Human capital investment and globalization in extortionary states

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 87, Issue 7-8, 2003, Pages 1539-1555

  Andersson, Fredrik ^a   Konrad, Kai A ^b  

^a LUND UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

^b FREIE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Commitment; Education; Globalization; Migration; Time consistent income taxation

Indexed keywords

EID: 0041841615     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(01)00201-8     Document Type: Article

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