldershot: Avebury, 1996).
34. Cf. Claus OFFE, 'Homogeneity' and Constitutional Democracy: Coping with Identity through Group Rights, The Journal of Political Philosophy, 6 (1998), No. 2: 113-141.
35. Judith TENDLER, Good Government in the Tropics (Baltimore: John Hopkins UP, 1997).
36. Cf. Gerald MARWELL and Pamela OLIVER, The Critical Mass in Collective Action: a Micro-Social Theory (Cambridge; Harvard UP, 1993).
37. Streeck and Schmitter, loc. cit.
38. Robert A. PUTNAM, Making Democracy Work (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1993).
39. Alexis de TOCQUEVILLE, Democracy in America, 2 vol. (New York: Schocken, 1961).