Experiment-dependent priors in psychology and physics

Theory and Decision

Volumn 47, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 213-227

  Bordley, Robert F ^b   Kadane, Joseph B ^a  

^a CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NONE

Author keywords

Healthy scepticism; Informativeness of experiments; Probability amplitude mechanics; Quantum mechanics; Support theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042729568     PISSN: 00405833     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1005107029264     Document Type: Article

References (19)

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