The wealth effects of shareholder-sponsored proposals

Review of Financial Economics

Volumn 8, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 61-72

  Forjan, James M ^a  

^a YORK COLLEGE OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Activism; Governance; Shareholder sponsored proposals;

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042096289     PISSN: 10583300     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S1058-3300(99)00003-8     Document Type: Article

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