When is the median voter paradigm a reasonable guide for policy choices in a representative democracy?

Economics and Politics

Volumn 15, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 247-284

  Cukierman, Alex ^a,b   Spiegel, Yossi ^a  

^a TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^b TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DEMOCRACY; PARTY POLITICS; POLITICAL SYSTEM; THEORETICAL STUDY; VOTING BEHAVIOR;

EID: 0242368868     PISSN: 09541985     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0343.00124     Document Type: Article

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