Condorcet's paradox for weak preference orderings

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 17, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 163-177

  Lepelley, Dominique ^a   Martin, Mathieu ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE CAEN   (France)

Author keywords

C7; Core; D7; Majority voting; Probability; Voting paradox

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042409549     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0176-2680(00)00034-3     Document Type: Article

References (9)

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