Locke on King's prerogative

Political Theory

Volumn 26, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 198-208

  Pasquino, Pasquale ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0032370751     PISSN: 00905917     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0090591798026002003     Document Type: Article

References (43)

1. See C. A. Viano, John Locke: Dal razionalismo all'illuminismo (Torino: Einaudi, 1960), 220.
2. Erich Kaufmann, Auswärtige Gewalt und Kolonialgewalt in der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika: Eine rechtsvergleichende Studie über die Grundlagen des amerikanischen und deutschen Verfassungsrecht (Leipzig: Duncker and Humblot, 1909), esp. 26-34, 187-91.
3. Condorcet, "De la nature des pouvoirs politiques dans une nation libre," in Oeuvres, ed. A. Condorcet O'Connor and M. F. Arago (Paris: Firmin Didot Frères, 1847), t. X, p. 595.
4. F. Alengry, Condorcet (Paris: Giard et Brière, 1904), 549 ff.
5. Immanuel Kant, "Metaphysics of Morals," in Political Writings, ed. H. Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 138.
6. See R. Carré de Malberg, Contribution à la théorie générale de l'Etat, 2 vols. (Paris: Sirey, 1920-22).
7. The Second Treatise of Government, chaps. XII-XIII, secs. 147-58.
8. M.J.C. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1967), scarcely mentions it; W. von Leyden's article about it is very disappointing ("La loi, la liberté et la prérogative dans la pensée politique de John Locke," Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger 163 [1973]: 187-203); see also the more interesting remarks in his book Hobbes and Locke (London: Macmillan, 1982), 143-50. Jim Tully, in his otherwise excellent chapter, "Locke," in Cambridge History of Political Thought 1450-1700, ed J. H. Burns (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 616-52, never refers to it. The exceptions to note are John Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), chap. 11, pp. 148-56; M. Rostock, Die Lehre von Gewaltenteilung in der politischen Theorie von John Locke (Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1974), 146 ff., which follows Dunn but does not refer to Kaufmann; J. Roy, "La prérogative chez Locke," Cahiers de Philosophie politique et juridique de l'Université de Caen 5 (1984): 149-55; E.-W. Böckenförde, Gesetz und gesetzgebende Gewalt (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1958), esp. 25-27; and F. Neumann, Die Herrschaft des Gesetzes (1936; Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1980), 137-48.
9. M.J.C. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1967), scarcely mentions it; W. von Leyden's article about it is very disappointing ("La loi, la liberté et la prérogative dans la pensée politique de John Locke," Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger 163 [1973]: 187-203); see also the more interesting remarks in his book Hobbes and Locke (London: Macmillan, 1982), 143-50. Jim Tully, in his otherwise excellent chapter, "Locke," in Cambridge History of Political Thought 1450-1700, ed J. H. Burns (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 616-52, never refers to it. The exceptions to note are John Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), chap. 11, pp. 148-56; M. Rostock, Die Lehre von Gewaltenteilung in der politischen Theorie von John Locke (Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1974), 146 ff., which follows Dunn but does not refer to Kaufmann; J. Roy, "La prérogative chez Locke," Cahiers de Philosophie politique et juridique de l'Université de Caen 5 (1984): 149-55; E.-W. Böckenförde, Gesetz und gesetzgebende Gewalt (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1958), esp. 25-27; and F. Neumann, Die Herrschaft des Gesetzes (1936; Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1980), 137-48.
10. M.J.C. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1967), scarcely mentions it; W. von Leyden's article about it is very disappointing ("La loi, la liberté et la prérogative dans la pensée politique de John Locke," Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger 163 [1973]: 187-203); see also the more interesting remarks in his book Hobbes and Locke (London: Macmillan, 1982), 143-50. Jim Tully, in his otherwise excellent chapter, "Locke," in Cambridge History of Political Thought 1450-1700, ed J. H. Burns (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 616-52, never refers to it. The exceptions to note are John Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), chap. 11, pp. 148-56; M. Rostock, Die Lehre von Gewaltenteilung in der politischen Theorie von John Locke (Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1974), 146 ff., which follows Dunn but does not refer to Kaufmann; J. Roy, "La prérogative chez Locke," Cahiers de Philosophie politique et juridique de l'Université de Caen 5 (1984): 149-55; E.-W. Böckenförde, Gesetz und gesetzgebende Gewalt (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1958), esp. 25-27; and F. Neumann, Die Herrschaft des Gesetzes (1936; Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1980), 137-48.
11. M.J.C. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1967), scarcely mentions it; W. von Leyden's article about it is very disappointing ("La loi, la liberté et la prérogative dans la pensée politique de John Locke," Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger 163 [1973]: 187-203); see also the more interesting remarks in his book Hobbes and Locke (London: Macmillan, 1982), 143-50. Jim Tully, in his otherwise excellent chapter, "Locke," in Cambridge History of Political Thought 1450-1700, ed J. H. Burns (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 616-52, never refers to it. The exceptions to note are John Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), chap. 11, pp. 148-56; M. Rostock, Die Lehre von Gewaltenteilung in der politischen Theorie von John Locke (Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1974), 146 ff., which follows Dunn but does not refer to Kaufmann; J. Roy, "La prérogative chez Locke," Cahiers de Philosophie politique et juridique de l'Université de Caen 5 (1984): 149-55; E.-W. Böckenförde, Gesetz und gesetzgebende Gewalt (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1958), esp. 25-27; and F. Neumann, Die Herrschaft des Gesetzes (1936; Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1980), 137-48.
12. M.J.C. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1967), scarcely mentions it; W. von Leyden's article about it is very disappointing ("La loi, la liberté et la prérogative dans la pensée politique de John Locke," Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger 163 [1973]: 187-203); see also the more interesting remarks in his book Hobbes and Locke (London: Macmillan, 1982), 143-50. Jim Tully, in his otherwise excellent chapter, "Locke," in Cambridge History of Political Thought 1450-1700, ed J. H. Burns (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 616-52, never refers to it. The exceptions to note are John Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), chap. 11, pp. 148-56; M. Rostock, Die Lehre von Gewaltenteilung in der politischen Theorie von John Locke (Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1974), 146 ff., which follows Dunn but does not refer to Kaufmann; J. Roy, "La prérogative chez Locke," Cahiers de Philosophie politique et juridique de l'Université de Caen 5 (1984): 149-55; E.-W. Böckenförde, Gesetz und gesetzgebende Gewalt (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1958), esp. 25-27; and F. Neumann, Die Herrschaft des Gesetzes (1936; Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1980), 137-48.
13. M.J.C. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1967), scarcely mentions it; W. von Leyden's article about it is very disappointing ("La loi, la liberté et la prérogative dans la pensée politique de John Locke," Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger 163 [1973]: 187-203); see also the more interesting remarks in his book Hobbes and Locke (London: Macmillan, 1982), 143-50. Jim Tully, in his otherwise excellent chapter, "Locke," in Cambridge History of Political Thought 1450-1700, ed J. H. Burns (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 616-52, never refers to it. The exceptions to note are John Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), chap. 11, pp. 148-56; M. Rostock, Die Lehre von Gewaltenteilung in der politischen Theorie von John Locke (Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1974), 146 ff., which follows Dunn but does not refer to Kaufmann; J. Roy, "La prérogative chez Locke," Cahiers de Philosophie politique et juridique de l'Université de Caen 5 (1984): 149-55; E.-W. Böckenförde, Gesetz und gesetzgebende Gewalt (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1958), esp. 25-27; and F. Neumann, Die Herrschaft des Gesetzes (1936; Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1980), 137-48.
14. M.J.C. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1967), scarcely mentions it; W. von Leyden's article about it is very disappointing ("La loi, la liberté et la prérogative dans la pensée politique de John Locke," Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger 163 [1973]: 187-203); see also the more interesting remarks in his book Hobbes and Locke (London: Macmillan, 1982), 143-50. Jim Tully, in his otherwise excellent chapter, "Locke," in Cambridge History of Political Thought 1450-1700, ed J. H. Burns (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 616-52, never refers to it. The exceptions to note are John Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), chap. 11, pp. 148-56; M. Rostock, Die Lehre von Gewaltenteilung in der politischen Theorie von John Locke (Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1974), 146 ff., which follows Dunn but does not refer to Kaufmann; J. Roy, "La prérogative chez Locke," Cahiers de Philosophie politique et juridique de l'Université de Caen 5 (1984): 149-55; E.-W. Böckenförde, Gesetz und gesetzgebende Gewalt (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1958), esp. 25-27; and F. Neumann, Die Herrschaft des Gesetzes (1936; Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1980), 137-48.
15. M.J.C. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1967), scarcely mentions it; W. von Leyden's article about it is very disappointing ("La loi, la liberté et la prérogative dans la pensée politique de John Locke," Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger 163 [1973]: 187-203); see also the more interesting remarks in his book Hobbes and Locke (London: Macmillan, 1982), 143-50. Jim Tully, in his otherwise excellent chapter, "Locke," in Cambridge History of Political Thought 1450-1700, ed J. H. Burns (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 616-52, never refers to it. The exceptions to note are John Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), chap. 11, pp. 148-56; M. Rostock, Die Lehre von Gewaltenteilung in der politischen Theorie von John Locke (Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1974), 146 ff., which follows Dunn but does not refer to Kaufmann; J. Roy, "La prérogative chez Locke," Cahiers de Philosophie politique et juridique de l'Université de Caen 5 (1984): 149-55; E.-W. Böckenförde, Gesetz und gesetzgebende Gewalt (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1958), esp. 25-27; and F. Neumann, Die Herrschaft des Gesetzes (1936; Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1980), 137-48.
16. M.J.C. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1967), scarcely mentions it; W. von Leyden's article about it is very disappointing ("La loi, la liberté et la prérogative dans la pensée politique de John Locke," Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger 163 [1973]: 187-203); see also the more interesting remarks in his book Hobbes and Locke (London: Macmillan, 1982), 143-50. Jim Tully, in his otherwise excellent chapter, "Locke," in Cambridge History of Political Thought 1450-1700, ed J. H. Burns (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 616-52, never refers to it. The exceptions to note are John Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), chap. 11, pp. 148-56; M. Rostock, Die Lehre von Gewaltenteilung in der politischen Theorie von John Locke (Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1974), 146 ff., which follows Dunn but does not refer to Kaufmann; J. Roy, "La prérogative chez Locke," Cahiers de Philosophie politique et juridique de l'Université de Caen 5 (1984): 149-55; E.-W. Böckenförde, Gesetz und gesetzgebende Gewalt (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1958), esp. 25-27; and F. Neumann, Die Herrschaft des Gesetzes (1936; Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1980), 137-48.
17. See W. Blackstone, Commentaries, vol. I, p. 232: king's prerogative is "special preeminence [. . .] over and above all other persons and out of the ordinary course of the common law, in right of his regal dignity." As Q. Skinner pointed out to my attention, the king's prerogative was abolished in England during the Glorious Revolution. In fact, the Bill of Rights passed by the Parliament in 1689 removed any form of absolute or extraordinary prerogative, the one not bound by the positive law and "which is applied to the general benefit of the people and is salus populi" (this definition is by Chief Baron Fleming in the famous Bate's Case, 1609, in A Complete Collection of State Trials, ed. T. B. Howell [London: Longman, 1916-26], vol. II, p. 389). In the Bill of Rights, we read, notably, "[t]hat the pretended power of suspending laws, or the execution of laws by regal authority, without the consent of parliament, is illegal. That the pretended power of dispensing with laws, or the execution of laws, by regal authority, as it hath been assumed and exercised of late, is illegal." The ordinary prerogative (king's veto), instead, has never been disputed.
18. See W. Blackstone, Commentaries, vol. I, p. 232: king's prerogative is "special preeminence [. . .] over and above all other persons and out of the ordinary course of the common law, in right of his regal dignity." As Q. Skinner pointed out to my attention, the king's prerogative was abolished in England during the Glorious Revolution. In fact, the Bill of Rights passed by the Parliament in 1689 removed any form of absolute or extraordinary prerogative, the one not bound by the positive law and "which is applied to the general benefit of the people and is salus populi" (this definition is by Chief Baron Fleming in the famous Bate's Case, 1609, in A Complete Collection of State Trials, ed. T. B. Howell [London: Longman, 1916-26], vol. II, p. 389). In the Bill of Rights, we read, notably, "[t]hat the pretended power of suspending laws, or the execution of laws by regal authority, without the consent of parliament, is illegal. That the pretended power of dispensing with laws, or the execution of laws, by regal authority, as it hath been assumed and exercised of late, is illegal." The ordinary prerogative (king's veto), instead, has never been disputed.
19. John Cowell, The Interpreter (1607; Menston, UK: Scholar University Press, 1972). On Cowell, "civil law" professor at Cambridge, see F. Oakley, "Jacobean Political Theology: The Absolute and Ordinary Powers of King," Journal of History of Ideas 29, no. 3 (1968): 323-46.
20. John Cowell, The Interpreter (1607; Menston, UK: Scholar University Press, 1972). On Cowell, "civil law" professor at Cambridge, see F. Oakley, "Jacobean Political Theology: The Absolute and Ordinary Powers of King," Journal of History of Ideas 29, no. 3 (1968): 323-46.
21. "The king's power is double, ordinary and absolute, and they have several laws and ends [. . .] The absolute power of the king is not that which is concerned or executed to private use, to the benefit of any particular person, but only that which is applied to the general benefit of the people and is salus populi." 12. Matthew Hale, The Prerogative of the King, ed. D.E.C. Yale (London: Selden Society, 1976).
22. "Dominus rex, pro comuni utilitate, per prerogativam suam in multis casibus est supra leges et consuetudines in regno suo usitatas" (Fleming, Ed. 1767, vol. I, p. 71).
23. See K. Loewenstein, Staatsrecht und Staatspraxis von Grossbritannien (Berlin: Springer, 1967), vol. I, pp. 499-503; C. Weston and J. R. Greenberg, Subjects and Sovereigns: The Grand Controversy over Legal Sovereignty in Stuart England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); J. P. Sommerville, Politics and Ideology in England 1603-1640 (London and New York: Longman, 1986).
24. See K. Loewenstein, Staatsrecht und Staatspraxis von Grossbritannien (Berlin: Springer, 1967), vol. I, pp. 499-503; C. Weston and J. R. Greenberg, Subjects and Sovereigns: The Grand Controversy over Legal Sovereignty in Stuart England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); J. P. Sommerville, Politics and Ideology in England 1603-1640 (London and New York: Longman, 1986).
25. See K. Loewenstein, Staatsrecht und Staatspraxis von Grossbritannien (Berlin: Springer, 1967), vol. I, pp. 499-503; C. Weston and J. R. Greenberg, Subjects and Sovereigns: The Grand Controversy over Legal Sovereignty in Stuart England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); J. P. Sommerville, Politics and Ideology in England 1603-1640 (London and New York: Longman, 1986).
26. "On nomme ainsi dans le gouvernement d'Angleterre un pouvoir arbitraire accordé au prince, pour faire du bien, et non du mal; ou pour le dire en moins de mots, c'est le pouvoir de procurer le bien publique sans règlements et sans lois. Ce pouvoir est établi fort judicieusement: car puisque dans le gouvernement de la Grande Bretagne le pouvoir législatif n'est pas toujours sur pied; que même l'assemblée de ce pouvoir est d'ordinaire trop nombreuse et trop lente à dépêcher les affaires qui demandent une prompte exécution, et qu'il est impossible de prévenir tout et pourvoir par les lois àtous les accidents et àtoutes les nécessités qui peuvent concerner le bien public: c'est pour toutes ces raisons qu'on a donné une grande liberté au pouvoir exécutif, et qu'on a laissé àsa discrétion bien de choses dont les lois ne disent rien."
27. For Locke's use of "wisdom" and "prudence," see also sections 156 and 162. For the Aristotelian concept, see P. Aubenque, La prudence chez Aristote (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1986); and C. Natali, La saggezza di Aristotele (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1989).
28. For Locke's use of "wisdom" and "prudence," see also sections 156 and 162. For the Aristotelian concept, see P. Aubenque, La prudence chez Aristote (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1986); and C. Natali, La saggezza di Aristotele (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1989).
29. See sections 142 and 144; moreover, concerning Locke's concept of law, see Böckenförde, Gesetz, 24-25.
30. Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, book I, chap. 34.
31. A reprint of this book was published in Darmstadt, Germany, by Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft in 1967.
32. Now in R. Smend, Staatsrechtliche Abhandlungen (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1968), 68-88.
33. A good introduction to this problem is to be found in J. Franklin, John Locke and the Theory of Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978).
34. As was first pointed out by Hans Medick, Naturzustand und Naturgeschiche der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1973).
35. "[T]he Government commonly began in the Father."
36. See, for a general introduction to this topic, R. Meek, Social Science and the Ignoble Savage (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).
37. E. Kaufmann, Auswärtige Gewalt, 29-30: "Prerogative plays in Locke's political theory the role of a historical principle necessary to him to the understanding of life of any political community."
38. Concerning this concept, see H. Aarsleff, "The State of Nature and the Nature of Men in Locke," in John Locke: Problems and Perspectives, ed. J. W. Yolton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 99.
39. See Böckenförde, Gesetz, 23-24; and, more extensively, Tull, "Locke."
40. See Böckenförde, Gesetz, 23-24; and, more extensively, Tull, "Locke."
41. On Locke's concept of state of nature, see P. Pasquino, "I limiti della politica: Lo stato di natura e l' 'appello al cielo' nel Secondo trattato sul governo di John Locke," Rivista di Filosofia 75, no. 3 (1984): 369-95.
42. See Leviathan, ed. R. Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), chap. 20, p. 140: "the Infant is first in the power of the Mother, so as she may either nourish, or expose it; if she nourish it, it oweth its life to the Mother; and it is therefore obliged to obey her, rather than any other; and by consequence the Dominion over it is hers. [. . .] For it ought to obey him by whom it is preserved; because preservation of life being the end, for which one man becomes subject to another, every man is supposed to promise obedience, to him, in whose power it is to save, or destroy him."
43. See also sections 162-63, 74-75, and 105-107. In section 162, speaking of the "Infancy of Government," Locke writes: "when mistake, or flattery prevailed with weak Princes to make use of this Power [prerogative], for private ends of their own, and not for the publik good, the People were fain by express Laws to get Prerogative determin'd."