American and Swedish tax regimes cultural and structural roots

Comparative Politics

Volumn 35, Issue 4, 2003, Pages

  Lockhart, Charles ^a  

^a TEXAS CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0042236554     PISSN: 00104159     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/4150186     Document Type: Review

References (79)

1. See Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 93; Michael Thompson, Richard J. Ellis, and Aaron Wildavsky, Cultural Theory (Boulder: Westview, 1990).
2. See Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 93; Michael Thompson, Richard J. Ellis, and Aaron Wildavsky, Cultural Theory (Boulder: Westview, 1990).
3. See Emile Durkheim, Suicide: A Study in Sociology (Glencoe: Free Press, 1951); E. E. Evans-Pritchard, The Nuer: A Description of the Modes of Livelihood and Political Institutions of the Nilotic People (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1940); Mary Douglas, ed., Essays in the Sociology of Perception (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982); Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky.
4. See Emile Durkheim, Suicide: A Study in Sociology (Glencoe: Free Press, 1951); E. E. Evans-Pritchard, The Nuer: A Description of the Modes of Livelihood and Political Institutions of the Nilotic People (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1940); Mary Douglas, ed., Essays in the Sociology of Perception (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982); Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky.
5. See Emile Durkheim, Suicide: A Study in Sociology (Glencoe: Free Press, 1951); E. E. Evans-Pritchard, The Nuer: A Description of the Modes of Livelihood and Political Institutions of the Nilotic People (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1940); Mary Douglas, ed., Essays in the Sociology of Perception (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982); Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky.
6. Aaron Wildavsky, "Why Self-Interest Means Less Outside of a Social Context: Cultural Contributions to a Theory of Rational Choices," Journal of Theoretical Politics, 6 (April 1994), 131-59.
7. Legitimacy of external prescription refers to the varying ease with which persons accept that other persons' judgments are valid for and binding on them.
8. This claim is controversial but less limiting than the widely accepted idea that variations on only two ways of life - hierarchy and individualism - are socially viable. See Charles E. Lindblom, Politics and Markets: The World's Political-Economic Systems (New York: Basic, 1977). Alan P. Fiske, Structures of Social Life: The Four Elementary Forms of Human Relations (New York: Free Press, 1993), and Mark Irving Lichbach, The Rebel's Dilemma (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), among others, have derived similar typologies, and much empirical research supports this claim. See Louis Dumont, Homo Hierarchius: The Caste System and Its Implications (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1940); Evans-Pritchard; Victor C. Uchendu, The Igbo of Southeast Nigeria (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965).
9. This claim is controversial but less limiting than the widely accepted idea that variations on only two ways of life - hierarchy and individualism - are socially viable. See Charles E. Lindblom, Politics and Markets: The World's Political-Economic Systems (New York: Basic, 1977). Alan P. Fiske, Structures of Social Life: The Four Elementary Forms of Human Relations (New York: Free Press, 1993), and Mark Irving Lichbach, The Rebel's Dilemma (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), among others, have derived similar typologies, and much empirical research supports this claim. See Louis Dumont, Homo Hierarchius: The Caste System and Its Implications (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1940); Evans-Pritchard; Victor C. Uchendu, The Igbo of Southeast Nigeria (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965).
10. This claim is controversial but less limiting than the widely accepted idea that variations on only two ways of life - hierarchy and individualism - are socially viable. See Charles E. Lindblom, Politics and Markets: The World's Political-Economic Systems (New York: Basic, 1977). Alan P. Fiske, Structures of Social Life: The Four Elementary Forms of Human Relations (New York: Free Press, 1993), and Mark Irving Lichbach, The Rebel's Dilemma (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), among others, have derived similar typologies, and much empirical research supports this claim. See Louis Dumont, Homo Hierarchius: The Caste System and Its Implications (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1940); Evans-Pritchard; Victor C. Uchendu, The Igbo of Southeast Nigeria (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965).
11. This claim is controversial but less limiting than the widely accepted idea that variations on only two ways of life - hierarchy and individualism - are socially viable. See Charles E. Lindblom, Politics and Markets: The World's Political-Economic Systems (New York: Basic, 1977). Alan P. Fiske, Structures of Social Life: The Four Elementary Forms of Human Relations (New York: Free Press, 1993), and Mark Irving Lichbach, The Rebel's Dilemma (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), among others, have derived similar typologies, and much empirical research supports this claim. See Louis Dumont, Homo Hierarchius: The Caste System and Its Implications (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1940); Evans-Pritchard; Victor C. Uchendu, The Igbo of Southeast Nigeria (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965).
12. This claim is controversial but less limiting than the widely accepted idea that variations on only two ways of life - hierarchy and individualism - are socially viable. See Charles E. Lindblom, Politics and Markets: The World's Political-Economic Systems (New York: Basic, 1977). Alan P. Fiske, Structures of Social Life: The Four Elementary Forms of Human Relations (New York: Free Press, 1993), and Mark Irving Lichbach, The Rebel's Dilemma (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), among others, have derived similar typologies, and much empirical research supports this claim. See Louis Dumont, Homo Hierarchius: The Caste System and Its Implications (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1940); Evans-Pritchard; Victor C. Uchendu, The Igbo of Southeast Nigeria (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965).
13. See Mary Douglas, How Institutions Think (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986).
14. Mark Howard Ross, "Culture and Identity in Comparative Political Analysis," in Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, eds., Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 42-80, esp. 46, 50, and 62.
15. Fatalism is a less socially interactive culture than the three just discussed, and its adherents are less actively involved in shaping social institutions. Thus, less attention is devoted to them in this article. Briefly, fatalists perceive the world as operating randomly and human beings, fittingly, as capricious. Accordingly, they attempt to stay out of harm's way by minimizing their interaction with unpredictable forces and uncontrollable persons.
16. Gunnar Grendstad, "A Political Cultural Map of Europe: A Survey Approach," Geojournal, 47 (1999), 463-75.
17. This approach is necessary in determining the proportions of populations adhering to rival cultures. The cultural biases of grid-group theory's rival cultures all hold some face validity, since each accurately portrays certain swaths of human experience. Thus, when indices for the cultures themselves are employed in surveys, ordinary citizens tend to load themselves onto the indices for more than one culture. See Richard M. Coughlin and Charles Lockhart, "Grid-Group Theory and Political Ideology: A Consideration of Their Relative Strengths and Weaknesses for Explaining the Structure of Mass Belief Systems," Journal of Theoretical Politics, 10 (January 1998), 33-58. Political activists and elites generally avoid this tendency and appear much more culturally pure. See Richard J. Ellis and Fred Thompson, "Culture and the Environment in the Pacific Northwest," American Political Science Review, 91 (December 1997), 885-97.
18. This approach is necessary in determining the proportions of populations adhering to rival cultures. The cultural biases of grid-group theory's rival cultures all hold some face validity, since each accurately portrays certain swaths of human experience. Thus, when indices for the cultures themselves are employed in surveys, ordinary citizens tend to load themselves onto the indices for more than one culture. See Richard M. Coughlin and Charles Lockhart, "Grid-Group Theory and Political Ideology: A Consideration of Their Relative Strengths and Weaknesses for Explaining the Structure of Mass Belief Systems," Journal of Theoretical Politics, 10 (January 1998), 33-58. Political activists and elites generally avoid this tendency and appear much more culturally pure. See Richard J. Ellis and Fred Thompson, "Culture and the Environment in the Pacific Northwest," American Political Science Review, 91 (December 1997), 885-97.
19. See, for instance, Norman Furniss and Timothy Tilton, The Case for the Welfare State: From Social Security to Social Equality (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977).
20. Studies of American political orientations in terms of the cultures that grid-group theory distinguishes affirm grid-group theory's capacity to explain a broad range of public attitudes, but unfortunately none has been done in the fashion of Furniss and Tilton that affords estimates of the proportions of the American population adhering to the rival cultures. See Karl Dake and Aaron Wildavsky, "Theories of Risk Perception: Who Fears What and Why?," Daedalus, 119 (Fall 1990), 41-60, Coughlin and Lockhart; Ellis and Thompson. On the U.S., see Donald Devine, The Political Culture of the United States (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972); Samuel P. Huntington, American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981); Seymour Martin Lipset, American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword (New York: Norton, 1996); Sidney Verba, Steven Kelman, Gary R. Orren, Ichiro Miyake, Joji Watanuki, Ikuo Kabashima, and G. Donald Ferree, Jr., Elites and the Idea of Equality: A Comparison of Japan, Sweden and the United States (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987); Richard W. Wilson, "American Political Culture in Comparative Perspective," Political Psychology, 18 (June 1997), 483-502.
21. Studies of American political orientations in terms of the cultures that grid-group theory distinguishes affirm grid-group theory's capacity to explain a broad range of public attitudes, but unfortunately none has been done in the fashion of Furniss and Tilton that affords estimates of the proportions of the American population adhering to the rival cultures. See Karl Dake and Aaron Wildavsky, "Theories of Risk Perception: Who Fears What and Why?," Daedalus, 119 (Fall 1990), 41-60, Coughlin and Lockhart; Ellis and Thompson. On the U.S., see Donald Devine, The Political Culture of the United States (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972); Samuel P. Huntington, American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981); Seymour Martin Lipset, American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword (New York: Norton, 1996); Sidney Verba, Steven Kelman, Gary R. Orren, Ichiro Miyake, Joji Watanuki, Ikuo Kabashima, and G. Donald Ferree, Jr., Elites and the Idea of Equality: A Comparison of Japan, Sweden and the United States (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987); Richard W. Wilson, "American Political Culture in Comparative Perspective," Political Psychology, 18 (June 1997), 483-502.
22. Studies of American political orientations in terms of the cultures that grid-group theory distinguishes affirm grid-group theory's capacity to explain a broad range of public attitudes, but unfortunately none has been done in the fashion of Furniss and Tilton that affords estimates of the proportions of the American population adhering to the rival cultures. See Karl Dake and Aaron Wildavsky, "Theories of Risk Perception: Who Fears What and Why?," Daedalus, 119 (Fall 1990), 41-60, Coughlin and Lockhart; Ellis and Thompson. On the U.S., see Donald Devine, The Political Culture of the United States (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972); Samuel P. Huntington, American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981); Seymour Martin Lipset, American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword (New York: Norton, 1996); Sidney Verba, Steven Kelman, Gary R. Orren, Ichiro Miyake, Joji Watanuki, Ikuo Kabashima, and G. Donald Ferree, Jr., Elites and the Idea of Equality: A Comparison of Japan, Sweden and the United States (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987); Richard W. Wilson, "American Political Culture in Comparative Perspective," Political Psychology, 18 (June 1997), 483-502.
23. Studies of American political orientations in terms of the cultures that grid-group theory distinguishes affirm grid-group theory's capacity to explain a broad range of public attitudes, but unfortunately none has been done in the fashion of Furniss and Tilton that affords estimates of the proportions of the American population adhering to the rival cultures. See Karl Dake and Aaron Wildavsky, "Theories of Risk Perception: Who Fears What and Why?," Daedalus, 119 (Fall 1990), 41-60, Coughlin and Lockhart; Ellis and Thompson. On the U.S., see Donald Devine, The Political Culture of the United States (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972); Samuel P. Huntington, American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981); Seymour Martin Lipset, American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword (New York: Norton, 1996); Sidney Verba, Steven Kelman, Gary R. Orren, Ichiro Miyake, Joji Watanuki, Ikuo Kabashima, and G. Donald Ferree, Jr., Elites and the Idea of Equality: A Comparison of Japan, Sweden and the United States (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987); Richard W. Wilson, "American Political Culture in Comparative Perspective," Political Psychology, 18 (June 1997), 483-502.
24. Studies of American political orientations in terms of the cultures that grid-group theory distinguishes affirm grid-group theory's capacity to explain a broad range of public attitudes, but unfortunately none has been done in the fashion of Furniss and Tilton that affords estimates of the proportions of the American population adhering to the rival cultures. See Karl Dake and Aaron Wildavsky, "Theories of Risk Perception: Who Fears What and Why?," Daedalus, 119 (Fall 1990), 41-60, Coughlin and Lockhart; Ellis and Thompson. On the U.S., see Donald Devine, The Political Culture of the United States (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972); Samuel P. Huntington, American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981); Seymour Martin Lipset, American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword (New York: Norton, 1996); Sidney Verba, Steven Kelman, Gary R. Orren, Ichiro Miyake, Joji Watanuki, Ikuo Kabashima, and G. Donald Ferree, Jr., Elites and the Idea of Equality: A Comparison of Japan, Sweden and the United States (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987); Richard W. Wilson, "American Political Culture in Comparative Perspective," Political Psychology, 18 (June 1997), 483-502.
25. Studies of American political orientations in terms of the cultures that grid-group theory distinguishes affirm grid-group theory's capacity to explain a broad range of public attitudes, but unfortunately none has been done in the fashion of Furniss and Tilton that affords estimates of the proportions of the American population adhering to the rival cultures. See Karl Dake and Aaron Wildavsky, "Theories of Risk Perception: Who Fears What and Why?," Daedalus, 119 (Fall 1990), 41-60, Coughlin and Lockhart; Ellis and Thompson. On the U.S., see Donald Devine, The Political Culture of the United States (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972); Samuel P. Huntington, American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981); Seymour Martin Lipset, American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword (New York: Norton, 1996); Sidney Verba, Steven Kelman, Gary R. Orren, Ichiro Miyake, Joji Watanuki, Ikuo Kabashima, and G. Donald Ferree, Jr., Elites and the Idea of Equality: A Comparison of Japan, Sweden and the United States (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987); Richard W. Wilson, "American Political Culture in Comparative Perspective," Political Psychology, 18 (June 1997), 483-502.
26. Shifts across time in the relative influence of rival cultures in the United States - associated with critical elections and periods of party government - have caused the activity levels of the United States' national government to rise and fall. See Charles Lockhart, "Political Culture, Patterns of American Political Development and Distinctive Rationalities," Review of Politics, 63 (Summer 2001), 531-62; Walter Dean Burhnam, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics (New York: Norton, 1970); Susan B. Hansen, The Politics of Taxation: Revenue without Representation (New York: Praeger, 1983). For contrasting the United States with Sweden, association of rival cultures with particular institutional forms works less well than the institutional interaction patterns employed here.
27. Shifts across time in the relative influence of rival cultures in the United States - associated with critical elections and periods of party government - have caused the activity levels of the United States' national government to rise and fall. See Charles Lockhart, "Political Culture, Patterns of American Political Development and Distinctive Rationalities," Review of Politics, 63 (Summer 2001), 531-62; Walter Dean Burhnam, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics (New York: Norton, 1970); Susan B. Hansen, The Politics of Taxation: Revenue without Representation (New York: Praeger, 1983). For contrasting the United States with Sweden, association of rival cultures with particular institutional forms works less well than the institutional interaction patterns employed here.
28. Shifts across time in the relative influence of rival cultures in the United States - associated with critical elections and periods of party government - have caused the activity levels of the United States' national government to rise and fall. See Charles Lockhart, "Political Culture, Patterns of American Political Development and Distinctive Rationalities," Review of Politics, 63 (Summer 2001), 531-62; Walter Dean Burhnam, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics (New York: Norton, 1970); Susan B. Hansen, The Politics of Taxation: Revenue without Representation (New York: Praeger, 1983). For contrasting the United States with Sweden, association of rival cultures with particular institutional forms works less well than the institutional interaction patterns employed here.
29. Grendstad, p. 473.
30. See Eric S. Einhorn and John Logue, Modern Welfare States: Politics and Policies in Social Democratic Scandinavia (New York: Praeger, 1989); Furniss and Tilton; Hugh Heclo and Henrik Madsen, Policy and Politics in Sweden (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987); Jan-Erik Lane, Tuomo Martikainen, Palle Svensson, Gunnar Vogt, and Henry Valen, "Scandinavian Exceptionalism Reconsidered," Journal of Theoretical Politics, 5 (July 1993), 195-230; Steven Kelman, Regulating America, Regulating Sweden: A Comparative Study of Occupational Safety and Health Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981); John D. Stephens, "The Scandinavian Welfare States: Achievements, Crisis, and Prospects," in Gøsta Esping-Andersen, ed., Welfare States in Transition: National Adaptations in Global Economies (London: Sage, 1996), pp. 32-65.
31. See Eric S. Einhorn and John Logue, Modern Welfare States: Politics and Policies in Social Democratic Scandinavia (New York: Praeger, 1989); Furniss and Tilton; Hugh Heclo and Henrik Madsen, Policy and Politics in Sweden (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987); Jan-Erik Lane, Tuomo Martikainen, Palle Svensson, Gunnar Vogt, and Henry Valen, "Scandinavian Exceptionalism Reconsidered," Journal of Theoretical Politics, 5 (July 1993), 195-230; Steven Kelman, Regulating America, Regulating Sweden: A Comparative Study of Occupational Safety and Health Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981); John D. Stephens, "The Scandinavian Welfare States: Achievements, Crisis, and Prospects," in Gøsta Esping-Andersen, ed., Welfare States in Transition: National Adaptations in Global Economies (London: Sage, 1996), pp. 32-65.
32. See Eric S. Einhorn and John Logue, Modern Welfare States: Politics and Policies in Social Democratic Scandinavia (New York: Praeger, 1989); Furniss and Tilton; Hugh Heclo and Henrik Madsen, Policy and Politics in Sweden (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987); Jan-Erik Lane, Tuomo Martikainen, Palle Svensson, Gunnar Vogt, and Henry Valen, "Scandinavian Exceptionalism Reconsidered," Journal of Theoretical Politics, 5 (July 1993), 195-230; Steven Kelman, Regulating America, Regulating Sweden: A Comparative Study of Occupational Safety and Health Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981); John D. Stephens, "The Scandinavian Welfare States: Achievements, Crisis, and Prospects," in Gøsta Esping-Andersen, ed., Welfare States in Transition: National Adaptations in Global Economies (London: Sage, 1996), pp. 32-65.
33. See Eric S. Einhorn and John Logue, Modern Welfare States: Politics and Policies in Social Democratic Scandinavia (New York: Praeger, 1989); Furniss and Tilton; Hugh Heclo and Henrik Madsen, Policy and Politics in Sweden (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987); Jan-Erik Lane, Tuomo Martikainen, Palle Svensson, Gunnar Vogt, and Henry Valen, "Scandinavian Exceptionalism Reconsidered," Journal of Theoretical Politics, 5 (July 1993), 195-230; Steven Kelman, Regulating America, Regulating Sweden: A Comparative Study of Occupational Safety and Health Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981); John D. Stephens, "The Scandinavian Welfare States: Achievements, Crisis, and Prospects," in Gøsta Esping-Andersen, ed., Welfare States in Transition: National Adaptations in Global Economies (London: Sage, 1996), pp. 32-65.
34. See Eric S. Einhorn and John Logue, Modern Welfare States: Politics and Policies in Social Democratic Scandinavia (New York: Praeger, 1989); Furniss and Tilton; Hugh Heclo and Henrik Madsen, Policy and Politics in Sweden (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987); Jan-Erik Lane, Tuomo Martikainen, Palle Svensson, Gunnar Vogt, and Henry Valen, "Scandinavian Exceptionalism Reconsidered," Journal of Theoretical Politics, 5 (July 1993), 195-230; Steven Kelman, Regulating America, Regulating Sweden: A Comparative Study of Occupational Safety and Health Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981); John D. Stephens, "The Scandinavian Welfare States: Achievements, Crisis, and Prospects," in Gøsta Esping-Andersen, ed., Welfare States in Transition: National Adaptations in Global Economies (London: Sage, 1996), pp. 32-65.
35. Thomas J. Anton, Administered Politics: Elite Political Culture in Sweden (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980); Kelman.
36. Sven Steinmo, Taxation and Democracy: Swedish, British and American Approaches to Financing the Modern State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), pp. 122-23.
37. Several qualifications should be added to this portrayal of a close fit between the form and interaction patterns of Swedish political institutions and the preferences shared by the high-group cultures. First, the SAP has at times compromised with the Liberal Party, so individualists have had some influence. Second, the increasingly global character of capital markets and their disruptive effects on labor markets have made corporatist cooperation and compromise more difficult. Third, the decision in 1970 to abolish the upper chamber of the Riksdag, prompted by the Liberal Party, removed a major incentive for interparty cooperation.
38. See Steinmo, Taxation and Democracy, p. 3.
39. See Congressional Budget Office, The Changing Distribution of Federal Taxes: 1975-1990 (Washington, D.C.: Congress of the United States, 1987), p. 6; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD in Figures: Statistics on the Member Countries (Paris: OECD, 1994); Joseph A. Pechman, "Introduction," in Joseph A. Pechman, ed., Comparative Tax Systems: Europe, Canada, and Japan (Arlington: Tax Analysts, 1987), pp. 3-32; John F. Witte, The Politics and Development of the Federal Income Tax (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985). Calculating tax burdens is a complex enterprise. The varying results of different authors reflect variations among statistical sources and contrasting judgments as to how to treat a variety of matters. See Joseph A. Pechman, Who Paid the Taxes, 1966-85? (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press, 1985), pp. 17-19.
40. See Congressional Budget Office, The Changing Distribution of Federal Taxes: 1975-1990 (Washington, D.C.: Congress of the United States, 1987), p. 6; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD in Figures: Statistics on the Member Countries (Paris: OECD, 1994); Joseph A. Pechman, "Introduction," in Joseph A. Pechman, ed., Comparative Tax Systems: Europe, Canada, and Japan (Arlington: Tax Analysts, 1987), pp. 3-32; John F. Witte, The Politics and Development of the Federal Income Tax (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985). Calculating tax burdens is a complex enterprise. The varying results of different authors reflect variations among statistical sources and contrasting judgments as to how to treat a variety of matters. See Joseph A. Pechman, Who Paid the Taxes, 1966-85? (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press, 1985), pp. 17-19.
41. See Congressional Budget Office, The Changing Distribution of Federal Taxes: 1975-1990 (Washington, D.C.: Congress of the United States, 1987), p. 6; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD in Figures: Statistics on the Member Countries (Paris: OECD, 1994); Joseph A. Pechman, "Introduction," in Joseph A. Pechman, ed., Comparative Tax Systems: Europe, Canada, and Japan (Arlington: Tax Analysts, 1987), pp. 3-32; John F. Witte, The Politics and Development of the Federal Income Tax (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985). Calculating tax burdens is a complex enterprise. The varying results of different authors reflect variations among statistical sources and contrasting judgments as to how to treat a variety of matters. See Joseph A. Pechman, Who Paid the Taxes, 1966-85? (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press, 1985), pp. 17-19.
42. See Congressional Budget Office, The Changing Distribution of Federal Taxes: 1975-1990 (Washington, D.C.: Congress of the United States, 1987), p. 6; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD in Figures: Statistics on the Member Countries (Paris: OECD, 1994); Joseph A. Pechman, "Introduction," in Joseph A. Pechman, ed., Comparative Tax Systems: Europe, Canada, and Japan (Arlington: Tax Analysts, 1987), pp. 3-32; John F. Witte, The Politics and Development of the Federal Income Tax (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985). Calculating tax burdens is a complex enterprise. The varying results of different authors reflect variations among statistical sources and contrasting judgments as to how to treat a variety of matters. See Joseph A. Pechman, Who Paid the Taxes, 1966-85? (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press, 1985), pp. 17-19.
43. See Congressional Budget Office, The Changing Distribution of Federal Taxes: 1975-1990 (Washington, D.C.: Congress of the United States, 1987), p. 6; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD in Figures: Statistics on the Member Countries (Paris: OECD, 1994); Joseph A. Pechman, "Introduction," in Joseph A. Pechman, ed., Comparative Tax Systems: Europe, Canada, and Japan (Arlington: Tax Analysts, 1987), pp. 3-32; John F. Witte, The Politics and Development of the Federal Income Tax (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985). Calculating tax burdens is a complex enterprise. The varying results of different authors reflect variations among statistical sources and contrasting judgments as to how to treat a variety of matters. See Joseph A. Pechman, Who Paid the Taxes, 1966-85? (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press, 1985), pp. 17-19.
44. See Steinmo, Taxation and Democracy, p. 132. Also, Iceland's public revenues are more modest, Iceland has several features that help to explain this anomaly. Its population is much smaller and is more homogeneous than those of the other societies in Tables 1 or 2. This population lives in a very compact area and is highly isolated. Under these circumstances, in which many Icelanders have family ties to a large segment of the population, Iceland achieves objectives through private means that other high-group societies turn to public policy to accomplish.
45. See Witte, p. 222. Also, none of the other advanced industrial societies with public sectors similar in size to that of the United States has been the leader of a worldwide set of military alliances. The United States runs on an unusually small public sector in spite of its exceptional international military commitment.
46. See Harold L. Wilensky, The Welfare State and Equality: The Structural and Ideological Roots of Public Expenditures (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); Theda Skocpol, "America's Incomplete Welfare State," in Martin Rein, Gøsta Esping-Andersen, and Lee Rainwater, eds., Stagnation and Renewal in Social Policy (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1987), pp. 35-58.
47. See Harold L. Wilensky, The Welfare State and Equality: The Structural and Ideological Roots of Public Expenditures (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); Theda Skocpol, "America's Incomplete Welfare State," in Martin Rein, Gøsta Esping-Andersen, and Lee Rainwater, eds., Stagnation and Renewal in Social Policy (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1987), pp. 35-58.
48. See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD in Figures: Statistics on the Member Countries (Paris: OECD, 1997).
49. Pechman, Who Paid the Taxes, p. 4. The Clinton administration made some federal taxes slightly more progressive, but the George W. Bush administration has instituted highly regressive tax cuts. Thus, the overall American tax burden may come even closer now to a flat rate than when Pechman conducted his analysis.
50. Witte, pp. 262, 374.
51. Steinmo, Taxation and Democracy, p. 2.
52. The focus here is on the American public sector overall. While American state tax regimes vary, they often differ from the overall model by relying more heavily on regressive sales and related (for example, excise and gasoline) taxes. Hansen, chs. 5 and 7, discusses state variation in tax regimes, some of which appear to be associated with the variations in state cultures delineated by Daniel J. Elazar, American Federalism: The View From the States, 2nd ed. (New York: Crowell, 1972), ch. 4.
53. Witte; Steinmo, Taxation and Democracy.
54. Witte, p. 292.
55. Pechman, "Introduction," p. 31.
56. Krister Andersson, "Sweden," in Pechman, ed., pp. 33-90.
57. Assar Lindbeck, The Swedish Experiment (Stockholm: SNS Foerlag, 1997); Olsen; Stephens.
58. Steinmo, Taxation and Democracy, p. 2.
59. Ibid., p. 117.
60. Ibid., pp. 88-91, 117, 156-60.
61. See Pechman, "Introduction," p. 31; Andersson, p. 67. During the bourgeois-bloc government of the early 1990s, changes in the Swedish tax regime reduced the pursuit of egalitarian values and increased the emphasis on the values of other cultures, particularly individualism. Personal income tax rates for high income citizens were reduced; tax expenditures were further systemized and modestly reduced; and regressive value-added taxes were increased. The SAP has reversed some of these changes since it returned to government. See Lindbeck; Gregg M. Olsen, "Remodeling Sweden: The Rise and Demise of the Compromise in a Global Economy," Social Problems, 42 (February 1996), 1-20.
62. See Pechman, "Introduction," p. 31; Andersson, p. 67. During the bourgeois-bloc government of the early 1990s, changes in the Swedish tax regime reduced the pursuit of egalitarian values and increased the emphasis on the values of other cultures, particularly individualism. Personal income tax rates for high income citizens were reduced; tax expenditures were further systemized and modestly reduced; and regressive value-added taxes were increased. The SAP has reversed some of these changes since it returned to government. See Lindbeck; Gregg M. Olsen, "Remodeling Sweden: The Rise and Demise of the Compromise in a Global Economy," Social Problems, 42 (February 1996), 1-20.
63. See Pechman, "Introduction," p. 31; Andersson, p. 67. During the bourgeois-bloc government of the early 1990s, changes in the Swedish tax regime reduced the pursuit of egalitarian values and increased the emphasis on the values of other cultures, particularly individualism. Personal income tax rates for high income citizens were reduced; tax expenditures were further systemized and modestly reduced; and regressive value-added taxes were increased. The SAP has reversed some of these changes since it returned to government. See Lindbeck; Gregg M. Olsen, "Remodeling Sweden: The Rise and Demise of the Compromise in a Global Economy," Social Problems, 42 (February 1996), 1-20.
64. See also Verba et al., p. 270.
65. See James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics (New York: Free Press, 1989). For an example of the "others," see Jeffrey W. Legro, "Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-Step," American Political Science Review, 90 (March 1996), 118-37.
66. See James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics (New York: Free Press, 1989). For an example of the "others," see Jeffrey W. Legro, "Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation Two-Step," American Political Science Review, 90 (March 1996), 118-37.
67. Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, eds., Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
68. Sven Steinmo, "Why Is Government So Small in America?," Governance, 8 (July 1995), 324, 327, 328.
69. See March and Olsen; Robert Rohrschneider, "Report from the Laboratory: The Influence of Institutions on Political Elites' Democratic Values in Germany," American Political Science Review, 88 (December 1994), 927-41.
70. Similarly, culture also complements rational choice explanations. Persons' persistent efforts to realize an active as opposed to a limited state can not explain why they have these particular interests rather than others. The explanation of disparate interests is exogenous to an instrumental (preference implementation) conception of rationality. Yet the distinctive beliefs and values held by the adherents of rival cultures can explain why various persons conceive of their interests differently, See Charles Lockhart, Protecting the Elderly: How Culture Shapes Social Policy (University Park: Penn State University Press, 2001), ch. 1.
71. See Henry E. Brady and David Collier, eds., Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003).
72. Alexander L. George and Timothy J. McKeown, "Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making," Advances in Information Processing in Organizations, 2 (1985), 21-58.
73. Witte, p. 151.
74. Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1955); Seymour Martin Lipset, Continental Divide: Values and Institutions of the United States and Canada (New York: Routledge, 1990).
75. Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1955); Seymour Martin Lipset, Continental Divide: Values and Institutions of the United States and Canada (New York: Routledge, 1990).
76. I b i d.
77. Inglehart; Kendall L. Baker, Russell J. Dalton, and Kai Hildebrandt, Germany Transformed: Political Culture and the New Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981).
78. Robert Henry Cox, "The Social Construction of an Imperative: Why Welfare Reform Happened in Denmark and the Netherlands but Not in Germany, " World Politics, 53 (April 2001), 463-98, discusses other instances involving such a dual process pattern.
79. See Lockhart, Protecting the Elderly, ch. 2, on these bifocal perspectives.