Two approaches to the problem of sharing delay costs in joint projects

Annals of Operations Research

Volumn 109, Issue 1-4, 2002, Pages 359-374

  Brânzei, Rodica ^a   Ferrari, Giulio ^b   Fragnelli, Vito ^c   Tijs, Stef ^d  

^a ALEXANDRU IOAN CUZA UNIVERSITY OF IASI   (Romania)

^b UNIVERSITY OF GENOA   (Italy)

^c UNIVERSITY OF EASTERN PIEDMONT   (Italy)

^d TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Activity graph; Bankruptcy; Delay cost; Serial cost sharing; Taxation

Indexed keywords

EID: 0141682348     PISSN: 02545330     EISSN: 15729338     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1016372707256     Document Type: Conference Paper

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