Implementation of allocation rules under perfect information

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 21, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 323-346

  Maniquet, François ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NAMUR   (Belgium)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0242382488     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-003-0262-6     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (37)

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