A Model of Stability and Persistence in a Democracy

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 33, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 20-40

  Artale, Angelo ^a   Grüner, Hans Peter ^b,c  

^a PricewaterhouseCoopers USA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

^c CEPR   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Democracy; political stability; political persistence

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042705182     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1998.0759     Document Type: Article

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