Attitudes toward science among the European public: A methodological analysis

Public Understanding of Science

Volumn 11, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 155-195

  Pardo, Rafael ^a,b   Calvo, Félix ^c  

^a CSIC   (Spain)

^b NONE   (Spain)

^c NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0041735292     PISSN: 09636625     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1088/0963-6625/11/2/305     Document Type: Article

References (104)

1. Steve Miller, "Public understanding of science at the crossroads," Public Understanding of Science 10 (2001): 115-120.
2. Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan, The Public Impact of Science in the Mass Media (Michigan: Institute for Social Research, 1958).
3. It is true, however, that the analysis of resistance to science was by no means confined to science literacy, but also investigated other variables, such as religious values, "orientations to the world in general," and the high salience of some negative "by-products [of science] in the minds of the public" in those years, particularly atomic weapons and the prospect of annihilation.
4. National Science Board, Science Indicators 1980 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), 157-179.
5. John R. Durant, Geoffrey A. Evans, and Geoffrey P. Thomas, "The public understanding of science," Nature 340 (6 July 1989): 11-14.
6. Geoffrey Evans and John Durant, "Understanding of science in Britain and the USA," in British Social Attitudes: Special International Report: The 6th Report, eds. Roger Jowell, Sharon Witherspoon, and Lindsay Brook (Hants: Gower-SCPR, 1989).
7. Philip E. Converse, "The nature of belief systems in mass publics," in Ideology and Discontent, ed. David E. Apter (London: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), 206-261; "Comment: The status of nonattitudes," The American Political Science Review 68 (1974): 650-660.
8. Philip E. Converse, "The nature of belief systems in mass publics," in Ideology and Discontent, ed. David E. Apter (London: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), 206-261; "Comment: The status of nonattitudes," The American Political Science Review 68 (1974): 650-660.
9. The notion of "attentiveness" was an extension of Gabriel Almond's notion of the "attentive public" for foreign policies matters (cf. Gabriel Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy [New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1950]) and elaborated by Miller and collaborators in Jon D. Miller, Robert W. Suchner, and Alan M. Voelker, Citizenship in an Age of Science: Changing Attitudes among Young Adults (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980).
10. The notion of "attentiveness" was an extension of Gabriel Almond's notion of the "attentive public" for foreign policies matters (cf. Gabriel Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy [New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1950]) and elaborated by Miller and collaborators in Jon D. Miller, Robert W. Suchner, and Alan M. Voelker, Citizenship in an Age of Science: Changing Attitudes among Young Adults (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980).
11. Dancker D. L. Daamen, Ivo A. Van der Lans, and Cees J. H. Midden, "Cognitive structures in the perception of modern technologies," Science, Technology, & Human Values 15, no. 2 (Spring 1990): 202-225.
12. One of these new developments (which we will not elaborate here) has been the application of Cognitive Science notions to the measurement and understanding of attitudes toward science, substituting the theoretical concept of "schemas" regarding promises and reservations about science for the more conventional perspective of a unique or unidimenional continuum (from negative to positive) of the attitudinal domain. This approach makes more complex and robust the indexes of benefits and risks of science introduced in earlier work by Miller et al. (1980). Other novelties include the use of advanced multivariate statistical techniques, such as confirmatory factor analysis and structural equation modeling in the analysis of the data (cf. Jon D. Miller, Rafael Pardo, and Fujio Niwa, Public Perceptions of Science and Technology: A Comparative Study of the European Union, the United States, Japan, and Canada [Madrid-Chicago: Fundación BBV-Chicago Academy of Sciences, 1997]).
13. John Durant and collaborators are the main internal critics of assumptions underlying the scientific literacy paradigm, regarding both the literacy concept and the association between literacy and attitudes toward science (cf. Geoffrey Evans and John Durant, "The relationship between knowledge and attitudes in the public understanding of science in Britain," Public Understanding of Science 4 [1995]: 57-74; Martin Bauer, John Durant, and Geoffrey Evans, "European public perceptions of science," International Journal of Public Opinion Research 6, no. 2 [1994]: 163-186.)
14. John Durant and collaborators are the main internal critics of assumptions underlying the scientific literacy paradigm, regarding both the literacy concept and the association between literacy and attitudes toward science (cf. Geoffrey Evans and John Durant, "The relationship between knowledge and attitudes in the public understanding of science in Britain," Public Understanding of Science 4 [1995]: 57-74; Martin Bauer, John Durant, and Geoffrey Evans, "European public perceptions of science," International Journal of Public Opinion Research 6, no. 2 [1994]: 163-186.)
15. Evans and Durant, "The relationship between knowledge and attitudes in the public understanding of science in Britain."
16. Bauer, Durant, and Evans, "European public perceptions of science."
17. John Durant et al., "Two cultures of public understanding of science and technology in Europe," in Between Understanding and Trust: The Public, Science and Technology, eds. Meinolf Dierkes and Claudia von Grote (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 2000), 131-156.
18. Georges Gaskell et al., "Europe ambivalent on biotechnology," Nature 387 (26 June 1997): 845-847.
19. Georges Gaskell, Martin Bauer, John Durant, and Nicholas C. Allum, "Worlds apart? The reception of genetically modified foods in Europe and the U.S.," Science 285 (16 July 1999): 384-387.
20. James Burke, Connections (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1978).
21. In this paper, we repeatedly refer to the concept of "modernity," with and without qualifiers ("late modernity," "postmodernity"). Like many other terms that are designed to capture both core dimensions of society and a more or less clearly bound time period, "modernity" and "postmodernity" can be fuzzy labels with varied and imprecise meanings. A speculative and anachronistic style of theorizing in some areas of the social sciences generates a continuous flow of such notions, which are often superseded by other labels only a few years later (a list of more than 75 societal transformations identified and labeled between 1950-1985 can be found in James R. Beniger, The Control Revolution [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986], 4-5.) But modernity, despite its varied meanings and uses, is a concept of central importance to the work of many social scientists and historians, from Max Weber to Ronald Inglehart and Anthony Giddens. "Modernization" or, to use an expression less loaded with undesirable connotations today, the "formation of modernity" refers to the interaction of several large-scale changes, including the emergence of the modern state, the constitution of a market economy, the industrial revolution, processes of urbanization, the development of modern science, and the rationalization of a growing number of public and private spheres. Modernity refers to that cluster of institutions or, in Giddens's words, "modes of social life or organization that emerged in Europe from about the seventeenth century onwards and which subsequently became more or less worldwide influence" (Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity [Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990]). Most authors include the Enlightenment as a central cultural force in the historical emergence of modernity; this term admittedly suffers from the same indeterminacy as "modernity," but its meaning encompasses "a cluster of ideas and attitudes," "a way of thinking set in place in Western culture [. . . ] the free play of critical and constructive reason, employing available knowledge in the humanistic search for a better society, better behaviour, greater happiness on earth" (cf. John W. Yolton, ed., The Blackwell Companion to the Enlightenment [Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1995]). Some of the main ideas and beliefs of modernity about rationality, knowledge, and control of the natural world and about the progress of society have their roots in the so-called "Enlightenment Project." Despite the difficulties in defining the precise meaning of notions such as "Enlightenment" and "modernity," their use is important in our context because some of the most interesting critiques, analyses, and debates about changes in the perception of science and technology and in values have been framed in terms of these concepts (cf. Gerald Holton, "What place for science in our culture at the 'end of the modern era'?," in Einstein, History, and Other Passions [Woodbury, NY: American Institute of Physics Press, 1995], 91-125; for additional discussions of modernity, cf. Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997], particularly Chapter 1 on the meanings of "modernity" and "postmodernity"; see also Stuart Hall et al., eds., Modernity: An Introduction to Modern Societies [Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996]). The literature on "postmodernity" to which we refer in this paper revolves around the thesis of a substitution, in the last decades of the twentieth century, of fragmented and heterogeneous perspectives, on an (allegedly) equal epistemic footing, for the so-called "grand narrative" (Lyotard) or overarching modern story line giving meaning to the past and the future; this grand narrative is closely associated with science, rational control, and progress. It is not necessary to make any commitment to the assumptions and style of theorizing of the postmodern perspective to see the heuristic value of this thesis regarding the multiplication of different visions claiming equal rights to knowledge. Finally, we use the expression "late modernity" to indicate that the observed transformations in the last part of the twentieth century (globalization, knowledge economies, changes in values), constitute important novelties to be analyzed, but we do not think that there is enough evidence to support the thesis that central modern institutions and culture (specifically the belief in science and progress) have been superseded by a new set of principles and modes of social organization.
22. In this paper, we repeatedly refer to the concept of "modernity," with and without qualifiers ("late modernity," "postmodernity"). Like many other terms that are designed to capture both core dimensions of society and a more or less clearly bound time period, "modernity" and "postmodernity" can be fuzzy labels with varied and imprecise meanings. A speculative and anachronistic style of theorizing in some areas of the social sciences generates a continuous flow of such notions, which are often superseded by other labels only a few years later (a list of more than 75 societal transformations identified and labeled between 1950-1985 can be found in James R. Beniger, The Control Revolution [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986], 4-5.) But modernity, despite its varied meanings and uses, is a concept of central importance to the work of many social scientists and historians, from Max Weber to Ronald Inglehart and Anthony Giddens. "Modernization" or, to use an expression less loaded with undesirable connotations today, the "formation of modernity" refers to the interaction of several large-scale changes, including the emergence of the modern state, the constitution of a market economy, the industrial revolution, processes of urbanization, the development of modern science, and the rationalization of a growing number of public and private spheres. Modernity refers to that cluster of institutions or, in Giddens's words, "modes of social life or organization that emerged in Europe from about the seventeenth century onwards and which subsequently became more or less worldwide influence" (Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity [Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990]). Most authors include the Enlightenment as a central cultural force in the historical emergence of modernity; this term admittedly suffers from the same indeterminacy as "modernity," but its meaning encompasses "a cluster of ideas and attitudes," "a way of thinking set in place in Western culture [. . . ] the free play of critical and constructive reason, employing available knowledge in the humanistic search for a better society, better behaviour, greater happiness on earth" (cf. John W. Yolton, ed., The Blackwell Companion to the Enlightenment [Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1995]). Some of the main ideas and beliefs of modernity about rationality, knowledge, and control of the natural world and about the progress of society have their roots in the so-called "Enlightenment Project." Despite the difficulties in defining the precise meaning of notions such as "Enlightenment" and "modernity," their use is important in our context because some of the most interesting critiques, analyses, and debates about changes in the perception of science and technology and in values have been framed in terms of these concepts (cf. Gerald Holton, "What place for science in our culture at the 'end of the modern era'?," in Einstein, History, and Other Passions [Woodbury, NY: American Institute of Physics Press, 1995], 91-125; for additional discussions of modernity, cf. Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997], particularly Chapter 1 on the meanings of "modernity" and "postmodernity"; see also Stuart Hall et al., eds., Modernity: An Introduction to Modern Societies [Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996]). The literature on "postmodernity" to which we refer in this paper revolves around the thesis of a substitution, in the last decades of the twentieth century, of fragmented and heterogeneous perspectives, on an (allegedly) equal epistemic footing, for the so-called "grand narrative" (Lyotard) or overarching modern story line giving meaning to the past and the future; this grand narrative is closely associated with science, rational control, and progress. It is not necessary to make any commitment to the assumptions and style of theorizing of the postmodern perspective to see the heuristic value of this thesis regarding the multiplication of different visions claiming equal rights to knowledge. Finally, we use the expression "late modernity" to indicate that the observed transformations in the last part of the twentieth century (globalization, knowledge economies, changes in values), constitute important novelties to be analyzed, but we do not think that there is enough evidence to support the thesis that central modern institutions and culture (specifically the belief in science and progress) have been superseded by a new set of principles and modes of social organization.
23. In this paper, we repeatedly refer to the concept of "modernity," with and without qualifiers ("late modernity," "postmodernity"). Like many other terms that are designed to capture both core dimensions of society and a more or less clearly bound time period, "modernity" and "postmodernity" can be fuzzy labels with varied and imprecise meanings. A speculative and anachronistic style of theorizing in some areas of the social sciences generates a continuous flow of such notions, which are often superseded by other labels only a few years later (a list of more than 75 societal transformations identified and labeled between 1950-1985 can be found in James R. Beniger, The Control Revolution [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986], 4-5.) But modernity, despite its varied meanings and uses, is a concept of central importance to the work of many social scientists and historians, from Max Weber to Ronald Inglehart and Anthony Giddens. "Modernization" or, to use an expression less loaded with undesirable connotations today, the "formation of modernity" refers to the interaction of several large-scale changes, including the emergence of the modern state, the constitution of a market economy, the industrial revolution, processes of urbanization, the development of modern science, and the rationalization of a growing number of public and private spheres. Modernity refers to that cluster of institutions or, in Giddens's words, "modes of social life or organization that emerged in Europe from about the seventeenth century onwards and which subsequently became more or less worldwide influence" (Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity [Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990]). Most authors include the Enlightenment as a central cultural force in the historical emergence of modernity; this term admittedly suffers from the same indeterminacy as "modernity," but its meaning encompasses "a cluster of ideas and attitudes," "a way of thinking set in place in Western culture [. . . ] the free play of critical and constructive reason, employing available knowledge in the humanistic search for a better society, better behaviour, greater happiness on earth" (cf. John W. Yolton, ed., The Blackwell Companion to the Enlightenment [Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1995]). Some of the main ideas and beliefs of modernity about rationality, knowledge, and control of the natural world and about the progress of society have their roots in the so-called "Enlightenment Project." Despite the difficulties in defining the precise meaning of notions such as "Enlightenment" and "modernity," their use is important in our context because some of the most interesting critiques, analyses, and debates about changes in the perception of science and technology and in values have been framed in terms of these concepts (cf. Gerald Holton, "What place for science in our culture at the 'end of the modern era'?," in Einstein, History, and Other Passions [Woodbury, NY: American Institute of Physics Press, 1995], 91-125; for additional discussions of modernity, cf. Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997], particularly Chapter 1 on the meanings of "modernity" and "postmodernity"; see also Stuart Hall et al., eds., Modernity: An Introduction to Modern Societies [Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996]). The literature on "postmodernity" to which we refer in this paper revolves around the thesis of a substitution, in the last decades of the twentieth century, of fragmented and heterogeneous perspectives, on an (allegedly) equal epistemic footing, for the so-called "grand narrative" (Lyotard) or overarching modern story line giving meaning to the past and the future; this grand narrative is closely associated with science, rational control, and progress. It is not necessary to make any commitment to the assumptions and style of theorizing of the postmodern perspective to see the heuristic value of this thesis regarding the multiplication of different visions claiming equal rights to knowledge. Finally, we use the expression "late modernity" to indicate that the observed transformations in the last part of the twentieth century (globalization, knowledge economies, changes in values), constitute important novelties to be analyzed, but we do not think that there is enough evidence to support the thesis that central modern institutions and culture (specifically the belief in science and progress) have been superseded by a new set of principles and modes of social organization.
24. In this paper, we repeatedly refer to the concept of "modernity," with and without qualifiers ("late modernity," "postmodernity"). Like many other terms that are designed to capture both core dimensions of society and a more or less clearly bound time period, "modernity" and "postmodernity" can be fuzzy labels with varied and imprecise meanings. A speculative and anachronistic style of theorizing in some areas of the social sciences generates a continuous flow of such notions, which are often superseded by other labels only a few years later (a list of more than 75 societal transformations identified and labeled between 1950-1985 can be found in James R. Beniger, The Control Revolution [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986], 4-5.) But modernity, despite its varied meanings and uses, is a concept of central importance to the work of many social scientists and historians, from Max Weber to Ronald Inglehart and Anthony Giddens. "Modernization" or, to use an expression less loaded with undesirable connotations today, the "formation of modernity" refers to the interaction of several large-scale changes, including the emergence of the modern state, the constitution of a market economy, the industrial revolution, processes of urbanization, the development of modern science, and the rationalization of a growing number of public and private spheres. Modernity refers to that cluster of institutions or, in Giddens's words, "modes of social life or organization that emerged in Europe from about the seventeenth century onwards and which subsequently became more or less worldwide influence" (Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity [Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990]). Most authors include the Enlightenment as a central cultural force in the historical emergence of modernity; this term admittedly suffers from the same indeterminacy as "modernity," but its meaning encompasses "a cluster of ideas and attitudes," "a way of thinking set in place in Western culture [. . . ] the free play of critical and constructive reason, employing available knowledge in the humanistic search for a better society, better behaviour, greater happiness on earth" (cf. John W. Yolton, ed., The Blackwell Companion to the Enlightenment [Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1995]). Some of the main ideas and beliefs of modernity about rationality, knowledge, and control of the natural world and about the progress of society have their roots in the so-called "Enlightenment Project." Despite the difficulties in defining the precise meaning of notions such as "Enlightenment" and "modernity," their use is important in our context because some of the most interesting critiques, analyses, and debates about changes in the perception of science and technology and in values have been framed in terms of these concepts (cf. Gerald Holton, "What place for science in our culture at the 'end of the modern era'?," in Einstein, History, and Other Passions [Woodbury, NY: American Institute of Physics Press, 1995], 91-125; for additional discussions of modernity, cf. Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997], particularly Chapter 1 on the meanings of "modernity" and "postmodernity"; see also Stuart Hall et al., eds., Modernity: An Introduction to Modern Societies [Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996]). The literature on "postmodernity" to which we refer in this paper revolves around the thesis of a substitution, in the last decades of the twentieth century, of fragmented and heterogeneous perspectives, on an (allegedly) equal epistemic footing, for the so-called "grand narrative" (Lyotard) or overarching modern story line giving meaning to the past and the future; this grand narrative is closely associated with science, rational control, and progress. It is not necessary to make any commitment to the assumptions and style of theorizing of the postmodern perspective to see the heuristic value of this thesis regarding the multiplication of different visions claiming equal rights to knowledge. Finally, we use the expression "late modernity" to indicate that the observed transformations in the last part of the twentieth century (globalization, knowledge economies, changes in values), constitute important novelties to be analyzed, but we do not think that there is enough evidence to support the thesis that central modern institutions and culture (specifically the belief in science and progress) have been superseded by a new set of principles and modes of social organization.
25. In this paper, we repeatedly refer to the concept of "modernity," with and without qualifiers ("late modernity," "postmodernity"). Like many other terms that are designed to capture both core dimensions of society and a more or less clearly bound time period, "modernity" and "postmodernity" can be fuzzy labels with varied and imprecise meanings. A speculative and anachronistic style of theorizing in some areas of the social sciences generates a continuous flow of such notions, which are often superseded by other labels only a few years later (a list of more than 75 societal transformations identified and labeled between 1950-1985 can be found in James R. Beniger, The Control Revolution [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986], 4-5.) But modernity, despite its varied meanings and uses, is a concept of central importance to the work of many social scientists and historians, from Max Weber to Ronald Inglehart and Anthony Giddens. "Modernization" or, to use an expression less loaded with undesirable connotations today, the "formation of modernity" refers to the interaction of several large-scale changes, including the emergence of the modern state, the constitution of a market economy, the industrial revolution, processes of urbanization, the development of modern science, and the rationalization of a growing number of public and private spheres. Modernity refers to that cluster of institutions or, in Giddens's words, "modes of social life or organization that emerged in Europe from about the seventeenth century onwards and which subsequently became more or less worldwide influence" (Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity [Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990]). Most authors include the Enlightenment as a central cultural force in the historical emergence of modernity; this term admittedly suffers from the same indeterminacy as "modernity," but its meaning encompasses "a cluster of ideas and attitudes," "a way of thinking set in place in Western culture [. . . ] the free play of critical and constructive reason, employing available knowledge in the humanistic search for a better society, better behaviour, greater happiness on earth" (cf. John W. Yolton, ed., The Blackwell Companion to the Enlightenment [Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1995]). Some of the main ideas and beliefs of modernity about rationality, knowledge, and control of the natural world and about the progress of society have their roots in the so-called "Enlightenment Project." Despite the difficulties in defining the precise meaning of notions such as "Enlightenment" and "modernity," their use is important in our context because some of the most interesting critiques, analyses, and debates about changes in the perception of science and technology and in values have been framed in terms of these concepts (cf. Gerald Holton, "What place for science in our culture at the 'end of the modern era'?," in Einstein, History, and Other Passions [Woodbury, NY: American Institute of Physics Press, 1995], 91-125; for additional discussions of modernity, cf. Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997], particularly Chapter 1 on the meanings of "modernity" and "postmodernity"; see also Stuart Hall et al., eds., Modernity: An Introduction to Modern Societies [Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996]). The literature on "postmodernity" to which we refer in this paper revolves around the thesis of a substitution, in the last decades of the twentieth century, of fragmented and heterogeneous perspectives, on an (allegedly) equal epistemic footing, for the so-called "grand narrative" (Lyotard) or overarching modern story line giving meaning to the past and the future; this grand narrative is closely associated with science, rational control, and progress. It is not necessary to make any commitment to the assumptions and style of theorizing of the postmodern perspective to see the heuristic value of this thesis regarding the multiplication of different visions claiming equal rights to knowledge. Finally, we use the expression "late modernity" to indicate that the observed transformations in the last part of the twentieth century (globalization, knowledge economies, changes in values), constitute important novelties to be analyzed, but we do not think that there is enough evidence to support the thesis that central modern institutions and culture (specifically the belief in science and progress) have been superseded by a new set of principles and modes of social organization.
26. In this paper, we repeatedly refer to the concept of "modernity," with and without qualifiers ("late modernity," "postmodernity"). Like many other terms that are designed to capture both core dimensions of society and a more or less clearly bound time period, "modernity" and "postmodernity" can be fuzzy labels with varied and imprecise meanings. A speculative and anachronistic style of theorizing in some areas of the social sciences generates a continuous flow of such notions, which are often superseded by other labels only a few years later (a list of more than 75 societal transformations identified and labeled between 1950-1985 can be found in James R. Beniger, The Control Revolution [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986], 4-5.) But modernity, despite its varied meanings and uses, is a concept of central importance to the work of many social scientists and historians, from Max Weber to Ronald Inglehart and Anthony Giddens. "Modernization" or, to use an expression less loaded with undesirable connotations today, the "formation of modernity" refers to the interaction of several large-scale changes, including the emergence of the modern state, the constitution of a market economy, the industrial revolution, processes of urbanization, the development of modern science, and the rationalization of a growing number of public and private spheres. Modernity refers to that cluster of institutions or, in Giddens's words, "modes of social life or organization that emerged in Europe from about the seventeenth century onwards and which subsequently became more or less worldwide influence" (Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity [Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990]). Most authors include the Enlightenment as a central cultural force in the historical emergence of modernity; this term admittedly suffers from the same indeterminacy as "modernity," but its meaning encompasses "a cluster of ideas and attitudes," "a way of thinking set in place in Western culture [. . . ] the free play of critical and constructive reason, employing available knowledge in the humanistic search for a better society, better behaviour, greater happiness on earth" (cf. John W. Yolton, ed., The Blackwell Companion to the Enlightenment [Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1995]). Some of the main ideas and beliefs of modernity about rationality, knowledge, and control of the natural world and about the progress of society have their roots in the so-called "Enlightenment Project." Despite the difficulties in defining the precise meaning of notions such as "Enlightenment" and "modernity," their use is important in our context because some of the most interesting critiques, analyses, and debates about changes in the perception of science and technology and in values have been framed in terms of these concepts (cf. Gerald Holton, "What place for science in our culture at the 'end of the modern era'?," in Einstein, History, and Other Passions [Woodbury, NY: American Institute of Physics Press, 1995], 91-125; for additional discussions of modernity, cf. Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997], particularly Chapter 1 on the meanings of "modernity" and "postmodernity"; see also Stuart Hall et al., eds., Modernity: An Introduction to Modern Societies [Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996]). The literature on "postmodernity" to which we refer in this paper revolves around the thesis of a substitution, in the last decades of the twentieth century, of fragmented and heterogeneous perspectives, on an (allegedly) equal epistemic footing, for the so-called "grand narrative" (Lyotard) or overarching modern story line giving meaning to the past and the future; this grand narrative is closely associated with science, rational control, and progress. It is not necessary to make any commitment to the assumptions and style of theorizing of the postmodern perspective to see the heuristic value of this thesis regarding the multiplication of different visions claiming equal rights to knowledge. Finally, we use the expression "late modernity" to indicate that the observed transformations in the last part of the twentieth century (globalization, knowledge economies, changes in values), constitute important novelties to be analyzed, but we do not think that there is enough evidence to support the thesis that central modern institutions and culture (specifically the belief in science and progress) have been superseded by a new set of principles and modes of social organization.
27. In this paper, we repeatedly refer to the concept of "modernity," with and without qualifiers ("late modernity," "postmodernity"). Like many other terms that are designed to capture both core dimensions of society and a more or less clearly bound time period, "modernity" and "postmodernity" can be fuzzy labels with varied and imprecise meanings. A speculative and anachronistic style of theorizing in some areas of the social sciences generates a continuous flow of such notions, which are often superseded by other labels only a few years later (a list of more than 75 societal transformations identified and labeled between 1950-1985 can be found in James R. Beniger, The Control Revolution [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986], 4-5.) But modernity, despite its varied meanings and uses, is a concept of central importance to the work of many social scientists and historians, from Max Weber to Ronald Inglehart and Anthony Giddens. "Modernization" or, to use an expression less loaded with undesirable connotations today, the "formation of modernity" refers to the interaction of several large-scale changes, including the emergence of the modern state, the constitution of a market economy, the industrial revolution, processes of urbanization, the development of modern science, and the rationalization of a growing number of public and private spheres. Modernity refers to that cluster of institutions or, in Giddens's words, "modes of social life or organization that emerged in Europe from about the seventeenth century onwards and which subsequently became more or less worldwide influence" (Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity [Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990]). Most authors include the Enlightenment as a central cultural force in the historical emergence of modernity; this term admittedly suffers from the same indeterminacy as "modernity," but its meaning encompasses "a cluster of ideas and attitudes," "a way of thinking set in place in Western culture [. . . ] the free play of critical and constructive reason, employing available knowledge in the humanistic search for a better society, better behaviour, greater happiness on earth" (cf. John W. Yolton, ed., The Blackwell Companion to the Enlightenment [Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1995]). Some of the main ideas and beliefs of modernity about rationality, knowledge, and control of the natural world and about the progress of society have their roots in the so-called "Enlightenment Project." Despite the difficulties in defining the precise meaning of notions such as "Enlightenment" and "modernity," their use is important in our context because some of the most interesting critiques, analyses, and debates about changes in the perception of science and technology and in values have been framed in terms of these concepts (cf. Gerald Holton, "What place for science in our culture at the 'end of the modern era'?," in Einstein, History, and Other Passions [Woodbury, NY: American Institute of Physics Press, 1995], 91-125; for additional discussions of modernity, cf. Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997], particularly Chapter 1 on the meanings of "modernity" and "postmodernity"; see also Stuart Hall et al., eds., Modernity: An Introduction to Modern Societies [Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996]). The literature on "postmodernity" to which we refer in this paper revolves around the thesis of a substitution, in the last decades of the twentieth century, of fragmented and heterogeneous perspectives, on an (allegedly) equal epistemic footing, for the so-called "grand narrative" (Lyotard) or overarching modern story line giving meaning to the past and the future; this grand narrative is closely associated with science, rational control, and progress. It is not necessary to make any commitment to the assumptions and style of theorizing of the postmodern perspective to see the heuristic value of this thesis regarding the multiplication of different visions claiming equal rights to knowledge. Finally, we use the expression "late modernity" to indicate that the observed transformations in the last part of the twentieth century (globalization, knowledge economies, changes in values), constitute important novelties to be analyzed, but we do not think that there is enough evidence to support the thesis that central modern institutions and culture (specifically the belief in science and progress) have been superseded by a new set of principles and modes of social organization.
28. Geoffrey Thomas and John Durant, "Why should we promote the public understanding of science?" in Scientific Literacy Papers, ed. M. Shortland (Oxford: Department of External Studies, 1987), 1-14.
29. Jon D. Miller, The American People and Science Policy (New York: Pergamon Press, 1983); Kenneth Prewitt, "Scientific illiteracy and democratic theory," Daedalus 112 no. 2 (Spring 1983): 49-64.
30. Jon D. Miller, The American People and Science Policy (New York: Pergamon Press, 1983); Kenneth Prewitt, "Scientific illiteracy and democratic theory," Daedalus 112 no. 2 (Spring 1983): 49-64.
31. House of Lords (Select Committee on Science and Technology), Science and Society (London: The Stationery Office, 2000).
32. Cf. Steve Miller, "Public understanding of science at the crossroads."
33. Steven Shapin, "Science and the public," in Companion to the History of Modern Science, eds. R. C. Olby et al. (London: Routledge, 1990), 990-1007; J. B. Morrell, "Professionalization," ibid., 980-989; Joseph Ben-David, The Scientist's Role in Society: A Comparative Study (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 108ff.
34. Steven Shapin, "Science and the public," in Companion to the History of Modern Science, eds. R. C. Olby et al. (London: Routledge, 1990), 990-1007; J. B. Morrell, "Professionalization," ibid., 980-989; Joseph Ben-David, The Scientist's Role in Society: A Comparative Study (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 108ff.
35. Steven Shapin, "Science and the public," in Companion to the History of Modern Science, eds. R. C. Olby et al. (London: Routledge, 1990), 990-1007; J. B. Morrell, "Professionalization," ibid., 980-989; Joseph Ben-David, The Scientist's Role in Society: A Comparative Study (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 108ff.
36. Cf. David C. Mowery and Nathan Rosenberg, Technology and the Pursuit of Economic Growth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
37. st Century: The Bush Report Revisited (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 1997).
38. st Century: The Bush Report Revisited (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 1997).
39. David H. Guston and Kenneth Keniston, "Introduction: the social contract for science," in The Fragile Contract: University Science and the federal Government, eds. David H. Guston and Kenneth Keniston (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994).
40. Norman Levitt, Prometheus Bedeviled: Science and the Contradictions of Contemporary Culture (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1999).
41. Morris H. Shamos, The Myth of Scientific Literacy (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1995).
42. Brian Wynne, "Misunderstood misunderstandings: social identities and public uptake of science," Public Understanding of Science 1 (1992): 281-304.
43. Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970).
44. Cf. Simon Joss and John Durant, eds., Public Participation in Science: The Role of Consensus Conferences in Europe (London: The Science Museum, 1995); E. F. Einsiedel, E. Jelsøe, and T. Breck, "Publics at the technology table: the Consensus Conference in Denmark, Canada, and Australia," Public Understanding of Science 10 (2001): 83-98.
45. Cf. Simon Joss and John Durant, eds., Public Participation in Science: The Role of Consensus Conferences in Europe (London: The Science Museum, 1995); E. F. Einsiedel, E. Jelsøe, and T. Breck, "Publics at the technology table: the Consensus Conference in Denmark, Canada, and Australia," Public Understanding of Science 10 (2001): 83-98.
46. Godin and Gingras' recent proposal of a multidimensional model of scientific and technological culture represents a valuable approach for introducing more clarity and complexity into the study of scientific culture, even though it remains largely disconnected from the empirically oriented literature of the PUOS field (cf. Benoit Godin and Yves Gingras, "What is scientific and technological culture and how is it measured? A multidimensional model," Public Understanding of Science 9 [2000]: 43-58).
47. Cf. the methodological conclusions in Durant et al., "Two cultures."
48. Jum C. Nunnally and Ira H. Bernstein, Psychometric Theory, 3rd ed., (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1994); John P. Robinson, Phillip R. Shaver, and Lawrence S. Wrightsman, "Scale selection and evaluation," in Measures of Political Altitudes, eds. John P. Robinson et al. (San Diego: Academic Press, 1999); Duane F. Alwin, Michael Braun, Janet Harkness, and Jacqueline Scott, "Measurement in multi-national surveys," in Trends and Perspectives in Empirical Social Research, eds. Ingwer Borg and Peter Ph. Mohler (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1994), 26-39.
49. Jum C. Nunnally and Ira H. Bernstein, Psychometric Theory, 3rd ed., (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1994); John P. Robinson, Phillip R. Shaver, and Lawrence S. Wrightsman, "Scale selection and evaluation," in Measures of Political Altitudes, eds. John P. Robinson et al. (San Diego: Academic Press, 1999); Duane F. Alwin, Michael Braun, Janet Harkness, and Jacqueline Scott, "Measurement in multi-national surveys," in Trends and Perspectives in Empirical Social Research, eds. Ingwer Borg and Peter Ph. Mohler (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1994), 26-39.
50. Jum C. Nunnally and Ira H. Bernstein, Psychometric Theory, 3rd ed., (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1994); John P. Robinson, Phillip R. Shaver, and Lawrence S. Wrightsman, "Scale selection and evaluation," in Measures of Political Altitudes, eds. John P. Robinson et al. (San Diego: Academic Press, 1999); Duane F. Alwin, Michael Braun, Janet Harkness, and Jacqueline Scott, "Measurement in multi-national surveys," in Trends and Perspectives in Empirical Social Research, eds. Ingwer Borg and Peter Ph. Mohler (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1994), 26-39.
51. John W. Tukey, Exploratory Data Analysis (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1977); J. P. Benzécri. Correspondence Analysis Handbook (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1992); L. Breiman, J. H. Friedman, R. A. Olshen, and C. J. Stone, Classification and Regression Trees (Monterey, CA: Wadsworth & Brooks, 1984).
52. John W. Tukey, Exploratory Data Analysis (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1977); J. P. Benzécri. Correspondence Analysis Handbook (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1992); L. Breiman, J. H. Friedman, R. A. Olshen, and C. J. Stone, Classification and Regression Trees (Monterey, CA: Wadsworth & Brooks, 1984).
53. John W. Tukey, Exploratory Data Analysis (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1977); J. P. Benzécri. Correspondence Analysis Handbook (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1992); L. Breiman, J. H. Friedman, R. A. Olshen, and C. J. Stone, Classification and Regression Trees (Monterey, CA: Wadsworth & Brooks, 1984).
54. The main report was published under the title The Public Impact of Science in the Mass Media (cf. note 2); some of its most salient results are also presented in Stephen B. Withey, "Public opinion about science and scientists," Public Opinion Quarterly 23, no. 3 (Fall 1959): 382-388.
55. The main report was published under the title The Public Impact of Science in the Mass Media (cf. note 2); some of its most salient results are also presented in Stephen B. Withey, "Public opinion about science and scientists," Public Opinion Quarterly 23, no. 3 (Fall 1959): 382-388.
56. National Science Board, Science Indicators: 1972 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973); National Science Board, Science Indicators: 1974 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975); National Science Board, Science Indicators: 1976 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977.) Each report referred mainly to surveys conducted a year earlier and also to a number of available secondary sources (such as the General Social Survey.)
57. National Science Board, Science Indicators: 1972 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973); National Science Board, Science Indicators: 1974 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975); National Science Board, Science Indicators: 1976 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977.) Each report referred mainly to surveys conducted a year earlier and also to a number of available secondary sources (such as the General Social Survey.)
58. National Science Board, Science Indicators: 1972 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973); National Science Board, Science Indicators: 1974 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975); National Science Board, Science Indicators: 1976 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977.) Each report referred mainly to surveys conducted a year earlier and also to a number of available secondary sources (such as the General Social Survey.)
59. National Science Board, Science Indicators: 1978 (Washington, D.C.; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), viii.
60. Cf. Miller, Suchner, and Voelker, Citizenship in an Age of Science.
61. The main indexes introduced were the ones on risks and benefits, developed by Miller, Suchner, and Voelker in their 1980 book, Citizenship in an Age of Science.
62. The different number of response options for attitudinal questions in the European Union and the U.S. (five vs. four) did not prevent a comparison of agreement levels in the Science & Engineering Indicators of 1991 and 1993. These comparisons, however, have to be taken with a certain amount of caution. Cf. Science & Engineering Indicators: 1991 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991); Science & Engineering Indicators: 1993 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993).
63. Commission of the European Communities, The European Public's Attitudes to Scientific and Technical Developments (Brussels: mimeo, 1979).
64. Even the Science & Engineering Report of 1998, which introduced several conceptual and methodological novelties (mainly the notion of promises and reservations schemas), did not make use of the scientific literacy index (labeled in that report "Index of Scientific Construct Understanding") in the analysis of attitudes toward science, but used science education and the already familiar variable of attentiveness instead. Cf. Science & Engineering Indicators: 1998 (Arlington, VA: National Science Foundation, 1998.)
65. Cf. Evans and Durant, "The relationship between knowledge and attitudes in the public understanding of science in Britain," p. 60. Evans and Durant mention that some of the nine questions used to measure general attitudes toward science in the 1988 British survey "were taken from previous studies [Withey, Miller], and others were devised following pilot studies of discussion groups of between ten and twelve people."
66. Miller, Suchner, and Voelker, Citizenship in an Age of Science.
67. The ATOSS scale was introduced in the Science & Engineering Indicators: 1993. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993).
68. For details regarding the construction and transformation of the "promises" and "reservations" schemas, see Miller, Pardo, and Niwa, Public Perceptions of Science and Technology.
69. Cf. John Ziman, "Public understanding of science," Science, Technology, & Human Values 16, no. 1 (1991): 99-105; Jean-Marc Lévy-Leblond, "About misunderstandings about misunderstandings," Public Understanding of Science 1 (1992): 17-22; Bruce V. Lewenstein, "Science and the media," in Handbook of Science and Technology Studies, eds. Sheila Jasanoff et al. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1995), 343-360; Brian Wynne, "Public understanding of science," ibid. 361-388; Brian Wynne, "Misunderstood misunderstandings: social identities and public uptake of science," in Misunderstood Science? The Public Reconstruction of Science and Technology, eds. Alan Irwin and Brian Wynne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 19-46.
70. Cf. John Ziman, "Public understanding of science," Science, Technology, & Human Values 16, no. 1 (1991): 99-105; Jean-Marc Lévy-Leblond, "About misunderstandings about misunderstandings," Public Understanding of Science 1 (1992): 17-22; Bruce V. Lewenstein, "Science and the media," in Handbook of Science and Technology Studies, eds. Sheila Jasanoff et al. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1995), 343-360; Brian Wynne, "Public understanding of science," ibid. 361-388; Brian Wynne, "Misunderstood misunderstandings: social identities and public uptake of science," in Misunderstood Science? The Public Reconstruction of Science and Technology, eds. Alan Irwin and Brian Wynne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 19-46.
71. Cf. John Ziman, "Public understanding of science," Science, Technology, & Human Values 16, no. 1 (1991): 99-105; Jean-Marc Lévy-Leblond, "About misunderstandings about misunderstandings," Public Understanding of Science 1 (1992): 17-22; Bruce V. Lewenstein, "Science and the media," in Handbook of Science and Technology Studies, eds. Sheila Jasanoff et al. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1995), 343-360; Brian Wynne, "Public understanding of science," ibid. 361-388; Brian Wynne, "Misunderstood misunderstandings: social identities and public uptake of science," in Misunderstood Science? The Public Reconstruction of Science and Technology, eds. Alan Irwin and Brian Wynne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 19-46.
72. Cf. John Ziman, "Public understanding of science," Science, Technology, & Human Values 16, no. 1 (1991): 99-105; Jean-Marc Lévy-Leblond, "About misunderstandings about misunderstandings," Public Understanding of Science 1 (1992): 17-22; Bruce V. Lewenstein, "Science and the media," in Handbook of Science and Technology Studies, eds. Sheila Jasanoff et al. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1995), 343-360; Brian Wynne, "Public understanding of science," ibid. 361-388; Brian Wynne, "Misunderstood misunderstandings: social identities and public uptake of science," in Misunderstood Science? The Public Reconstruction of Science and Technology, eds. Alan Irwin and Brian Wynne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 19-46.
73. Cf. John Ziman, "Public understanding of science," Science, Technology, & Human Values 16, no. 1 (1991): 99-105; Jean-Marc Lévy-Leblond, "About misunderstandings about misunderstandings," Public Understanding of Science 1 (1992): 17-22; Bruce V. Lewenstein, "Science and the media," in Handbook of Science and Technology Studies, eds. Sheila Jasanoff et al. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1995), 343-360; Brian Wynne, "Public understanding of science," ibid. 361-388; Brian Wynne, "Misunderstood misunderstandings: social identities and public uptake of science," in Misunderstood Science? The Public Reconstruction of Science and Technology, eds. Alan Irwin and Brian Wynne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 19-46.
74. General information about the history, characteristics, and role of the Eurobarometer can be found in Karlheinz Reif and Ronald Inglehart, eds., Eurobarometer: The Dynamics of European Public Opinion. Essays in Honour of Jacques-René Rabier (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991).
75. INRA (Europe) and Report International, Europeans, Science and Technology: Public Understanding and Attitudes (Brussels: European Commission/Directorate General XII, 1993.) The fieldwork of the Eurobarometer 38.1 was carried out by INRA (Europe) between November 3 and November 29 on
76. As of this writing, a preliminary report for the 2001 Eurobarometer 55.2 has been released that can be accessed at http://europa.eu.int/comm/research/press/200!/pr0612en-report.pdf.
77. The main novelty in terms of content compared to the 89 Eurobarometer was the introduction of a large number of questions about the natural environment that addressed not only attitudes, but also awareness and knowledge.
78. Icek Ajzen and Dagmar Krebs, "Attitude theory and measurement: implications for survey research," in Trends and Perspectives in Empirical Social Research, eds. Ingwer Borg and Peter Ph. Mohler (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1994), 250-265. On the crucial notion of "salience of beliefs," Fishbein and Ajzen have written that "although a person may hold a large number of beliefs about any given object, it appears that only a relatively small number of beliefs serve as determinants of his attitude at any given moment. [. . . ] under most circumstances, a small number of beliefs serve as the determinants of a person's attitude. Clearly, salient beliefs are also subject to change: they may be strengthened or replaced by new beliefs." Despite the methodological problems of capturing all the salient beliefs of a person, these authors recommend as a "rule of thumb" the identification of the first five to nine beliefs "as the basic determinants of attitude" and "to ascertain the modal salient beliefs within a given population" through the use of a representative sample (cf. Martin Fishbein and Icek Ajzen, Belief, Attitude, Intention and Behavior [Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1975], 218-219).
79. Other analysts of the Eurobarometer have opted for the use of only the half (of 6.000 cases) with four options, i.e., for the use of exactly the same metric in the U.S. and in Europe (cf. Miller, Pardo, and Niwa, Public Perceptions of Science and Technology).
80. The countries included were Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Luxembourg was excluded from the analysis because of its small number of cases.
81. Cf. INRA (Europe) and Report International, Europeans, Science and Technology, 113-114.
82. Howard Schuman and Stanley Presser, Questions and Answers in Attitude Surreys (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1996).
83. Durant et al., "Two Cultures": Bauer, Durant, and Evans, "European public perceptions."
84. Durant et al., "Two Cultures": Bauer, Durant, and Evans, "European public perceptions."
85. Jean M. Converse, "Predicting no opinion in the polls," The Public Opinion Quarterly 40, no. 4 (Winter 1976-1977): 515-530.
86. G. David Faulkenberry and Robert Mason, "Characteristics of nonopinion and no opinion response groups," The Public Opinion Quarterly 42 (1978): 533-543.
87. Durant et al., "Two cultures."
88. Cf. Miller, Pardo, and Niwa, Public Perceptions of Science and Technology.
89. For an illuminating critique of Stevens's typology, see Paul Velleman and Leland Wilkinson, "Nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio typologies are misleading," in Trends and Perspectives in Empirical Social Research, eds. Ingwer Borg and Peter Ph. Mohler, 161-177.
90. Karl G. Jöreskog has for many years been one of the most eminent advocates for the use of polychoric correlations with ordinal variables, and their computation is routinely carried out with PRELIS as a preparation for structural equation modeling under LISREL. Cf. SPSS LISREL 7 and PRELIS: User's Guide and Reference (Chicago: SPSS Inc., 1990), B4-B9. See also Jöreskog's recent contribution "Analysis of ordinal variables I: preliminary analysis [revised October 18, 2001]," which can be found (with three other contributions) at http://www.ssicentral.com/lisrel/ordl.pdf.
91. 2 higher than 10%, and two in the Pearson correlation matrix. In sum, the magnitude and structure of the differences between the two matrices do not modify the judgment about the weak level of relationship between the attitudinal items.
92. Durant et al., "Two cultures."
93. The reliability coefficient of the 23-item scale with homogenized data in split A is α = 0.66. In split B, it is α = 0.64. The reliability coefficient for the original data in split α is a = 0.69, in split B α = 0.68.
94. Nunnally and Bernstein, Psychometric Theory.
95. See. G. C. Helmstadter, Principles of Psychological Measurement (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1964).
96. 70 Level of scientific knowledge was measured with a 12-item scale that is useful for an exploratory analysis, even though it is not exempt from conceptual and metrical problems; the items were constructed on the basis of questions Q55 and A56 of the Eurobarometer questionnaire, each with three response options: 1 = True, 2 = False, 3 = Don't know. The summated scale consists of the following 12 items: 1. The center of the earth is very hot; 2. The oxygen we breathe comes from plants; 3. Radioactive milk can be made safe by boiling it; 4. Electrons are smaller than atoms; 5. The continents on which we live have been moving their location for millions of years and will continue to move in the future; 6. It is the father's gene which decides whether the baby is a boy or a girl; 7. The earliest humans lived at the same time as the dinosaurs; 8. Antibiotics kill viruses as well as bacteria; 9. Lasers work by focusing sound waves; 10. All radioactivity is man-made; 11. Human beings, as we know them today, developed from earlier species of animals; 12. Does the earth go around the sun or does the sun go around the earth?. Cronbach's Alpha reliability is 0.71 for the total sample, ranging from 0.47 for those w ith 20 or more years of education to 0.77 for the group with 15 or fewer years of education.
97. Cf. Miller, Pardo, and Niwa, Public Perceptions of Science and Technology, 88-89.
98. Gorsuch recommends that "if the correlations among the oblique factors are negligible, then the varimax solution should be accepted as a reasonable solution"; cf. Richard L. Gorsuch, Factor Analysis, 2nd ed. (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1983), 205.
99. The wording of the three items is: "We depend too much on science and not enough on faith," "Because of their knowledge, scientific researchers have a power that makes them dangerous," and "Science makes our way of life change too fast."
100. Jon Turney, Frankenstein's Footsteps: Science, Genetics and Popular Culture (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998).
101. Durant et al., "Two cultures."
102. The two response possibilities that were offered, five categories in split A and four in split B, have proven to be too limited and statistically not very efficient. Regardless of the validity of the construction of the 23 items, the results would certainly have been more nuanced if the response categories had been expanded to seven or even more. The main reason for expanding the spectrum of responses is statistically well known: correlation coefficients tend to increase when the measurement is richer and more diverse, and tend to decrease when the measurement is more reduced and focused. With a broader range, the differentiation of subjects increases, factor analyses are able to identify clearer groups among the variables, subject clusters, or typologies are more easily detectable, and all the statistical results and coefficients definitely acquire greater intelligibility and thereby facilitate interpretation. The amount of differentiation in the responses that can be applied without producing serious side effects is a question open to experimentation, and needs to be explored in relation to attitudes toward science.
103. Daamen, Van der Lans, and Midden, "Cognitive structures."
104. Cf. Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).