The "figure" of god and the limits to liberalism: A rereading of Locke's Essay and Two Treatises

Journal of the History of Ideas

Volumn 60, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 83-98

  Brown, Vivienne ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0042208755     PISSN: 00225037     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/3654001     Document Type: Article

References (140)

1. I would like to thank Michael Ayers, Susan Khin Zaw, and Gordon Schochet for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. I would also like to thank participants at an Open University workshop seminar in 1996, the Conference of the British Society for Eighteenth-Century Studies, Oxford, 1998, and the Politics, Rhetoric and the Media Conference, Leeds University, UK, 1998, where versions of this paper were given. I am grateful for financial support provided by the Open University's Research Development Fund.
2. C. B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (Oxford, 1962); Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago, 1953); John Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke (Cambridge, 1969).
3. C. B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (Oxford, 1962); Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago, 1953); John Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke (Cambridge, 1969).
4. C. B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (Oxford, 1962); Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago, 1953); John Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke (Cambridge, 1969).
5. James Tully, A Discourse on Property: John Locke and his Adversaries (Cambridge, 1980) and Tully, An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in Contexts (Cambridge, 1993); Richard Ashcraft, Revolutionary Politics and Locke's "Two Treatises of Government" (Princeton, 1986) and Ashcraft, Locke's "Two Treatises of Government" (London, 1987).
6. James Tully, A Discourse on Property: John Locke and his Adversaries (Cambridge, 1980) and Tully, An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in Contexts (Cambridge, 1993); Richard Ashcraft, Revolutionary Politics and Locke's "Two Treatises of Government" (Princeton, 1986) and Ashcraft, Locke's "Two Treatises of Government" (London, 1987).
7. James Tully, A Discourse on Property: John Locke and his Adversaries (Cambridge, 1980) and Tully, An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in Contexts (Cambridge, 1993); Richard Ashcraft, Revolutionary Politics and Locke's "Two Treatises of Government" (Princeton, 1986) and Ashcraft, Locke's "Two Treatises of Government" (London, 1987).
8. James Tully, A Discourse on Property: John Locke and his Adversaries (Cambridge, 1980) and Tully, An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in Contexts (Cambridge, 1993); Richard Ashcraft, Revolutionary Politics and Locke's "Two Treatises of Government" (Princeton, 1986) and Ashcraft, Locke's "Two Treatises of Government" (London, 1987).
9. John Marshall, John Locke: Resistance, Religion and Responsibility (Cambridge, 1994). For a later correction see John Marshall, "Locke and Socinianism," The Locke Newsletter, 27 (1996), 147-48.
10. John Marshall, John Locke: Resistance, Religion and Responsibility (Cambridge, 1994). For a later correction see John Marshall, "Locke and Socinianism," The Locke Newsletter, 27 (1996), 147-48.
11. Ian Harris, The Mind of John Locke: A Study of Political Theory in its Intellectual Setting (Cambridge, 1994).
12. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford, 1975); Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge, 1988).
13. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford, 1975); Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge, 1988).
14. Analyses of rhetoric, figuration, and style in Locke's works may be found in Rosalie Colie, "The essayist in his Essay," in John Locke: Problems and Perspectives, ed. John W. Yolton (Cambridge, 1969), 234-61; S. H. Clark, "The Philosophical Rhetoric of Locke's Essay," The Locke Newsletter, 17 (1986), 93-140; Philip Vogt, "Seascape with Fog: Metaphor in Locke's Essay," JHI, 54 (1993), 1-18; Peter Walmsley, "Dispute and Conversation: Probability and the Rhetoric of Natural Philosophy in Locke's Essay," JHI, 54 (1993), 381-94, and "Prince Maurice's Rational Parrot: Civil Discourse in Locke's Essay," Eighteenth-Century Studies, 28 (1995), 413-25; William Walker, Locke, Literary Criticism and Philosophy (Cambridge, 1994).
15. Analyses of rhetoric, figuration, and style in Locke's works may be found in Rosalie Colie, "The essayist in his Essay," in John Locke: Problems and Perspectives, ed. John W. Yolton (Cambridge, 1969), 234-61; S. H. Clark, "The Philosophical Rhetoric of Locke's Essay," The Locke Newsletter, 17 (1986), 93-140; Philip Vogt, "Seascape with Fog: Metaphor in Locke's Essay," JHI, 54 (1993), 1-18; Peter Walmsley, "Dispute and Conversation: Probability and the Rhetoric of Natural Philosophy in Locke's Essay," JHI, 54 (1993), 381-94, and "Prince Maurice's Rational Parrot: Civil Discourse in Locke's Essay," Eighteenth-Century Studies, 28 (1995), 413-25; William Walker, Locke, Literary Criticism and Philosophy (Cambridge, 1994).
16. Analyses of rhetoric, figuration, and style in Locke's works may be found in Rosalie Colie, "The essayist in his Essay," in John Locke: Problems and Perspectives, ed. John W. Yolton (Cambridge, 1969), 234-61; S. H. Clark, "The Philosophical Rhetoric of Locke's Essay," The Locke Newsletter, 17 (1986), 93-140; Philip Vogt, "Seascape with Fog: Metaphor in Locke's Essay," JHI, 54 (1993), 1-18; Peter Walmsley, "Dispute and Conversation: Probability and the Rhetoric of Natural Philosophy in Locke's Essay," JHI, 54 (1993), 381-94, and "Prince Maurice's Rational Parrot: Civil Discourse in Locke's Essay," Eighteenth-Century Studies, 28 (1995), 413-25; William Walker, Locke, Literary Criticism and Philosophy (Cambridge, 1994).
17. Analyses of rhetoric, figuration, and style in Locke's works may be found in Rosalie Colie, "The essayist in his Essay," in John Locke: Problems and Perspectives, ed. John W. Yolton (Cambridge, 1969), 234-61; S. H. Clark, "The Philosophical Rhetoric of Locke's Essay," The Locke Newsletter, 17 (1986), 93-140; Philip Vogt, "Seascape with Fog: Metaphor in Locke's Essay," JHI, 54 (1993), 1-18; Peter Walmsley, "Dispute and Conversation: Probability and the Rhetoric of Natural Philosophy in Locke's Essay," JHI, 54 (1993), 381-94, and "Prince Maurice's Rational Parrot: Civil Discourse in Locke's Essay," Eighteenth-Century Studies, 28 (1995), 413-25; William Walker, Locke, Literary Criticism and Philosophy (Cambridge, 1994).
18. Analyses of rhetoric, figuration, and style in Locke's works may be found in Rosalie Colie, "The essayist in his Essay," in John Locke: Problems and Perspectives, ed. John W. Yolton (Cambridge, 1969), 234-61; S. H. Clark, "The Philosophical Rhetoric of Locke's Essay," The Locke Newsletter, 17 (1986), 93-140; Philip Vogt, "Seascape with Fog: Metaphor in Locke's Essay," JHI, 54 (1993), 1-18; Peter Walmsley, "Dispute and Conversation: Probability and the Rhetoric of Natural Philosophy in Locke's Essay," JHI, 54 (1993), 381-94, and "Prince Maurice's Rational Parrot: Civil Discourse in Locke's Essay," Eighteenth-Century Studies, 28 (1995), 413-25; William Walker, Locke, Literary Criticism and Philosophy (Cambridge, 1994).
19. Analyses of rhetoric, figuration, and style in Locke's works may be found in Rosalie Colie, "The essayist in his Essay," in John Locke: Problems and Perspectives, ed. John W. Yolton (Cambridge, 1969), 234-61; S. H. Clark, "The Philosophical Rhetoric of Locke's Essay," The Locke Newsletter, 17 (1986), 93-140; Philip Vogt, "Seascape with Fog: Metaphor in Locke's Essay," JHI, 54 (1993), 1-18; Peter Walmsley, "Dispute and Conversation: Probability and the Rhetoric of Natural Philosophy in Locke's Essay," JHI, 54 (1993), 381-94, and "Prince Maurice's Rational Parrot: Civil Discourse in Locke's Essay," Eighteenth-Century Studies, 28 (1995), 413-25; William Walker, Locke, Literary Criticism and Philosophy (Cambridge, 1994).
20. This paper is part of a larger study of Locke's writings provisionally entitled John Locke, Language and Liberalism (in preparation). For a similar approach in reading another canonic writer in western European liberalism, see Vivienne Brown, Adam Smith's Discourse: Canonicity, Commerce and Conscience (London, 1994); "The moral self and ethical dialogism: three genres," Philosophy and Rhetoric, 28 (1995), 276-99; and "Dialogism, the Gaze, and the Emergence of Economic Discourse," New Literary History, 28 (1997), 697-710.
21. This paper is part of a larger study of Locke's writings provisionally entitled John Locke, Language and Liberalism (in preparation). For a similar approach in reading another canonic writer in western European liberalism, see Vivienne Brown, Adam Smith's Discourse: Canonicity, Commerce and Conscience (London, 1994); "The moral self and ethical dialogism: three genres," Philosophy and Rhetoric, 28 (1995), 276-99; and "Dialogism, the Gaze, and the Emergence of Economic Discourse," New Literary History, 28 (1997), 697-710.
22. This paper is part of a larger study of Locke's writings provisionally entitled John Locke, Language and Liberalism (in preparation). For a similar approach in reading another canonic writer in western European liberalism, see Vivienne Brown, Adam Smith's Discourse: Canonicity, Commerce and Conscience (London, 1994); "The moral self and ethical dialogism: three genres," Philosophy and Rhetoric, 28 (1995), 276-99; and "Dialogism, the Gaze, and the Emergence of Economic Discourse," New Literary History, 28 (1997), 697-710.
23. This paper is part of a larger study of Locke's writings provisionally entitled John Locke, Language and Liberalism (in preparation). For a similar approach in reading another canonic writer in western European liberalism, see Vivienne Brown, Adam Smith's Discourse: Canonicity, Commerce and Conscience (London, 1994); "The moral self and ethical dialogism: three genres," Philosophy and Rhetoric, 28 (1995), 276-99; and "Dialogism, the Gaze, and the Emergence of Economic Discourse," New Literary History, 28 (1997), 697-710.
24. Essay, II.xxiii.35.
25. Essay, III.vi.11.
26. Essay, I.iv.16.
27. Essay, II.xxiii.33.
28. Essay, I.iii.13; II.xv.12; II.xxi.49-50, 70; II.xxviii.8; IV.iii.6. In this and in other instances below, I have benefited from the Oxford electronic text of Locke's Essay and R. M. P. Malpas, "An Electronic Text of the Essay," The Locke Newsletter, 21 (1990), 57-110. For some cautions in the use of this electronic text, see M. A. Stewart and R. E. Savage, "The Nidditch Locke on disk: some cautions," The Locke Newsletter, 27 (1996), 139-46.
29. Essay, I.iii.13; II.xv.12; II.xxi.49-50, 70; II.xxviii.8; IV.iii.6. In this and in other instances below, I have benefited from the Oxford electronic text of Locke's Essay and R. M. P. Malpas, "An Electronic Text of the Essay," The Locke Newsletter, 21 (1990), 57-110. For some cautions in the use of this electronic text, see M. A. Stewart and R. E. Savage, "The Nidditch Locke on disk: some cautions," The Locke Newsletter, 27 (1996), 139-46.
30. Essay, I.iii.13; II.xv.12; II.xxi.49-50, 70; II.xxviii.8; IV.iii.6. In this and in other instances below, I have benefited from the Oxford electronic text of Locke's Essay and R. M. P. Malpas, "An Electronic Text of the Essay," The Locke Newsletter, 21 (1990), 57-110. For some cautions in the use of this electronic text, see M. A. Stewart and R. E. Savage, "The Nidditch Locke on disk: some cautions," The Locke Newsletter, 27 (1996), 139-46.
31. Essay, I.iii.13; II.xv.12; II.xxi.49-50, 70; II.xxviii.8; IV.iii.6. In this and in other instances below, I have benefited from the Oxford electronic text of Locke's Essay and R. M. P. Malpas, "An Electronic Text of the Essay," The Locke Newsletter, 21 (1990), 57-110. For some cautions in the use of this electronic text, see M. A. Stewart and R. E. Savage, "The Nidditch Locke on disk: some cautions," The Locke Newsletter, 27 (1996), 139-46.
32. Essay, I.iv.10; II.xiv.31; II.xv.3; II.xvii. 1,17,20; II.xxiii.33-35; III.vi.11-12; IV.iii.6,18; IV.x.passim.
33. Essay, I.iv.12,21; II.xiii. 18,22; II.xv.3,12; II.xvii.1,20; II.xviii.20; II.xxiii.13; II.xxvii.2,13; II.xxviii.8; II.xxxii.14; III.vi.9,11; IV.x.passim; IV.xi.12; IV.xvii.4; IV.xviii.11.
34. Essay, II.i.15; II.xiii.18; II.xv.8; II.xvii.1; II.xxiii.33.
35. Essay, II.xxiii.34.
36. Essay, II.xvii.1.
37. Essay, II.xvii.7-16; H.xxix. 15-16. Cf. "we cause great confusion in our Thoughts, when we join Infinity to any supposed Idea of Quantity the mind can be thought to have, and so discourse or reason about an infinite quantity, (viz.) an infinite Space, or an infinite Duration: ... we are carefully to distinguish between the Idea of the Infinity of Space, and the Idea of a Space infinite" (Essay, II.xvii.7). See Vivienne Brown, "On Theological Discourse in Locke's Essay," The Locke Newsletter, 29 (1998), forthcoming. Colie, "Essayist," 255-56, argues that Locke's awkward prose style at II.xvii.13 is indicative of his intellectual difficulties with the idea of infinity. On infinity cf. G. A. J. Rogers, "Innate ideas and the infinite: the case of Locke and Descartes," in Locke's Enlightenment: Aspects of the Origin, Nature and Impact of his Philosophy (Hildesheim, 1998), 49-60.
38. Essay, II.xvii.7-16; H.xxix. 15-16. Cf. "we cause great confusion in our Thoughts, when we join Infinity to any supposed Idea of Quantity the mind can be thought to have, and so discourse or reason about an infinite quantity, (viz.) an infinite Space, or an infinite Duration: ... we are carefully to distinguish between the Idea of the Infinity of Space, and the Idea of a Space infinite" (Essay, II.xvii.7). See Vivienne Brown, "On Theological Discourse in Locke's Essay," The Locke Newsletter, 29 (1998), forthcoming. Colie, "Essayist," 255-56, argues that Locke's awkward prose style at II.xvii.13 is indicative of his intellectual difficulties with the idea of infinity. On infinity cf. G. A. J. Rogers, "Innate ideas and the infinite: the case of Locke and Descartes," in Locke's Enlightenment: Aspects of the Origin, Nature and Impact of his Philosophy (Hildesheim, 1998), 49-60.
39. Essay, II.xvii.7-16; H.xxix. 15-16. Cf. "we cause great confusion in our Thoughts, when we join Infinity to any supposed Idea of Quantity the mind can be thought to have, and so discourse or reason about an infinite quantity, (viz.) an infinite Space, or an infinite Duration: ... we are carefully to distinguish between the Idea of the Infinity of Space, and the Idea of a Space infinite" (Essay, II.xvii.7). See Vivienne Brown, "On Theological Discourse in Locke's Essay," The Locke Newsletter, 29 (1998), forthcoming. Colie, "Essayist," 255-56, argues that Locke's awkward prose style at II.xvii.13 is indicative of his intellectual difficulties with the idea of infinity. On infinity cf. G. A. J. Rogers, "Innate ideas and the infinite: the case of Locke and Descartes," in Locke's Enlightenment: Aspects of the Origin, Nature and Impact of his Philosophy (Hildesheim, 1998), 49-60.
40. Essay, II.xvii.7-16; H.xxix. 15-16. Cf. "we cause great confusion in our Thoughts, when we join Infinity to any supposed Idea of Quantity the mind can be thought to have, and so discourse or reason about an infinite quantity, (viz.) an infinite Space, or an infinite Duration: ... we are carefully to distinguish between the Idea of the Infinity of Space, and the Idea of a Space infinite" (Essay, II.xvii.7). See Vivienne Brown, "On Theological Discourse in Locke's Essay," The Locke Newsletter, 29 (1998), forthcoming. Colie, "Essayist," 255-56, argues that Locke's awkward prose style at II.xvii.13 is indicative of his intellectual difficulties with the idea of infinity. On infinity cf. G. A. J. Rogers, "Innate ideas and the infinite: the case of Locke and Descartes," in Locke's Enlightenment: Aspects of the Origin, Nature and Impact of his Philosophy (Hildesheim, 1998), 49-60.
41. Essay, II.xvii.7-16; H.xxix. 15-16. Cf. "we cause great confusion in our Thoughts, when we join Infinity to any supposed Idea of Quantity the mind can be thought to have, and so discourse or reason about an infinite quantity, (viz.) an infinite Space, or an infinite Duration: ... we are carefully to distinguish between the Idea of the Infinity of Space, and the Idea of a Space infinite" (Essay, II.xvii.7). See Vivienne Brown, "On Theological Discourse in Locke's Essay," The Locke Newsletter, 29 (1998), forthcoming. Colie, "Essayist," 255-56, argues that Locke's awkward prose style at II.xvii.13 is indicative of his intellectual difficulties with the idea of infinity. On infinity cf. G. A. J. Rogers, "Innate ideas and the infinite: the case of Locke and Descartes," in Locke's Enlightenment: Aspects of the Origin, Nature and Impact of his Philosophy (Hildesheim, 1998), 49-60.
42. Essay, II.xvii.17.
43. Essay, II.xxiii.35. Walter Ott, "Locke and the Scholastics on Theological Discourse," The Locke Newsletter, 28 (1997), 51-66, claims that Locke's theological discourse is rooted in the scholastic framework of analogy and that Locke is inconsistent in his treatment of the idea of God at Essay, II.xvii and II.xxiii. See Brown, "Theological Discourse."
44. Essay, II.xxiii.35. Walter Ott, "Locke and the Scholastics on Theological Discourse," The Locke Newsletter, 28 (1997), 51-66, claims that Locke's theological discourse is rooted in the scholastic framework of analogy and that Locke is inconsistent in his treatment of the idea of God at Essay, II.xvii and II.xxiii. See Brown, "Theological Discourse."
45. Essay, II.xxiii.35. Walter Ott, "Locke and the Scholastics on Theological Discourse," The Locke Newsletter, 28 (1997), 51-66, claims that Locke's theological discourse is rooted in the scholastic framework of analogy and that Locke is inconsistent in his treatment of the idea of God at Essay, II.xvii and II.xxiii. See Brown, "Theological Discourse."
46. Essay, II.xxiii.35. Walter Ott, "Locke and the Scholastics on Theological Discourse," The Locke Newsletter, 28 (1997), 51-66, claims that Locke's theological discourse is rooted in the scholastic framework of analogy and that Locke is inconsistent in his treatment of the idea of God at Essay, II.xvii and II.xxiii. See Brown, "Theological Discourse."
47. Essay, II.xxv.8.
48. Essay, II.xxv.2.
49. Essay, II.xxviii.2.
50. Essay, II.xxviii.3.
51. God as "father" of mankind occurs twice in the Essay at II.xxi.53 and IV.iv.14; he is father of spirits at IV.iii.27 and the father of light at IV.xix.4 (twice). God as "judge" of mankind also occurs twice at II.xxi.53, 60. God as law-maker occurs (sometimes implicitly) at I.iii.12-13; I.iv.8; II.xxviii.5,14; IV.iv.10; God as law-giver at I.iii.6,13.
52. Tully, Discourse, 10, 34, argues that the relation between God and man "is a natural relation with respect to man but instituted with respect to God," but such a hybrid model is not put forward in the Essay as an account of the relation between man and God and, if present, would undercut the notion of reciprocity in all these relations. Further, as instituted relations are those potentially alterable relations between men which depend on their wills or agreement within society, this cannot be an apt description of God's will for mankind, which is unalterable and independent of men and their agreements.
53. Essay, II.xxvi.2.
54. God the "creator" occurs at Essay, II.i.15; II.vii.3; II.xxiii.12; IV.iii.6,23; IV.iv.14; IV.x.18; IV.xvi.12.
55. Essay, III.vi.39; IV.iii.25
56. Essay, II.xii.3-6; II.xxxi. 12-14.
57. Essay, II.ii.2; II.xii.1. Cf. Michael Losonsky, "Locke on the Making of Complex Ideas," The Locke Newsletter, 20 (1989), 35-46.
58. Essay, II.ii.2; II.xii.1. Cf. Michael Losonsky, "Locke on the Making of Complex Ideas," The Locke Newsletter, 20 (1989), 35-46.
59. Essay, III.iii.12-14; III.v.4,6,13-14,16; III.vi.37; IV.xii.3. Also cf. III.v.8; III.vi.26.
60. Mankind is God's "workmanship" at Essay, I.iv.13; III.vi.9; IV.iii.18; IV.x.18; IV.xviii.5. Cf I.iii.26. God as "maker" occurs more frequently at I.i.5; I.iv.13; II.ii.3; II.vii.4; II.ix.12; II.xxi.34; II.xxx.2; III.vi.3,12; IV.iii.6; IV.iv.4; IV.xvii.24.
61. The "workmanship model" has been used as a central exegetical vehicle for analyzing Locke's account of property; see, for example, Tully, Discourse. In this paper I shall argue that its function in the Essay is not reproduced in the Two Treatises.
62. At I.iii.26 and I.iv.13 in the context of the argument against there being any innate ideas of the relation between God and man.
63. Essay, III.vi.11.
64. Essay. II.xxii.10,11.
65. Although, as noted above, the term "workmanship" is not used to describe the product of material making. The extent of the similarity between material and intellectual making is an issue that lies outside the scope of this paper.
66. Tully, Discourse, 22, 37, where God's dominion over his workmanship explains man's dominion over the products of his (man's) making; the causation thus runs from God to man.
67. It also neglects the point that the workmanship model of the understanding includes nominal essences and the sorting of things, as well as the archetypes of the understanding.
68. Essay, IV.xviii.5.
69. Elsewhere God's power of creation and making are elided, e.g. Essay, IV.x.18-19. Intellectual activities are on occasion also called the "creatures of the understanding," cf Essay, III.iii.11; III.v.5, 12.
70. Elsewhere God's power of creation and making are elided, e.g. Essay, IV.x.18-19. Intellectual activities are on occasion also called the "creatures of the understanding," cf Essay, III.iii.11; III.v.5, 12.
71. 4), 10; cf. Essay, IV.iii.18.
72. 4), 10; cf. Essay, IV.iii.18.
73. 4), 10; cf. Essay, IV.iii.18.
74. 4), 10; cf. Essay, IV.iii.18.
75. Essay, IV.x.
76. Here the two theories are elided by defending the argument that God created matter out of nothing on the grounds that to deny this implies denying "the first great piece of his Workmanship, the Creation," Essay, IV.x.18.
77. Essay, IV.x.4.
78. Essay, IV.x.5.
79. Essay, IV.x.6. This implies, however, that those characteristics which are lacking in man are also absent from the proof of the existence of God. In particular, the proof does not establish that goodness is an attribute of God, nor does it establish that God is the legislator for mankind, even though these are taken for granted elsewhere in the Essay. The failure of the Essay to provide a demonstrative ethics in spite of declarations of its being possible, is thus not unrelated to this.
80. TT, I.30; also I.40.
81. TT, I.6; II.79. Also infinite wisdom, TT, I.54, and infinitely wise, TT, II.6.
82. TT, I.6; II.79. Also infinite wisdom, TT, I.54, and infinitely wise, TT, II.6.
83. TT, I.6; II.79. Also infinite wisdom, TT, I.54, and infinitely wise, TT, II.6.
84. TT, I.15; II.6, 195.
85. TT, I.53, 85; II.56, 67, 195.
86. TT, I.39, 40, 45, 53, 86; II.6, 56, 79.
87. TT, II.80.
88. TT, I.52, 95.
89. TT, I.52.
90. TT, I.53, 86; II.6, 56.
91. Robert Filmer, Patriarcha and Other Writings, ed. Johann P. Sommerville (Cambridge, 1991).
92. TT, I.53.
93. TT, I.39. Also TT, I.85. In the Essay, God is not referred to as proprietor. God is also Lord at TT, I.42,53,67; at TT, II. 4 God is the Lord and Master. In the Essay, there is a single reference to God as master of men and beasts in the context as to whether changelings are men or beasts, at IV.iv.14; he is the "Sovereign Being" at II.xxiii.34; and the "Soveraign Disposer of all Things" at II.vii.6, but not the sovereign master. There is a single reference in the Essay to God as lord in a reference to the "candle of the Lord" within an epistemological context (IV.iii.20).
94. TT, I.39. Also TT, I.85. In the Essay, God is not referred to as proprietor. God is also Lord at TT, I.42,53,67; at TT, II. 4 God is the Lord and Master. In the Essay, there is a single reference to God as master of men and beasts in the context as to whether changelings are men or beasts, at IV.iv.14; he is the "Sovereign Being" at II.xxiii.34; and the "Soveraign Disposer of all Things" at II.vii.6, but not the sovereign master. There is a single reference in the Essay to God as lord in a reference to the "candle of the Lord" within an epistemological context (IV.iii.20).
95. TT, I.39. Also TT, I.85. In the Essay, God is not referred to as proprietor. God is also Lord at TT, I.42,53,67; at TT, II. 4 God is the Lord and Master. In the Essay, there is a single reference to God as master of men and beasts in the context as to whether changelings are men or beasts, at IV.iv.14; he is the "Sovereign Being" at II.xxiii.34; and the "Soveraign Disposer of all Things" at II.vii.6, but not the sovereign master. There is a single reference in the Essay to God as lord in a reference to the "candle of the Lord" within an epistemological context (IV.iii.20).
96. TT, I.39. Also TT, I.85. In the Essay, God is not referred to as proprietor. God is also Lord at TT, I.42,53,67; at TT, II. 4 God is the Lord and Master. In the Essay, there is a single reference to God as master of men and beasts in the context as to whether changelings are men or beasts, at IV.iv.14; he is the "Sovereign Being" at II.xxiii.34; and the "Soveraign Disposer of all Things" at II.vii.6, but not the sovereign master. There is a single reference in the Essay to God as lord in a reference to the "candle of the Lord" within an epistemological context (IV.iii.20).
97. TT, II.6. In the Essay, mankind is not de scribed as God's property. There is also no reference to men as God's property in Locke's 1680 Journal Note on God ("The Idea We Have of God," John Locke: Political Writings, ed. D. Wootton [Harmondsworth, 1993], 237-38; "Of God's Justice," Locke: Political Essays, ed. M. Goldie [Cambridge, 1997], 277-78), although Marshall, John Locke, 206, writes "the centrality of securing preservation of God's property ... [was] elevated in a 1680 journal note into one of God's most important desires." There is a servant analogy at Essay, I.i.5
98. TT, II.6. In the Essay, mankind is not de scribed as God's property. There is also no reference to men as God's property in Locke's 1680 Journal Note on God ("The Idea We Have of God," John Locke: Political Writings, ed. D. Wootton [Harmondsworth, 1993], 237-38; "Of God's Justice," Locke: Political Essays, ed. M. Goldie [Cambridge, 1997], 277-78), although Marshall, John Locke, 206, writes "the centrality of securing preservation of God's property ... [was] elevated in a 1680 journal note into one of God's most important desires." There is a servant analogy at Essay, I.i.5
99. TT, II.6. In the Essay, mankind is not de scribed as God's property. There is also no reference to men as God's property in Locke's 1680 Journal Note on God ("The Idea We Have of God," John Locke: Political Writings, ed. D. Wootton [Harmondsworth, 1993], 237-38; "Of God's Justice," Locke: Political Essays, ed. M. Goldie [Cambridge, 1997], 277-78), although Marshall, John Locke, 206, writes "the centrality of securing preservation of God's property ... [was] elevated in a 1680 journal note into one of God's most important desires." There is a servant analogy at Essay, I.i.5
100. TT, II.6. In the Essay, mankind is not de scribed as God's property. There is also no reference to men as God's property in Locke's 1680 Journal Note on God ("The Idea We Have of God," John Locke: Political Writings, ed. D. Wootton [Harmondsworth, 1993], 237-38; "Of God's Justice," Locke: Political Essays, ed. M. Goldie [Cambridge, 1997], 277-78), although Marshall, John Locke, 206, writes "the centrality of securing preservation of God's property ... [was] elevated in a 1680 journal note into one of God's most important desires." There is a servant analogy at Essay, I.i.5
101. TT, II.6. In the Essay, mankind is not de scribed as God's property. There is also no reference to men as God's property in Locke's 1680 Journal Note on God ("The Idea We Have of God," John Locke: Political Writings, ed. D. Wootton [Harmondsworth, 1993], 237-38; "Of God's Justice," Locke: Political Essays, ed. M. Goldie [Cambridge, 1997], 277-78), although Marshall, John Locke, 206, writes "the centrality of securing preservation of God's property ... [was] elevated in a 1680 journal note into one of God's most important desires." There is a servant analogy at Essay, I.i.5
102. TT, II.166. God is not described as either monarch or absolute monarch in the Essay. At Essay, IV.x.19, however, God's "eternal infinite Mind ... made and governs all Things...." Mankind are "sent into the World by his order and about his business ... made to last during his [i.e. God's], not one anothers Pleasure" (TT, II.6). Cf. the bad absolute monarch who "works them [i.e. the people] for his own Pleasure or Profit" (TT, II.163).
103. TT, II.166. God is not described as either monarch or absolute monarch in the Essay. At Essay, IV.x.19, however, God's "eternal infinite Mind ... made and governs all Things...." Mankind are "sent into the World by his order and about his business ... made to last during his [i.e. God's], not one anothers Pleasure" (TT, II.6). Cf. the bad absolute monarch who "works them [i.e. the people] for his own Pleasure or Profit" (TT, II.163).
104. TT, II.166. God is not described as either monarch or absolute monarch in the Essay. At Essay, IV.x.19, however, God's "eternal infinite Mind ... made and governs all Things...." Mankind are "sent into the World by his order and about his business ... made to last during his [i.e. God's], not one anothers Pleasure" (TT, II.6). Cf. the bad absolute monarch who "works them [i.e. the people] for his own Pleasure or Profit" (TT, II.163).
105. TT, II.166. God is not described as either monarch or absolute monarch in the Essay. At Essay, IV.x.19, however, God's "eternal infinite Mind ... made and governs all Things...." Mankind are "sent into the World by his order and about his business ... made to last during his [i.e. God's], not one anothers Pleasure" (TT, II.6). Cf. the bad absolute monarch who "works them [i.e. the people] for his own Pleasure or Profit" (TT, II.163).
106. TT, I.9.
107. TT, I.39. Also TT, I.85.
108. TT, I.39. Also TT, I.85.
109. TT, I.11.
110. TT, I.52.
111. TT, I.9.
112. TT, II.6.
113. TT, II.134-35.
114. TT, II.199. The passage continues: "When the Governour, however intituled, makes not the Law, but his Will, the Rule; and his Commands and Actions are not directed to the preservation of the Properties of his People, but the satisfaction of his own Ambition, Revenge, Covetousness, or any other irregular Passion."
115. TT, II.158-68. Cf. TT, II.156.
116. TT, II.158-68. Cf. TT, II.156.
117. TT, II.160.
118. TT, II.163.
119. TT, II.166. A. John Simmons, The Lockean Theory of Rights (Princeton, 1992), 29-30, n. 39, cannot believe that Locke is really intending to support this claim, but chapter XIV of the Second Treatise is indeed directed to defending an extensive use of prerogative. Cf Dunn, Political Thought, 162, "it becomes clear that the law can be disregarded, if its purposes can be better served by so doing, and that the decision whether this is so is necessarily left to the executive." This implies, however, that the protection of liberties is not itself a purpose of the law. Pasquale Pasquino, "Locke on King's Prerogative," Political Theory, 26 (1998), 198-208, argues that Locke is constructing a constitutional theory of extralegal power.
120. TT, II.166. A. John Simmons, The Lockean Theory of Rights (Princeton, 1992), 29-30, n. 39, cannot believe that Locke is really intending to support this claim, but chapter XIV of the Second Treatise is indeed directed to defending an extensive use of prerogative. Cf Dunn, Political Thought, 162, "it becomes clear that the law can be disregarded, if its purposes can be better served by so doing, and that the decision whether this is so is necessarily left to the executive." This implies, however, that the protection of liberties is not itself a purpose of the law. Pasquale Pasquino, "Locke on King's Prerogative," Political Theory, 26 (1998), 198-208, argues that Locke is constructing a constitutional theory of extralegal power.
121. TT, II.166. A. John Simmons, The Lockean Theory of Rights (Princeton, 1992), 29-30, n. 39, cannot believe that Locke is really intending to support this claim, but chapter XIV of the Second Treatise is indeed directed to defending an extensive use of prerogative. Cf Dunn, Political Thought, 162, "it becomes clear that the law can be disregarded, if its purposes can be better served by so doing, and that the decision whether this is so is necessarily left to the executive." This implies, however, that the protection of liberties is not itself a purpose of the law. Pasquale Pasquino, "Locke on King's Prerogative," Political Theory, 26 (1998), 198-208, argues that Locke is constructing a constitutional theory of extralegal power.
122. TT, II.166. A. John Simmons, The Lockean Theory of Rights (Princeton, 1992), 29-30, n. 39, cannot believe that Locke is really intending to support this claim, but chapter XIV of the Second Treatise is indeed directed to defending an extensive use of prerogative. Cf Dunn, Political Thought, 162, "it becomes clear that the law can be disregarded, if its purposes can be better served by so doing, and that the decision whether this is so is necessarily left to the executive." This implies, however, that the protection of liberties is not itself a purpose of the law. Pasquale Pasquino, "Locke on King's Prerogative," Political Theory, 26 (1998), 198-208, argues that Locke is constructing a constitutional theory of extralegal power.
123. TT, II.164.
124. TT, II.166.
125. TT, II.161,163-65.
126. TT, II.94, 168.
127. TT, II.165.
128. TT, II.166.
129. TT, I.30. Also TT, I.40.
130. TT, I.30. Also TT, I.40.
131. TT, I.28.
132. TT, II.123. Cf. natural men's individual "sovereignty" at TT, II.61.
133. TT, II.123. Cf. natural men's individual "sovereignty" at TT, II.61.
134. TT, II.13, 87, 125, 136.
135. TT, II.13. Also TT, II.90-91, 94. At TT, II.8 it is said that the law of nature does not give any man an absolute or arbitrary power over any other man, but what is at issue is the way in which each man is judge and executioner in deciding his own case with respect to that law.
136. TT, II.13. Also TT, II.90-91, 94. At TT, II.8 it is said that the law of nature does not give any man an absolute or arbitrary power over any other man, but what is at issue is the way in which each man is judge and executioner in deciding his own case with respect to that law.
137. TT, II.13. Also TT, II.90-91, 94. At TT, II.8 it is said that the law of nature does not give any man an absolute or arbitrary power over any other man, but what is at issue is the way in which each man is judge and executioner in deciding his own case with respect to that law.
138. Cf. TT, II. 124-25.
139. Cf. Wolterstorff, Ethics of Belief, 151, "In Locke's epistemological thought, as well as his political thought, the sovereign individual occupies center stage."
140. The provenance of these rhetorical terms has been much disputed, see Richard A. Lanham, A Handlist of Rhetorical Terms (Berkeley, 1991), 178.