Position shifting in pursuit of higher office

American Journal of Political Science

Volumn 40, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 768-786

  Francis, Wayne L ^a   Kenny, Lawrence W ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030305205     PISSN: 00925853     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2111794     Document Type: Article

References (16)

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2. Carey, John. 1994. "Political Shirking and the Last Term Problem: Evidence for a Party-Administered Pension System." Public Choice 81:1-22.
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4. Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row.
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9. Maddala, G. S. 1977. Econometrica. New York: McGraw Hill.
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11. Peltzman, Sam. 1990. "How Efficient is the Voting Market?" Journal of Law and Economics 33:27-64.
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13. Poole, Keith T., and Howard Rosenthal. 1991. "Patterns of Congressional Voting." American Journal of Political Science 35:228-78.
14. Schmidt, Amy B., Lawrence W. Kenny, and Rebecca B. Morton. N.d. "Evidence on Electoral Accountability in the U.S. Senate: Are Unfaithful Agents Really Punished?" Economic Inquiry. Forthcoming.
15. VanBeek, James R. 1991. "Does the Decision to Retire Increase the Amount of Political Shirking?" Public Finance Quarterly 19:444-56.
16. Zupan, Mark A. 1990. "The Last Period Problem in Politics: Do Congressional Representatives Not Subject to a Reelection Constraint Alter their Voting Behavior?" Public Choice 65:167-80.