Vernon Smith's insomnia and the dawn of economics as experimental science

Scandinavian Journal of Economics

Volumn 105, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 181-205

  Bergstrom, Theodore C ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ACADEMIC RESEARCH; ECONOMICS;

EID: 0042813554     PISSN: 03470520     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9442.t01-1-00004     Document Type: Article

References (69)

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