Non-cooperative routing in loss networks

Performance Evaluation

Volumn 49, Issue 1-4, 2002, Pages 257-272

  Altman, Eitan ^a,b   Azouzi, Rachid El ^a   Abramov, Vyacheslav ^c  

^a INRIA   (France)

^b UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES   (Venezuela)

^c TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

Author keywords

Game theory; Loss networks; Nash equilibrium; Wardrop equilibrium

Indexed keywords

BANDWIDTH; FUNCTIONS; GAME THEORY; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; ROUTERS; TELECOMMUNICATION LINKS; TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS; THEOREM PROVING; TOPOLOGY;

LOSS NETWORKS; NASH EQUILIBRIUM; WARDROP EQUILIBRIUM;

QUEUEING NETWORKS;

EID: 0042963553     PISSN: 01665316     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0166-5316(02)00112-8     Document Type: Conference Paper

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