Computing solutions to moral-hazard programs using the Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition algorithm

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control

Volumn 28, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 777-800

  Prescott, Edward Simpson ^a  

^a FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND   (United States)

Author keywords

Decomposition; Linear programming; Moral hazard

Indexed keywords

EID: 0141576804     PISSN: 01651889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-1889(03)00053-8     Document Type: Article

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