Divided Government: A New Approach to Taiwan's Local Politics

Issues and Studies

Volumn 35, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 1-35

  Don Yun, Chen ^b   Tong Yi, Huang ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

^b NONE

Author keywords

Divided government; Executive president; Party government; Separation of powers; Unified government

Indexed keywords

EID: 0242319495     PISSN: 10132511     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (124)

1. Huang Chin-tang, Difang zizhi fazhihua wenti zhi yanjiu (A study regarding the institution of laws on local autonomy) (Taipei: Yuedan chubanshe, June 1995); Chen Ming-tung, Paixi zhengzhi yu Taiwan zhengzhi bianqian (Factional politics and Taiwan's political changes) (Taipei: Yuedan chubanshe, October 1995); Chao Yung-mao, "The Division of Powers between Central and Local Governments and the Way to Reduce Government-Council Conflicts," Yankao shuangyuekan (Research and Evaluation Bimonthly) 20, no. 4 (August 1996): 16-22.
2. Huang Chin-tang, Difang zizhi fazhihua wenti zhi yanjiu (A study regarding the institution of laws on local autonomy) (Taipei: Yuedan chubanshe, June 1995); Chen Ming-tung, Paixi zhengzhi yu Taiwan zhengzhi bianqian (Factional politics and Taiwan's political changes) (Taipei: Yuedan chubanshe, October 1995); Chao Yung-mao, "The Division of Powers between Central and Local Governments and the Way to Reduce Government-Council Conflicts," Yankao shuangyuekan (Research and Evaluation Bimonthly) 20, no. 4 (August 1996): 16-22.
3. Huang Chin-tang, Difang zizhi fazhihua wenti zhi yanjiu (A study regarding the institution of laws on local autonomy) (Taipei: Yuedan chubanshe, June 1995); Chen Ming-tung, Paixi zhengzhi yu Taiwan zhengzhi bianqian (Factional politics and Taiwan's political changes) (Taipei: Yuedan chubanshe, October 1995); Chao Yung-mao, "The Division of Powers between Central and Local Governments and the Way to Reduce Government-Council Conflicts," Yankao shuangyuekan (Research and Evaluation Bimonthly) 20, no. 4 (August 1996): 16-22.
4. Without doubt, the operation of institutions relies on people. From the perspective of rational choice, the neo-institutional theory has enabled us to realize that institutions are not limited to the game rules stipulated in relevant government organizational regulations (i.e., the changeability of regulations). Institutions condition people's behavior, but they are also the results of people's interaction. See Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach," Journal of Theoretical Politics 1, no. 2 (1989): 131-47; Randall L. Calvert, "The Rational Choice Theory of Social Institutions: Cooperation, Coordination, and Communication," in Modern Political Economy: Old Topics, New Directions, ed. Jeffrey S. Banks and Eric A. Hanushek (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 217-18. Basically, consideration is simultaneously given to the origin, choices, and changes of institutions, i.e., the dynamic operation of institutions which was neglected by traditional institutional theories. In fact, James M. Buchanan, a Nobel economics prize winner, regards the lack of a set of theories on operation of institutions as a bottleneck in current institutional studies. He says that an informed and meaningful theory of constitutions cannot be constructed until and unless there exists some theory of the operation of alternative political rules. In the authors' opinion, for the sake of democratic consolidation, Taiwan urgently needs the study of divided government whose chief focus is on the operation of power-separation institutions. See James M. Buchanan, "Politics without Romance: A Sketch of Positive Public Choice Theory and Its Normative Implications," in The Theory of Public Choice, ed. James M. Buchanan and Robert D. Tollison, vol. 2 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1984), 16.
5. Without doubt, the operation of institutions relies on people. From the perspective of rational choice, the neo-institutional theory has enabled us to realize that institutions are not limited to the game rules stipulated in relevant government organizational regulations (i.e., the changeability of regulations). Institutions condition people's behavior, but they are also the results of people's interaction. See Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach," Journal of Theoretical Politics 1, no. 2 (1989): 131-47; Randall L. Calvert, "The Rational Choice Theory of Social Institutions: Cooperation, Coordination, and Communication," in Modern Political Economy: Old Topics, New Directions, ed. Jeffrey S. Banks and Eric A. Hanushek (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 217-18. Basically, consideration is simultaneously given to the origin, choices, and changes of institutions, i.e., the dynamic operation of institutions which was neglected by traditional institutional theories. In fact, James M. Buchanan, a Nobel economics prize winner, regards the lack of a set of theories on operation of institutions as a bottleneck in current institutional studies. He says that an informed and meaningful theory of constitutions cannot be constructed until and unless there exists some theory of the operation of alternative political rules. In the authors' opinion, for the sake of democratic consolidation, Taiwan urgently needs the study of divided government whose chief focus is on the operation of power-separation institutions. See James M. Buchanan, "Politics without Romance: A Sketch of Positive Public Choice Theory and Its Normative Implications," in The Theory of Public Choice, ed. James M. Buchanan and Robert D. Tollison, vol. 2 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1984), 16.
6. Without doubt, the operation of institutions relies on people. From the perspective of rational choice, the neo-institutional theory has enabled us to realize that institutions are not limited to the game rules stipulated in relevant government organizational regulations (i.e., the changeability of regulations). Institutions condition people's behavior, but they are also the results of people's interaction. See Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach," Journal of Theoretical Politics 1, no. 2 (1989): 131-47; Randall L. Calvert, "The Rational Choice Theory of Social Institutions: Cooperation, Coordination, and Communication," in Modern Political Economy: Old Topics, New Directions, ed. Jeffrey S. Banks and Eric A. Hanushek (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 217-18. Basically, consideration is simultaneously given to the origin, choices, and changes of institutions, i.e., the dynamic operation of institutions which was neglected by traditional institutional theories. In fact, James M. Buchanan, a Nobel economics prize winner, regards the lack of a set of theories on operation of institutions as a bottleneck in current institutional studies. He says that an informed and meaningful theory of constitutions cannot be constructed until and unless there exists some theory of the operation of alternative political rules. In the authors' opinion, for the sake of democratic consolidation, Taiwan urgently needs the study of divided government whose chief focus is on the operation of power-separation institutions. See James M. Buchanan, "Politics without Romance: A Sketch of Positive Public Choice Theory and Its Normative Implications," in The Theory of Public Choice, ed. James M. Buchanan and Robert D. Tollison, vol. 2 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1984), 16.
7. David Menefee-Libey, "Divided Government as Scapegoat," PS: Political Science and Politics 24, no. 4 (1991): 643-46.
8. The term opposite to "divided government" is "unified government," which means both the executive and legislative branches are under the control of the same political party.
9. Strictly speaking, both the presidential and cabinet systems are democratic polities of checks and balances. The cabinet system emphasizes the checks and balances of power on the basis of executive-legislative fusion and party responsibilities while the presidential system stresses the achievement of checks and balances by complete separation of executive and legislative powers by institutions. Giovanni Sartori says that "all constitutional systems are systems of checks and balances but that the American formula is, in fact, unique in checking and balancing power by dividing it." See Giovanni Sartori, "Neither Presidentialism Nor Parliamentarianism," in The Failure of Presidential Democracy: Comparative Perspectives, ed. Juan J. Linz, and Arturo Valenzuela (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 116 n. 8.
10. Here, it must be pointed out that the definition of "divided government" is related to whether party institutions are clearly defined or not. Particularly, the requirements for party control of a parliament are sometimes not very precise. For instance, if the KMT is in the majority by only one seat in the parliament, it may have nominal control of the parliament yet this majority is quite fragile. Moreover, if the guiding forces in the parliament are factions rather than parties, the definition of "divided government" built on power distribution according to parties will be inaccurate. However, this is a problem inherent in the studies of all party politics, not just in the case of divided government.
11. In fact, from the perspective of comparative government, the phenomenon of divided government in the United States may be compared with the coalition government that has been adopted by many European governments for years. Although important differences exist between the constitutional systems in the United States and the European continent (a two-party presidential system versus a multiparty cabinet system), there are similarities between a divided government under presidentialism and a minority government on the European continent. See Kaare Strom, Minority Government and Majority Rule (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). The demarcation of two-party and multiparty systems may become blurred because of "divided government" studies. See Michael Laver and Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Divided Government: American Is Not 'Exceptional'," Governance 4 (1991): 250-69; G. B. Powell, Jr., "Divided Government as a Pattern of Governance," ibid., 236-49; Morris P. Fiorina, Divided Government, second edition (New York: Macmillan, 1996), 111-24.
12. In fact, from the perspective of comparative government, the phenomenon of divided government in the United States may be compared with the coalition government that has been adopted by many European governments for years. Although important differences exist between the constitutional systems in the United States and the European continent (a two- party presidential system versus a multiparty cabinet system), there are similarities between a divided government under presidentialism and a minority government on the European continent. See Kaare Strom, Minority Government and Majority Rule (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). The demarcation of two-party and multiparty systems may become blurred because of "divided government" studies. See Michael Laver and Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Divided Government: American Is Not 'Exceptional'," Governance 4 (1991): 250-69; G. B. Powell, Jr., "Divided Government as a Pattern of Governance," ibid., 236-49; Morris P. Fiorina, Divided Government, second edition (New York: Macmillan, 1996), 111-24.
13. In fact, from the perspective of comparative government, the phenomenon of divided government in the United States may be compared with the coalition government that has been adopted by many European governments for years. Although important differences exist between the constitutional systems in the United States and the European continent (a two- party presidential system versus a multiparty cabinet system), there are similarities between a divided government under presidentialism and a minority government on the European continent. See Kaare Strom, Minority Government and Majority Rule (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). The demarcation of two-party and multiparty systems may become blurred because of "divided government" studies. See Michael Laver and Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Divided Government: American Is Not 'Exceptional'," Governance 4 (1991): 250-69; G. B. Powell, Jr., "Divided Government as a Pattern of Governance," ibid., 236-49; Morris P. Fiorina, Divided Government, second edition (New York: Macmillan, 1996), 111-24.
14. In fact, from the perspective of comparative government, the phenomenon of divided government in the United States may be compared with the coalition government that has been adopted by many European governments for years. Although important differences exist between the constitutional systems in the United States and the European continent (a two- party presidential system versus a multiparty cabinet system), there are similarities between a divided government under presidentialism and a minority government on the European continent. See Kaare Strom, Minority Government and Majority Rule (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). The demarcation of two-party and multiparty systems may become blurred because of "divided government" studies. See Michael Laver and Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Divided Government: American Is Not 'Exceptional'," Governance 4 (1991): 250-69; G. B. Powell, Jr., "Divided Government as a Pattern of Governance," ibid., 236-49; Morris P. Fiorina, Divided Government, second edition (New York: Macmillan, 1996), 111-24.
15. Of course, the American system of government has another split possibility, that is, diverse majorities between the House and the Senate. Therefore, divided government may develop toward two main directions: split branch and split legislatures. The existence of a split branch may not involve split legislatures but the existence of split legislatures is a sure sign of a split branch. Cox and McCubbins have tried to define divided government by the relations between the President, the Senate, and the House, resulting in eight possible combinations. In addition to unified Republican government, unified Democratic government, President (Republican)-Congress (Democratic), and President (Democratic)-Congress (Republican), there are four more divided government situations: President (Republican)-Senate (Republican)-House (Democratic), President (Republican)-Senate (Democratic)-House (Republican), President (Democratic)-Senate (Democratic)-House (Republican), and President (Democratic)-Senate (Republican)-House (Democratic). The concept of split legislatures will be used to explain the budget deficit problem. See note 37 below.
16. See the following works by James L. Sundquist: Constitutional Reform and Effective Government (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1986); "Needed: A Political Theory for the New Era of Coalition Government in the United States," Political Science Quarterly 103 (1988): 613-35; and "Response to the Petracca-Bailey-Smith Evaluation of the Committee on the Constitutional System," Presidential Studies Quarterly 20 (1990): 533-43.
17. See the following works by James L. Sundquist: Constitutional Reform and Effective Government (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1986); "Needed: A Political Theory for the New Era of Coalition Government in the United States," Political Science Quarterly 103 (1988): 613-35; and "Response to the Petracca-Bailey-Smith Evaluation of the Committee on the Constitutional System," Presidential Studies Quarterly 20 (1990): 533-43.
18. See the following works by James L. Sundquist: Constitutional Reform and Effective Government (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1986); "Needed: A Political Theory for the New Era of Coalition Government in the United States," Political Science Quarterly 103 (1988): 613-35; and "Response to the Petracca-Bailey-Smith Evaluation of the Committee on the Constitutional System," Presidential Studies Quarterly 20 (1990): 533-43.
19. Some scholars maintain that political parties constitute a force for unification in the divided American political system. See Frank J. Sorauf and Paul Allen Beck, Party Politics in America (Boston: Scott, Foresman, 1988), 16.
20. For the main points of the Committee's review report, see Arend Lijphart, ed., Parliamentary versus Presidential Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 78-89.
21. This viewpoint can at least be traced back to a 1950 research report of the American Political Science Association entitled "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System," which defined the political party within the U.S. government as the unifier of the separate powers. In fact, this viewpoint represents a longing for the clear responsibilities of political parties in the operation of the British government. See Sundquist, "Needed: A Political Theory for the New Era," 617.
22. See the following works by Lloyd N. Cutler: "To Form a Government," Foreign Affairs 59 (1980): 126-43; "Some Reflections about Divided Government," Presidential Studies Quarterly 17 (1988): 485-92; and "How Is the Time for All Good Men...," William and Mary Law Review 30 (1989): 387-402.
23. See the following works by Lloyd N. Cutler: "To Form a Government," Foreign Affairs 59 (1980): 126-43; "Some Reflections about Divided Government," Presidential Studies Quarterly 17 (1988): 485-92; and "How Is the Time for All Good Men...," William and Mary Law Review 30 (1989): 387-402.
24. See the following works by Lloyd N. Cutler: "To Form a Government," Foreign Affairs 59 (1980): 126-43; "Some Reflections about Divided Government," Presidential Studies Quarterly 17 (1988): 485-92; and "How Is the Time for All Good Men...," William and Mary Law Review 30 (1989): 387-402.
25. See Philip C. Bobbitt, "The Committee on the Constitutional System Proposals: Coherence and Dominance," William and Mary Law Review 30 (1989): 403-9; Erwin Chemerinsky, "The Question Is Not Clear, But Party Government Is Not the Answer," ibid., 411-23; Morris P. Fiorina, "An Era of Divided Government," in Developments in American Politics, ed. Bruce Cain and Gillian Peele (London: Macmillan, 1991); Mark P. Petracca, Lonce Bailey, and Pamela Smith, "Proposals for Constitutional Reform; An Evaluation of the Committee on the Constitutional System," Presidential Studies Quarterly 20 (1990): 503-32.
26. See Philip C. Bobbitt, "The Committee on the Constitutional System Proposals: Coherence and Dominance," William and Mary Law Review 30 (1989): 403-9; Erwin Chemerinsky, "The Question Is Not Clear, But Party Government Is Not the Answer," ibid., 411-23; Morris P. Fiorina, "An Era of Divided Government," in Developments in American Politics, ed. Bruce Cain and Gillian Peele (London: Macmillan, 1991); Mark P. Petracca, Lonce Bailey, and Pamela Smith, "Proposals for Constitutional Reform; An Evaluation of the Committee on the Constitutional System," Presidential Studies Quarterly 20 (1990): 503-32.
27. See Philip C. Bobbitt, "The Committee on the Constitutional System Proposals: Coherence and Dominance," William and Mary Law Review 30 (1989): 403-9; Erwin Chemerinsky, "The Question Is Not Clear, But Party Government Is Not the Answer," ibid., 411-23; Morris P. Fiorina, "An Era of Divided Government," in Developments in American Politics, ed. Bruce Cain and Gillian Peele (London: Macmillan, 1991); Mark P. Petracca, Lonce Bailey, and Pamela Smith, "Proposals for Constitutional Reform; An Evaluation of the Committee on the Constitutional System," Presidential Studies Quarterly 20 (1990): 503-32.
28. See Philip C. Bobbitt, "The Committee on the Constitutional System Proposals: Coherence and Dominance," William and Mary Law Review 30 (1989): 403-9; Erwin Chemerinsky, "The Question Is Not Clear, But Party Government Is Not the Answer," ibid., 411-23; Morris P. Fiorina, "An Era of Divided Government," in Developments in American Politics, ed. Bruce Cain and Gillian Peele (London: Macmillan, 1991); Mark P. Petracca, Lonce Bailey, and Pamela Smith, "Proposals for Constitutional Reform; An Evaluation of the Committee on the Constitutional System," Presidential Studies Quarterly 20 (1990): 503-32.
29. The party alignment and realignment theory is, to a certain extent, related to the theory of social cleavages proposed by Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan in 1967. However, the latter focuses on the freezing effect of social cleavage structures on party systems while the former stresses the influences on party systems caused by the changes in social cleavage structures. See Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction," in Party Systems and Voter Alignments, ed. Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan (New York: Free Press, 1967), 1-64.
30. Walter Dean Burnham, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics (New York: Norton, 1970); Valdimer O. Key, Jr., "A Theory of Critical Elections," Journal of Politics 17 (1955): 3-18.
31. Walter Dean Burnham, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics (New York: Norton, 1970); Valdimer O. Key, Jr., "A Theory of Critical Elections," Journal of Politics 17 (1955): 3-18.
32. Valdimer O. Key, Jr., "Secular Realignment and the Party System," Journal of Politics 21 (1959): 198-210; James L. Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United States (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1983).
33. Valdimer O. Key, Jr., "Secular Realignment and the Party System," Journal of Politics 21 (1959): 198-210; James L. Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United States (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1983).
34. Everett C. Ladd, "Like Waiting for Godot: The Uselessness of Realignment for Understanding Change in Contemporary American Politics," Polity 22 (1990): 511-25; Byron E. Shafer, The End of Realignment (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991).
35. Everett C. Ladd, "Like Waiting for Godot: The Uselessness of Realignment for Understanding Change in Contemporary American Politics," Polity 22 (1990): 511-25; Byron E. Shafer, The End of Realignment (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991).
36. John Leonard, "Divided Government and Dysfunctional Politics," PS: Political Science and Politics 24, no. 4 (1991): 651-53.
37. Since 1968, the Republicans have been defeated only twice in presidential elections, by Jimmy Carter in 1976 and by Bill Clinton in 1992. The Democrats, however, had dominated the House for a long period until a group of Republican freshmen were elected to the House in 1994. See Martin P. Wattenberg, "The Republican Presidential Advantage in the Age of Party Disunity," in The Politics of Divided Government, ed. Gary W. Cox and Samuel Kernell (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991); Gary C. Jacobson, "The Persistence of Democratic House Majorities," ibid.
38. Since 1968, the Republicans have been defeated only twice in presidential elections, by Jimmy Carter in 1976 and by Bill Clinton in 1992. The Democrats, however, had dominated the House for a long period until a group of Republican freshmen were elected to the House in 1994. See Martin P. Wattenberg, "The Republican Presidential Advantage in the Age of Party Disunity," in The Politics of Divided Government, ed. Gary W. Cox and Samuel Kernell (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991); Gary C. Jacobson, "The Persistence of Democratic House Majorities," ibid.
39. Morris Fiorina divided the explanations for the causes of divided government into by-product explanations and purposive explanations, which coincided respectively with the last two points mentioned here. See Fiorina, Divided Government, 44-84.
40. Ibid., 6-43; Fiorina, "An Era of Divided Government," 387-95.
41. Ibid., 6-43; Fiorina, "An Era of Divided Government," 387-95.
42. Gary C. Jacobson, The Electoral Origins of Divided Government (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), 75-137.
43. H. Douglas Price, "Congress and the Election of Legislative 'Professionalism'," in Congress in Change, ed. Norman J. Ornstein (New York: Praeger, 1975).
44. Mark Zupan has used the "prisoner's dilemma" to develop a similar explanation. He maintains that the Democrats pay more attention to local interests while the Republicans attach more importance to national interests. If an electoral district supports the Republican candidate but all other electoral districts support Democratic candidates, that electoral district will become the sucker in the prisoner's dilemma because it will have to pay for the local interests of other electoral districts. However, this will never happen in the elections for executive heads of government. See Mark Zupan, "An Economic Explanation for the Existence and Nature of Political Ticket Splitting," Journal of Law and Economics 34 (1991): 343-69.
45. Fiorina, Divided Government, 177.
46. Cutler, "To Form a Government" and "Some Reflections about Divided Government"; Sundquist, "Needed: A Political Theory for the New Era."
47. Cutler, "To Form a Government" and "Some Reflections about Divided Government"; Sundquist, "Needed: A Political Theory for the New Era."
48. David R. Mayhew, Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations, 1946-1990 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1991).
49. Charles O. Jones, The Presidency in a Separated System (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1994); Keith Krehbiel, "Institutional and Partisan Sources of Gridlock: A Theory of Divided and Unified Government," Journal of Theoretical Politics 8 (1996): 7-40; Keith Krehbiel, Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).
50. Charles O. Jones, The Presidency in a Separated System (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1994); Keith Krehbiel, "Institutional and Partisan Sources of Gridlock: A Theory of Divided and Unified Government," Journal of Theoretical Politics 8 (1996): 7-40; Keith Krehbiel, Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).
51. Charles O. Jones, The Presidency in a Separated System (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1994); Keith Krehbiel, "Institutional and Partisan Sources of Gridlock: A Theory of Divided and Unified Government," Journal of Theoretical Politics 8 (1996): 7-40; Keith Krehbiel, Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).
52. Based on the degree of tension of partisan relations, four patterns of partisan interaction are identified: partisanship, copartisanship, bipartisanship, and cross-partisanship.
53. Krehbiel combines the rational choice theory with the study of divided government. See Krehbiel, Pivotal Politics. The first chapter of this book contains a penetrating and comprehensive discussion of these theories.
54. Laura A. Van Assendelft, Governors, Agenda Setting, and Divided Government (New York: University Press of America, 1997).
55. Here, McCubbins refers to the Republican control of the Senate and the Democratic control of the House. See M. D. McCubbins, "Party Governance and U.S. Budget Deficits: Divided Government and Fiscal Stalemate," in Politics and Economics in the Eighties, ed. Alberto Alesina and Geoffrey Carliner (Chicago: University of Chicago Press and National Bureau of Economic Research, 1991), 83-111; M. D. McCubbins, "Government on Lay-Away: Federal Spending and Deficits under Divided Party Control," in Cox and Kernell, The Politics of Divided Government.
56. Here, McCubbins refers to the Republican control of the Senate and the Democratic control of the House. See M. D. McCubbins, "Party Governance and U.S. Budget Deficits: Divided Government and Fiscal Stalemate," in Politics and Economics in the Eighties, ed. Alberto Alesina and Geoffrey Carliner (Chicago: University of Chicago Press and National Bureau of Economic Research, 1991), 83-111; M. D. McCubbins, "Government on Lay-Away: Federal Spending and Deficits under Divided Party Control," in Cox and Kernell, The Politics of Divided Government.
57. James E. Alt and Robert C. Lowry, "Divided Government, Fiscal Institutions, and Budget Deficits: Evidence from the States," American Political Science Review 88 (1994): 811-28; James M. Poterba, "State Response to Fiscal Crises: The Effects of Budgetary Institutions and Politics," Journal of Political Economy 102 (1994): 799-821.
58. James E. Alt and Robert C. Lowry, "Divided Government, Fiscal Institutions, and Budget Deficits: Evidence from the States," American Political Science Review 88 (1994): 811-28; James M. Poterba, "State Response to Fiscal Crises: The Effects of Budgetary Institutions and Politics," Journal of Political Economy 102 (1994): 799-821.
59. For the difference between split branch and split legislatures, see note 12 above.
60. Jeffrey A. Segal, "Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees: A Neoinstitutionalist Model," American Political Science Review 84 (1990): 525-34; Albert C. Ringelstein, "Presidential Vetoes: Motivations and Classification," in The American Presidency, ed. Harry A. Bailey, Jr. and Jay M. Shafritz (Chicago: Dorsey Press, 1988).
61. Jeffrey A. Segal, "Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees: A Neoinstitutionalist Model," American Political Science Review 84 (1990): 525-34; Albert C. Ringelstein, "Presidential Vetoes: Motivations and Classification," in The American Presidency, ed. Harry A. Bailey, Jr. and Jay M. Shafritz (Chicago: Dorsey Press, 1988).
62. Paul Peterson and Jay Greene, "Why Executive-Legislative Conflict in the United States Is Dwindling," British Journal of Political Science 24 (1994): 33-55.
63. Cox and Kernell, The Politics of Divided Government, 243.
64. This argument is closely related to the interest group theory and the political pluralism theory. See also Jeffrey M. Berry, The Interest Group Society, second edition (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, 1989).
65. Fiorina, Divided Government, 103-6.
66. Ibid., 106.
67. Montesquieu, an originator of the power-separation theory, was aware of its potential problem, but he believed that a "necessary force" would appear to solve the problem. See Lijphart, Parliamentary versus Presidential Government, 48-51. This necessary force may be, as seen by James Madison, the people's inherent inclination to form factions. Although Madison did not encourage factional struggle (see The Federalist Document, no. 10), he did not think that separation of powers was designed to eliminate people's faction-forming inclination. On the contrary, he believed that the system can guide that inclination via institutional rivalry so that ambition can be suppressed by ambition and government administration can develop a constructive orientation. Madison did not see the development of the party system in democracies in this century. However, the operation of the party system is undoubtedly the basis for the operation of the power-separation system.
68. Montesquieu, an originator of the power-separation theory, was aware of its potential problem, but he believed that a "necessary force" would appear to solve the problem. See Lijphart, Parliamentary versus Presidential Government, 48-51. This necessary force may be, as seen by James Madison, the people's inherent inclination to form factions. Although Madison did not encourage factional struggle (see The Federalist Document, no. 10), he did not think that separation of powers was designed to eliminate people's faction-forming inclination. On the contrary, he believed that the system can guide that inclination via institutional rivalry so that ambition can be suppressed by ambition and government administration can develop a constructive orientation. Madison did not see the development of the party system in democracies in this century. However, the operation of the party system is undoubtedly the basis for the operation of the power-separation system.
69. Samuel Kernell, "Facing an Opposition Congress: The President's Strategic Circumstance," in Cox and Kernell, The Politics of Divided Government; Bert A. Rockman, "Legislative- Executive Relations and Legislative Oversight," Legislative Studies Quarterly 9, no. 3 (1984): 387-440; James A. Thurber, Divided Democracy: Cooperation and Conflict Between the President and Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1991); James A. Thurber, "Representation, Accountability, and Efficiency in Divided Party Control of Government," PS: Political Science and Politics 23, no. 4 (1991): 653-57; Wattenberg, "The Republican Presidential Advantage in the Age of Party Disunity."
70. Samuel Kernell, "Facing an Opposition Congress: The President's Strategic Circumstance," in Cox and Kernell, The Politics of Divided Government; Bert A. Rockman, "Legislative-Executive Relations and Legislative Oversight," Legislative Studies Quarterly 9, no. 3 (1984): 387-440; James A. Thurber, Divided Democracy: Cooperation and Conflict Between the President and Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1991); James A. Thurber, "Representation, Accountability, and Efficiency in Divided Party Control of Government," PS: Political Science and Politics 23, no. 4 (1991): 653-57; Wattenberg, "The Republican Presidential Advantage in the Age of Party Disunity."
71. Samuel Kernell, "Facing an Opposition Congress: The President's Strategic Circumstance," in Cox and Kernell, The Politics of Divided Government; Bert A. Rockman, "Legislative- Executive Relations and Legislative Oversight," Legislative Studies Quarterly 9, no. 3 (1984): 387-440; James A. Thurber, Divided Democracy: Cooperation and Conflict Between the President and Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1991); James A. Thurber, "Representation, Accountability, and Efficiency in Divided Party Control of Government," PS: Political Science and Politics 23, no. 4 (1991): 653-57; Wattenberg, "The Republican Presidential Advantage in the Age of Party Disunity."
72. Samuel Kernell, "Facing an Opposition Congress: The President's Strategic Circumstance," in Cox and Kernell, The Politics of Divided Government; Bert A. Rockman, "Legislative- Executive Relations and Legislative Oversight," Legislative Studies Quarterly 9, no. 3 (1984): 387-440; James A. Thurber, Divided Democracy: Cooperation and Conflict Between the President and Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1991); James A. Thurber, "Representation, Accountability, and Efficiency in Divided Party Control of Government," PS: Political Science and Politics 23, no. 4 (1991): 653-57; Wattenberg, "The Republican Presidential Advantage in the Age of Party Disunity."
73. Samuel Kernell, "Facing an Opposition Congress: The President's Strategic Circumstance," in Cox and Kernell, The Politics of Divided Government; Bert A. Rockman, "Legislative- Executive Relations and Legislative Oversight," Legislative Studies Quarterly 9, no. 3 (1984): 387-440; James A. Thurber, Divided Democracy: Cooperation and Conflict Between the President and Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1991); James A. Thurber, "Representation, Accountability, and Efficiency in Divided Party Control of Government," PS: Political Science and Politics 23, no. 4 (1991): 653-57; Wattenberg, "The Republican Presidential Advantage in the Age of Party Disunity."
74. Jacobson, The Electoral Origins of Divided Government; Morris P. Fiorina, "Coalition Governments, Divided Governments, and Electoral Theory," Governance 4 (1991): 236- 49; Krehbiel, "Institutional and Partisan Sources of Gridlock"; John R. Petrocik, "Divided Government: Is It All in the Campaigns?" in Cox and Kernell, The Politics of Divided Government; Peverill Squire, "Divided Government and Public Opinion in the States," State and Local Government Review 25, no. 3 (1993): 150-54.
75. Jacobson, The Electoral Origins of Divided Government; Morris P. Fiorina, "Coalition Governments, Divided Governments, and Electoral Theory," Governance 4 (1991): 236-49; Krehbiel, "Institutional and Partisan Sources of Gridlock"; John R. Petrocik, "Divided Government: Is It All in the Campaigns?" in Cox and Kernell, The Politics of Divided Government; Peverill Squire, "Divided Government and Public Opinion in the States," State and Local Government Review 25, no. 3 (1993): 150-54.
76. Jacobson, The Electoral Origins of Divided Government; Morris P. Fiorina, "Coalition Governments, Divided Governments, and Electoral Theory," Governance 4 (1991): 236- 49; Krehbiel, "Institutional and Partisan Sources of Gridlock"; John R. Petrocik, "Divided Government: Is It All in the Campaigns?" in Cox and Kernell, The Politics of Divided Government; Peverill Squire, "Divided Government and Public Opinion in the States," State and Local Government Review 25, no. 3 (1993): 150-54.
77. Jacobson, The Electoral Origins of Divided Government; Morris P. Fiorina, "Coalition Governments, Divided Governments, and Electoral Theory," Governance 4 (1991): 236- 49; Krehbiel, "Institutional and Partisan Sources of Gridlock"; John R. Petrocik, "Divided Government: Is It All in the Campaigns?" in Cox and Kernell, The Politics of Divided Government; Peverill Squire, "Divided Government and Public Opinion in the States," State and Local Government Review 25, no. 3 (1993): 150-54.
78. Jacobson, The Electoral Origins of Divided Government; Morris P. Fiorina, "Coalition Governments, Divided Governments, and Electoral Theory," Governance 4 (1991): 236- 49; Krehbiel, "Institutional and Partisan Sources of Gridlock"; John R. Petrocik, "Divided Government: Is It All in the Campaigns?" in Cox and Kernell, The Politics of Divided Government; Peverill Squire, "Divided Government and Public Opinion in the States," State and Local Government Review 25, no. 3 (1993): 150-54.
79. Alberto Alesina and Howard Rosenthal, Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
80. McCubbins, "Party Governance and U.S. Budget Deficits"; Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, "Divided Control of Fiscal Policy," in Cox and Kernell, The Politics of Divided Government.
81. McCubbins, "Party Governance and U.S. Budget Deficits"; Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, "Divided Control of Fiscal Policy," in Cox and Kernell, The Politics of Divided Government.
82. Klaus Von Beyme, American as a Model (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987).
83. Herbert H.P. Ma, "American Influence on the Formation of the Constitution and Constitutional Law of the Republic of China: Past History and Future Prospects," in Constitutionalism in Asia: Asian Views of the American Influence, ed. Lawrence W. Beer (Occasional Papers in Contemporary Asian Studies, School of Law, University of Maryland, 1988).
84. David Osborne and Ted Gaebler, Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit Is Transforming the Public Sector (New York: Plume, 1993).
85. Chiang Ta-shu, "Administrative Divisions and Government Levels," Guojia zhengce shuangzhoukan (National Policy Biweekly), no. 97 (October 18, 1994): 6-8.
86. Research, Development and Evaluation Commission of the Executive Yuan, Quanmian tisheng fuwu pinzhi fang'an (The TQM program) (Taipei: Executive Yuan, 1996).
87. Editorial, Zhongguo shibao, December 30, 1997. Lin Shui-po and Ho Hung-jung, "The Legislative Yuan's Restructuring and Agenda-Setting"; Weng Hsing-li, "The Legislative Yuan's Structure and Agenda-Setting"; and Chou Yu-jen, "Presidential Office/Executive Yuan-Legislative Yuan Relations" (Papers presented at the Symposium on Reinventing Parliaments sponsored by the College of Law of National Taiwan University, Taipei, January 1996). See also Chou Lung-shan, "Where Will 'None of the Three Political Parties Winning over Half of Seats' Be Found? - Discussion Based on the Electoral Tendency," Zhongshan renwen shehui kexue qikan (The Chungshan Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences) 4, no. 2 (December 1995): 239-44; Chen Shan-jung, "The Caucus Operation in the Legislative Yuan Characterized by Three Political Parties and One Faction'," Guojia zhengce shuangzhoukan, no. 138 (May 14, 1996): 6-7; Ho Hung-jung, Zaizao xiaoneng zhengfu - Xingzheng chongzhu, guohui kongzhi yu gaizao (Reinventing an efficient government - Administrative reorganization, and the control and reinvention of parliaments) (Taipei: Shiying chubanshe, September 1996); Huang Cheng-hsiung, "A Review of Executive-Legislative Interactions," Guojia zhengce shuangzhoukan, no. 140 (June 11, 1996): 5-6; Huang Chun-sheng, "Executive-Legislative Relations - The Sharing of Legislative Powers by the Parliament and the Government," ibid., no. 73 (November 16, 1993): 14-15.
88. Editorial, Zhongguo shibao, December 30, 1997. Lin Shui-po and Ho Hung-jung, "The Legislative Yuan's Restructuring and Agenda-Setting"; Weng Hsing-li, "The Legislative Yuan's Structure and Agenda-Setting"; and Chou Yu-jen, "Presidential Office/Executive Yuan-Legislative Yuan Relations" (Papers presented at the Symposium on Reinventing Parliaments sponsored by the College of Law of National Taiwan University, Taipei, January 1996). See also Chou Lung-shan, "Where Will 'None of the Three Political Parties Winning over Half of Seats' Be Found? - Discussion Based on the Electoral Tendency," Zhongshan renwen shehui kexue qikan (The Chungshan Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences) 4, no. 2 (December 1995): 239-44; Chen Shan-jung, "The Caucus Operation in the Legislative Yuan Characterized by Three Political Parties and One Faction'," Guojia zhengce shuangzhoukan, no. 138 (May 14, 1996): 6-7; Ho Hung-jung, Zaizao xiaoneng zhengfu - Xingzheng chongzhu, guohui kongzhi yu gaizao (Reinventing an efficient government - Administrative reorganization, and the control and reinvention of parliaments) (Taipei: Shiying chubanshe, September 1996); Huang Cheng-hsiung, "A Review of Executive-Legislative Interactions," Guojia zhengce shuangzhoukan, no. 140 (June 11, 1996): 5-6; Huang Chun-sheng, "Executive-Legislative Relations - The Sharing of Legislative Powers by the Parliament and the Government," ibid., no. 73 (November 16, 1993): 14-15.
89. Editorial, Zhongguo shibao, December 30, 1997. Lin Shui-po and Ho Hung-jung, "The Legislative Yuan's Restructuring and Agenda-Setting"; Weng Hsing-li, "The Legislative Yuan's Structure and Agenda-Setting"; and Chou Yu-jen, "Presidential Office/Executive Yuan-Legislative Yuan Relations" (Papers presented at the Symposium on Reinventing Parliaments sponsored by the College of Law of National Taiwan University, Taipei, January 1996). See also Chou Lung-shan, "Where Will 'None of the Three Political Parties Winning over Half of Seats' Be Found? - Discussion Based on the Electoral Tendency," Zhongshan renwen shehui kexue qikan (The Chungshan Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences) 4, no. 2 (December 1995): 239-44; Chen Shan-jung, "The Caucus Operation in the Legislative Yuan Characterized by Three Political Parties and One Faction'," Guojia zhengce shuangzhoukan, no. 138 (May 14, 1996): 6-7; Ho Hung-jung, Zaizao xiaoneng zhengfu - Xingzheng chongzhu, guohui kongzhi yu gaizao (Reinventing an efficient government - Administrative reorganization, and the control and reinvention of parliaments) (Taipei: Shiying chubanshe, September 1996); Huang Cheng-hsiung, "A Review of Executive-Legislative Interactions," Guojia zhengce shuangzhoukan, no. 140 (June 11, 1996): 5-6; Huang Chun-sheng, "Executive-Legislative Relations - The Sharing of Legislative Powers by the Parliament and the Government," ibid., no. 73 (November 16, 1993): 14-15.
90. Editorial, Zhongguo shibao, December 30, 1997. Lin Shui-po and Ho Hung-jung, "The Legislative Yuan's Restructuring and Agenda-Setting"; Weng Hsing-li, "The Legislative Yuan's Structure and Agenda-Setting"; and Chou Yu-jen, "Presidential Office/Executive Yuan-Legislative Yuan Relations" (Papers presented at the Symposium on Reinventing Parliaments sponsored by the College of Law of National Taiwan University, Taipei, January 1996). See also Chou Lung-shan, "Where Will 'None of the Three Political Parties Winning over Half of Seats' Be Found? - Discussion Based on the Electoral Tendency," Zhongshan renwen shehui kexue qikan (The Chungshan Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences) 4, no. 2 (December 1995): 239-44; Chen Shan-jung, "The Caucus Operation in the Legislative Yuan Characterized by Three Political Parties and One Faction'," Guojia zhengce shuangzhoukan, no. 138 (May 14, 1996): 6-7; Ho Hung-jung, Zaizao xiaoneng zhengfu - Xingzheng chongzhu, guohui kongzhi yu gaizao (Reinventing an efficient government - Administrative reorganization, and the control and reinvention of parliaments) (Taipei: Shiying chubanshe, September 1996); Huang Cheng-hsiung, "A Review of Executive-Legislative Interactions," Guojia zhengce shuangzhoukan, no. 140 (June 11, 1996): 5-6; Huang Chun-sheng, "Executive-Legislative Relations - The Sharing of Legislative Powers by the Parliament and the Government," ibid., no. 73 (November 16, 1993): 14-15.
91. Editorial, Zhongguo shibao, December 30, 1997. Lin Shui-po and Ho Hung-jung, "The Legislative Yuan's Restructuring and Agenda-Setting"; Weng Hsing-li, "The Legislative Yuan's Structure and Agenda-Setting"; and Chou Yu-jen, "Presidential Office/Executive Yuan-Legislative Yuan Relations" (Papers presented at the Symposium on Reinventing Parliaments sponsored by the College of Law of National Taiwan University, Taipei, January 1996). See also Chou Lung-shan, "Where Will 'None of the Three Political Parties Winning over Half of Seats' Be Found? - Discussion Based on the Electoral Tendency," Zhongshan renwen shehui kexue qikan (The Chungshan Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences) 4, no. 2 (December 1995): 239-44; Chen Shan-jung, "The Caucus Operation in the Legislative Yuan Characterized by Three Political Parties and One Faction'," Guojia zhengce shuangzhoukan, no. 138 (May 14, 1996): 6-7; Ho Hung-jung, Zaizao xiaoneng zhengfu - Xingzheng chongzhu, guohui kongzhi yu gaizao (Reinventing an efficient government - Administrative reorganization, and the control and reinvention of parliaments) (Taipei: Shiying chubanshe, September 1996); Huang Cheng-hsiung, "A Review of Executive-Legislative Interactions," Guojia zhengce shuangzhoukan, no. 140 (June 11, 1996): 5-6; Huang Chun-sheng, "Executive-Legislative Relations - The Sharing of Legislative Powers by the Parliament and the Government," ibid., no. 73 (November 16, 1993): 14-15.
92. Editorial, Zhongguo shibao, December 30, 1997. Lin Shui-po and Ho Hung-jung, "The Legislative Yuan's Restructuring and Agenda-Setting"; Weng Hsing-li, "The Legislative Yuan's Structure and Agenda-Setting"; and Chou Yu-jen, "Presidential Office/Executive Yuan-Legislative Yuan Relations" (Papers presented at the Symposium on Reinventing Parliaments sponsored by the College of Law of National Taiwan University, Taipei, January 1996). See also Chou Lung-shan, "Where Will 'None of the Three Political Parties Winning over Half of Seats' Be Found? - Discussion Based on the Electoral Tendency," Zhongshan renwen shehui kexue qikan (The Chungshan Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences) 4, no. 2 (December 1995): 239-44; Chen Shan-jung, "The Caucus Operation in the Legislative Yuan Characterized by Three Political Parties and One Faction'," Guojia zhengce shuangzhoukan, no. 138 (May 14, 1996): 6-7; Ho Hung-jung, Zaizao xiaoneng zhengfu - Xingzheng chongzhu, guohui kongzhi yu gaizao (Reinventing an efficient government - Administrative reorganization, and the control and reinvention of parliaments) (Taipei: Shiying chubanshe, September 1996); Huang Cheng-hsiung, "A Review of Executive-Legislative Interactions," Guojia zhengce shuangzhoukan, no. 140 (June 11, 1996): 5-6; Huang Chun-sheng, "Executive-Legislative Relations - The Sharing of Legislative Powers by the Parliament and the Government," ibid., no. 73 (November 16, 1993): 14-15.
93. Editorial, Zhongguo shibao, December 30, 1997. Lin Shui-po and Ho Hung-jung, "The Legislative Yuan's Restructuring and Agenda-Setting"; Weng Hsing-li, "The Legislative Yuan's Structure and Agenda-Setting"; and Chou Yu-jen, "Presidential Office/Executive Yuan-Legislative Yuan Relations" (Papers presented at the Symposium on Reinventing Parliaments sponsored by the College of Law of National Taiwan University, Taipei, January 1996). See also Chou Lung-shan, "Where Will 'None of the Three Political Parties Winning over Half of Seats' Be Found? - Discussion Based on the Electoral Tendency," Zhongshan renwen shehui kexue qikan (The Chungshan Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences) 4, no. 2 (December 1995): 239-44; Chen Shan-jung, "The Caucus Operation in the Legislative Yuan Characterized by Three Political Parties and One Faction'," Guojia zhengce shuangzhoukan, no. 138 (May 14, 1996): 6-7; Ho Hung-jung, Zaizao xiaoneng zhengfu - Xingzheng chongzhu, guohui kongzhi yu gaizao (Reinventing an efficient government - Administrative reorganization, and the control and reinvention of parliaments) (Taipei: Shiying chubanshe, September 1996); Huang Cheng-hsiung, "A Review of Executive-Legislative Interactions," Guojia zhengce shuangzhoukan, no. 140 (June 11, 1996): 5-6; Huang Chun-sheng, "Executive-Legislative Relations - The Sharing of Legislative Powers by the Parliament and the Government," ibid., no. 73 (November 16, 1993): 14-15.
94. Editorial, Zhongguo shibao, December 30, 1997. Lin Shui-po and Ho Hung-jung, "The Legislative Yuan's Restructuring and Agenda-Setting"; Weng Hsing-li, "The Legislative Yuan's Structure and Agenda-Setting"; and Chou Yu-jen, "Presidential Office/Executive Yuan-Legislative Yuan Relations" (Papers presented at the Symposium on Reinventing Parliaments sponsored by the College of Law of National Taiwan University, Taipei, January 1996). See also Chou Lung-shan, "Where Will 'None of the Three Political Parties Winning over Half of Seats' Be Found? - Discussion Based on the Electoral Tendency," Zhongshan renwen shehui kexue qikan (The Chungshan Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences) 4, no. 2 (December 1995): 239-44; Chen Shan-jung, "The Caucus Operation in the Legislative Yuan Characterized by Three Political Parties and One Faction'," Guojia zhengce shuangzhoukan, no. 138 (May 14, 1996): 6-7; Ho Hung-jung, Zaizao xiaoneng zhengfu - Xingzheng chongzhu, guohui kongzhi yu gaizao (Reinventing an efficient government - Administrative reorganization, and the control and reinvention of parliaments) (Taipei: Shiying chubanshe, September 1996); Huang Cheng-hsiung, "A Review of Executive-Legislative Interactions," Guojia zhengce shuangzhoukan, no. 140 (June 11, 1996): 5-6; Huang Chun-sheng, "Executive-Legislative Relations - The Sharing of Legislative Powers by the Parliament and the Government," ibid., no. 73 (November 16, 1993): 14-15.
95. Editorial, Zhongguo shibao, December 30, 1997. Lin Shui-po and Ho Hung-jung, "The Legislative Yuan's Restructuring and Agenda-Setting"; Weng Hsing-li, "The Legislative Yuan's Structure and Agenda-Setting"; and Chou Yu-jen, "Presidential Office/Executive Yuan-Legislative Yuan Relations" (Papers presented at the Symposium on Reinventing Parliaments sponsored by the College of Law of National Taiwan University, Taipei, January 1996). See also Chou Lung-shan, "Where Will 'None of the Three Political Parties Winning over Half of Seats' Be Found? - Discussion Based on the Electoral Tendency," Zhongshan renwen shehui kexue qikan (The Chungshan Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences) 4, no. 2 (December 1995): 239-44; Chen Shan-jung, "The Caucus Operation in the Legislative Yuan Characterized by Three Political Parties and One Faction'," Guojia zhengce shuangzhoukan, no. 138 (May 14, 1996): 6-7; Ho Hung-jung, Zaizao xiaoneng zhengfu - Xingzheng chongzhu, guohui kongzhi yu gaizao (Reinventing an efficient government - Administrative reorganization, and the control and reinvention of parliaments)
96. Lin Ching-hua, "A Study of Taipei City's Government-Council Relations" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of Public Administration, National Chengchi University, Taipei, May 1972); Wu Sheng-yu, "A Study of Taiwan Province's Local Government-Council Relations" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of the Three People's Principles, Chinese Culture University, Taipei, May 1982); Huang Chin-tang, "An Institutional and Political Analysis of Taipei City's Government-Council Relations," Lüshi tongxun (Lawyers' Newsletter), no. 202 (July 1996): 38-42; Chang Hung-an, "A Study of Kaohsiung City's Government- Council Relations" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of Public Administration, National Chengchi University, Taipei, June 1975); Chang Chien-hung, "A Study of Taipei City's Government-Council Relations" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of Public Administration, National Chengchi University, Taipei, June 1997); Tsai Hsiang-ting, "A Study of the Power Relations Between the Taipei City Government and the Taipei City Council" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of the Three People's Principles, National Taiwan Normal University, June 1990); Yen Ming-te, "A Study of the Relations Between Taiwan's County/City Governments and County/City Councils" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of Public Administration, National Chengchi University, Taipei, July 1976); Lien Che-wei, "Government-Council Relations in DPP-Ruled Counties and Cities: A Comparative Analysis of Hsinchu County, Changhua County, and Kaohsiung County (1989-93)" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of Political Science, National Chengchi University, Taipei, June 1995).
97. Lin Ching-hua, "A Study of Taipei City's Government-Council Relations" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of Public Administration, National Chengchi University, Taipei, May 1972); Wu Sheng-yu, "A Study of Taiwan Province's Local Government-Council Relations" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of the Three People's Principles, Chinese Culture University, Taipei, May 1982); Huang Chin-tang, "An Institutional and Political Analysis of Taipei City's Government-Council Relations," Lüshi tongxun (Lawyers' Newsletter), no. 202 (July 1996): 38-42; Chang Hung-an, "A Study of Kaohsiung City's Government- Council Relations" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of Public Administration, National Chengchi University, Taipei, June 1975); Chang Chien-hung, "A Study of Taipei City's Government-Council Relations" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of Public Administration, National Chengchi University, Taipei, June 1997); Tsai Hsiang-ting, "A Study of the Power Relations Between the Taipei City Government and the Taipei City Council" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of the Three People's Principles, National Taiwan Normal University, June 1990); Yen Ming-te, "A Study of the Relations Between Taiwan's County/City Governments and County/City Councils" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of Public Administration, National Chengchi University, Taipei, July 1976); Lien Che-wei, "Government-Council Relations in DPP-Ruled Counties and Cities: A Comparative Analysis of Hsinchu County, Changhua County, and Kaohsiung County (1989-93)" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of Political Science, National Chengchi University, Taipei, June 1995).
98. Lin Ching-hua, "A Study of Taipei City's Government-Council Relations" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of Public Administration, National Chengchi University, Taipei, May 1972); Wu Sheng-yu, "A Study of Taiwan Province's Local Government-Council Relations" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of the Three People's Principles, Chinese Culture University, Taipei, May 1982); Huang Chin-tang, "An Institutional and Political Analysis of Taipei City's Government-Council Relations," Lüshi tongxun (Lawyers' Newsletter), no. 202 (July 1996): 38-42; Chang Hung-an, "A Study of Kaohsiung City's Government- Council Relations" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of Public Administration, National Chengchi University, Taipei, June 1975); Chang Chien-hung, "A Study of Taipei City's Government-Council Relations" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of Public Administration, National Chengchi University, Taipei, June 1997); Tsai Hsiang-ting, "A Study of the Power Relations Between the Taipei City Government and the Taipei City Council" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of the Three People's Principles, National Taiwan Normal University, June 1990); Yen Ming-te, "A Study of the Relations Between Taiwan's County/City Governments and County/City Councils" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of Public Administration, National Chengchi University, Taipei, July 1976); Lien Che-wei, "Government-Council Relations in DPP-Ruled Counties and Cities: A Comparative Analysis of Hsinchu County, Changhua County, and Kaohsiung County (1989-93)" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of Political Science, National Chengchi University, Taipei, June 1995).
99. Lin Ching-hua, "A Study of Taipei City's Government-Council Relations" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of Public Administration, National Chengchi University, Taipei, May 1972); Wu Sheng-yu, "A Study of Taiwan Province's Local Government-Council Relations" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of the Three People's Principles, Chinese Culture University, Taipei, May 1982); Huang Chin-tang, "An Institutional and Political Analysis of Taipei City's Government-Council Relations," Lüshi tongxun (Lawyers' Newsletter), no. 202 (July 1996): 38-42; Chang Hung-an, "A Study of Kaohsiung City's Government-Council Relations" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of Public Administration, National Chengchi University, Taipei, June 1975); Chang Chien-hung, "A Study of Taipei City's Government-Council Relations" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of Public Administration, National Chengchi University, Taipei, June 1997); Tsai Hsiang-ting, "A Study of the Power Relations Between the Taipei City Government and the Taipei City Council" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of the Three People's Principles, National Taiwan Normal University, June 1990); Yen Ming-te, "A Study of the Relations Between Taiwan's County/City Governments and County/City Councils" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of Public Administration, National Chengchi University, Taipei, July 1976); Lien Che-wei, "Government-Council Relations in DPP-Ruled Counties and Cities: A Comparative Analysis of Hsinchu County, Changhua County, and Kaohsiung County (1989-93)" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of Political Science, National Chengchi University, Taipei, June 1995).
100. Lin Ching-hua, "A Study of Taipei City's Government-Council Relations" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of Public Administration, National Chengchi University, Taipei, May 1972); Wu Sheng-yu, "A Study of Taiwan Province's Local Government-Council Relations" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of the Three People's Principles, Chinese Culture University, Taipei, May 1982); Huang Chin-tang, "An Institutional and Political Analysis of Taipei City's Government-Council Relations," Lüshi tongxun (Lawyers' Newsletter), no. 202 (July 1996): 38-42; Chang Hung-an, "A Study of Kaohsiung City's Government- Council Relations" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of Public Administration, National Chengchi University, Taipei, June 1975); Chang Chien-hung, "A Study of Taipei City's Government-Council Relations" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of Public Administration, National Chengchi University, Taipei, June 1997); Tsai Hsiang-ting, "A Study of the Power Relations Between the Taipei City Government and the Taipei City Council" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of the Three People's Principles, National Taiwan Normal University, June 1990); Yen Ming-te, "A Study of the Relations Between Taiwan's County/City Governments and County/City Councils" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of Public Administration, National Chengchi University, Taipei, July 1976); Lien Che-wei, "Government-Council Relations in DPP-Ruled Counties and Cities: A Comparative Analysis of Hsinchu County, Changhua County, and Kaohsiung County (1989-93)" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of Political Science, National Chengchi University, Taipei, June 1995).
101. Lin Ching-hua, "A Study of Taipei City's Government-Council Relations" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of Public Administration, National Chengchi University, Taipei, May 1972); Wu Sheng-yu, "A Study of Taiwan Province's Local Government-Council Relations" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of the Three People's Principles, Chinese Culture University, Taipei, May 1982); Huang Chin-tang, "An Institutional and Political Analysis of Taipei City's Government-Council Relations," Lüshi tongxun (Lawyers' Newsletter), no. 202 (July 1996): 38-42; Chang Hung-an, "A Study of Kaohsiung City's Government- Council Relations" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of Public Administration, National Chengchi University, Taipei, June 1975); Chang Chien-hung, "A Study of Taipei City's Government-Council Relations" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of Public Administration, National Chengchi University, Taipei, June 1997); Tsai Hsiang-ting, "A Study of the Power Relations Between the Taipei City Government and the Taipei City Council" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of the Three People's Principles, National Taiwan Normal University, June 1990); Yen Ming-te, "A Study of the Relations Between Taiwan's County/City Governments and County/City Councils" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of Public Administration, National Chengchi University, Taipei, July 1976); Lien Che-wei, "Government-Council Relations in DPP-Ruled Counties and Cities: A Comparative Analysis of Hsinchu County, Changhua County, and Kaohsiung County (1989-93)" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of Political Science, National Chengchi University, Taipei, June 1995).
102. Lin Ching-hua, "A Study of Taipei City's Government-Council Relations" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of Public Administration, National Chengchi University, Taipei, May 1972); Wu Sheng-yu, "A Study of Taiwan Province's Local Government-Council Relations" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of the Three People's Principles, Chinese Culture University, Taipei, May 1982); Huang Chin-tang, "An Institutional and Political Analysis of Taipei City's Government-Council Relations," Lüshi tongxun (Lawyers' Newsletter), no. 202 (July 1996): 38-42; Chang Hung-an, "A Study of Kaohsiung City's Government- Council Relations" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of Public Administration, National Chengchi University, Taipei, June 1975); Chang Chien-hung, "A Study of Taipei City's Government-Council Relations" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of Public Administration, National Chengchi University, Taipei, June 1997); Tsai Hsiang-ting, "A Study of the Power Relations Between the Taipei City Government and the Taipei City Council" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of the Three People's Principles, National Taiwan Normal University, June 1990); Yen Ming-te, "A Study of the Relations Between Taiwan's County/City Governments and County/City Councils" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of Public Administration, National Chengchi University, Taipei, July 1976); Lien Che-wei, "Government-Council Relations in DPP-Ruled Counties and Cities: A Comparative Analysis of Hsinchu County, Changhua County, and Kaohsiung County (1989-93)" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of Political Science, National Chengchi University, Taipei, June 1995).
103. Lin Ching-hua, "A Study of Taipei City's Government-Council Relations" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of Public Administration, National Chengchi University, Taipei, May 1972); Wu Sheng-yu, "A Study of Taiwan Province's Local Government-Council Relations" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of the Three People's Principles, Chinese Culture University, Taipei, May 1982); Huang Chin-tang, "An Institutional and Political Analysis of Taipei City's Government-Council Relations," Lüshi tongxun (Lawyers' Newsletter), no. 202 (July 1996): 38-42; Chang Hung-an, "A Study of Kaohsiung City's Government- Council Relations" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of Public Administration, National Chengchi University, Taipei, June 1975); Chang Chien-hung, "A Study of Taipei City's Government-Council Relations" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of Public Administration, National Chengchi University, Taipei, June 1997); Tsai Hsiang-ting, "A Study of the Power Relations Between the Taipei City Government and the Taipei City Council" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of the Three People's Principles, National Taiwan Normal University, June 1990); Yen Ming-te, "A Study of the Relations Between Taiwan's County/City Governments and County/City Councils" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of Public Administration, National Chengchi University, Taipei, July 1976); Lien Che-wei, "Government-Council Relations in DPP-Ruled Counties and Cities: A Comparative Analysis of Hsinchu County, Changhua County, and Kaohsiung County (1989-93)" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of Political Science, National Chengchi University, Taipei, June 1995).
104. Chen, Paixi zhengzhi yu Taiwan zhengzhi bianqian; Chao Yung-mao, Taiwan difang zhengzhi de bianqian yu tezhi (The changes and special characteristics of Taiwan's local politics) (Taipei: Hanlu chubanshe, February 1997).
105. Chen, Paixi zhengzhi yu Taiwan zhengzhi bianqian; Chao Yung-mao, Taiwan difang zhengzhi de bianqian yu tezhi (The changes and special characteristics of Taiwan's local politics) (Taipei: Hanlu chubanshe, February 1997).
106. Lijphart, Parliamentary versus Presidential Government; Arend Lijphart, "Democratization and Constitutional Choices in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland," Journal of Theoretical Politics 4, no. 2 (1992): 207-23; Arend Lijphart, "Constitutional Choices for New Democracies," in The Global Resurgence of Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 146-58; Arend Lijphart, "Presidentialism and Majoritarian Democracy: Theoretical Observations," in Linz and Valenzuela, The Failure of Presidential Democracy, 91-105; Juan J. Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?" ibid., 3-87; Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering (New York: New York University Press, 1994); Sartori, "Neither Presidentialism Nor Parliamentarianism," 106-18; Scott Mainwaring, "Presidentialism in Latin America," Latin American Research Review 25, no. 1 (1990): 157-79; Scott Mainwaring, "Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy," Comparative Political Studies 26, no. 2 (1993): 198-228; G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982); Matthew S. Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, "Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarianism versus Presidentialism," World Politics 46, no. 1 (1993): 1-22.
107. Lijphart, Parliamentary versus Presidential Government; Arend Lijphart, "Democratization and Constitutional Choices in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland," Journal of Theoretical Politics 4, no. 2 (1992): 207-23; Arend Lijphart, "Constitutional Choices for New Democracies," in The Global Resurgence of Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 146-58; Arend Lijphart, "Presidentialism and Majoritarian Democracy: Theoretical Observations," in Linz and Valenzuela, The Failure of Presidential Democracy, 91-105; Juan J. Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?" ibid., 3-87; Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering (New York: New York University Press, 1994); Sartori, "Neither Presidentialism Nor Parliamentarianism," 106-18; Scott Mainwaring, "Presidentialism in Latin America," Latin American Research Review 25, no. 1 (1990): 157-79; Scott Mainwaring, "Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy," Comparative Political Studies 26, no. 2 (1993): 198-228; G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982); Matthew S. Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, "Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarianism versus Presidentialism," World Politics 46, no. 1 (1993): 1-22.
108. Lijphart, Parliamentary versus Presidential Government; Arend Lijphart, "Democratization and Constitutional Choices in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland," Journal of Theoretical Politics 4, no. 2 (1992): 207-23; Arend Lijphart, "Constitutional Choices for New Democracies," in The Global Resurgence of Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 146-58; Arend Lijphart, "Presidentialism and Majoritarian Democracy: Theoretical Observations," in Linz and Valenzuela, The Failure of Presidential Democracy, 91-105; Juan J. Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?" ibid., 3-87; Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering (New York: New York University Press, 1994); Sartori, "Neither Presidentialism Nor Parliamentarianism," 106-18; Scott Mainwaring, "Presidentialism in Latin America," Latin American Research Review 25, no. 1 (1990): 157-79; Scott Mainwaring, "Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy," Comparative Political Studies 26, no. 2 (1993): 198-228; G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982); Matthew S. Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, "Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarianism versus Presidentialism," World Politics 46, no. 1 (1993): 1-22.
109. Lijphart, Parliamentary versus Presidential Government; Arend Lijphart, "Democratization and Constitutional Choices in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland," Journal of Theoretical Politics 4, no. 2 (1992): 207-23; Arend Lijphart, "Constitutional Choices for New Democracies," in The Global Resurgence of Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 146-58; Arend Lijphart, "Presidentialism and Majoritarian Democracy: Theoretical Observations," in Linz and Valenzuela, The Failure of Presidential Democracy, 91-105; Juan J. Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?" ibid., 3-87; Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering (New York: New York University Press, 1994); Sartori, "Neither Presidentialism Nor Parliamentarianism," 106-18; Scott Mainwaring, "Presidentialism in Latin America," Latin American Research Review 25, no. 1 (1990): 157-79; Scott Mainwaring, "Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy," Comparative Political Studies 26, no. 2 (1993): 198-228; G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982); Matthew S. Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, "Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarianism versus Presidentialism," World Politics 46, no. 1 (1993): 1-22.
110. Lijphart, Parliamentary versus Presidential Government; Arend Lijphart, "Democratization and Constitutional Choices in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland," Journal of Theoretical Politics 4, no. 2 (1992): 207-23; Arend Lijphart, "Constitutional Choices for New Democracies," in The Global Resurgence of Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 146-58; Arend Lijphart, "Presidentialism and Majoritarian Democracy: Theoretical Observations," in Linz and Valenzuela, The Failure of Presidential Democracy, 91-105; Juan J. Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?" ibid., 3-87; Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering (New York: New York University Press, 1994); Sartori, "Neither Presidentialism Nor Parliamentarianism," 106-18; Scott Mainwaring, "Presidentialism in Latin America," Latin American Research Review 25, no. 1 (1990): 157-79; Scott Mainwaring, "Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy," Comparative Political Studies 26, no. 2 (1993): 198-228; G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982); Matthew S. Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, "Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarianism versus Presidentialism," World Politics 46, no. 1 (1993): 1-22.
111. Lijphart, Parliamentary versus Presidential Government; Arend Lijphart, "Democratization and Constitutional Choices in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland," Journal of Theoretical Politics 4, no. 2 (1992): 207-23; Arend Lijphart, "Constitutional Choices for New Democracies," in The Global Resurgence of Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 146-58; Arend Lijphart, "Presidentialism and Majoritarian Democracy: Theoretical Observations," in Linz and Valenzuela, The Failure of Presidential Democracy, 91-105; Juan J. Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?" ibid., 3-87; Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering (New York: New York University Press, 1994); Sartori, "Neither Presidentialism Nor Parliamentarianism," 106-18; Scott Mainwaring, "Presidentialism in Latin America," Latin American Research Review 25, no. 1 (1990): 157-79; Scott Mainwaring, "Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy," Comparative Political Studies 26, no. 2 (1993): 198-228; G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982); Matthew S. Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, "Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarianism versus Presidentialism," World Politics 46, no. 1 (1993): 1-22.
112. Lijphart, Parliamentary versus Presidential Government; Arend Lijphart, "Democratization and Constitutional Choices in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland," Journal of Theoretical Politics 4, no. 2 (1992): 207-23; Arend Lijphart, "Constitutional Choices for New Democracies," in The Global Resurgence of Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 146-58; Arend Lijphart, "Presidentialism and Majoritarian Democracy: Theoretical Observations," in Linz and Valenzuela, The Failure of Presidential Democracy, 91-105; Juan J. Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?" ibid., 3-87; Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering (New York: New York University Press, 1994); Sartori, "Neither Presidentialism Nor Parliamentarianism," 106-18; Scott Mainwaring, "Presidentialism in Latin America," Latin American Research Review 25, no. 1 (1990): 157-79; Scott Mainwaring, "Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy," Comparative Political Studies 26, no. 2 (1993): 198-228; G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982); Matthew S. Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, "Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarianism versus Presidentialism," World Politics 46, no. 1 (1993): 1-22.
113. Lijphart, Parliamentary versus Presidential Government; Arend Lijphart, "Democratization and Constitutional Choices in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland," Journal of Theoretical Politics 4, no. 2 (1992): 207-23; Arend Lijphart, "Constitutional Choices for New Democracies," in The Global Resurgence of Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 146-58; Arend Lijphart, "Presidentialism and Majoritarian Democracy: Theoretical Observations," in Linz and Valenzuela, The Failure of Presidential Democracy, 91-105; Juan J. Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?" ibid., 3-87; Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering (New York: New York University Press, 1994); Sartori, "Neither Presidentialism Nor Parliamentarianism," 106-18; Scott Mainwaring, "Presidentialism in Latin America," Latin American Research Review 25, no. 1 (1990): 157-79; Scott Mainwaring, "Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy," Comparative Political Studies 26, no. 2 (1993): 198-228; G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982); Matthew S. Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, "Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarianism versus Presidentialism," World Politics 46, no. 1 (1993): 1-22.
114. Lijphart, Parliamentary versus Presidential Government; Arend Lijphart, "Democratization and Constitutional Choices in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland," Journal of Theoretical Politics 4, no. 2 (1992): 207-23; Arend Lijphart, "Constitutional Choices for New Democracies," in The Global Resurgence of Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 146-58; Arend Lijphart, "Presidentialism and Majoritarian Democracy: Theoretical Observations," in Linz and Valenzuela, The Failure of Presidential Democracy, 91-105; Juan J. Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?" ibid., 3-87; Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering (New York: New York University Press, 1994); Sartori, "Neither Presidentialism Nor Parliamentarianism," 106-18; Scott Mainwaring, "Presidentialism in Latin America," Latin American Research Review 25, no. 1 (1990): 157-79; Scott Mainwaring, "Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy," Comparative Political Studies 26, no. 2 (1993): 198-228; G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982); Matthew S. Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, "Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarianism versus Presidentialism," World Politics 46, no. 1 (1993): 1-22.
115. Lijphart, Parliamentary versus Presidential Government; Arend Lijphart, "Democratization and Constitutional Choices in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland," Journal of Theoretical Politics 4, no. 2 (1992): 207-23; Arend Lijphart, "Constitutional Choices for New Democracies," in The Global Resurgence of Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 146-58; Arend Lijphart, "Presidentialism and Majoritarian Democracy: Theoretical Observations," in Linz and Valenzuela, The Failure of Presidential Democracy, 91-105; Juan J. Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?" ibid., 3-87; Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering (New York: New York University Press, 1994); Sartori, "Neither Presidentialism Nor Parliamentarianism," 106-18; Scott Mainwaring, "Presidentialism in Latin America," Latin American Research Review 25, no. 1 (1990): 157-79; Scott Mainwaring, "Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy," Comparative Political Studies 26, no. 2 (1993): 198-228; G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982); Matthew S. Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, "Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarianism versus Presidentialism," World Politics 46, no. 1 (1993): 1-22.
116. Lijphart, Parliamentary versus Presidential Government; Arend Lijphart, "Democratization and Constitutional Choices in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland," Journal of Theoretical Politics 4, no. 2 (1992): 207-23; Arend Lijphart, "Constitutional Choices for New Democracies," in The Global Resurgence of Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 146-58; Arend Lijphart, "Presidentialism and Majoritarian Democracy: Theoretical Observations," in Linz and Valenzuela, The Failure of Presidential Democracy, 91-105; Juan J. Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?" ibid., 3-87; Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering (New York: New York University Press, 1994); Sartori, "Neither Presidentialism Nor Parliamentarianism," 106-18; Scott Mainwaring, "Presidentialism in Latin America," Latin American Research Review 25, no. 1 (1990): 157-79; Scott Mainwaring, "Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy," Comparative Political Studies 26, no. 2 (1993): 198-228; G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982); Matthew S. Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, "Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarianism versus Presidentialism," World Politics 46, no. 1 (1993): 1-22.
117. Lijphart, Parliamentary versus Presidential Government; Arend Lijphart, "Democratization and Constitutional Choices in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland," Journal of Theoretical Politics 4, no. 2 (1992): 207-23; Arend Lijphart, "Constitutional Choices for New Democracies," in The Global Resurgence of Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 146-58; Arend Lijphart, "Presidentialism and Majoritarian Democracy: Theoretical Observations," in Linz and Valenzuela, The Failure of Presidential Democracy, 91-105; Juan J. Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?" ibid., 3-87; Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering (New York: New York University Press, 1994); Sartori, "Neither Presidentialism Nor Parliamentarianism," 106-18; Scott Mainwaring, "Presidentialism in Latin America," Latin American Research Review 25, no. 1 (1990): 157-79; Scott Mainwaring, "Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy," Comparative Political Studies 26, no. 2 (1993): 198-228; G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982); Matthew S. Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, "Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarianism versus Presidentialism," World Politics 46, no. 1 (1993): 1-22.
118. Fred W. Riggs, "The Survival of Presidentialism in America: Para-Constitutional Practices," International Political Science Review 9, no. 4 (1988): 247-78.
119. See Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Society (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968), 1-23, 93-139. Huntington says that appropriate power centralization is conducive to stability of a government in a transitional period. However, when discussing democratic consolidation, he also mentions that in many countries, immobilism caused by the parliament learning to check the executive powers leads to the crumbling of democracy and the return to inefficient, undemocratic military or strongman dictatorship. This may also be the reason why Mainwaring believes that presidentialism and multipartism is a dangerous combination. He argues that a strong president confronting a parliament under multiparty control (also a divided government situation) is an insupportable environment of institutional operation for a country just beginning to learn checks and balances through the separation of powers. He believes that under such a scenario immobilization of the government will be inevitable. See Mainwaring, "Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy."
120. See Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Society (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968), 1-23, 93-139. Huntington says that appropriate power centralization is conducive to stability of a government in a transitional period. However, when discussing democratic consolidation, he also mentions that in many countries, immobilism caused by the parliament learning to check the executive powers leads to the crumbling of democracy and the return to inefficient, undemocratic military or strongman dictatorship. This may also be the reason why Mainwaring believes that presidentialism and multipartism is a dangerous combination. He argues that a strong president confronting a parliament under multiparty control (also a divided government situation) is an insupportable environment of institutional operation for a country just beginning to learn checks and balances through the separation of powers. He believes that under such a scenario immobilization of the government will be inevitable. See Mainwaring, "Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy."
121. On the question of too few case studies in comparative political studies as well as general arguments about case study methodology, see Harry Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science," in Handbook of Political Science, ed. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, vol. 7 (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975).
122. Taipei and Kaohsiung cities are municipalities under the jurisdiction of the Executive Yuan.
123. Rein Taagepera and Matthew Soberg Shugart, Seats and Votes (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989), 78-79.
124. Using a conclusion deduced from aggregate data to infer individual behavior can easily cause the so-called "ecological fallacy." See Gary King, A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem: Reconstructing Individual Behavior from Aggregate Data (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998).