Common agency with rational expectations: Theory and application to a monetary union

Economic Journal

Volumn 113, Issue 489, 2003, Pages 539-549

  Dixit, Avinash ^a   Jensen, Henrik ^b  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN   (Denmark)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CENTRAL BANK; INCENTIVE; MODEL; MONETARY UNION; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 0043076449     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0297.t01-1-00143     Document Type: Article

References (13)

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