Bureaucratic behavior in the local public sector: A revealed preference approach

Public Choice

Volumn 113, Issue 1-2, 2002, Pages 191-209

  Chang, Chinkun ^a   Turnbull, Geoffrey K ^b  

^a Chinatrust Commercial Bank ^*  (China)

^b GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0141564570     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1020385329491     Document Type: Article

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