Comparing Third-Wave Democracies: East Central Europe and the ROC

Issues and Studies

Volumn 37, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 1-37

  Wu, Y U Shan ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Czech Republic; Hungary; Poland; Republic of China (ROC); Semi presidential system; Social cleavage

Indexed keywords

EID: 0043196972     PISSN: 10132511     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (90)

1. See, for example, Daniel Chirot, ed., The Crisis of Leninism and the Decline of the Left (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1991).
2. Such as Andrew G. Walder, ed., The Waning of the Communist State: Economic Origins of Political Decline in China and Hungary (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). In this book, the chapters on the Chinese reform and those on the Hungarian reform are merely juxtaposed. Even though the editor attempts to come up with a general framework to knit all the chapters together, the book is basically two collections of articles dealing with the Chinese and Hungarian reforms respectively.
3. For an exception, see Jeffrey Kopstein and Mark Lichbach, eds., Comparative Politics: Interests, Identities, and Institutions in a Changing Global Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
4. This is a problem that has existed for a long time. Except for comparative works that depend exclusively on quantitative data, one rarely finds works that deal with cross-regional comparisons. For one exception, see Thomas P. Bernstein, "Leadership and Mass Mobilization in the Soviet and Chinese Collectivization Campaigns of 1929-30 and 1955-56: A Comparison," The China Quarterly, no. 31 (July-September 1967): 1-47.
5. Even though writers-cum-editors are interested in developing a genuinely comparative framework, publishers are hesitant to market cross-regional works. See the comparative framework developed by Edwin A. Winckler in his edited book, Transition from Communism in China: Institutional and Comparative Analyses (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1999). Note that the case studies in the book are completely restricted to China.
6. Here we are not talking about research on international relations, such as studies on Sino-Russian relations in the post-Cold War era. For example, see Sherman W. Garnett, ed., Rapprochement or Rivalry: Russia-China Relations in a Changing Asia (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000).
7. Such as Payam Akhavan and Robert Howse, eds., Yugoslavia: The Former and Future (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995).
8. For example, see Ivo Banac, ed., Eastern Europe in Revolution (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992).
9. Such as Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).
10. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); and Larry Diamond et al., eds., Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Themes and Perspectives (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997).
11. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); and Larry Diamond et al., eds., Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Themes and Perspectives (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997).
12. One major effort in this direction was the conference held by the ROC's National Science Council and the Czech Academy of Sciences on transitional societies in comparison in Prague, on May 26-30, 1999. The resulting publication was Conference Prague 1999: Transitional Societies in Comparison: East Europe vs. Taiwan, ed. Bonn Office of the National Science Council (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2000). However, all the chapters in the book are concentrated on a single country, be it Taiwan, Poland, the Czech Republic, or other ECE countries. One finds no comparative framework, nor empirical research based on such framework in the volume. This is a reflection of the general situation as mentioned earlier in this paper.
13. In November 1991, the European Commission met with the governments of Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia at Visegrad in Hungary and initiated a series of agreements that provide for free trade, economic, and technical cooperation, financial assistance, and the creation of political dialogue. The agreements incorporate principles of democracy and liberalization and conditionality for the transition to the second stage of accession by the then three countries (four, later on, given the breakup of Czechoslovakia in January 1993) to the European Union. In this paper, Visegrad countries refer to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary.
14. Whether economic and political transitions are complementary or incompatible is subject to academic debate. See Leslie Elliott Armijo, Thomas J. Biersteker, and Abraham F. Lowenthal, "The Problems of Simultaneous Transitions," in Economic Reform and Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 227.
15. Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, chap. 2.
16. See Robert A. Dahl and Edward R. Tufte, Size and Democracy (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1973).
17. Thus, for example, the anti-Prague sentiment in the regions of the Czech Republic is quite like the anti-Taipei feelings in central, and particularly southern, Taiwan. Both are real but containable. See Andrew Stroehlein, "The Second Possibility," Central Europe Review 0, no. 20 (February 8, 1999), at 〈http://www.ce-review.org/-authorarchives/stroehlein_ archive/stroehlein20old.html〉.
18. It is the belief of this author that Taiwan's democracy should be compared not with the advanced countries in the West that have had long experience with democratic institutions and practices, but with the nascent democracies in Eastern Europe (or Southern Europe and Latin America). Proper comparisons can shed light on our own problems and suggest possible solutions. Comparisons with the West would be less fruitful.
19. Obviously there are other comparative frameworks, such as the legalistic one that emphasizes the formal institutions or the functional one that directs one's attention to the structures and functions of a political system. As we are primarily interested in political stability in a transitional society, however, we will concentrate on the four variables as specified for they have direct bearing on our main concern.
20. For an authoritative treatment of the changing pattern of social cleavages, see Ronald Inglehart, "The Changing Structure of Political Cleavages in Western Society," in Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies: Realignment or Dealignment? ed. Russell J. Dalton, Scott C. Flanagan, and Paul Allen Beck (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 25-69.
21. The Polish Peasant Party was founded in May 1990 as the result of a merger agreement between the satellite United Peasant Party and several émigré parties that ay claim to old prewar traditions. See Gordon Wightman, "Parties and Politics," in Development in Central and European Politics 2, ed. Stephen White, Judy Batt, and Paul Lewis (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1998), 150.
22. Among the three, the Polish SdRP's founding congress was the continuation of the final congress of the Polish United Workers Party (PZPR), the ruling communist party in the past The MSzMP (Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party) split into MSzMP (the conservatives) and MSzP (the reformers) after the October 1989 conference; thus MSzP's relation with the former communist party is not as strong as the SdRP's relation with the Polish Communist Party. The Czech KSČM is unique in being the least reformed communist party in ECE, and thus has the strongest linkage with the past. See "Bulletin: Electoral Statistics and Public Opinion Research Data," East European Politics and Societies 7 no. 3 (Fall 1993): 562, 568, 574; András Bozóki, "Post-Communist Transition: Political Tendencies in Hungary," ibid. 4, no. 2 (Spring 1990): 217; and Michal Klima, "The Formation of the Czech Party System and Its Role in the Institutionalization of the New Regime" (Paper delivered at the 17th World Congress of the International Political Science Association, August 17-21, 1997, Seoul, Korea).
23. Among the three, the Polish SdRP's founding congress was the continuation of the final congress of the Polish United Workers Party (PZPR), the ruling communist party in the past The MSzMP (Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party) split into MSzMP (the conservatives) and MSzP (the reformers) after the October 1989 conference; thus MSzP's relation with the former communist party is not as strong as the SdRP's relation with the Polish Communist Party. The Czech KSČM is unique in being the least reformed communist party in ECE, and thus has the strongest linkage with the past. See "Bulletin: Electoral Statistics and Public Opinion Research Data," East European Politics and Societies 7 no. 3 (Fall 1993): 562, 568, 574; András Bozóki, "Post-Communist Transition: Political Tendencies in Hungary," ibid. 4, no. 2 (Spring 1990): 217; and Michal Klima, "The Formation of the Czech Party System and Its Role in the Institutionalization of the New Regime" (Paper delivered at the 17th World Congress of the International Political Science Association, August 17-21, 1997, Seoul, Korea).
24. Among the three, the Polish SdRP's founding congress was the continuation of the final congress of the Polish United Workers Party (PZPR), the ruling communist party in the past The MSzMP (Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party) split into MSzMP (the conservatives) and MSzP (the reformers) after the October 1989 conference; thus MSzP's relation with the former communist party is not as strong as the SdRP's relation with the Polish Communist Party. The Czech KSČM is unique in being the least reformed communist party in ECE, and thus has the strongest linkage with the past. See "Bulletin: Electoral Statistics and Public Opinion Research Data," East European Politics and Societies 7 no. 3 (Fall 1993): 562, 568, 574; András Bozóki, "Post-Communist Transition: Political Tendencies in Hungary," ibid. 4, no. 2 (Spring 1990): 217; and Michal Klima, "The Formation of the Czech Party System and Its Role in the Institutionalization of the New Regime" (Paper delivered at the 17th World Congress of the International Political Science Association, August 17-21, 1997, Seoul, Korea).
25. In this general framework, one still finds attempts by Right-wing political parties to emphasize sociocultural conservatism in major elections, such as the campaign run by the presidential candidate of the Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) Marian Krzaklewski in 2000 that focused on Catholicism and his opponent's communist past. See Andrew Cave, "Off Balance," Central Europe Review 2, no. 36 (October 23, 2000), at 〈http://www.cereview.org/00/36/cave36.html〉.
26. Ibid.
27. For a discussion of the Czechoslovak "Velvet Revolution," see Jan Škaloud, "The Case of Czechoslovakia's Managed Divorce," Chinese Political Science Review 24 (June 1995): 165-70.
28. For the interwar political history of the three countries, see Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe Between the Two World Wars (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1993).
29. Obviously, if one defines class purely in terms of its relation with the means of production, then with the elimination of the propertied class under state socialism, one can no longer speak of class differentiation in the traditional, Marxist sense. This is why Jon Elster and others argue that "class conflict was repressed under state socialism, both regarding distributional struggles and struggles for the control of the production process," and that there was "a highly amorphous socioeconomic pattern of interests and conflict and an atomized social structure." However, the disappearance of propertied class does not render a "classless society," as the workers, managers, peasants, intellectuals, and party apparatchiks were stratified in terms of income and prestige, and endowed with specific material interest. For the opinions of Elster and others, see Jon Elster, Claus Offe, and Ulrich K. Preuss, Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 248.
30. The overthrow of a series of communist governments in Poland (Edward Ochab in 1956, Włedysław Gomułka in 1970, and Edward Gierek in 1980) testifies to the power of the Polish workers even under communist rule. The Hungarian workers' unions also played a critical role in sabotaging the New Economic Mechanism reform of 1968-72. See Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), chap. 11; J. F. Brown, Eastern Europe and Communist Rule (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1988), chap. 5; and Yu-Shan Wu, Comparative Economic Transformation: Mainland China, Hungary, the Soviet Union, and Taiwan (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1994), chap. 3.
31. The overthrow of a series of communist governments in Poland (Edward Ochab in 1956, Włedysław Gomułka in 1970, and Edward Gierek in 1980) testifies to the power of the Polish workers even under communist rule. The Hungarian workers' unions also played a critical role in sabotaging the New Economic Mechanism reform of 1968-72. See Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), chap. 11; J. F. Brown, Eastern Europe and Communist Rule (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1988), chap. 5; and Yu-Shan Wu, Comparative Economic Transformation: Mainland China, Hungary, the Soviet Union, and Taiwan (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1994), chap. 3.
32. The overthrow of a series of communist governments in Poland (Edward Ochab in 1956, Włedysław Gomułka in 1970, and Edward Gierek in 1980) testifies to the power of the Polish workers even under communist rule. The Hungarian workers' unions also played a critical role in sabotaging the New Economic Mechanism reform of 1968-72. See Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), chap. 11; J. F. Brown, Eastern Europe and Communist Rule (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1988), chap. 5; and Yu-Shan Wu, Comparative Economic Transformation: Mainland China, Hungary, the Soviet Union, and Taiwan (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1994), chap. 3.
33. In the 1991 census of Czecholovakia, 13.2 percent of the total population chose Moravian nationality. In Moravian districts the share of Moravians ranged from 20 to 65 percent. However, the temporary rise of Moravian regionalism is more of an economic nature than an ethnic nature. See Michal Illner, "The Protracted Reform of Territorial Government in the Czech Republic," in Conference Prague 1999, 131.
34. Elster, Offe, and Preuss, Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies, 254.
35. One also finds many Hok-los in the PFP, and even the NP camp.
36. After Chen's inauguration and the installment of Premier Tang Fei's government in May 2000, the KMT-controlled Legislative Yuan collided with the DPP over a government bill regulating working hours and made havoc of a previous agreement between business leaders and unions. Both the KMT and the DPP reversed their previously-held positions: the KMT demanded fewer working hours for the workers, while the DPP insisted that any cut of working hours should not impose an unbearable burden on business. See Yu-Shan Wu, "Taiwan in 2000: Managing the Aftershocks from Power Transfer," Asian Survey 41, no. 1 (January/February 2001): 46.
37. See Graham Smith et al., Nation-building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands: The Politics of National Identities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
38. See Yu-Shan Wu, "Marketization of Politics: The Taiwan Experience," Asian Survey 29, no. 4 (April 1989): 382-400.
39. This argument is expanded into the concept of "differential reconcilability" applied to socioeconomic, politico-ideological, and ethno-cultural cleavages with decreasing reconcilability. See Elster, Offe, and Preuss, Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies, 249, 251.
40. There are different ways to define the nature of party systems. Thus Giovanni Sartori stresses the importance of party size, and their "coalition potential" and "blackmail potential"; Jean Blondel provides a typology of party systems based on the number of dominant parties as defined by their seat shares; Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera calculate the "effective number of parties"; and Douglas W. Rae and Michael Taylor offer the "index of fragmentation" to define the party systems. See Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 122-23; Jean Blondel, "Party Systems and Patterns of Government in Western Democracies," Canadian Journal of Political Science 1, no. 2 (June 1968): 180-203 ; Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera, "Effective Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe," Comparative Political Studies 12, no. 1 (April 1979): 3-27; Douglas W. Rae and Michael Taylor, The Analysis of Political Cleavages (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1970), 22-44 ; and Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984), 117-22.
41. There are different ways to define the nature of party systems. Thus Giovanni Sartori stresses the importance of party size, and their "coalition potential" and "blackmail potential"; Jean Blondel provides a typology of party systems based on the number of dominant parties as defined by their seat shares; Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera calculate the "effective number of parties"; and Douglas W. Rae and Michael Taylor offer the "index of fragmentation" to define the party systems. See Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 122-23; Jean Blondel, "Party Systems and Patterns of Government in Western Democracies," Canadian Journal of Political Science 1, no. 2 (June 1968): 180-203 ; Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera, "Effective Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe," Comparative Political Studies 12, no. 1 (April 1979): 3-27; Douglas W. Rae and Michael Taylor, The Analysis of Political Cleavages (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1970), 22-44 ; and Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984), 117-22.
42. There are different ways to define the nature of party systems. Thus Giovanni Sartori stresses the importance of party size, and their "coalition potential" and "blackmail potential"; Jean Blondel provides a typology of party systems based on the number of dominant parties as defined by their seat shares; Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera calculate the "effective number of parties"; and Douglas W. Rae and Michael Taylor offer the "index of fragmentation" to define the party systems. See Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 122-23; Jean Blondel, "Party Systems and Patterns of Government in Western Democracies," Canadian Journal of Political Science 1, no. 2 (June 1968): 180-203 ; Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera, "Effective Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe," Comparative Political Studies 12, no. 1 (April 1979): 3-27; Douglas W. Rae and Michael Taylor, The Analysis of Political Cleavages (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1970), 22-44 ; and Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984), 117-22.
43. There are different ways to define the nature of party systems. Thus Giovanni Sartori stresses the importance of party size, and their "coalition potential" and "blackmail potential"; Jean Blondel provides a typology of party systems based on the number of dominant parties as defined by their seat shares; Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera calculate the "effective number of parties"; and Douglas W. Rae and Michael Taylor offer the "index of fragmentation" to define the party systems. See Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 122-23; Jean Blondel, "Party Systems and Patterns of Government in Western Democracies," Canadian Journal of Political Science 1, no. 2 (June 1968): 180-203 ; Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera, "Effective Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe," Comparative Political Studies 12, no. 1 (April 1979): 3-27; Douglas W. Rae and Michael Taylor, The Analysis of Political Cleavages (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1970), 22-44 ; and Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984), 117-22.
44. There are different ways to define the nature of party systems. Thus Giovanni Sartori stresses the importance of party size, and their "coalition potential" and "blackmail potential"; Jean Blondel provides a typology of party systems based on the number of dominant parties as defined by their seat shares; Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera calculate the "effective number of parties"; and Douglas W. Rae and Michael Taylor offer the "index of fragmentation" to define the party systems. See Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 122-23; Jean Blondel, "Party Systems and Patterns of Government in Western Democracies," Canadian Journal of Political Science 1, no. 2 (June 1968): 180-203 ; Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera, "Effective Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe," Comparative Political Studies 12, no. 1 (April 1979): 3-27; Douglas W. Rae and Michael Taylor, The Analysis of Political Cleavages (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1970), 22-44 ; and Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984), 117-22.
45. Obviously proportional representation systems differ among themselves, and greater proportionality begets a more fractured party system. For the Polish electoral reforms and their impact on the structure of the party system, see Krzysztof Jasiewicz, "The Pit and the Pendulum: Electoral Designs and Political Stability in Post-Communist Poland" (Paper delivered at the 17th World Congress of the International Political Science Association, August 17-21, 1997, Seoul, Korea).
46. Even though there was a period when the New Party seemed successful in presenting itself as the third, and the critical force, the vote and seat shares that the NP managed to garner in national elections were not enough to warrant a redefining of Taiwan's party system that remained biparty. The rise of James Soong's PFP presents a greater challenge to the biparty structure. How effective that challenge will be will depend on the performance of the PFP in the December 2001 parliamentary elections. Prior to that, it is safe to characterize Taiwan's party system as bipolar.
47. Chou Hui-chun, "A Study of Division or Unity in the Opposition during Democratization: The Cases of the Polish Solidarity and Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party (MA. thesis, Graduate Institute of Political Science, National Taiwan University, 1996, in Chinese).
48. Timothy Garton Ash witnessed the creation of the Civic Forum in the Magic Lantern Theatre in November 1989 and recorded the Velvet Revolution from within the Forum in The Magic Lantern: The Revolution of 89 Witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin, and Prague (New York: Random House, 1990), 78-130.
49. Wightman, "Parties and Politics," 152.
50. For the rise of Solidarity, see Raman Laba, The Roots of Solidarity (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991); and Jerome Karabel, "Polish Intellectuals and the Origins of Solidarity: The Making of an Oppositional Alliance," Communist and Post-Communist Studies 26, no. 1 (March 1993): 25-46.
51. For the rise of Solidarity, see Raman Laba, The Roots of Solidarity (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991); and Jerome Karabel, "Polish Intellectuals and the Origins of Solidarity: The Making of an Oppositional Alliance," Communist and Post-Communist Studies 26, no. 1 (March 1993): 25-46.
52. The fate of the Right has much to do with the cohesiveness of the post-Solidarity parties. In 1993, they disintegrated into competing political blocs and the SLD decisively won the parliamentary elections. The 1997 elections demonstrated the opposite phenomenon when a united AWS defeated the SLD. Prior to the 2001 elections, the Right again splintered into competing blocs, as represented by the AWS-P (coalition of Solidarity Electoral Action and former prime minister Jan Olszewski's Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland, ROP), the Freedom Union (UW), the Civic Platform (PO, founded by Andrzej Olechowski, the presidential election runner-up; Sejm Speaker Maciej Plazynski; and Senate Deputy Speaker Donald Tusk), the Conservative People's Party (SKL), the Right-Wing Alliance, and many others. This pre-election division of the Right doomed their hope of sustaining the majority position in the Sejm. See Wojtek Kosc. "A Surprising Alliance," Central Europe Review 3, no. 4 (January 29, 2001), at 〈http://www.ce-review.org/01/4/kosc4.html〉; and The Polish Voice, no. 9, at 〈http://www.thepolishvoice.pl〉.
53. The fate of the Right has much to do with the cohesiveness of the post-Solidarity parties. In 1993, they disintegrated into competing political blocs and the SLD decisively won the parliamentary elections. The 1997 elections demonstrated the opposite phenomenon when a united AWS defeated the SLD. Prior to the 2001 elections, the Right again splintered into competing blocs, as represented by the AWS-P (coalition of Solidarity Electoral Action and former prime minister Jan Olszewski's Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland, ROP), the Freedom Union (UW), the Civic Platform (PO, founded by Andrzej Olechowski, the presidential election runner-up; Sejm Speaker Maciej Plazynski; and Senate Deputy Speaker Donald Tusk), the Conservative People's Party (SKL), the Right-Wing Alliance, and many others. This pre-election division of the Right doomed their hope of sustaining the majority position in the Sejm. See Wojtek Kosc. "A Surprising Alliance," Central Europe Review 3, no. 4 (January 29, 2001), at 〈http://www.ce-review.org/01/4/kosc4.html〉; and The Polish Voice, no. 9, at 〈http://www.thepolishvoice.pl〉.
54. The TSU is spiritually led by the former President-cum-KMT Chairman Lee Tcng-hm, thus damaging the prospects of winning for some KMT legislators. However, since Lee has taken a more pro-independence position with his reentry into national politics, the brunt of the TSU's shock is felt by the DPP candidates.
55. See Thomas A. Baylis, "Presidents versus Prime Ministers: Shaping Executive Authority in Eastern Europe," World Politics 48, no. 3 (April 1996): 297-323; and Beverly Crawford and Arend Lijphart, "Explaining Political and Economic Change in Post-Communist Eastern Europe: Old Legacies, New Institutions, Hegemonic Norms, and International Pressures," Comparative Political Studies 28, no. 2 (July 1995): 171-99.
56. See Thomas A. Baylis, "Presidents versus Prime Ministers: Shaping Executive Authority in Eastern Europe," World Politics 48, no. 3 (April 1996): 297-323; and Beverly Crawford and Arend Lijphart, "Explaining Political and Economic Change in Post-Communist Eastern Europe: Old Legacies, New Institutions, Hegemonic Norms, and International Pressures," Comparative Political Studies 28, no. 2 (July 1995): 171-99.
57. This model is pioneered by Andrew Janos and elaborated by Jeffrey Kopstein and David Reilly, and is also proposed by Yu-Shan Wu. See Jeffrey S. Kopstein and David A. Reilly, "Geographic Diffusion and the Transformation of the Postcommunist World," World Politics 53 no. 1 (October 2000): 1-37; and Yu-Shan Wu, Eluosi zhuanzing 1992-1999: Yige zhengzhi jingjixue de fenxi (Russia's transition 1992-99: A politico-economic approach) (Taipei: Wunan, 2000), 53-55.
58. This model is pioneered by Andrew Janos and elaborated by Jeffrey Kopstein and David Reilly, and is also proposed by Yu-Shan Wu. See Jeffrey S. Kopstein and David A. Reilly, "Geographic Diffusion and the Transformation of the Postcommunist World," World Politics 53 no. 1 (October 2000): 1-37; and Yu-Shan Wu, Eluosi zhuanzing 1992-1999: Yige zhengzhi jingjixue de fenxi (Russia's transition 1992-99: A politico-economic approach) (Taipei: Wunan, 2000), 53-55.
59. For advocates of this model, see Gerald M. Easter, "Preference for Presidentialism: Post-Communist Regime Change in Russia and the NIS," World Politics 49, no. 2 (January 1997): 187-90; and Barbara Geddes, "Institutional Choice in Post-Communist Eastern Europe" (Paper presented at the 1993 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 1993).
60. For advocates of this model, see Gerald M. Easter, "Preference for Presidentialism: Post- Communist Regime Change in Russia and the NIS," World Politics 49, no. 2 (January 1997): 187-90; and Barbara Geddes, "Institutional Choice in Post-Communist Eastern Europe" (Paper presented at the 1993 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 1993).
61. Another opposition party, the Democratic Forum (MDF), was willing to collaborate with Pozsgay's plan, for the MDF was linked to the reform wing in the MSzMP from the start.
62. Sharon L. Wolchik, "The Czech Republic: Havel and the Evolution of the Presidency since 1989," in Postcommunist Presidents, ed. Ray Taras (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 178.
63. Ibid., 181.
64. Obviously the method of electing the president is not the only criterion to determine whether the country has a parliamentary or a semi-presidential system. However, popularly elected president is a necessary condition of semi-presidentialism.
65. For an account of Taiwan's constitutional reform process, see Yu-Shan Wu, "Taiwan's Constitutional Framework and Cross-Straits Relations" (Paper presented at the 1999 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia, September 2-5, 1999).
66. Popularly elected president, substantial presidential powers, and a cabinet responsible to parliament are the three main features of Maurice Duverger's semi-presidentialism. See Maurice Duverger, "A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government," European Journal of Political Research 8, no. 2 (June 1980): 165-97.
67. Sometimes, semi-presidentialism is confused with dual leadership, bi-cephalic executive, etc., which stresses the existence of two heads in the executive branch of the government. True, duarchy is possible under the semi-presidential system. However, semi-presidential systems may take many different forms and a division of authority between the president and the premier is but one mode of president-parliament interaction. The French Fifth Republic, for example, has never had balanced division of power between the president and the premier, or two heads, in the executive branch of the government. The real power either resides with the president (non-cohabitation period) or with the premier (during cohabitation). At the same time, duarchy is possible in non-semi-presidential or nondemocratic regimes. See Jean Blondel, "Dual Leadership in the Contemporary World," in Parliamentary versus Presidential Government, ed. Arend Lijphart (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 162-72; Huang Chun-sheng, "The Relations between the Executive and Legislative Authorities: Rational Parliamentarianism," in Faguo diwu gonghe de xianzheng yunzuo (The constitutional operation of the French Fifth Republic), ed. Yao Chih-kang et al. (Taipei: Yeqiang, 1994), 161.
68. Sometimes, semi-presidentialism is confused with dual leadership, bi-cephalic executive, etc., which stresses the existence of two heads in the executive branch of the government. True, duarchy is possible under the semi-presidential system. However, semi-presidential systems may take many different forms and a division of authority between the president and the premier is but one mode of president-parliament interaction. The French Fifth Republic, for example, has never had balanced division of power between the president and the premier, or two heads, in the executive branch of the government. The real power either resides with the president (non-cohabitation period) or with the premier (during cohabitation). At the same time, duarchy is possible in non-semi-presidential or nondemocratic regimes. See Jean Blondel, "Dual Leadership in the Contemporary World," in Parliamentary versus Presidential Government, ed. Arend Lijphart (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 162-72; Huang Chun-sheng, "The Relations between the Executive and Legislative Authorities: Rational Parliamentarianism," in Faguo diwu gonghe de xianzheng yunzuo (The constitutional operation of the French Fifth Republic), ed. Yao Chih-kang et al. (Taipei: Yeqiang, 1994), 161.
69. 54 AWS was created in June 1996 in response to Solidarity's catastrophic performance in the 1993 elections. Marian Krzaklewski, Solidarity president since 1991, managed to unite three-dozen political groupings under the union's banner and leadership.
70. In June 2000 French President Jacques Chirac proposed to cut the presidential term from seven to five years in order to be in sync with the term of the National Assembly so as to reduce the possibility of cohabitation. That proposal was ratified in the September 2000 referendum.
71. See, for example, the constitutional strife between Wałȩsa and the SLD government over the 1995 budget and Wałȩsa's threat to dissolve the Sejm for its failure to pass the budget bill into law within three months of the bill's submission to the Sejm (which was caused by none other than Wałȩsa himself). See EIU Country Report: Poland, First Quarter 1995, 10.
72. For a discussion of political conflict under Taiwan's semi-presidential system, see Yu-Shan Wu, "The ROC's Semi-Presidentialism at Work: Unstable Compromise, Not Cohabitation " Issues & Studies 36, no. 5 (September/October 2000): 1-40.
73. This is not to say, of course, that President Václav Havel did not conflict with the Czech administration, whoever is the prime minister, or President Arpad Göncz did not exercise his influence in the Hungarian government affairs. However, Havel and Göncz are no match for Wałȩsa in terms of exercising presidential powers and ruling the country. See Taras, Postcommunist President, chaps. 6 and 7.
74. For an overall discussion of the economic transitions of formerly socialist socialist countries, see Stanley Fischer and Alan Gelb, "Issues in the Reform of Socialist Economies, in Reforming Central and Eastern European Economics: Initial Results and Challenges, ed. Vittorio Corbo, Fabrizio Coricelli, and Jan Bossak (Washington, D.C: The World Bank, 1991), 67-82; Ben Slay, "Rapid versus Gradual Economic Transition "RFE/RL Research, Report 3, no. 31 (1994): 31-42; and Stanley Fischer, Ratna Sahay, and Carlos A. Vegh, "Stabilization and Growth in Transition Economies: The Early Experience Journal of Economy Perspectives 10, no. 2 (Spring 1996): 45-66. For a discussion of the economic transitions in East and Central Europe, see Leszek Balcerowicz, Socialism, Capitalism, Transformation (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995).
75. For an overall discussion of the economic transitions of formerly socialist socialist countries, see Stanley Fischer and Alan Gelb, "Issues in the Reform of Socialist Economies, in Reforming Central and Eastern European Economics: Initial Results and Challenges, ed. Vittorio Corbo, Fabrizio Coricelli, and Jan Bossak (Washington, D.C: The World Bank, 1991), 67-82; Ben Slay, "Rapid versus Gradual Economic Transition "RFE/RL Research, Report 3, no. 31 (1994): 31-42; and Stanley Fischer, Ratna Sahay, and Carlos A. Vegh, "Stabilization and Growth in Transition Economies: The Early Experience Journal of Economy Perspectives 10, no. 2 (Spring 1996): 45-66. For a discussion of the economic transitions in East and Central Europe, see Leszek Balcerowicz, Socialism, Capitalism, Transformation (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995).
76. For an overall discussion of the economic transitions of formerly socialist socialist countries, see Stanley Fischer and Alan Gelb, "Issues in the Reform of Socialist Economies, in Reforming Central and Eastern European Economics: Initial Results and Challenges, ed. Vittorio Corbo, Fabrizio Coricelli, and Jan Bossak (Washington, D.C: The World Bank, 1991), 67-82; Ben Slay, "Rapid versus Gradual Economic Transition "RFE/RL Research, Report 3, no. 31 (1994): 31-42; and Stanley Fischer, Ratna Sahay, and Carlos A. Vegh, "Stabilization and Growth in Transition Economies: The Early Experience Journal of Economy Perspectives 10, no. 2 (Spring 1996): 45-66. For a discussion of the economic transitions in East and Central Europe, see Leszek Balcerowicz, Socialism, Capitalism, Transformation (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995).
77. For an overall discussion of the economic transitions of formerly socialist socialist countries, see Stanley Fischer and Alan Gelb, "Issues in the Reform of Socialist Economies, in Reforming Central and Eastern European Economics: Initial Results and Challenges, ed. Vittorio Corbo, Fabrizio Coricelli, and Jan Bossak (Washington, D.C: The World Bank, 1991), 67-82; Ben Slay, "Rapid versus Gradual Economic Transition "RFE/RL Research, Report 3, no. 31 (1994): 31-42; and Stanley Fischer, Ratna Sahay, and Carlos A. Vegh, "Stabilization and Growth in Transition Economies: The Early Experience Journal of Economy Perspectives 10, no. 2 (Spring 1996): 45-66. For a discussion of the economic transitions in East and Central Europe, see Leszek Balcerowicz, Socialism, Capitalism, Transformation (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995).
78. Judy Batt, East Central Europe from Reform to Transformation (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1991), 73.
79. The Central Alliance's Jan Olszewski organized a coalition government in December 1991 after twenty-nine parties were elected into the Sejm through an extreme proportional rep-resentation system in the October 1991 elections. Olszewski's government was toppled in June 1992, and after a short interlude by the Peasant Party's Pawlak, the Democratic Union's Hanna Suchocka was appointed prime minister by Wałȩsa in July 1992. Thus from 1991 through 1993 when the second Sejm elections were held, Poland had a Right-wing government. 62 In the 1997 parliamentary elections, the AWS received 34 percent of the vote and 201 deputies, the SLD had 27 percent of the vote and 164 deputies, the Freedom Union (UW) 13 percent of the vote and 60 deputies, the PSL 7.3 percent of the vote and 27 deputies, and the ROP 5.5 percent of the vote and 6 deputies. Only those five parties entered the Sejm. With 51 senators, the AWS has the majority in the Senate, the SLD has 28 senators, UW 8, ROP 5, and PSL 3. Five senators are independent.
80. The lag was so huge that prior to the parliamentary elections, President Kwasniewski showed confidence that the SLD could win majority in the Sejm and form a single-party government. See "Polish Left-wing Electoral Coalition Continues to Lead in Polls," Po-land Today, March 28, 2001; and Wojtek Kość, "Reshufflings on the Right," Central Europe Review 3, no. 13 (April 2, 2001), at 〈http://www.ce-review.org/01/13/koscl3.html〉.
81. The lag was so huge that prior to the parliamentary elections, President Kwasniewski showed confidence that the SLD could win majority in the Sejm and form a single-party government. See "Polish Left-wing Electoral Coalition Continues to Lead in Polls," Po- land Today, March 28, 2001; and Wojtek Kość, "Reshufflings on the Right," Central Europe Review 3, no. 13 (April 2, 2001), at 〈http://www.ce-review.org/01/13/koscl3.html〉.
82. For the theory of economic voting, see Marcus A.G. Harper, "Economic Voting in Postcommunist Eastern Europe," Comparative Political Studies 33, no. 9 (November 2000): 1191-27.
83. Istvan Csurka, the leader of the MDF's radical wing, launched a populist movement (Magyar Ut) against Antall and sought support from the people embittered by the social costs of economic transformation. This effort was not successful. See Edith Oltay, "Hungary: Csurka Launches 'National Movement'," RFE/RL Research Report 2, no. 13 (March 26, 1993): 25-31.
84. For a discussion of the transformation of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (MSzMP) into the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSzP), see Bozóki, "Post-Communist Transition: Political Tendencies in Hungary," 217-20.
85. Václav Klaus was prime minister from 1992 to 1997. He saw himself as a Right-wing poli-tician, a follower of Margaret Thatcher. His policies were aimed at undoing communism and reinstalling capitalism in the Czech Republic. He was highly successful for the initial fours years in office and was welcome by most Czechs who abhorred communist rule and wished to rejoin Europe. See Andrew Stroehlein, "The Czech Republic 1992 to 1999," Central Europe Review 1, no. 12 (September 13, 1999), at 〈http://www.ce-review.org/99/ 12/stroehlein12.html〉.
86. Partly because of a successful smear campaign run by the ODS, the CSSD garnered insufficient votes in the June 1998 parliamentary elections and was more or less forced to seek an agreement with the ODS. See Jan Culik, "The Politics of Smear," Central Europe Review 2, no. 20 (May 22, 2000), at 〈http://www.ce-review.org/00/20/culik20.html〉.
87. Andrew Stroehlein, "A Grand Coalition of Politics and the Media," Central Europe Review 0, no. 37 (June 7, 1999), at 〈http://www.ce-review.org/authorarchives/stroehlein_archive/ stroehlein37old.html〉.
88. Because President Havel has held a steadfast position in refusing to talk with the Communist members in the parliament, and excluded them as much as he could from any political decision-making process, the Communists are the only Czech political party that are not implicated in the mismanagement of the economy. See Jan Culik, "Completing the Circle," Central Europe Review 1, no. 19(November 1, 1999), at 〈http://www.ce-review.org/99/19/ culik19.html〉.
89. Jan Culik, "Profound Disillusionment," Central Europe Review 1, no. 20 (November 8, 1999), at 〈http://www.ce-review.org/99/20/culik20.html〉.
90. Michael G. Roskin, The Rebirth of East Europe (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1991), 146.