Taxation of rent-seeking activities

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 72, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 61-72

  Glazer, Amihai ^a   Konrad, Kai A ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b FREIE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Burden free taxes; D72; H21; Profit taxation; Rent seeking

Indexed keywords

EID: 0041727156     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(98)00084-X     Document Type: Article

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