Leverage, risk-shifting incentive, and stock-based compensation

Journal of Financial Research

Volumn 19, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 417-428

  Harikumar, T ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ALASKA FAIRBANKS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0043186476     PISSN: 02702592     EISSN: 14756803     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-6803.1996.tb00222.x     Document Type: Article

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