The ROC's semi-presidentialism at work: Unstable compromise, not cohabitation

Issues and Studies

Volumn 36, Issue 5, 2000, Pages 1-40

  Wu, Yu Shan ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Chen Shui bian; Cohabitation; Constitutional reform; Semi presidentialism; Taiwan

Indexed keywords

EID: 0002183030     PISSN: 10132511     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (68)

1. This is what this paper late r describes as "president-parliament congruence," a very important factor contributing to stability in a semi-presidential system.
2. For a similar categorization, see Arend Lijphart, "Introduction," in Parliamentary versus Presidential Government, ed. Arend Lijphart (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 2; and Jon Elster, "Afterword: The Making of Postcommunist Presidencies," in Postcommunist President, ed. Ray Taras (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 225.
3. For a similar categorization, see Arend Lijphart, "Introduction," in Parliamentary versus Presidential Government, ed. Arend Lijphart (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 2; and Jon Elster, "Afterword: The Making of Postcommunist Presidencies," in Postcommunist President, ed. Ray Taras (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 225.
4. See, for example, Patrick H. O'Neil, "Revolution from Within: Institutional Analysis, Transitions from Authoritarianism, and the Case of Hungary," World Politics 48, no. 4 (July 1996): 579-603; and Gerald M. Easter, "Preference for Presidentialism: Post-Communist Regime Change in Russia and the NIS," ibid. 49, no. 2 (January 1997): 184-211.
5. See, for example, Patrick H. O'Neil, "Revolution from Within: Institutional Analysis, Transitions from Authoritarianism, and the Case of Hungary," World Politics 48, no. 4 (July 1996): 579-603; and Gerald M. Easter, "Preference for Presidentialism: Post-Communist Regime Change in Russia and the NIS," ibid. 49, no. 2 (January 1997): 184-211.
6. See, for example, Ernst Veser, "Semipresidentialism - Duverger's Concept: A New Political System Model" (Delivered at the Constitutional Choice Round Table, Taipei, May 31, 1997).
7. See, for example, Juan J. Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?" in The Failure of Presidential Democracy: Comparative Perspectives, ed. Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 3-87; Juan J. Linz, "The Perils of Presidentialism," in The Global Resurgence of Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 108-26; and Horst Bahro, "Virtues and Vices of Semi-Presidential Government" (Delivered at the Constitutional Choice Round Table, Taipei, May 31, 1997).
8. See, for example, Juan J. Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?" in The Failure of Presidential Democracy: Comparative Perspectives, ed. Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 3-87; Juan J. Linz, "The Perils of Presidentialism," in The Global Resurgence of Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 108-26; and Horst Bahro, "Virtues and Vices of Semi-Presidential Government" (Delivered at the Constitutional Choice Round Table, Taipei, May 31, 1997).
9. See, for example, Juan J. Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?" in The Failure of Presidential Democracy: Comparative Perspectives, ed. Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 3-87; Juan J. Linz, "The Perils of Presidentialism," in The Global Resurgence of Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 108-26; and Horst Bahro, "Virtues and Vices of Semi-Presidential Government" (Delivered at the Constitutional Choice Round Table, Taipei, May 31, 1997).
10. See Larry Diamond, "Three Paradoxes of Democracy," in Diamond and Plattner, The Global Resurgence of Democracy, 95-107.
11. "Semi-presidentialism" was coined by Maurice Duverger. Duverger eventually identified seven semi-presidential systems around the world: France, Weimar Germany, Austria, Iceland, Finland, Ireland, and Portugal. However, with the democratization of the former Soviet-bloc countries, semi-presidentialism rapidly expanded. See note 4 above.
12. For a typology of constitutional systems and a thorough discussion of the concept, historical practices, and inherent problems of semi-presdentialism see Yu-Shan Wu, "Semi-Presdentialism or Imperial-Presidentialism? A Comparison between Constitutional Reforms in the ROC and the Russian Federation" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, September 3-6, 1998).
13. A popularly-elected president, substantial presidential powers, and a cabinet responsible to parliament are the three main features of Maurice Duverger's semi-presidentialism. See Maurice Duverger, "A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government," European Journal of Political Research 8, no. 2 (June 1980): 165-97.
14. The following conceptualization is based on Li Feng-yu, "The Impact of the Types of Semi-Presidentialism Party System, and President-Parliament Relations on Political Stability: An Institutional Analysis of the Weimar Republic, the French Fifth Republic, and the Taiwan Experience" (Working paper, Department of Political Science, National Taiwan University, June 1999; in Chinese).
15. Here the constitutional practices are obviously linked with political culture and the particular historical constitutional history of the country concerned.
16. The concept of "crisis society" was developed by the DPP's former chairman Hsu Hsinliang. See Hsia Chen, Hsu Hsin-liang de zhengzhi shijie (Hsu Hsin-liang's political world) (Taipei: Commonwealth, 1998), 224-28. For an application of the "crisis society" concept to the analysis of semi-presidential systems, see Lin Jih-wen, "The Triangular Balance under Semi-Presidentialism" (Paper delivered at the Conference on Political Institutions: Theory and Practice, Academia Sinica, Taipei, June 25-26, 1998; in Chinese).
17. The concept of "crisis society" was developed by the DPP's former chairman Hsu Hsinliang. See Hsia Chen, Hsu Hsin-liang de zhengzhi shijie (Hsu Hsin-liang's political world) (Taipei: Commonwealth, 1998), 224-28. For an application of the "crisis society" concept to the analysis of semi-presidential systems, see Lin Jih-wen, "The Triangular Balance under Semi-Presidentialism" (Paper delivered at the Conference on Political Institutions: Theory and Practice, Academia Sinica, Taipei, June 25-26, 1998; in Chinese).
18. The scenario of different political party affiliations coupled with memberships in the same faction is logically impossible. However, it is not unthinkable that severe competition in the party may lead to greater conflict between the president and the prime minister than between the president and the leaders of a different political party.
19. Yu-Shan Wu, "A Study on the Relations among the President, the Cabinet, and the Parliament in the Russian Federation and Eastern Europe" (National Science Council Research Project, NSC 88-2414-H-002-018, 1999; in Chinese).
20. This author has developed a typology to describe the main political systems (autocracy, evolving democracy, parliamentananism, presidentialism, and semi-presidentialism), using a triangular perspective (president-parliament-premier). It is asserted that a semi-presidential system is inherently unstable because "who controls the government" is a perennial question to which the system does not offer any ready solution. See note 8 above.
21. The three cohabitations are François Mitterrand cohabitating with Jacques Chirac (1986-88), François Mitterrand with Edouard Balladur (1993-95), and Jacques Chirac with Lionel Jospin (1997-present).
22. For the concept of "premier-presidentialism" and "president-parliamentarianism," see Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
23. See Tsai Tsung-chen, "Some Thoughts on the Structural Defects of the Weimar Constitution and Their Impact" (Paper delivered at the Conference on Political Institutions: Theory and Practice, Academia Sinica, Taipei, June 25-26, 1998; in Chinese).
24. This is what this author has done in comparing political stability in the Russian Federation and other semi-presidential systems. See Yu-Shan Wu, Eluosi zhuanxing 1992-1999: Yige zhengzhi-jingjixue de fenxi (Russia's transition 1992-99: A politico-economic analysis) (Taipei: Wunan, 2000), chap. 3.
25. The necessity of this is pointed out by this author in Yu-Shan Wu, "Taiwan's Constitutional Framework and Cross-Straits Relations" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, September 2-5, 1999).
26. There are some ostensibly semi-presidential regimes that formally give their presidents substantial powers but never see those powers exercised by the presidents who behave quite like their counterparts in parliamentary systems. Duverger called them countries with a figurehead presidency. His examples are Austria, Ireland, and Iceland. In this paper, we consider those "semi-presidential" regimes actually failing to fulfill the requirement that the president in a semi-presidential system should have quite considerable powers. Hence this paper does not discuss those "semi-presidential" regimes.
27. This author has calculated the frequency of cabinet turnovers as an index of political stability in four semi-presidential countries: the French Fifth Republic (noncohabitation period), post-1997 Taiwan, post-communist Poland (cohabitation period), and the Russian Federation, and found their stability indexes corresponding to their ratings predicted in the table. See note 19 above.
28. See John Fuh-sheng Hsieh, "Types of Cabinet and Constitutional Operation," Wenti yu yanjiu (Issues & Studies) 34, no. 12 (December 1996): 1-10.
29. See Bert A. Rockman, "Separation? Fusion? Or Hybridization? The Menu of Constitutional Choice" (Paper delivered at the Workshop on Institutional Choice, Taipei, August 23, 1997).
30. See note 8 above. The only exception was during the short interlude of Yen Chia-kan's presidency (1975-78), when Premier Chiang Ching-kuo held real power.
31. However, if one uses the notion of "dual executives" instead of "semi-presidentialism," then the ROC's constitutional order under the Temporary Provisions is a perfect case of dual heads in the administration, very much like in former socialist countries where a General Secretary rules supreme and the Prime Minister heads the administration. See Jean Blondel, "Dual Leadership in the Contemporary World," in Lijphart, Parliamentary versus Presidential Government, 163.
32. See Kuo Cheng-liang, Minjindang zhuanxing zhi tong (The DPP's agony of transition) (Taipei: Commonwealth, 1998), 8.
33. The Republic of China 1998 Yearbook (Taipei: Government Information Office, 1998), 79.
34. In the National Assembly elected in March 1996, the KMT had 54.8 percent of seats, the DPP 29.6 percent, and the New Party 13.8 percent.
35. At the NDC, the DPP showed their willingness to accept the KMT's semi-presidentialism with expanded presidential powers, provided that the gubernatorial election and the provincial assembly election were to be suspended together with the National Assembly elections (the seats would be allocated among political parties based on their vote shares in other elections) and the elections for rural township, urban township, and township-level municipality offices. The DPP expected to gain political benefits from incapacitating Taiwan Province and the National Assembly, for these two are symbols of unified China, and from abolishing grass-roots elections which had always been dominated by the KMT. It was on these terms that the KMT and the DPP reached consensus at the NDC. The marginalized New Party opted to leave the NDC at the last minute.
36. After the NDC, a National Assembly session was convened in May 1997 to formalize the KMT-DPP consensus reached at the NDC into constitutional amendments. However, there was opposition to the consensus within both the KMT and the DPP. On the KMT side, all those with vested interest in the continuation of the five elections rallied around James Soong, the governor of Taiwan, and fought against the NDC initiatives. On the DPP side, those who were for establishing a presidential system and those who abhorred cooperating with the KMT raised strong opposition against the grand swap worked out by the DPP's Chairman Hsu Hsin-liang and his KMT counterpart. As it turned out, the surge of Soong's influence during the process caused the opposition opinion in the DPP to wane for fear that Soong might gain political benefits by wrecking the deal (i.e., by preserving the Taiwan Provincial Government that he was heading). Last-minute intervention by President Lee saved the day. Though not to the complete satisfaction of either side, a French-style semi-presidential system was created and embodied in the Additional Articles of the ROC Constitution.
37. The official term of this move is "jingsheng," or "streamlining the Taiwan provincial government and assembly," which is euphemism for abolishing Taiwan Province as an administrative and self-governing body, thus depriving James Soong, an obvious power contender in the upcoming 2000 presidential elections, of his institutional base.
38. Presumably, the president may set up policy guidelines on national security for the government to follow, either in the form of proposals of law to be passed by the parliament or in executive ordinances that are authorized by enabling laws. However, whether the president's guidelines can be properly translated into laws or executive ordinances is an open question. According to the Organic Law of the National Security Council (NSC) that was passed in 1993, the NSC is merely a consultative organ and the president is left without the power to directly issue orders to implement his policy on national security matters. At the time when the ROC Constitution was amended in 1997, the KMT did propose to expand the president's power by inserting into the Second Amendment the rule that the president's decisions concerning national security should be carried out by the Executive Yuan. This was opposed by the DPP and the final amendment did not obligate the government to implement the president's decisions on national security matters. Thus, clear is that any presidential decision on national security is not automatically binding on the government. See Policy Coordination Committee of the KMT, "Contrast Table of the Constitutional Amendment Proposals (on Dual-Executive System) by the KMT and the DPP" (1997).
39. This power has been transferred to the Legislative Yuan after the sixth constitutional reform in April 2000 Through that reform, the National Assembly has been reduced to a task force whose function is to decide presidential impeachment resolutions and constitutional reform bills initiated by the Legislative Yuan. The seats of the National Assembly are now divided among different political parties through popular elections. Any ad hoc Assembly would have one month to complete its assignment and dissolve automatically. Right before the presidential election, the Council of Grand Justices ruled the fifth constitutional reform in 1999 unconstitutional and made a National Assembly election inevitable. The KMT collaborated with the DPP in abolishing the National Assembly as a permanent representative body in order to deprive the People First Party (PFP) of a chance to take concrete shape and to translate Soong's personal popularity into a solid political base.
40. This point is particularly important as the existence of an independent presidential decree power would enable the president to bypass the government and implement his own policies through apparatus directly responsible to him.
41. See Lin Chia-lung "Semi-Presidentialism, Multiparty System, and Democratic Polity: An Institutional Analysis of Constitutional Conflicts in Taiwan" (Paper delivered at the Conference on Political Institutions: Theory and Practice, Academia Sinica, Taipei, June 25-66, 1998; in Chinese).
42. Some scholars argue that the ROC president can dissolve the Legislative Yuan without the Legislative Yuan first passing a no-confidence vote on the government. Ibid.
43. This is why Ya-li Lu calls the core of the new constitutional structure "imperial presidency." See Ya-Li Lu, "The Transformation of the Role of the President in Taiwan's Constitutional Evolution" (Paper delivered at the Workshop on Institutional Choice, Taipei, August 23, 1997).
44. Taiwan is a crisis society in that the country has for half a century been overshadowed by military threat from mainland China. People in Taiwan are naturally concerned with national security to a much greater extent than most of the neighboring countries. This being the case, people tend to rally around their leaders when facing mainland China and consider expansion of presidential power acceptable as long as it is in the nation's security interest. As such the crisis society mentality adds to the institutional power of the president in dealing with national security matters.
45. Lee's fears did not come true because the KMT scored a handsome victory in the December 1998 parliamentary elections which gave the KMT a comfortable ten-seat majority in the Legislative Yuan. 41 As mentioned earlier, the only cabinet reshuffle in 1997-99 occurred when the president considered Lien Chan not suitable for concurrently holding the positions of vice-president and premier, and placed Vincent Siew, another presidential loyalist, into the premiership. The action was not forced on the president or the premier by the opposition in the parliament.
46. A similar opinion is expressed by Lin Chia-lung, "The Challenge to and Response from a Divided Government," Guojia zhengce shuangzhoukan (National Policy Dynamic Analysis) 14 (May 19, 2000): 6-9.
47. Most prominent among the KMT defectors are Chin Huei-chu, Lee Ching-an, and Wang Tein-ging. New Party heavyweight Lee Ching-hua also switched to the PFP after the presidential election.
48. The December 1998 elections brought about a KMT-dominated parliament wherein the KMT captured 56 percent of a total of 225 seats, the DPP 31 percent, and the New Party 5 percent.
49. The criterion here is the composition of the Legislative Yuan. If one takes into consideration the administrative branch at the central and local levels, then the DPP is in a dominant position. Even there, however, one finds KMT strongholds.
50. Olivier Duhamel, "Some Thoughts on Cohabitation and the French Cohabitation," trans. Tsuo Ya-ling et al., in Faguo diwu gonghe de xianzheng yunzuo (The constitutional operation of the French Fifth Republic), by Yao Chih-kang et al. (Taipei: Yeqiang, 1994), 273.
51. Olivier Duhamel, "Some Thoughts on Cohabitation and the French Cohabitation," trans. Tsuo Ya-ling et al., in Faguo diwu gonghe de xianzheng yunzuo (The constitutional operation of the French Fifth Republic), by Yao Chih-kang et al. (Taipei: Yeqiang, 1994), 273.
52. See note 17 above.
53. See note 4 above.
54. David Arter, Politics and Policy-Making in Finland (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987).
55. Wu, Eluosi zhuanxing, chap. 2.
56. Finland and Weimar Germany are mentioned by Maurice Duverger as countries with "balanced presidency and government," meaning there is real dualism in the executive. The two cases are not differentiated by Duverger as two types of interaction between the president and the parliament. See note 9 above.
57. If we apply game theoretical terminology and let president be player one and parliament player two, then "cohabitation" would be CD, "division of labor" would be CC, "collision" would be DD, and "supremacy of president" would be DC.
58. Olivier Duhamel, "The Strengths and Weaknesses of the French Constitutional System," trans. Hsu You-wei, in Yao et al., Faguo diwu gonghe de xianzheng yunzuo, 266.
59. Olivier Duhamel, "The Strengths and Weaknesses of the French Constitutional System," trans. Hsu You-wei, in Yao et al., Faguo diwu gonghe de xianzheng yunzuo, 266.
60. Cohabitation has never been a desirable situation for the French president, but rather something he was forced to accept. In June 2000, French President Jacques Chirac proposed to cut the presidential term from seven years to five years in order to be in sync with the term of the National Assembly so as to reduce the possibility of cohabitation. Zhongguo shibao (China Times) (Taipei), June 7, 2000, 13.
61. Chen's first choice was Lee Yuan-tseh, president of Academia Sinica, whose last-minute endorsement of Chen's candidacy proved critical in Chen's ultimate victory. However, Lee turned down Chen's offer, which forced Chen to restart his search.
62. Had President Chen allowed Tang Fei and the KMT members in the new cabinet to retain organizational linkage with the KMT, then Chen would be actually forming a coalition government with the KMT. See Chou Yujen, "Forming a New Government: Coalition Government is More Feasible," Lianhe bao (United Daily News) (Taipei), March 27, 2000, 15. This is what happened in Poland when President Lech Wałȩsa demanded the power to appoint the defense minister, foreign minister, and minister of internal affairs. For the Polish case, see Wu, Eluosi zhuanxing, chap. 3.
63. Had President Chen allowed Tang Fei and the KMT members in the new cabinet to retain organizational linkage with the KMT, then Chen would be actually forming a coalition government with the KMT. See Chou Yujen, "Forming a New Government: Coalition Government is More Feasible," Lianhe bao (United Daily News) (Taipei), March 27, 2000, 15. This is what happened in Poland when President Lech Wałȩsa demanded the power to appoint the defense minister, foreign minister, and minister of internal affairs. For the Polish case, see Wu, Eluosi zhuanxing, chap. 3.
64. Including Shea Jia-dong, minister of finance, who later retired from his ministerial post upon Tang's resignation; Wu Shih-wen, minister of defense; and Perng Fai-nan, governor of the Central Bank of China.
65. Such as Chen Ding-nan, minister of justice; Yeh Chu-lan minister of transportation and communications; Chen Chu, chair of the Council of Labor Affairs; and Chang Fu-mei, chair of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission.
66. Such as Minister of Economic Affairs Lin Hsin-yi.
67. Such as Ovid J.L. Tzeng, minister of education; Weng Cheng-i, chair of the National Science Council; and Tsai Ing-wen, chair of the Mainland Affairs Council.
68. The most prominent among this group of Chen's loyalists are Lee Yi-yang, vice-minister of the interior; Ho Cheng-tan, vice-minister of transportation and communications; Chen Ming-tong, deputy chair of the Mainland Affairs Council; Chang Jing-sen, deputy chair of the Council for Economic Planning and Development; Yu Ying-lung, deputy chair of the Research, Development, and Evaluation Commission; and Luo Wen-jia, deputy chair of the Council for Cultural Affairs.