Double implementation in Nash and strong Nash equilibria

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 14, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 439-447

  Suh, Sang Chul ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031527503     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s003550050077     Document Type: Article

References (21)

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